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A B S T R A C T
The purpose of th is  study is to determine the extent to 
which the heritage of p o l i t ic a l  thought shaping European 
r a i son d * £ta t  is s ig n if ic an t  for the theory and practice of 
post-World War I I  realism in American foreign policy.  
Analysis is guided by the hypothesis that the response of 
postwar r e a l is ts  to the issues raised by an interdependent 
m ult is tate  system d if fe rs  from the t ra d it io n a l  ra t io n a le  of 
ra i  son d 'e ta t  intended for a Eurocentric in te rn a t1onal 
society charactericed by common diplomatic objectives and 
values. Consideration is  given to how the continental 
legacy has been modified and adapted by r e a l is t  spokesmen to 
the exigencies of America's postwar foreign policy agenda.
An opening chapter examines some of the leading 
European proponents of raison d '6 1at (Thucydides,
Machiavel1i , Hobbes, Richelieu, and Bismarck). The 
following four chapters provide a number of case studies by 
which four prominent American thinkers (Walter Lippmann, 
Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans J. Morgenthau. and George K. Kennan) 
can be compared and evaluated with regard to the basic 
assumptions and princ ip les  of raison d ' e t a t . The four 
general c r i t e r i a  for evaluation include: (1) p o l i t ic a l
philosophy and methods of analysis; <2) conceptualisation
V I
and d e f in i t io n ;  (3) realism and moral choice in foreign 
policy; and (4) contemporary foreign policy developments.
A cone 1 Lid i ng chapter assesses the m t e l l  ectual 
orientat ion  of American realism by noting both s im i la r i t ie s  
and differences with respect to how the four American 
thinkers c r i t iq u e  the methods and princ ip les  of raison 
d"61 a t . S p e c if ic a l ly ,  r e a l is t  scholars have more often 
exemplified a "pragmatic" perspective in seeking to 
reconcile universal moral pr inc ip les  with the necessities of 
national survival and security .  Moreover, the continuing 
signif icance of the national i nterest and balance of power 
i l lu s t r a te s  the tension between the persistence of state  
sovereignty and the need f or p o l i t ic a l  re a l i  st s to 
fo rc e fu l ly  address the emergence of new domestic and 
transnational variables that have become relevant for the 
ro le  and re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  of American power in world p o l i t ic s .
S ' l  1
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of th is  study is  to determine the extent to 
which the heritage of p o l i t ic a l  thought shaping European 
r aison d * £t at is  s ign if ican t  for the theory and practice of 
postwar realism in American foreign policy. In compar1ng 
the two t ra d it io n s ,  analysis w i l l  be guided by the 
hypothesis that the response of postwar re a l is ts  to many of 
the challeng1ng 1ssues raised by an 1ncreasing1y 
i nterdependent mul11 state system d i f fe r s  from the classic  
r at i onale Df r aison d • £t at  i nt ended f or a Eurocentr i c 
1nternational society characterized by common diplomatic 
ob j ect i ves and values. The pr oposed hypothesls is not 
intended to suggest the absence of any relat ionsh ip  or 
continuity between the continental t ra d i t io n  and the basic 
tenets of recent American realism. At issue, however, is 
the method (or j u s t i f i c a t i  on) by which the i nherited  
European t ra d it io n  has been modified and subsequently 
adapted by r e a l is t  in terp reters  to the exigencies of post- 
Wor I d  W ir I I  Lin i tprl r" t a t e f ■ ■ i - i g  n policy. An qu a l l .  
important consideration in the examination of American 
realism is the recogni11on of per s is t  en t , and of ten 
c ontr adic tor y , themes and p r in c ip le s , which have influenced 
American foreign policy since the founding of the republic
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(e .g . ,  isolationism, legalism, idealism, and pragmatism), 
and that have been given v iv id  expression in numerous 
doctrines, u n i la te ra l  declarations, and m u lt i la te ra l  
diplomatic commitments of the United States.
Realist p o l i t ic a l  philosophy is  based upon the 
r ec ogn11 i on of the sources of power and c o n f l ic t  at a l l  
levels of human existence and the methods by which 
expressions of individual and national s e l f - in te r e s t  might 
be kept consistent with the requirements of order. For the 
r e a l i s t ,  the realm of p o l i t ic s  is the tw i l ig h t  zone where 
ethics and power meet. The formulation of th is  perennial 
p o l i t ic a l  dilemma is impossible without some prior  
consideration of antecedent philosophical assumptions 
related to the problems of human nature and p o l i t ic s ,  order 
and disorder in society, state of nature, and the quest for  
commum t y . In add111 on, these core assumpti ons bear 
d ire c t ly  upon the p o s s ib i l i ty  of compromise and 
reconc il ia t ion  of divergent national in terests backed by 
r iv a l  moral claims. At th is  juncture, our objective w i l l  be 
to id e n t i fy  c le a r ly  any possible nexus between the 
continental t ra d i t io n  of ra j  son df £ta t  and postwar American 
;.c ! . t . • ! r c , 1 , >n, i ii cr >1er to grasp I ’it- m .: .1 problem am. r-.j
nations, as well as the d i f f i c u l t y  in defining viable and 
coherent guides to national action.
I f  a case can be made that the r e a l is t  in terp re ta t ion  
of the postwar aims of American power in world a f fa i r s
1 x
d i f fe rs  from the continental th inkers7 vindication of the 
statesman's primary obligation to follow the d ictates of 
s e l f - in te re s t  in state re la t io n s ,  knowledge of the former's 
views should serve two important purposes. F i r s t ,  insight  
into the normative roots of r e a l is t  thought should help 
explain some of the p e c u l ia r i t ie s ,  novel features, and 
recurrent t r a i t s  of the contemporary American approach to 
worId a f fa i r s ,  wh i ch of ten puzz1e forei gn observers and 
leads them e ither  to praise the special v irtues of American 
policy or condemn what they consider i t s  "hypocrit ical"  
pretense. Second, the ideals influencing the r e a l is t  
estimation of the appropriate methods and national aims of 
American diplomacy should help to promote c r i t i c a l  s e l f -  
understanding of America's moral presuppositions and of the 
deeply ingrained habits of thought af fecting  i t s  foreign 
policy conduct in a f ie ld  where emotion and value judgment 
play an important ro le .  By ident ify ing  and paying respect 
to an impressive in te l le c tu a l  ancestry for American realism, 
our understanding of 1nternat1onal p o l i t ic s  should gain in 
philosophical depth, h is to r ica l  perspective, and academic 
respec tab i 111y.
Tti- '.Ji .'f > genet heft' -on the classical (DrmulaUon ol 
r ai son d7 fet at and the operative pr inc ip les  of postwar 
American realism was noted by Arnold Wolfers’ e a r l ie r  and 
broad d is t inc t ion  between the Ang1o—Amerlcan approach to 
foreign policy and the contribution of such continental
precursors as Machiavelli ,  Grotius, Spinoza, Rousseau, and 
K ant.1 I t  would be misleading to suggest that a l l  versions 
of continental international thought have been 
Machiavel1lan; opposition to the views expressed in 
M achiave l l i ' 5 Pr1 nee was voiced repeatedly throughout the 
centuries that -followed i t s  publication. in p a r t ic u la r .  
Friedrich Meinecke provided an i l lum inat ing expos# o-f the 
debate between the Machiavellians and an t i -M ach iave l l ians .a 
However, Meinecfe’ s analysis ju s t i f i e s  the contention that 
continental theory centered around the idea of the 
"necessity of the s ta te ,"  which was the focal point of 
M achiave l l i 's  position. From the venue of continental 
raison d' # t a t . the main problem presented by the conditions 
of multiple sovereignty was the existence of a profound 
cleavage between the requirements of morality and expedient 
calculations of national s e l f - in te re s t  in foreign policy.  
This was consistent with the experience common to a l l  
continental countries which— in the face of constant 
external threats to th e ir  national existence—believed 
themselves exposed to the compelling impact of forces beyond 
th e ir  control.  The central question for the continental 
theoris ts ,  therefore, was w’-- * ’:er the st n t esm-.x', wu--. und 
any moral obligat ion to res is t  these "compelling" demands of 
state necessity. From th is  perspective, a statesman found 
l i t t l e  leeway, i f  any, to reconcile the need for security  
with universal norms or laws applicable to an anarchic
x  i
environment of sovereign s ta te s .3
On the other hand, English and American thinkers were 
less inclined to accept a r ig id  d is t in c t io n  between the 
requi rement s of s e l f - 1nterest and moral pr inc ip les  i n 
f oreign policy behavi o r . To a consi der ab1e degree, the 
concepts of "necessity of the state" or raison d '6 ta t  
remained anathema to p o l i t ic a l  thinkers of the Eng 1lsh-  
speaking world. Moreover, the Anglo-American approach took 
the form of a debate about the most appropriate way of 
applying accepted princ ip les  of morality to foreign policy  
conduct. The ra t io n a le  for such e f fo r ts  was the b e l ie f  that 
statesmen enjoyed a degree of freedom in choosing the 
"right"  path in th e ir  external po l ic ies  (much as they did in 
thei r i nternal conduct). The dichotomy between nati onal 
in terest  and moral p r inc ip le  was not seen as irreconci lab le ;  
there was surely room, i t  was often held, to decide for the 
good ends and to preservr them with the least e v i l  of the 
availab le  means. As Wolfers pointed out, th is  was a 
philosophy of choice, "which was bound to be e th ic a l ,  over 
agai nst a philnsophy i n whlch f orces beyond moral c ontrol 
were believed to p r e v a i l . " *  Indeed, choice implies the 
ireedom to decide what yD^i = to pur ' < .-r.d what to u-.t_
in accordance with one's desires and convictions.
In comparing American realism with continental  
in te rnat lona1 thought, Wolfers’ h is to r ic a l  survey Df 
competing theoret ica l t rad i t ion s  offers  a useful typology
for assessing the in te l le c tu a l  antecedents of realism as a 
contemporary man i f estatlon of Ang 1o-Amer i can th in l in g  on 
in te rn a t1onal p o l i t ic s .  In ta c t ,  the point can be argued 
that realism simply gives renewed expression to the fam il iar  
Anglo-American s t ipu la t ion  that statesmen are compelled to 
integrate two basic goals: one, the primary though prudently 
conceived objective of national s e l f —preservat1 on; the 
other, implied in such prudence, a fu l f i l lm e n t  of the moral 
law to the maximum compatible with the primary duty of 
defense. For example, there is  freedom of choice between 
more or less moder a t 1 on, more or less concer n f or the 
in terests  of others, more or less e f fo r t  to preserve the 
peace, and more or less respons ib i l i ty  for the whole of 
manFind. The underlying philosophy and concepts that inhere 
in realism as a theory of internat ional p o l i t ic s  are v i ta l  
f or* demar c at i ng the bound ar ies and limi ta t  i ons of any such 
philosophy of choice and i t s  relevance for spec if ic  policy  
1n1t i a t l v e s .
Before turning to the issues that arise from these 
broader and more far-ranging questions, a qualify ing  
statement about in ternat lonal re la t io n s  theory is  in order. 
In ter  n a t i  i - u l  r ••• -t r. - *noo ry  i ■■ not " ph i I os op h > " i n  the- 
broade5t sense. As a ru le ,  i t  does not seek to deflne the 
nature of t ru th  or locate man's place in the universe. I t  
does not ask with theology, "What is  ult imate t r u th ?"; nor 
with philosophy, "What is man's highest end in l i f e ' 3" This
:: l l l
lack has led philosophers, such as the la te  Leo Strauss, to
question the v a l id i t y  of a philosophy of 1nternat1onal
p o l i t ic s .  Unless i t  sought to answer such questions,
Strauss asked whether a philosophy of world p o l i t ic s  was not
as problematical as, for example, a philosophy for New
York’ s san itat ion workers! To a degree, Strauss was correct
in believing that theorizing about 1nternat1onal p o l i t ic s
usually takes place at a more immediate or less universal
level of discourse that general philosophy, and as a result
i t  suf f er s f rom the fact that common mor al p r1nc1p1es are
d i f f i c u l t  to discover in such theories.™
At the same time, i t  would be the height of
in te l le c tu a l  arrogance for one school of thought to claim a
monopoly over philosophy. By way of analogy, one can
appreci ate the f undamental d i 1emma of Edmond Cahn, one of
the twentieth century’ s most distinguished scholars of
jurisprudence, who asked: Where is the legal theor1st to
find the ideas and princip les  necessary tor the il lumination
of the broad di men s 1 ons of his f i e ld '7 Writing in The Sense
of In just ice  (1^49) , Cahn obser ved:
The choice would be rather d i f f i c u l t  i f  we did not 
have the benefit  of indications v iv id ly  and 
r ti'fic i.c-d 1 > inscribe-. lo ttn. history m 
philosophy., . . That is why the ideal is  hab itua lly  
set off against the pos it ive ,  iden t i ty  against 
time, the free  against the determined, reason 
against passi on.*■
For our purpose, philosophy provides a number of
in te rp re t iv e  and normative constructs by which to re la te  and
:■: l v
assign meaning to recurrent patterns o-f internat ional  
p o l i t ic a l  behavior. Most social sc ient is ts  seeking to 
understand the causes ot war and the conditions of con f l ic t  
resolution assemble and explain th e ir  data on the basis ot 
assumptions about the nature and behavior of man. the 
internal organisation of societ ies , or the decentralized  
character of the i n t e r na t i o na l  p o l i t ic a l  system.
Certain cautions and q u a l i f ica t ion s  must be 
acknowledged in any e f fo r t  to id e n t i fy  and analyze '■ 
philosophical and ethical roots of the American r e a l is t  
t ra d i t io n .  F i r s t ,  ra re ly  has a majority of the re a l is ts  
ever approached th e ir  tasks with any e x p l ic i t  acknowledgment 
of an in te l le c tu a l  debt to the competing trad it io n s  of 
Western p o l i t ic a l  thought. Second, the p o l i t ic a l  norms of 
postwar re a l i  sm have oft  en been obscured by the energet1c 
c r i t iq u e  of idealism and the abstract moral groping 
associated with spec if ic  foreign policy in i t i a t i v e s  since 
the interwar years. Third, p o l i t ic a l  rea11sm draws on the 
varied contributions of both academicians and diplomatic 
pra c t i t ioners  at the highest levels of government. The 
occupational specia l izat ion  of these scholars has inspired a 
wide varif-uv of r oar ch i n f er os-1 : -<rd a l t  err • vr
approaches (e .g . ,  h is to r ic a l ,  descriptive , theore t ica l )  to 
contemporary issues in American foreign policy. Fourth, the 
philosophy and concepts ot realism have ty p ic a l ly  been 
associated with the work: of spec if ic  individuals, writing
i: v
during p art icu lar  periods and about part icu lar  topics. lor  
example, the subject matter and h is to r ic a l  t i e ld  tor the 
"early re a l is ts "  such as Walter Lippmann and Reinhold 
Niebuhr can, in a number at respects, be d i t t e r e n t 1ated from 
the developing perspectives ot more contemporary spokesmen 
such as Geor ge kennan and Kenneth Thompson. F in a l ly ,  as a 
consequence ot the behavioral revolution in the social and 
p o l i t ic a l  sciences, p o l i t ic a l  realism has been exposed to 
considerable censure tor a contusion ot i t s  theoret ica l aims 
and i t s  ambiguous conceptualization.
The elaboration ot a unitying philosophical disposition  
largely depends on the p o s s ib i l i t y  ot iden t ity ing  a common 
body ot pr inc ip les  or a core ot residual truths re t le c t in g  
the essence ot American realism. That American r e a l is t  
thought can be cast in general philosophical terms has been 
the principal theme ot one prominent spokesman, Kenneth 
Thompson, in much ol his published work over the previous 
t h i r t y  years. P a r t ic u la r ly  relevant tor th is  study is his 
P o l i t ic a l  Realism And The C ris is  Dt World P o l i t ic s ;  An 
American Approach to Foreign Policy (19t>9) in which he 
portrays the normative prerequisites ot the r e a l is t  
pu ; 1. j  ui i.. in Lii form c: d is t in c t iv e  Amor 1 c  vi . approach t_c-
toreign p o l ic y .7. Much ok the motivation tor th is  
dissertat ion derives trom what can be perceived as the 
strengths, weaknesses, omissions, and unanswered questions 
associated with Thompson 7 s thoughtt ul contr i but i on.
; ; v i
Thompson emphasizes Tour a t t r ib u te s  inherent in the 
phi losophical basis o-f American realism. F i r s t ,  p o l i t ic a l  
re a l is ts  bring to the ir  task a l i v e ly  sense ot history.  
Consideration here extends to d i f fe re n t ia t in g  between the 
recurrent and un1que in h istory, as wel1 as the 1egacy of 
philosophies ot history predicated on the idea ot progress.
Second, re a l is ts  share the conviction that an 
understanding ot both in ternat ional and domestic p o l i t ic a l  
phenomena 1s der1ved from a cl ear concept i on ot human 
nature. This view runs counter to much ot present—day 
social science thought which holds that man is  a bundle ot 
contradictory impulses and that his behavior must be tested 
and ana 1 yz ed e:: per 1 mental 1 y bet or e anyt. h i ng at a l l  may be 
said about p o l i t ic a l  philosoph1es.
Third, American re a l is ts  evince a p art icu lar  outlook 
toward the p o s s ib i l i ty  ot human progress. History is  seen 
as the record ot important human advances, but ot advances 
mar ked by re t r  eat and retrogress ion. More ot ten than not , 
progress is the ha l t -s tep ,  the p a r t ia l  advance which is  
accepted when the ult imate goal is  beyond reach. The 
r e a l is t  is  compelled to challenge the Enlightenment 
conception '*■ * p ess, as wc-J I as view- espous i.-', b,
millennial Christians, l ib e ra ls ,  and secular Marxists a l ike .
F in a l ly ,  a r e a l is t  philosophy must possess a workable 
concept ot p o l i t ic s .  Accordi ng to 1hompson, p o l i t ic s  is  
compromise, the adjustment of divergent in te res ts ,  and the
reconc i l ia t ion  of a l te rn a t iv e  moral claims. P o l i t ic s  ca l ls  
for the highest moral stamina i f  men are to stand on the 
uncertain te r ra in  where to act may be to act unjust ly ,  where 
there are few i f  any absolutes in human existence, and where 
success is  the most common c r i t e r i a  of p o l i t ic a l  ac t io n .w
The various l im ita t ion s  embodied in Thompson's account 
of p o l i t ic a l  realism permit a renewal of the debate and a 
reevaluation of the philosophic vision promulgated in the 
early postwar environment. Thompson’ s P o l i t ic a l  Realism was 
published during the height of the cold war and was 
understandably influenced by perceptions of a global system 
with d is t in c t iv e  ( i f  changing) structural features. Today, 
attention  should focus on the v ia b i l i t y  ot conceptual 
d e f in i t io n s  (e .g . ,  power, national in te re s t ,  balance of 
power, force) in l ig h t  of fundamental ways in which the 
world has changed since 1945. A l te rn a t iv e ly ,  to what e;:tent 
has the transformation of world p o l i t ic s  in the twentieth  
century been inh ib ited  by the strength of persistent global 
patterns9 The answers to these questions are in tegral to 
any contemporary appraisal of conceptual strengths and 
weaknesses in the r e a l is t  position.
A ’ a r1 1.. 1 1 l  i u i  , and perhaps m o r e  imp or ‘ a m . ,  J i t t i ,
stems from Thompson's penchant for a t t r ib u t in g  the 
in te l le c tu a l  antecedents of American realism to a d ivers i ty  
of trad i t io n s  in Western p o l i t ic a l  thought, encompassing 
such figures as A r is to t le ,  St. Augustine, Machiavelli ,
;; v  l  l  l
Grotius, Burke, De Tocquevilie, Lincoln, and Niebuhr. Our 
interest l ie s  less in sorting out Thompson's explanation o-f 
realism's philosophical pedigree than in explicating how 
American re a l is ts  either aff irm or disavow the 
presuppositions of the European trad it ion  of raison d' £tat . 
There can be no doubt that modern expressions of p o l i t ic a l  
realism, at least in part,  invoke philosophical assumptions 
and categories of analysis well-known to the continental 
trad 11 i on.
How does an underlying philosophy of the major tenets 
and questions of p o l i t ic a l  realism ( i . e . ,  h istory, human 
nature, p o l i t ic s ,  and progress) converge or d i f fe r  from 
comparable cons1derat 1ons germane to ralson d' £ ta t? In 
fac t ,  is i t  even possible to speak: of an "Americanized"
Real do1111k (rooted in the precepts of raison d'6 t a t ) and, 
i f  so, how can i t  be d i f fe ren t ia ted  from competing 
explanations of United States foreign policy and diplomatic 
history which invoke a lternat ive  phi 1 osophi cal c r i t e r i a 7' I f  
these preliminary considerations or root assumptions in the 
continental and American conceptions are essentia l ly  
compatible, how is the re a l is t  to ju s t i fy  or explain a 
<f l st l nr 1 l - u t  n -J , ’ - ’ + i r h  -n1ition in . 1 \ t er n? t ■ ' 1
a f fa irs '7 Insofar as European advocates of "reason of state" 
looked to an anarchic lnternatlonal arena organized only by 
the expedient projection and balancing of power, why have 
r e a l is t  thinkers been unwilling to dissociate the exercise
o-f American national in terest  -from universal moral 
principles? Failure  to address the significance of this  
r el at i onsh 1 p can on 1 y f urther e:; acer bate the unenthusi as 11 c 
reception of p o l i t i c a l  realism in both the d is c ip l in e  of 
p o l i t ic a l  science and Amer1can society as a whole.
As a basis for  contrasting American realism with 
continental internat ional  thought, an opening chapter 
enamines some of the leading European theoris ts and 
diplomatic p rac t i t ioners  of raison r i '£tat  (Thucydides, 
Machiavel11 , Hobbes, Richelieu, and Bismarck). A 
prelimimary section within these pages reviews the principal  
a tt r ib u te s  and problems of theoriz ing about state re la t ions  
in the history of European p o l i t i c a l  thought. Subsequent 
treatment of the various spokesmen for r a i son d7Stat w i l l  
build on such considerations as : (1) the philosophical
understanding of human nature and p o l i t ic s  characterlzlng  
each th inker 's  d e f in i t io n  of state in terest  in foreign  
policy: (2) the comb inat i  on of domes 11 c and e:; t  ernal f ac t or s
influencing a s ta te ’ s diplomatic and m i l i ta ry  objectives  
acr oss a l l  or par t of Europe; (3 > the manner i n which state
in te res t ,  or state necessity, is manifested in a l l iance  
■■-■.■<7 t e r n s  i 1 n!  -i r e  o f  p^wer a r r  : [ < \ t e  men k v. ; - ■ ■* > i  n r
relevance of ethical commands in the s ta te 's  re lent less  
quest f or power and sec ur11 y .
In judging the significance of raison d7 £tat tor 
postwar Amer ican realism, the f o i l  owlng chapter s pr ovide a
representative number of case studies by which four 
prominent r e a l is ts  can be compared within a common frameworl 
of analysis. An e f fo r t  w i l l  be made to select individuals  
of d i f fe re n t  background and experience, whose published 
works address a wide var ie ty  of topics in the postwar 
period. This w i l l  contribute to an understanding of major 
and minor differences among the ideas of various re a l is ts ;  
i t  w i l l  also highlight  the evolution in the thought and 
perspective of individual thinkers. Integral to the 
development of an American r e a l is t  philosophy of 
in ternat ional p o l i t ic s  has been the seminal contributions of 
Walter Lippmann, Reinhold Niebuhr. Hans J. Morgenthau, and 
George F. Kennan.
While other individuals could be added to our l i s t ,  
these scholars have been selected for three reasons. Each 
of these thinkers has pers is tent ly  explored the larger  
philosophical and theoret ical  themes of p o l i t ic a l  realism, 
in addition to commenting on a wide var ie ty of contemporary 
foreign policy concerns. Moreover, these individuals helped 
to id e n t i fy  the core pr inciples  of r e a l is t  thought from 
unique professional and occupational perspectives. F ina l ly ,  
thi 5 Qt oupin.i of 11.1! i v 1 ■' i ,. : ■ amplifies the evolution v . 
development of r e a l ls t  doctrine over a v o la t i le  fo r ty  year 
postwar period in United States foreign policy.
The framework of analysis to be u t i l is e d  embodies four 
main c r i t e r i a  of description and comparison that can be
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applied consistently in the various case studies. Moreover , 
the -framework incorporates the normative -features of 
Thompson’ s early  e f fo r t  in P o l i t ic a l  Realism (and seeks to 
update them), as well as other categories that receive only 
b r ie f  attention in his work. These c r i t e r i a  include:
1. P o l i t ic a l  Philosophy And Method Of Analysis— Emphasis 
in th is  section is  devoted to the operative in te l le c tu a l  
commitments and formative personal experience of each 
r e a l is t  th inker. To what extent have theological or 
philosophical assumptions of history and p o l i t ic s  influenced 
th e ir  inquiry into the perennial problems of man’ s existence 
in society7 The continental theorists examined in th is  
study exhibit  s ign if ican t  differences in viewpoint 
concerning the requirements ot order and jus t ice  within  
p o l i t ic a l  society; however, the ir  in te rn a t1onal perspective 
more commonly posits a s t r i c t  separation between the ethical  
standards of state behavior and the moral respons ib i l i ty  of 
the individual.  By contrast, the Anglo-American p o l i t ic a l  
t ra d i t io n  is  distinguished by an array of constitutional  
re s t ra in ts  on the leg it im ate functions of governmental 
power. The morality of state behavior is shaped by, and 
inseparable tr o.n, certain self cv'didc-nt pr inciples of 
l ib e r ty  and equality  which find expression in the Christian-  
1 i beral--human! ta r  1 an values of the American mission. How 
have r e a l is t  thinkers been able to reconcile th e ir  
allegiance to the transcendent ideals embodied in the
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American mission with man's incurable ego and the exigencies 
of power p o l i t ic s ?  In addition, is  i t  possible to reconcile  
the objectives of both normative and empirical theory in a 
r e a l is t  philosophy o-f i nternat 1 onal po li t ics?
2. Conceptualization And F’roblems Ot D e f in i t io n —Problems 
of conceptual d e f in i t io n  extend to competing interpretat ions  
o-f power, nat i ona 1 i nter e s t . and balance of power. While 
American r e a l is ts  have elaborated on and applied a wide 
varie ty  o-f concepts, none is  perhaps more basic than these 
three. An assessment would have to take into account both 
domestic and 1n te rn a t1ona1 developments that contribute to 
the selection of appropriate c r i t e r i a  tor d e t in i t io n  and 
evaluation. Insofar as these three pr inc iples were 
consistently attirmed by proponents ot raison d '£ t a t . how 
have American r e a l is ts  accommodated such developments as 
growing m il i ta ry  and economic interdependence among an ever-  
lncreasing number ot nations, as well as the rel iance  on new 
modalities ot power and influence (e .g . ,  economic, 
psychological, and ideologica l)? Furthermore, how do 
r e a l is t  d e f in i t io n s  of these basic concepts impact on the 
l im its  and p o s s ib i l i t ie s  of a democratic foreign policy?
Realism and Moral Choice in umencan Foreign F'olicy— 
"the significance of continental r ai son d * 6 ta t  for American 
diplomacy points to the statesman’ s dilemma of having to 
reconcile the requirements of moral p r inc ip le  and national 
security .  In addition to th e ir  more e x p l ic i t  observations
>:in
on the ro le ot power and p r inc ip le  in s ta te c ra f t ,  i t  w i l l  be 
important to determine the degree to which these individuals  
id en t i ty  a d is t in c t iv e  American mission or purpose in world 
a t ta i r s .  How, i t  at a l l ,  does the r e a l is t  reconcile the 
successtul detense ot the national in terest  through 
strategies ot balance ot power and spheres ot influence with 
the promotion of universal values (e .g . ,  l ib e r ty  and 
freedom) in foreign policy'71 Indeed, can America’ s national 
in terest  in world a f fa i r s  be interpreted as an objective,  
value-free category e;:empt from any normative re s tra in ts  
transcending the parochial national community? Do American 
r e a l is ts  acknowledge transnational norms in a world menaced 
by the nightmare of nuclear catastrophe and ecological 
d i saster ?
4. Contemporary Foreign Policy Developments— In addition  
to a deep appreciation for the philosophical and ethical  
roots of th e ir  in te l le c tu a l  t ra d i t io n ,  these scholars were 
dedicated p o l i t ic a l  a c t iv is ts ,  always outspoken on the 
domestic and 1 nt.ernat 1 onal issues of the day. th e ir  views 
often carried considerable weight at the highest echelons of 
government and helped to shape public perception ot the 
methods and goals of U n i t e d  hLat.es f cn L-tgii po licy. Utter, 
overlooked by those c r i t i c s  who equate the philosophy ot 
realism with the cynicism of r a ison d * £t at is  how often 
r e a l i s t  thinkers have emphasized the l im its  and 
responsibi11tv of American power as well as the increasing
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obsolescence o-f the national in terest  in an era o-t 
increasing interdependence. Inasmuch as a complete 
1 nventory o-f the many nat 1 ona 1 1 ssues they addressed
throughout the postwar era is  beyond the scope o-f th is  
study, select ive  consideration is given to such topics a s  : 
(1) l im its  of internat ional law and organisation; (2) 
nuclear p ro l l fe ra t io n  and disarmament; (3) American foreign 
policy and the Third World; (4) containment strategy and the 
l im its  of American intervention; and (5) human r igh ts  and 
the American mora1 purpose ln worId a f fa i r s .
Within the content of each case study, the part icu lar  
topics to be examined w i l l  largely be determined by both the 
respective in terests  of each thinker, as well as the time 
period in which they were active . For example, Lippmann and 
Niebuhr published l i t t l e  a f te r  the period of American 
involvement in the Vietnam War. By contrast, Morgenthau and 
Kennan are more i l lum inat ing on the or ientatlon and 
evolution in r e a l is t  thought regarding the current debate 
over human r ights  in foreign policy and the nuclear balance 
of terror  in the aftermath of the SALT agreements.
A concluding chapter attempts to assess the 
i n f o ] let t u - 1 * -r 1 u r .  ’ it. i on of the f our Amur i i: an real j ■ i. D
evaluating th e ir  c r i t iq u e  of the methods and pr inciples  of 
r aison dJ61 at according to the categories of comparison 
u t i l is e d  in each case study. A balanced assessment of r at son 
d7 £ t at in American diplomatic experience cannot be made i_n
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vacuo, separate and apart -from r iv a l  in te l le c tu a l  currents 
and influences. Indeed, one expectation of th is  study is  
that the pr inc ip les  ot r a 1 son d' £t at f a i l  to provide an 
adequate ju s t i f ic a t io n  for the rank—order1ng of p r io r i t ie s  
in foreign policy formulation or, for that matter, a 
convincing ra t io n a le  for many ot America's diverse  
diplomatic in i t i a t i v e s  since the Second World War. A second 
expectation, therefore, is that r aison dTStat is  but one of 
the important in te l le c tu a l  determinants that has been 
factored into the r e a l is t  worldview. This expectation 
brings into focus the tension between the pr inc ip les  of the
cont1nental t ra d 111 on and the willingness of leading
American commentators to acknowledge the emergence ot new 
domestic and transnat1onal variables that have become
1ncr easing1y relevant f or the f ormu1 at 1 on and lmp1ement ation
of American foreign policy.
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V I  1
C H A P T E R  I
THE CONTINENTAL TRADITION OF RAIOON D’ ETAT
This chapter w i l l  focus an the fcroad philosophical 
her 11age ot r a1 son c i 7 £ t  a t t r om i t s  moor1 ngs in the classical  
c i ty  state system ot Thucydides to i t s  culmination in the 
BismarcFian conceptualisation ot Rea 1 d o  I i t i t :  in nineteenth 
century Germany. A number ot key considerations w i l l  
structure the inquiry into the evolution and 1nterpretat  1 on 
ot th is  millennial concept, in the wort ot continental 
theoris ts and statesmen. F i rs t ,  how and why was raison 
d 7 £ta t  an ear ly  manifestation of theoricing about in te rs ta te  
relations'? Second, what cont inu it ies  and inconsistencies in 
conceptual understanding can be derived from a review ot 
some of the prominent exponents of ra i  son d"£ t a t in 
d if fe re n t  h is to r ic a l  periods? F in a l ly ,  as a theory of 
in ternat ional p o l i t ic s ,  how does raison d7 fetat supply 
meaningful presuppositions for the successful e::ercise of 
European diplomacy and balance of power7
M achiave ll i 's  doctrine of raison d 7 £ t a t as the servant 
of p o l i t ic a l  necessity represented both a thesis and 
ju s t i f ic a t io n  which numerous European statesmen f e l t  obliged 
to af f irm  and practice in the ir  diplomatic and foreign  
policy conduct. The doctrine was repeated in the words of
1
Frederick the Great: "Princes are slaves to th e ir  resources
the i n terest  o-f the state is th e ir  law, and th is  law is
in v io la b le ." 1 I ts  s p i r i t  was s im i la r ly  expressed when
Bismarck suggested that: " I t  is better  to seek salvation vi
the sewer than to allow oneself to be choked or beaten to
death."*  A more comprehensive summation of Machiavel11 ' s
p r inc ip le  was offered by the German h is tor ian , Friedrich
Meinecke, who pointed out that:
Rai son df 6t at is the fundamental p r inc ip le  of 
internat ional  conduct, the S ta te '5 F irs t  Law of 
Motion. I t  t e l l s  the statesman what he must do to 
preserve the health and strength of the state.
The state is an organic structure whose f u l l  power 
can only be maintained by allowing i t . . . t o  
continue growing; and raison d* 6tat indicates both
the path and goal for such growth.3
Rai son d ' 6tat as interpreted and elaborated by
continental theoris ts s ign if ied  a pattern or t ra d i t io n  of
thought which encompasses a descr1 i on of the nature of
in ternational p o l i t ic s  and also a set of pr escr ip t i  ons as t
how statesmen should conduct themselves. For what has been
termed the Machiavel1ian t ra d it io n  in international
p o l i t i c s — including such figures as Thomas Hobbes, Cardinal
Richelieu, Frederick the Great, Georges Clemenceau, the
twentleth century re a l i  sts such as L. H. Car r and Hans
Morgenthau— the true description of international p o l i t ic s
was one of internat ional anarchy, a war of a l l  against a l l ,
or a relat ionship of unending co n f l ic t  among sovereign
states. M
The structure of diplomatic practices was based on the
existence of a number of independent t e r r i t o r i a l  states,  
f r ee from e::ternal control and able to pur sue t  hei i own 
in terests by bargaining and f igh t ing  with each o th e r .D Each 
national unit  pursued objectives that best served the 
in terests of i t s  ru ling  (and largely a r is to c r a t ic ) class. 
These ob j ec t i ves, out 1 i ned i n The Prince, i n vol ved a max 1 mum 
extension of the t e r r i t o r y  and power of the state at the 
expense of r iv a ls .  Dipl omacy, balance of power, and war 
were the means to power. The quest 1 on of morali ty in 
1nternational p o l i t ic s ,  at least in the sense of moral rules  
which restrained states in th e ir  mutual re la t io n s ,  e ither  
did not ar ise  or was e f fe c t iv e ly  subordinated to the 
competitive struggle for power.-1
European P o l i t ic a l  Theory and the Rise of Raison D'etat  
By what standards or c r i t e r i a  can raison d '£ ta t  be 
ln t  erpreted or j u s t i f ie d  as a t heor y of i nt ernat i onal 
p o l i t ic s ?  Is i t  possible to s p e c if ic a l ly  id e n t i fy  the 
in te l le c tu a l  or igins of ra i  son dJ£ta t  in the long history of 
European statecraft?’ As a theory or explanation of 
re la t ions  among i ndependent s ta te s , how can raison d’ H a t  be 
distinguished from the emphasis of t ra d i t io n a l  p o l i t ic a l  
philosophy on the primordial fact of man's membership and 
obligations wi th in  separate states'7 F in a l ly ,  what are the 
implications deriving from raison d'£ ta t  for such 
fundamental topics in internat ional  thought as the nature 
and structure of in te rn a t i ona1 society, the relat ionsh ip
4between human nature and state conduct, the ro le ot power 
and diplomacy, the naturn and conduct o-f war, and viable 
ethical guidelines above the state i ts e l f?
At the outset, i t  is important to address b r ie f ly  the 
development and p oss ib i l i ty  of theory in international  
relat ions. Perhaps the prevailing view concerning the scope 
of theory is that the f ie ld  is beleaguered by a plethora of 
theoretical approaches, models, and r iva l  conceptual 
frameworks—that i t  is "in as much a state of change, chaos, 
and confusion as the contemporary world scene which i t  
strives to comprehend"—and that theorizing about 
international re lations is of only " f ai r 1 y ir ecent or igin ." '7'
Martin Wight suggests that i f  international re lations  
theory "means a trad it ion  of systematic investigation about 
relat ions between states, a t rad i t ion  imagined as the twin 
of speculation about the state to which the name p o l i t ic a l  
theory is  appropriated, i t  can hardly be said to exist at 
a l l . " *
Wight’ s observation, perhaps expressing a consensus 
among contemporary observers of international p o l i t ic s ,  
provides an i n i t i a l  platform by which to assess the 
consequences of p o l i t ic a l  theory above the nation state.
Wight’ s comment posits a basic d ist inct ion between 
p o l i t ic a l  theory and international theory. The former 
represents speculation about the state; the la t te r  seems to 
constitute "either the methodology of the study of
in ternat ional re la t ions ,  or some conceptual system which 
purports to o ffer  a unified explanation of internationa 1 
phenomena.N’  Even i f  in ternat ional theory is  on a less 
rigorous plane, construed as philosophical or h is to r ica l  
description of p a r t ic u la r  events and diplomatic practices,  
i t  remains true that many of the older theoret ica l t r e a t ­
ments are not eas i ly  accessible because they are scattered 
over the writ ings of highly diverse authors.
Prior to the twentieth century, for example, 
speculation focusing on the society of states was largely  
confined to internat ional  law and such other sources as: (1) 
theoris ts who foreshadowed the League of Nations, such as 
Erasmus, William Penn, and the Abbe de St. Pierre;  (2)
Machiavel1ians and defenders of raison d 7 £t a t . such as 
Machiavelli ,  Hobbes, Meinecke, and E.H. Carr; (3) philoso­
phers and histor ians who examined basic problem© of 
in ternational p o l i t ic s ,  as in David Hume’ s "The Balance of 
Power," Jean-Jacques Rousseau’ s 'Project of Perpetual 
Peace," Jeremy Bentham’ s "Plan for an Universal Peace," 
Edmund Burke’ s "Thoughts on French A f fa i rs ,"  Leopold von 
Ranke’ s essay on the q^eat powers, and J.S, M i l l ' s  essay on 
the law of nations; and (4) speeches, dispatches, memoirs, 
and essays of statesmen, such as George Canning’ s classic  
dispatch of 1823 on the drv'cnne of guarantees, Bismarck’ s 
Gedan ken und Erlnner unaen. and Lord Sali sbur y’ s early  essays 
on foreign a f fa i r s  in the Quarter 1v Revi ew. 10
fo
The o-f ten diverse and ambiguous expression ot p o l i t ic a l  
theory above the nation state can be explained in some 
measure by a number of assumptions which reinforce the gulf 
between p o l i t ic a l  theory and international p o l i t ic s .  The 
start ing  point far the majority of p o l i t ic a l  theorists and 
phi1 osophers has been the quest1 on of man and human nature.
P la to ’ s often-quoted phrase that a polls  is  man written  
la rg e 11 provides a general p r in c ip le  for the 1nterpretat ion  
of society. Eric Voegelin points out that "as a general 
p rin c ip le  i t  means that in i t s  order every society re f le c ts  
the type of men of whom i t  is  composed."131 Whenever the 
theoris t  wants to understand a p o l i t ic a l  society, i t  w i l l  be 
one of his f i r s t  tasks, i f  not the very f i r s t ,  to ascertain 
the human type which expresses i t s e l f  in the order of the 
concrete s o c ie ty .13 While the typ ica l s tart ing  point for 
the theoris t  is  man, the question of human nature does lead 
to an inquiry into men who l iv e  in association with others 
under government. In short, the p o l i t ic a l  theorist  
frequent 1y is  1ed to rieve1 op a theory of p o l i t ic s  and the 
state,  as well as to explain the terms of man’ s membership 
in the state. 1 *
Does man l iv e  in one state or many"71 Although several 
theor i sts and phi 1 osopher s have rai  sed the questlon of a 
t ru ly  global community free of parochial and se l f - in te res te d  
nation s ta te s ,1” few thinkers have wavered from the 
conclusion that man l ives and w i l l  always l iv e  in
7d x f f er en t i ated p o l i t ic a l  and social structures. While 
p o l i t ic a l  theorists  are apt to begin th e ir  work with an 
i nqu i r y into human nature, they do not beg in with mank ind as 
a basis tor distinguishing between the reason and unreason 
ot the separate states into which he is  divided.
The assumption of man’ s membership in separate states  
poses the fundamental dilemma for any p o l i t ic a l  theory of 
in te rs ta te  re la t io n s .  I f  human nature and potentia l are 
fu l l y  actualized in the p o l i ty  or state, what can there be 
for the th ero r is t  to say about in te rn a t1onal relations?  
Gerhart Niemeyer id e n t i f ie s  the source of the problem by 
suggest i ng:
Foreign policy 1ac ks the d i rect ref erence to human 
nature, since i t  deals not with the re la t io n  
between the part icu lar  man as c i t ize n  and the 
commun i t y  of c i t i z  ens as a whole, but rather  
re la t ions  between wholes who are not "natural"  
substances in the way each individual person is ,  
and who have no center of nor mat ive e>; per i ences 
resembling the human soul, 17
Niemeyer's cogent observation indicates that the duties of
the statesman cannot be reduced to the c i t ize n s '  good l i f e ,
but rather operate to insure "the continued existence of an
a r t i fa c te d  whole neither the size, nor the conflgurat i on,
nor the duration of which are given, as i t  were, by
n a tu re ." 1** On what basis and with what ju s t i f ic a t io n
(theoret ica l or not) did European p o l i tca l  theoris ts and
statesmen r e f le c t  on the normative c r i t e r i a  that govern
di p1omat i c conduc t in a worId of co-soverei gn nat i on s tates?
While the older theoretical  treatments of ln ternat iona1
ep o l i t ic s  sre often "unsysteinatic" and "highly dispersed," i t  
is possible to ascertain a reasonable degree of coherence in 
matters of both preliminary philosophical assumptions *nd 
conceptual d e f in i t io n .  Recognizing that the development ot 
in ternat i  onal p o l i t ic a l  theor y c ont1nues to st i mulate 
profound disagreement among contemporary scholars, i t  w i l l  
i l lum inate our subject to view the growth of classical  
in ternat iona1 theory in terms of the general developmental 
pattern of s c ie n t i f ic  d iscipl ines  as outlined toy Thomas
S. Kuhn in The Structure of S c ie n t i f ic  Revolutions.
Arend L i jphart  argued that continental thinking about 
in te rs ta te  re la t ions  was, in fa c t ,  governed by what Kuhn 
c a l ls  a "paradigm, 1 and th is  paradigm remained the basis of 
a research t ra d it io n  that dominated the f i e ld  u n t i l  the 
1950s.30 Kuhn id e n t i f ie d  science as a communal a c t iv i ty ,  
carried on by a community of scholars who share a common set 
of assumptions about the nature of th e ir  subject m atter .31 
These assumptions and b e l ie fs  constitute a paradigm within  
which normal s c ie n t i f ic  a c t iv i t y  is  conducted. A paradigm 
represents an accepted approach, model, or theory which 
const i tute? the f oundat i on f or the cumu1 atlve  growth ot 
sci ent i f i c knowledge.
While Kuhn’ s concept of a paradigm frequently yields  
diverse in terp retat ions  in the philosophy of science 
1l te r a tu r e , 33 the term is applicable to t ra d it io n a l  patterns 
of theorizing about lnternatlonal r e la t io n s .33 I t  is in the
9more global and philosophical sense ( i . e . ,  comprehensive 
ways o-f looking at the subject matter, or "worldviews") that  
European theorising about international re la t io n s  meets the 
c r i t e r i a  ot paradigmatic thinking, as id e n t i f ie d  by Kuhn. 
According to Kuhn, a philosophical paradigm is both wider 
than and pr ior  to theory .24 I t  is  what Michael Polanyi ca l ls  
a "heurist ic  vision" that leads to the -formulation of 
theory .2" By drawing on Kuhn's contribution, i t  w i l l  be 
useful to approach the question of "theory" in the classical  
mold by s h if t in g  the in te l le c tu a l  focus to account for the 
philosophical worldview that influences not only the 
id e n t i f ic a t io n  of a r e a l i t y  between separate states but the 
adumbration of key concepts which il lumine the nature and 
type of re la t io n s  between separate states. While the fu l l  
development of European thought on in te rs ta te  re la t ions  over 
the last four-hundred years often displays considerable 
d iv e rs i ty  in subject matter and method, i t  is possible to 
id e n t i fy  sa l ie n t  paradigmatic a t t r ib u te s  that impart a 
modicum of coherence to continental theory. Peter Savigear 
argued that the theory of the state in Europe from i t s  
beginnings in the High Renaissance spawned a theory of 
ln ter  natlonal r e la t i  ons. In p a r t ic u la r , ear 1 y contlnent a 1 
theoriz ing focused upon two features of the p o l i t ic a l  
landscape: the constitut ion (or nature) of the state and the
dilemma of ethical guideposts imposing some minimal level of 
order in re la t io n s  among s ta te s .3'7'
l u
Arnold Wolfers pointed out that the main question f or 
the continental theorists was whether statesmen and nations 
were under any moral obligation to res is t  these compelling 
demands o-f state necessity. The underlying tension
between the unavoidable demands o-f state in terests  and the 
application o-f e th ica l desiderata in -foreign policy rests on 
a number o-f presuppositions associated with a Machiavellian  
worldview o-f 1 nter nat i onal p o l i t ic s .  I t  should be 
acknowledged that many European theoris ts who were 
proponents of ra i son d* 6tat often di sagreed about the scope 
and method of th e ir  theoret ica l examination of phenomena 
within the nation state;  however, on the question of the 
structure of internat ional  society and the ju s t i f ic a t io n  of 
state conduct, they viewed a number of principal a t tr ibu tes  
as integral to the development of raison dJ 6tat as the basis 
f or a theor y of i n te rnat1ona1 p o l i t ic s .
F i r s t ,  advocates of raison d r £ta t  have generally  
emphasized the inev i tab le expression of individual s e l f -  
in teres t  and the lust tor power at a l l  levels ot human 
existence. Violence, coercion, and countervailing power are 
the principal means by which the state must protect the 
in te g r i ty  of i t s  p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  and defend i t s  security  
against external threats and subversion. From the vantage 
point of morality , the state is  under no ethical obligation  
other than the expedient observance of i t s  own in te res t .
From Machiavelli to Bismarck, raison d'£ ta t  has been
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char ac ter i 2 ed by the tendency to sharply dj-f f erenti ate 
between the moral inc l inat ions  o-f the s o l i ta ry  individual 
and the immoral nature of p o l i t ic a l  society both within and 
above the state.
Second, the state i t s e l f  represents a moral force. The 
state did not simply exist as a set of in s t i tu t io n s ,  but 
made a claim on the loya lty and service of i t s  c i t izens  and, 
as such, toDf: on a moral quality  which demanded p r io r i t y  and 
obedience. Machiavelli was one of the strongest advocates 
of th is  position in urging that the statesman's duty was to 
the p o l i t ic a l  e n t i ty  and i t s  security ,  and not to any other 
moral code.5'*' The d is t inc t ion  between the public and 
private realms of ethical behavior became a central premise 
for those thinkers who assumed that preserving the in te g r i ty  
and sovereignty of the state was a necessary objective of 
ln ternat lonal p o l i t ic s .  The assumption that the public 
realm acquired a r ig h t fu l  authority  which superseded private  
conscience led many theorists to assign primacy to the 
external strength of the state and adopt a more expedient 
view by which p o l i t ic a l  actions would be evaluated.30
Third, the i nternationa 1 environment exists and has 
structure. In terms of the structure of the lnternational  
arena, a number of thinkers argued that the state was not 
defined ex c lus ive lv  by i ts  internal ordering or t e r r i t o r i a l  
domain, but also by an understanding of the in terests  of 
other s ta te s .3 * The ruler was obliged by the external
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c x r cumst ances o-f the s ta te *3 to formulate policy objectives
by reference to the in te rs ta te  environment. However, the
interrelatedness and rec iprocity  of states was largely
res tr ic ted  to the norms of m i l i t a ry  capab il ity  and the
successful defense of state sovereignty. International
thought based on rai  son d' £tat portrayed international
society as merely the sum of i t s  individual ( i . e . ,  state)
parts and bereft  of moral c e r ta in t ie s  transcending
confl ic t ing  and competitive national goals. The task for
the theoris t  of international p o l i t ic s  was to provide some
ju s t i f ic a t io n  for the p o s s ib i l i ty  of orderly p o l i t ic a l
re la t ions  among states in an anarchic global setting where:
Kings and Persons of Soveraigne authority , because 
of th e ir  Independency, are in continual 
jealousies, and in the state and posture of 
gladiators; having th e ir  weapons pointing, and 
th e ir  eyes fi;:ed on one another; that is ,  th e ir  
Forts, Garrisons and Guns, upon the Frontiers of 
the ir  Kingdoms; and continual Spyes upon the ir  
neighbors; which is a posture of war.33
Fourth, among the ideas in tegral to rai  son d"6 ta t—by 
many c r i t e r i a ,  perhaps i t s  pivotal idea— is the concept of 
power.34 I t  is from an understanding of the nature and ro le  
of power in p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  that co l la te ra l  concepts l ik e  
balance of power, national in te re s t ,  and diplomacy are 
largely der ived.3® From the standpoint of many continental 
theoris ts ,  power p o l i t ic s  as applied to re la t io n s  among 
sovereign states constitutes a theory of survival by which 
statesmen seek freedom, security , prosperity, or even power 
i t s e l f .  Whenever states s t r iv e  to re a l iz e  such goals by
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means of 1nternat iona1 p o l i t ic s ,  they do so by a s tr iv ing  
f or power .
F i f th ,  an important coro llary  to the idea that  
in ternat ional p o l i t ic s  is best described as a struggle for 
power and s ta te  security is the idea that statesmen may 
define diplomatic ends in terms of re l ig ious ,  philosophic, 
economic, or social objectives. Ideological c r i t e r i a  and 
other normative sources, however, c nd to disguise and 
d is to r t  the universal urge to power.3*  Moral and ethical  
pronouncements can play a pos it ive  role in foreign policy  
only insofar as they function to leg i t im ize  successful 
policy in i t i a t i v e s  and "keep aspirations for power within 
soc ia l ly  to le rab le  bounds."3'7'
Si:<th, while proponents of ra i  son d ' £tat were less than 
sanguine about the prospects of an authentic i nternatlonal  
community based on a harmony of values and ln te re s ts , 
several thinkers turned th e ir  at tention to the the 
formulation of rules and norms consistent with the 
p o s s ib i l i t y  of a minimum level of orderly re la t io n s  among 
states. The recognition of any rudimentary form of order 
among constituent states was predicated upon the 
preservatlon of s tate sovereignty (in addition to 
f a c i l i t a t i n g  a wide margin of maneuverability in diplomatic 
str  ategy). In b r l e f , the prob1em of order in i nternat i ona1 
p o l i t ic s  presented continental theorists with the challenge 
of defending both the source and nature of v iab le standards
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o-f state conduct in a world that exhibited the 
i n d i v i s i b i l i t y  o-f peace and war.3*  Moreover, how could the 
continental theoris t  reconcile the elaboration o-f any such 
ethical norms at the internat ional level with a view o-f 
global p o l i t ic s  as essent ia l ly  anarchic?
Both structura l and procedural a t t r ibu te s  id e n t i f ie d  as 
contributing to the maintenance o-f orderly in teract ion  among 
states were subsumed under such principles as diplomacy and 
balance o-f power. While i t  must be admitted that both 
concepts have been invoked by competing theoret ica l  
approaches to the study o-f 1 nternat i onal p o l i t ic s ,  i t  can 
safely be asserted that the continental t ra d i t io n  o-f ra i  son 
d”£tat provided a distinguished h is to r ic a l  legacy by which 
they were i n i t i a l l y  -formulated and adapted to the emergence 
of the modern European state system. More importantly, both 
the means and ends of diplomacy, as well as the operation of 
the balance of power, offered a conceptual basis by which 
European statesmen and thinkers attempted to build a 
coherent worldview of a European system of state re la t ions  
that  acknowledged the 1nterrelatedness of states based on 
the pursuit of in terest  and the recognition of the in te re s t1- 
of others. 3“*
In sum, international theory grounded in raison dJ£tat 
b u i l t  upon philosophical assumptions about human nature and 
p o l i t ic a l  r e a l i t y .  Moreover, these assumptions provided the 
ju s t i f ic a t io n  for pr incip les  and concepts which functioned
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a5 both a description o-f the internat ional mill  eu as well as 
a prescription tor foreign policy conduct. At th is  
juncture, i t  w i l l  be useful to introduce a central parado;: 
in classical ra i son d' H a t  that is exhibited by several 
thinkers evaluated in th is  study. On the one hand, 
continental theoris ts  c lear ly  re l ie d  on ethical and 
p o l i t ic a l  norms for the i nvestigati on of in ternat iona1 
phenomena. For example, the preoccupation with national 
s e l f - in te r e s t  grew out of the value placed on the existence 
of sovereign states. S im i la r ly ,  emphasis on diplomacy and 
the balance of power ref lec ted  a concern for the sources of 
order and s t a b i l i t y  in an anarchic world. On the other 
hand, proponents of raison d”£tat distinguish between the 
private realm of ethical discourse af fect ing  the individual  
and the moral 1y-neutral ob1i gatlons i ncumbent on the 
statesman in the defense of state interests*
The emergence of such a paradox in international  
theoriz ing raises a number of s ign if ican t  questions. Have 
expositors of raison d' £tat c lea r ly  and convincingly 
demonstrated the importance of p o l i t ic a l  philosophy (or 
ethics) for the theory and practice of 1nternat iona1 
p o l i t ic s ?  I f  such a ju s t i f ic a t io n  can be found, does i t  
f ind consistent support and in terp re ta t ion  from theorists of 
d if fe re n t  h is to r ic a l  periods'1 What is the exact nature of 
the relat ionsh ip  between philosophical thinking about 
ethical c r i t e r i a  applying to man's membership in the state
1 6
and the nature and -functions o-f norms o-f in te rs ta te  
behavior?
The section which -follows w i l l  examine several o-f the 
more prominent p o l i t ic a l  thinkers who have drawn on the fey 
assumptions and precepts of raison d * £tat in an e f fo r t  to 
theorize about re la t io n s  among sovereign states. An attempt 
w il l  be made to give b r ie f  a t tent ion  to the in te l le c tu a l  
heritage of rai  son d"Stat in the h istory of Western 
p o l i t ic a l  philosophy (e .g . ,  Thucydides, Machiavell i ,  and 
Hobbes) as well as i t s  culmination in the statesmanship of 
Realpoli t i k associated with the classical era of European 
diplomacy since the Peace of Westphalia (e .g . ,  Richelieu and 
B1 sntarc k ) .
European Philosophers and Statesmen:
An Inquiry in to a Theory of International P o l i t ic s
Thucydidesi While a philosophy of raison d’ £tat  has
ty p ic a l ly  been associated with a description and explanation
of conditions of mult iple sovereignty since the period of
the European Renaissance, i t s  central assumptions and
concepts received thoughtful attent ion by Thucydides ( f i f t h
century B.C.) in the History of the Pel oponnesian War.
Indeed, few surveys of the development of in ternat lona1
p o l i t ic a l  theory f a i l  to assign his contribution a prominent
position among other in te l le c tu a l  precursors of more modern
p o l i t ic a l  realism. Thucydides' Hi stor y not only aimed at
making future readers understand a singular event but also
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at describing generally the necessary logic of a certain
kind of human behavior. His basic ambition was to
i l lu s t r a t e  how the combination of human nature, a certain
structure of power, and the spec if ic  properties of r iva l
states create an inescapable logic character ist ic  of world
p o l i t i c s . 1*0 A leading student of the period has written:
He was w r it ing ,  he said, for the guidance of men 
of a l l  times and in a l l  places, on the assumption 
that recurrent elements were present in varying 
h is to r ic a l  circumstances. This assumption was 
based on the conviction that man has a nature .1* 1
The Hi story i l lu s t r a te s  a number of general pr inciples
that have continuing relevance for contemporary
international p o l i t ic a l  theory. A cursory inventory of
topics encompassed by Thucydides' analysis include: the
relat ionsh ip  between force and consent, the d is t inc t ion
between co a l i t io n  and dominion, the nature of leadership,
the ef f ect of means upon ends, and the contrast i ng
implications of land and sea power.43 Our in teres t  w i l l  be
confined to Thucydides' understanding of how such seminal
themes for ra i  son d' £tat as human nature, the in terest  of
the p o l i t ic a l  community, and power cohere to form a
theoretical worldview or e-'planation of i n t er nat 1 ona 1
pol11 i cs .
Although the work of Thucydides can be p ro f i ta b ly  read 
as a t re a t is e  on war ( i t s  causes and e f fe c ts ) ,  i t  u lt im ately  
belongs to the category of t rag ic  drama.43 Throughout, 
there is a sense of destiny and the helplessness of men to
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save themselves from d is a s te r .44 The downtal 1 o-f Athens was 
attr ibu ted , in no small part ,  to a deter iorat ion  in human 
character in the t o i l s  o-f war. Thucydides' observations on 
human nature became e x p l ic i t  in his chronicle on the moral
demise o-f Athenian statesmanship a-fter the death o-f 
Pericles. In one o-f his most -famous and often-quoted
passages, Thucydides spoke d i re c t ly  about the eclipse ot 
p o l i t ic a l  morality under the s tra in  of war:
In peace and prosperity states and individuals are 
governed by higher ideals because they are not 
involved in necessities beyond the ir  control, but 
war deprives them of th e ir  easy ex is tence .. . and 
brings most men’ s dispositions down to the level  
of th e ir  circumstances. Bo c i v i l  war broke out in 
the c i t ie s ,  and the la te r  revolut ionaries  
. . .d e r iv e d  new ideas which went far  beyond e a r l ie r  
ones, so elaborate were th e ir  enterprises, so 
novel th e ir  revenges.. . .  The cause of a l l  these 
e v i ls  was love of power due to ambition and greed, 
which led to the r iv a l r i e s  from which party s p i r i t  
sprung.
The tragedy of Athens, as Thucydides saw i t ,  lay in i ts  
i n a b i l i t y  to l iv e  up to the moral standards and 
respons ib i l i ty  that had resulted from her own moral
ex cel 1 ence.1441
The demoralization of Athenian p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  and the 
increasing demagogy called into question the ro le played by 
human nature in the course of h is to r ica l  events and suggests
the importance of d i f fe re n t ia t in g  between the impact of 
human and environmental factors. In assessing the force of 
human nature v is -A -v is  external determinants of the origin  
and conduct of the war, Thucydides turned his attention to
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two sources: the p o l i t ic a l  necessities inherent in the
circumstances which man can neither harness nor evade, and
man7s ambi t  i ous and passi onate nature which prevents him
-from exercising ra t ional choices. 47 Of major importance in
Thucydides’ examination of the inexorable force of
environmental factors which shape state conduct was the
d is tr ib u t io n  of power among Greek: states and i t s  impact on
the i nterest of the nati on . Thucydi des7 d1agnosis of the
causes of the war received s tr ik ing  formulation in Book 1:
The real cause I consider to be the one which was 
formal1y most kept out of s ight. The growth of 
power of Athens, and the alarm which th is  inspired 
in Lacedaemon, made war in e v i ta b le .4*
I t  is  possible, from Thucydides7 account of the
Hellenic world (the Archaeoloqy) and the creation of the
Athenian empire (the F i f t y  Year s ) . to understand his
conception of power, how i t  operates, and i t s  re la t io n  to
the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. B r ie f ly ,  power
encompasses a number of important variables, including
cumulative material resources (p . q . ,  capital combined with
mi 11 tary-naval strength, national character, and leadership
p o te n t ia l ) .® 0 The process of c iv i l i z a t io n  is  also a process
of the growth of power. Moreover, power operates in a world
of states much l ik e  a physical 1 aw; i t  expands u n t i l  checked
or balanced by countervailing power.811 Once checked, as
Athenian power was, i t  dissipates and the e n t i re  h is tor ica l
process toward higher organization and e f fe c t iv e  use of
technological resources begins anew. In Thucydides’ words:
2u
The object of 1nterest for the nation i i i t s  
h is to r ica l  development is  dvnami s . power, and this  
means dominion over others. Fear and greed are 
the dominating motives on the road to imperialism, 
and there is  no turning back.®3
Power becomes an amoral force that w i l l  grow u n t i l  resisted
by opposing power, and i t s  very growth promotes c o n f l ic t  and
opposition. Indeed, Thucydides' statement that " iden t i ty  of
in terests  is  the surest of bonds whether between states or
individuals" simply affirms a key assumption associated with
a philosophy of ra i  son d * 6t a t : the idea of in terest  (defined
in terms of power) is an objective category and the very
essence of p o l i t ic s .® 3
In summation, Thucydides' treatment of the
Peloponnesian War represents a conscious e f fo r t  to
a r t ic u la te  th e o re t ic a l1y the dynamics of international
p o l i t ic s  as they might be id e n t i f ie d  in the intense struggle
between Athens and Sparta. Thucydides introduced a number
of insights and princ ip les  which form the core of a
philosophy of raison d"frtat and were subsequently applied to
the European system of states by continental theoris ts .
F i rs t ,  he called  attention to the fact that the
structure of the in ternat ional system and the power
re la t ions  betweeen states are primary factors in individual
state behavior. Second, his id e n t i f ic a t  1 on of system
structure and the re la t ions  of power was based on a vision
of human nature which reminds the reader of the tragic
ambiguity of l i f e  and the i r ra t io n a l  inc l ina t ion  toward
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hubr1s (pride) which tempts the powerful to grandiose or 
arrogant polic ies.  Third, he pointed to the gulf that 
separates the p o ss ib i l i ty  of dike ( justice) and moral 
obligation in the po li ty  and the type of p o l i t ic a l  morality 
which guides the statesman in the quest for successful 
policy. To understand such an apparent inconsistency, 
Thucydides argued that the statesman must be prepared to act 
in accordance with certain necessities which are not of his 
making, even i f  such actions do not conform to generally 
accepted moral standards.
Thucydides bequeathed to Western c iv i l is a t io n  one of 
the ear 1iest and most original e f forts  to theorize about 
relat ions between states in terms of both recurrent and 
universal categories (e .g . ,  human nature, p o l i t ic s ,  power, 
in te re s t ) .  However, the scope of his theoretical inquiry 
was circumscribed by two elemental factors! the specific  
configuration of r iv a l  c i ty  states on the Greek peninsula in 
the f i f t h  century B.C., and the absence of any ex p l ic i t  
formula or c r i t e r ia  by which to d i f fe re n t ia te  the ad hoc 
assemblage of ethical prescriptions from empirical 
general i : 1 one,. While mnre modern European thinkers in +he
trad it io n  of raison d ' £tat (and American "rea l is ts")  
acknowledge a normative or philosophical component in their  
theorizing, the v i ta l  nexus remains obscure and ambiguous in 
Thucydides’ t re a t ise .
Niccola Machiavel1l (1469-1527): The Renaissance marked the
decline of a comprehensive theocracy which had governed the 
feudal structure of internat ional society. The appearance 
of a system of independent states in I t a ly  as well as a 
diminution in the status of the pope to prince contributed 
to Machiavel1i ’ s formulation of a "new morality" prevail ing  
in the re la t ions  among sovereign states. Although 
Machiavelli was s t i l l  far from having succeeded in 
elaborating a comprehensive conception of the new type of 
in te rnat iona1 re la t ions  which would characterise Europe just  
two centuries a f te r  his death, he was among the f i r s t  to 
t re a t  the study of internat ional p o l i t ic s  as a purely 
technical a f f a i r .
I t  was not u n t i l  the period of the I ta l ia n  Renaissance 
at the close of the f i f te e n th  century that Machiavelli  
provided a somewhat more systematic and far-reaching theory 
of the modern state  and the emerging in te rs ta te  system. The 
elaboration of raison d' £tat (or raqion di s ta to ) as a 
unifying theme for Machiavel1i ' s understanding Df state  
re la t ions  was heavily influenced by several important 
biographical and h is to r ic a l  developments. As a secretary 
and diplomat of the Florentine Republic unt i l  151?, 
Machiavelli observed the French and Spanish invasions which 
overtook I t a ly  a f te r  1494 and led to the decline of 
Neopolitan and Milanese independence, the change of 
government in Florence, and the c o l le c t iv e  impact of foreign 
powers on the en t ire  Apenmne penin5ula.°4 While
Machiavell i Js diplomatic and -foreign policy background
endowed him with a working knowledge of I t a l ia n
s t a t e c r a f t '015 i t  was not un t i l  the restoration of the
Medicis in Florence (1512) that he was prompted to develop
and express his own thoughts concerning the or ig in  and
nature of s tate  behavior.
As a member of the party which had been overthrown,
Machiavelli sought to reestablish himself by seeking the
favor of the Medici ru lers .  A c o n f l ic t  thus developed
between Mach1 a ve l1i ' s own p o l i t ic a l  and egocentric
objectives, and the ideas of republican freedom he had long
acknowledged. I t  was against such a p o l i t ic a l  background
that Machiavelli re f lec ted  on the re la t ions  between republic
and monarchy, as well as the new national mission of
monarchy on the I t a l ia n  peninsula. In the words of one
hi stor 1cal schoiar:
I t  was in a content of a l l  th is  that the whole 
essence of ra i  son d ' 61at . compounded of ming1ed 
lngredi ent s both pure and lmpure, both lo f ty  and 
hatefu l ,  achieved a ruthless expression. He had 
reached his fo r t ie th  year— the age at which 
productive s c ie n t i f ic  minds often gave of th e ir  
best — when a f te r  1513 he wrote the l i t t l e  book on 
the prince and the Pi scorsi sopra 1 a prlma deca di 
Tito Li v i □.
In addition, Machlavel1i ’ s work: was brought into being 
by an extraordinary conjunction of events: the coinciding of
a p o l i t ic a l  collapse with a s p ir i tu a l  and in te l le c tu a l  
renaissance. He wrote at a time when the personal loya l t ies  
of the feuda1 age were disappear i ng, when the mora1
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re s tra in ts  of the Middle Ages were f e l t  less keenly, and
when I t a ly  was rul ed by a number o-f petty t yrants. I n
studying the -formation and background of Mach i avel 1 i ' s
Pr1 nee. one contemporary p o l i t ic a l  philosopher has written:
The mediaeval Chr i s t lan i t as was fa l l in g  apart into  
the Church and the natlonal s ta tes . . . .The 
disintegrat ion of the Chr i s t lan i  tas affected both 
the s p ir i tu a l  and temporal orders insofar as in 
both spheres the common s p i r i t ,  inducing e f fe c t iv e  
cooperation between persons in spite of divergence 
of in terests  as well as the sense of an obligation  
to compromise in the s p i r i t  of the whole, was 
seeping out.*9*
The focus of at tent ion had sh ifted  from God to man. with the 
consequence that increasing attent ion was given to temporal 
security  over eternal s a lv a t io n .* *  Displacing God, man 
became the center of the universe; the values of th is  new 
solar system was inev itab ly  d i f fe re n t  from those o-f the 
God-created un iverse .*0
Machiavel1i ' s passionate in terest  was the s ta te,  the 
analysis and computation of i t s  d i f fe re n t  forms, functions, 
and conditions for  ex is te n c e .*1 Indeed, i t  was in 
M achiave l l i ’ s analysis of the new secular state idivorced 
from eccles ias t ica l  considerations) that the s p e c if ic a l ly  
ra t io n a l ,  empirical, and ca lculat ing element in I t a l ia n  
Renaissance culture reached i t s  peak in Machiavel1i ' s 
thought. He was interested in the state as a 
s e l f - s u f f ic ie n t  e n t i ty  in continual contact with other 
states and, therefore, in need of power. His contribution  
to raison d * 61 at can, in no small part,  be understood as an
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urgent plea to the princes -for a new conception of p o l i t ic s  
in general, both at home and abroad. An attempt to d i s t i l l  
the core a t t r ib u te s  o-f Machiavel1ian r ai son d •’ 6 ta t  must 
acknowledge a sense o-f l im ita t io n  at the outset. Meinecke 
pointed out:
Machiavelli had not yet compressed his thoughts on 
rai son d * £tat into a single slogan. Fond as he 
was o-f forceful and meaningful catch-words, he did 
not al wav 5 f eel the need to express in wor d s the 
supreme ideas which f i l l e d  him.. . . C r i t ic s  have 
noticed that he f a i l s  to express any opinion about 
the f in a l  real purpose of the State, and they have 
mistakenly deduced from th is  that he did not 
re f le c t  on the subject. B u t . . .h is  whole l i f e  was 
bound up with a d e f in i te  supreme purpose of the 
State. And in the same way his whole p o l i t ic a l  
way of thought is nothing but a continual process 
of thinking about rai  son d7S ta t . * z
For our purposes, three basic themes of rai son d7 6tat
were especially  important in Machiavellian thought. 
M achiave ll i '5 preoccupation with such pr incip les as v i r t u .
fortuna , and necessita sum up the demands he made of the 
state in terms of power p o l i t ic s .  Consideration of these 
recurrent themes and th e ir  in te r re la t lo n  w i l l  also highlight  
many of the fundamental problems and topics (e .g . ,  human 
nature, power, in te res t ,  morality) integral to the 
his to r ic a l  development of raison d 7 61at .
Machiavel1l 7s deliberations on the meaning Df v ir tu  (or 
manly s trength )*3 has i t s  origin in the e f fo r t  to restore  
the sources of order for both individual and social 
existence as a result  of the p o l i t ic a l  humiliation in f l ic te d  
by foreign powers on the I t a l ia n  peninsula. Foremost among
2 6
Machiavel11 ' s objectives was to see I t a ly  united in a 
condition o-f peace and security . The v i r 10 of the 
conquering prince became the source o-f order; the p o l i t ic a l  
i n s t a b i l i t y  represented a challenge to a ru ler  o-f 
semi-divine, heroic qua l i t ies  to eject the barbarians, to 
restore the order of I ta ly  through his v ir tu  that would 
overcome the adverse f or tuna .
Although the concept of v i r tu  was taken over from 
ant iqu ity  and humanism by Machlavel1i ’ s era, i t  represented 
something of a new n a tu ra l is t ic  e th ic * °  that denoted 
q u a l i t ie s  of heroic p o l i t ic a l  and m il i ta ry  achievements, as 
well as the strength for the founding and preservation of 
states.**" Indeed, the development of v ir tu  by the prince 
was proclaimed by Machiavelli as the ideal and se lf -ev ident  
purpose of the s tate.  Equally important was the connection 
Machiavelli made between v ir tu  and monarchy. Perceiving the 
incurable corruption of republican ru le ,  Machiavelli argued 
that the creative  v i r tu  of one individual should take the 
state in hand and revive i t .  Devoted to securing the 
authority  of the Medicis, the Prinee featured advice on the 
prerequisites of diplomatic success within the set of novel 
circumstances that had arisen in Renaissance I t a ly .
Before turning to the principal manifestations of 
princely ru le,  b r ie f  attent ion must be given to a serious 
problematic element in the whole character of ra i  son 
d • 61 a t ■ This dilemma concerns the co n f l ic t  between the
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e thical  sphere of v i r t  u (and the state animated by v i r t u )
and the old sphere of morality and re l ig io n ,  represented by
the Christian transcendenta1 order. From Mach1a v e l1i ' s
perspective, re l ig io n  and morality were seen as
indispensable in the influence they exerted towards
maintaining the s t a t e , fcT However, by th is  formulation,
Christian ethics and morality became nothing but means
toward the goal of the state animated by v i r t b . Insofar as
the higher realm of v ir tu  constituted the v i t a l  source of
the state (v ivere p o l i t i c o ) . i t  could be permitted to
encr oach on the moral worId to achi eve i t s  ends. * “
Reference must also be made to the concepts of fortuna
(fortune or fate)  and necessita (necessity) and how they
influenced Machiavel1i ?s re f le c t io n s  on the requirements of
state conduct. While Machiavelli viewed the u n if ica t io n  of
I t a ly  as a present p o s s ib i l i ty ,  he was quick to acknowledge
the ro le  of fortune ( f or tuna) in human a f fa i r s .  The drama
of human existence achieves meaning by the d ia le c t ic a l
in terp lay  between the creative  genius of the individual
(v i r t u ) and the unsuspected revolutions of fa te .
Because, where men have l i t t l e  a b i l i t y ,  Foutune 
shows her power much, and because she is var iable,  
republics and states often vary, and vary they 
always w i l l  un t i l  someone arr ives who is  so great 
a lover of an t iqu ity  that  he w i l l  ru le  fortune in 
such a way that she w i l l  not have cause to show in 
every revolution of the sun how much she can d o .*”
Machiavelli concludes that fortune can be an a l ly  or
adversary, depending on the circumstances. The true task of
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v i r t  lit is ,  therefore, the a b i l i t y  to suppress f or tuna.
Because f ortuna is  often malicious, so v i r t  u must also be 
malicious when there is no other ava ilab le o p t ion .70 That a 
man of v ir tu  can conquer the vicissitudes of fa te  expresses 
the inner spirutual core of Machiavel1ian1sm and supplies an 
essential presupposition of ra j  son d7£t a t ; the doctrine  
th a t ,  in national behavior, even immoral methods are 
sanctioned in the heroic defense and preservation of the 
s ta te ,
The t r 1 umph of vi r t  fi over f or tuna was 1 ar gel y 
contingent on the i ntervening force of necessit a (necessit y ) 
in human conduct. I t  is  important to note that Machiavelli 
traced the o r lg 1n of mora1i t  y bac k to the ldea of 
"necessity." In the Di sourses. he suggests that men w il l  
never do anything good, unless they are driven to i t  by some 
necessity. Machiavel1i 7s conception of raison d 7 41 at was 
both amoral in essence and originated in ineluctable  
necessi t y . 71 The state was a necess11y; power was necessary 
to the state; and in or der t d secure power i t  was s o m e t i m e s .  
necessary to v io la te  the laws of decency and morality. 7a:
Although re l ig io n ,  law, and morality were considered 
indispensable for the s ta te ’ s existence, the requirements of 
necessit a somet i mes compel led the statesman to set these 
aside whenever the need for national seH -preservation  
required i t .  Machiavelli pointed out that ,  for the purpose 
of maintaining the state, a prince "is often obliged
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(necessi t a t o ) to act without lo ya l ty ,  without mercy, without 
humanity, and without re l ig io n .  1,73 However, he does not 
offer  dispensations -for a l l  human sins. Only the stern 
necessities of the s ta te —not personal caprice, nor any 
other personal consideration— ju s t i f ie d  doing e v i l .  In 
summation, the struggle between v1r t  u and f or tuna, and the 
theory of necessi t  a . worked together to leg it im ise  the 
prince in the discriminating use of immoral methods.
While ostensibly preoccupied with the need to bring 
unity out of the anarchy of I t a ly ,  Machiavel11 ' s adaptation 
of power p o l i t ic s  to a community of sovereign states yields  
a number of key pr incip les for the study of world p o l i t ic s .  
Machiavelli id e n t i f ie d  two key elements which would shape 
continental theory about state re la t ions  for the next 
four-hundred years: the state is a moral force and the 
international world exists and has structure. The I ta l ia n  
state system created i t s  own patterns and demands that  
transformed the in teres t  of the state by reference to the 
lnt er state envlronment. To i l l u s t r  at e th is  c ontent i on, 
Machiavelli re fers  to the analogous experience of Rome: " I t
was Rome's neighbors who in th e ir  desire to crush her, 
caused her to set up in s t i tu t io n s  which not only enabled her 
to defend herself but also to attack them with greater  
force, counsel and authority .  1174 In short, the state was 
not defined simply by internal factors but also by the 
in terests and objectives of other states.
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Concomitant with the idea of the interrelatedness of 
states was the elevation o-f the state to the level of a new 
moral -force in world p o l i t ic s .  Taking primacy over older 
p o l i t ic a l  forms l ik e  the guilds and feudatories, the state  
was viewed as a moral en t i ty  which demanded the s acr i f ic e  
and service of i t s  c i t izens  and could be defended against 
competing moral claims. Indeed, Mach1avel11 ’ s concept of 
necessita (a central theme in raison d' 6 t a t ) was based on 
the idea that the r u l e r ’ s primary duty was to protect and 
defend the sovereignty of the state.  The morality and 
ra i  son d ^  £tat derived from the ethical  imperative of 
national survival and state security .
Mach1ave l11 ' s discussion of the state as a moral e n t i ty  
has d irect  relevance for the ethics of statesmanship. The 
axioms and princ ip les  of s ta te c ra ft  presented in The Prince 
and the Discourses were intended to apply to the intercourse  
of states as much as to in ternal p o l i t i c s . 741 In elaborating  
on the requirements of successful p o l i t ic a l  actions, 
Machiavelli reaches the conclusion that a ru ler  is  often 
obliged to ignore considerations of re l ig ion  and ethics  
(perhaps applicable to pr ivate rel ationships) and employ 
force and fraud where needed. Though Machiavelli never 
praises immorality for i ts  own sake or denies the existence 
of values in th is  world, his writ ing affirms that in the 
situat ion  of the statesman the rules of power have p r io r i ty  
over those of ethics and morality . In fac t ,  power becomes
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an end in i t s e l f ,  and he confines his inquiry into the means 
that are best suited for acquiring, re tain ing , and expanding 
power.77 In p o l i t ic a l  re lat ionsh ips,  morals are not to 
enter at a l l :  the only question that need trouble a prince
is whether the means he employs— and i f  necessary they might 
include assassina11 on — are best adapted to the great end, 
the preservation or advancement of the s t a t e .70
□f equal importance to the study of international  
p o l i t ic s  are the implications deriving from Machiavel11 ' s 
assessment of human nature. Though one can find some 
evidence of a f r a g i le  optimism in the a b i l i t y  of 
i n s t i t u t i  ons to channel human ambit i on s for publie good, i n 
the main, he seems to subscribe to the notion that "men are 
ungrateful, inconstant, d e c e i t fu l . . .greedy and 
avaricious."^** That the prince must be as ferocious as the 
l ion  and as cunning as the fox is a re f le c t io n  of 
Machiavel1l ' s b e l ie f  that history proves the most successful 
ru lers  to be those who do not scruple to break th e ir  
pledges. Since most men are wicked and fa i th le s s ,  
Machiavelli sanctions the sovereign's breach of t rea ty  where 
f i d e l i t y  to such an agr eeirrn t wou Id turn tn the di sad van f -■ <~ 
of one who signed i t . * °  Pope Alexander VI"s success in 
extending his power throughout I t a ly ,  Machiavelli explained, 
was due to the fact  that he was a past master of th is  
str  at agem. * 1
Unlike many of the 1ater proponents of ra i son d'£ t at in
European p o l i t ic s ,  Machiavelli was both ambivalent and 
c r i t i c a l  about the balance of power system. The 
ineffectiveness of the balance of power in the I t a ly  of his 
day for creating unity against foreign aggression from the 
outside discredited the concept in his eyes. Pr 1 or to the 
invasion of Charles V I I I  of France, power was d istr ibuted  
among the Holy See, the Venetian Republic, the Kingdom of 
Naples, the Duchy of Milan, and the Florentines. While the 
greatest of the f iv e  powers was Venice and Rome, i t  toot an 
a l l ian ce  of the other four to hold Venice in check. Rome 
was held at bay by fomenting discord among the Orsini and 
Colonna factions. Machiavelli admitted that th is  sort o-f 
arrangement was sound policy in the days when the balance of 
power was f a i r l y  stable in I t a ly ,  but he thought i t  would be 
mistaken in his own day.®3
In addition, Machiavelli was c r i t i c a l  of a l l ian ces ,  the 
working combination of states within the balance of power 
system. The chaos into which I t a ly  had fa l le n ,  he thought, 
was la rg ly  due to the use of disloyal mercenary and a l l ie d  
troops. Instead, Machiavelli advocated a policy of m i l i ta ry  
s e l f - r e l ia n c e ." 4 He cited the case of Caesar Borgia who 
began with a l l ie d  troops, turned to mercenaries, and ended 
with his own forces.®0 At the same time, he argued that no 
ru ler  can simply afford to ignore the workings of the 
balance of power system. For example, Machiavelli thought 
that the ru ler  was i l l -a d v is e d  to remain neutral in a
c o n f l ic t  between two nearby powers, -for he would lose no 
matter which side should win, whereas he could only lose one 
way i f  he were committed.** In short, the prudent prince 
was one who is able to develop his own m il i t a ry  arsenal and 
re ly  on i t  alone and never, unless compelled by necessity, 
on the power of a l l i e s .
In conclusion, i t  must oy noted that liach 1 avel 1 i ' s 
desire that I t a ly  a t ta in  unity and freedom from foreign  
interference did not enta i l  a state organized for peace 
rather than conquest. The Greet: ideal of the small state  
f ree  from preoccupation with external a f fa i r s ,  absorbing i t s  
energies within i t s e l f ,  was not pract ica l . -7, He learned 
from Polybius that nothing is  permanent in human a f fa i r s  and 
that the f or tunes of ever y state are repeat ed in a cycle of 
r is e  and f a l l .  I f  orgam z ed on1y to 1i , with no thought 
of foreign conquest, necessity may nevertheless drive them 
to pursue conquest.““ With regard to internat ional  
p o l i t ic s ,  Machiavelli assumed that there is  a necessary and 
natural h o s t i l i t y  among states and that the advancement of 
the in terests  of one must necessarily be at the expense of 
the other. Abandoning good fa i th  as an essential 
requirement for public intercourse, and elevating rai  son 
d 7 61 at above a l l  other consideratlons, Machiavelli rejected  
the p o s s ib i l i ty  of any moral premises uniting the larger  
community of sovereign states.
Thomas Hobbes <1568-1679): Etefore turning to the more
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d irec t  impact of Machiavel1ianiam and raison d1£tat on 
European p o l i t ic s  and statemanship following the Treaty of 
Westphalia (1648), b r ie f  a t tent ion  w i l l  be devoted to how 
the work of the English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, supplies 
a number of in terest ing  var ia tions on the theme of raison 
d"£ta t  in world p o l i t ic s .  While the p o l i t ic a l  thought of 
Hobbes has often been cited as an "adaptation" or even 
"departure" from the thrust of Mach i avel I t s  anal ysi s, 
several reasons can be offered to ju s t i f y  his inclusion 
within the scope of th is  study.
In p a r t ic u la r ,  the philosophy of Hobbes provides an 
early  and in terest ing  example of how specif ic  a t t r ib u te s  of 
rai  son d * £ t  at impact on the Anglo-American t r a d i t io n 8'' of 
theoriz ing  about in ternat ional p o l i t ic s .  Moreover, such an 
invest igation  reveals how certain pr incip les  associated with 
raison d? £t at from the horizon of continental theorists have 
been revised and recast, according to a l te rn a t iv e  
ph ilosophical c r i t e r i a .  F in a l ly ,  the tendency to associate 
postwar American " re a l is ts"  with ei ther  a Hobbesian or 
Machiave11i an worldview of global a f fa i r s  can be better  
understood by including Hobbes as a representat i ve disciple  
of raison d ’ £tat in state behavior.
That the name of Hobbes is  frequently employed by 
contemporary observers to characterize a p ar t ic u la r  vision  
of internat ional  p o l i t ic s  is  subject, however, to some 
q u a l i f ic a t io n .  Indeed, Hobbes constitutes no exception to
the general t ru th  that may be stated about many of the 
greatest thinkers of the past: few ever devoted themselves
prim ari ly  to the study of the subject . ’ 0 The h is to r ica l  
drama in re la t io n  to which Hobbes1 ideas ta le  much of their  
relevance was, a f te r  a l l ,  not an international but an 
internal c iv i l  c o n f l ic t .  Aside from the more general 
objective of providing a s c ie n t i f ic  basis for moral and 
p o l i t ic a l  philosophy, his thought seeks to contribute to the 
establishment of c iv ic  peace and amity and to the disposing 
of mankind toward f u l f i l l i n g  i t s  c iv ic  d u t ie s .^ 1 The 
p r io r i t y  that Hobbes assigns to the pursuit of domestic or 
internal peace over internat ional concord appears to re f le c t  
his b e l ie f  that internal s t r i f e  is  more t e r r ib le  than s t r i f e  
among states.
At the same time, a var ie ty  of h is to r ica l  and 
in te l le c tu a l  factors led Hobbes also to re f le c t  on 
in ternat ional and in te rs ta te  c o n f l ic t .  Born in 1508—the 
year of the Spanish Armada— Hobbes lived through the 
struggles of the Hapsburg ascendancy, the last phase of the 
European wars of re l ig io n ,  and the ear ly  phase of the wars 
for naval and mercantile pr edomi n anre-. w*' Ac a youth hr- t'sr. 
introduced to the subject by his readings of Thucydides’ 
History of the F'el oponnesi an War. Francis Baron’ s essay on 
The True Greatness of Kingdoms, and John Selden's Mare 
Clausum. More s ig n if ic a n t ly ,  in Hobbes' time, c iv i l  
confl ic ts  and in te rs ta te  co n f l ic ts  were c lea r ly  bound
together.^3 C iv i l  wars brought opportunities -for -foreign 
intervent ion, and re l ig ious  lo y a l t ie s  linked part ies  across 
state boundaries. In his account o-f the history o-f the 
English C iv i l  War <Behemoth). Hobbes attempted to show that 
co n fl ic ts  within states are often determined by re lat ions  
among them. In fa c t ,  the in s t i tu t io n  of Commonwealth can be 
ju s t i f ie d  by reference to i ts  capacity to insure internal  
security  as well as i t s  a b i l i t y  to e f fe c t iv e ly  re s is t  
foreign intrusions.^"*
In terms of his contribution to world p o l i t ic s ,  Hobbes 
seeks to account for the logic of re la t ions  between 
independent powers that find themselves in a s i tuat ion  of 
anarchy. Both descriptive and prescript ive c r i t e r i a  
structured the direct ion of his inquiry. On the one hand, 
Hobbes explains why and haw these powers do and must 
confront one another under the imperatives of international  
anarchy; on the other hand, he suggests what they should and 
sometimes can do to insure a modicum of security  even while 
remaining in th is  condition. Hobbes’ view of internat ional  
anarchy is premised on the idea of a "state of nature" 
that functions both as a description for the l i f e  of 
individual men as well as the condition of states in 
re la t io n  to one another. In a state of nature, pr ior  to the 
establishment of c iv i l  society, man 1s at war with man 
seeking to ju s t i f y  his own desires, to keep what he has or 
to preserve his re p u ta t io n .*0 In such a condition, men
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l iv e  in "continual -fear" and in "danger of v iolent death," 
the " l i f e  of man being s o l i ta ry ,  poor, nasty, brutish and 
short. In th is  war of every man against every man, i t  is
not unt il  men enter into c i v i l  society that ju s t ic e  is  
possible for "where there is no common power, there is no 
law: where no law, no in jus t ice ."^ '9'
While Hobbes’ understanding of human nature la id  the 
foundation for his contract theory and defense of 
absolutism, i t  also contributed to his rather f a t a l i s t i c  
view concerning world p o l i t ic s .  The l i f e  of individual men 
in the state of nature may be interpreted as a description  
of the existence of states in re la t io n  to one another. 
Nations l i f e  individuals,  before the la t te r  are coerced by a 
supreme authority ,  exist within a state of nature, which is 
a state of war.1’ 0 At the same time, however, Hobbes stops 
just  short of suggesting that a l 1 in ternat lanal p o l i t ic s  is  
characterised by recurrent and unending warfare. The 
s itu ta t io n  is not one of war, but of a "posture of war."
The very v ig i lance  of the state is  i t s e l f  a modification of 
a world of to tal  chaos and implies, in however rudimentary 
form, some degree of order in the world of states.
I t  is  a feature of a condition of war that "the notions 
of r igh t  and wrong, jus t ice  and in jus t ice  have there no 
p la c e ."100 Where there is  no common power to enforce 
compliance with legal requirements, force and fraud become 
the virtues by which the statesman acts to preserve the
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security of the s tate .  The conception of internat ional law,
which Hugo Brotius had established as offer ing a l im ita t io n
to c o n f l ic t  among nations, was refuted by Hobbes with the
foilowing remart:
Concer ni ng the of f ices of one soverei gn to 
another, which are comprehended in that law, which 
is  commonly called the law of nations, 1 need not 
say anything in th is  place, because the law of 
nations, and the law of Nature, is the same 
thing. And every sovereign hath the same r ig h t ,  
in procuring the safety of his peoples, that any 
p art icu lar  man can have in procuring the 
safety of his own body. 101
I t  is  Hobbes-’ conception of the natural r ig h t  of states  
to take a l l  appropriate actions to ensure the ir  own survival 
that l inks him to the continental t ra d i t io n  of ra i  son 
d’ f t a t . In asserting the ult imate freedom of states from 
moral fe t te r s ,  at least where the objective of 
self-preservat ion  is  concerned, and in his will ingness to 
allow whatever measures are ra t io n a l ly  judged necessary to 
achieve th is  object ive,  Hobbes stands within the broad 
t ra d i t io n  Df Machiavellianism. 10:1 I t  is well to remember 
that  only the i nternal a f fa i r s  of states, according to 
Hobbes, are susceptible to ra t iona l  pac if ica t ion  by means of 
sett ing  up an all-powerful Leviathan capable of restoring  
order and t r a n q u i l i t y  in the commonwealth. In the absence 
of a supranational Leviathan with the power to transform the 
internat ional s tate of nature (b e l1 urn omn i um contra omnes),  
Hobbes’ doctrine of natural r ight  performs the function of 
hallowing s e l f - i n t e r e s t . 103
Yet i t  is also possible to point to a number of 
important differences between Machiavelli and Hobbes 
concerning the core assumptions of raison d' £t a t . At the 
out set , i t  is quest i on ab 1 e to what e::tent Hobbes sub sc r 1 bed 
to Mach1ave l1i ' s understanding of the state as a l iv ing  
personality , which had a value of i t s  own and which 
possessed, in raispn ri' £ t a t . a law governing the ongoing 
process of i t s  own per f ect i on. For Hobbes, the personallty  
of the state is reduced to an a r t i f i c i a l  authority  created 
by individual acts of w i l l  and embodied in an Absolute 
Sovereign W i l l . 10"* In other words, the sovereign becomes an 
a r t i f i c i a l  person who represents "the words and actions of 
another." In return for obedience and the surrender of 
th e ir  natural right, to unlimited self-defense (a 
precondition tor c i v i l  society) ,  the subjects may expect a 
sovereign to establish a milieu in which they can pursue 
f e l i c i t y  in reasonable t ra n q u i l i t y .  The sovereign's tast is 
not to repress men, but to help create those conditions 
under which they can express th e ir  in d iv id u a l i ty .
While Hobbes' Levi athan is  often considered the climax 
of the K<=, o 1 u t l s t  c o n r p p h n n  of T' hr* r t  at e a n d  r *• • ~ on d r £t_at . 
i t  does not ceiebrate absolutism for the sate of the idea 
i t s e l f .  A completely in d iv id u a l is t ic  and u t i l i t a r i a n  s p i r i t  
pervades everything that he has to say about the f ina l  
purposes of the s t a t e . to= I t  is precisely th is  a t t r ib u te  of 
Hobbes' p o l i t ic a l  philosophy which sets him apart from
Machiavellian rai son d *6 t a t . While Hobbes’
mechanically-contrived state may ca l l  for blind obedience 
from i t s  c i t izens  for the sale of public order and 
individual well-being, i t  cannot require from them that 
devotion founded on fa i th  and attachment to the t r u ly  and 
l iv in g  personal s t a t e . 10A
Two examples may be b r ie f ly  c ited  to i l l u s t r a t e  how 
Hobbes' mechanistic conception of the state d i f fe r s  from the 
v ir tu  republic of Machiavelli .  F i rs t ,  unlike Machiavelli ,  
Hobbes argued that a c i t iz e n  who has been taken captive by 
an enemy country is  ju s t i f ie d  in saving his l i f e  by becoming 
an enemy subject. Second, Hobbes suggested that a c i t izen  
can ask to be released from m i l i t a ry  service to the state as 
long as one can find a s u b s t i tu te .10'7'
fit the same time, Hobbes supplied a new in te l le c tu a l  
ju s t i f ic a t io n  by which to assess and aff irm  the ro le  of 
ra i  son d'6 ta t  in re la t ions  among sovereign states. Hobbes' 
f a t a l i s t i c  equation of the 1nternat1onal state of nature 
with a condition of anarchy contains an important 
q u a l i f ic a t io n ,  re la t in g  to what Hobbes perceived as a 
fundamental tension between morality and power in foreign  
policy.  In foreign p o l i t ic s ,  a l l  the power measures and 
underhanded t r - e l s  of Machiavellianism are possible, because 
the part ic ipants  are bound by no contract and cannot be sure 
that  the laws of nature w i l l  be observed.10"*
However, Hobbes was not prepared to divorce himself
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to ta l ly  from the t ra d it io n  of natural law as the necessary
ethical basis for in te rs ta te  re la t ions .  According to
Hobbes, peace was impossible unless such laws of nature were
observed.10** I t  followed that:
the same law, that d ic ta te th  to men that have no 
c iv i l  government, what they ought to do, and what 
to avoid in regard to one another, d ic ta teth  the 
same to commonwealths, that is ,  to the consciences 
of sovereign princes and sovereign assemblies; 
there being no court of natural ju s t ic e ,  but in 
consc i ence on1y . 110
Yet even here sovereigns are morally obligated to observe
these laws as far  as possible without jeopardising the
safety of th e ir  dominions, since otherwise there would be no
respite from war. Reason, Hobbes argued, was the principal
element in the law of nature and implied a s t r iv ing  towards
some sort of international society. Imperfect as they might
be, these laws of nature, "the a r t ic le s  of peace" as Hobbes
called them, are the l i f e l i n e  to which sovereign states in
the internat ional anarchy must cling i f  they are to
sur v1ve, 111
Cardinal Richelieu (Armand Jean du P le s s is ) ; Throughout the 
course of European h istory,  the d e f in i t io n  and ju s t i f ic a t io n  
of governmental policy has been the most consequential issue 
that has forced i t s  attent ion upon ru lers ,  statesmen, and 
p o l i t ic a l  thinkers a l ike .  The consolidat1 on of power 
commensurate with the emergence of the modern nation state  
must be vi ewed against a bac kground character i zed by the 
breakdown of the community of b e l ie f  (Christendom) that tool
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place in the Re-formation and Mas made mani-fest during the 
Religious Wars o-f the sixteenth and seventeenth 
c e n tu r ie s .113 The unity and moral rec ip ro c ity  o-f the 
medieval Chr i s t 1ani tas was rendered obsolete by the Treaty 
o-f Westphalia, which made the t e r r i t o r i a l  state the 
cornerstone o-f the modern state system.113 The new 
ju s t i f ic a t io n  associated with the development and use of 
power within the modern state and in the community o-f 
nations was, in no small part ,  the achievement of Cardinal 
Richelieu ’ s ( 158*3-1642) po lic ies ,  while serving as prime 
minister of Louis X I I I ’ s France.
The same generation which observed the in a b i l i t y  of 
Wallenstein to convert the Holy Roman Empire of the German 
nation into a modern state saw the consolidation of such a 
state in France under Richelieu. As prime minister,  
Richelieu was charged with the resp o n s ib i l i ty  of preserving 
and strengthening the French state in the face of formidable 
foreign obstacles. These included not only the massive 
Hapsburg challenge abroad but also endemic governmental 
weakness, social fragmentation, and factionalism at home.
In his celebrated Memo!res. Richelieu described his 
conception of policy as consisting of three in terre la ted  
parts: destroying the Huguenot opposition, humbling the 
great nobles and reducing them to subjects, and raising the 
royal prestige and power abroad to i t s  deserved "place in 
the sun . 1 1 1 *
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At the core of R ichelieu's domestic and -foreign policy
designs was one central ambition: aggr and 1z emen t  o-f the
royal power at home and abroad to the point where true
sovereignty and independence would be rea lized . The
rel  at 1onsh i p between Louis X I I I  and Richelieu was 1ntense1y
personal and mutually advantageous. While a sovereign o-f
l im ited a b i l i t y ,  Louis X I I I  had ti.e judgment to support
Richelieu as the embodiment o-f royal power and prestige. 11D
In turn, by mating the achievement of absolute power by the
ting his overriding goal, Richelieu enhanced his own
position accordingly. The p o l i t ic a l  objectives of
Richelieu have been summarized by Carl Friedrich as follows:
Through him, a prince of the church, the claims of 
absolute secular authority  were made to p reva i l ,  
and the body corporate of the modern state came 
into b e in g . . . .T h e  state which Machiavelli had 
visualized as the most admirable work of art  man 
can make thus emerged in true baroque style:  not 
c lear ly  against the church, but part ly  by i t s  
conni vance.11v
While the f u l l  range of R ichelieu 's l i t e r a r y  and 
p o l i t ic a l  achievements are beyond the purposes of th is  
study, specif ic  consideration w i l l  be given to his 
conceptual formulation of the state as a necessary moral 
end. Attention w i l l  also be devoted to the implications of 
his philosophy of the state for diplomatic and p o l i t ic a l  
re la t ions  within the v o la t i le  European state system. To 
what extent did Richelieu draw upon or modify Machiavel11 an 
raison d' 61at in his ju s t i f ic a t io n  of French absolutism^ Is 
the p o l i t ic ia n  or diplomat obliged to evaluate his actions
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exclusively -from the standpoint of expediency and success; 
or should he pursue the paths of personal honor and 
righteousness though the end may be f a i lu r e 7 How did 
Richelieu d i f fe r e n t ia te  between public and pr ivate realms of 
ethical behavior in his e f fo r ts  to defend the in te g r i ty  of 
France against internal subversion and external 
constr1ct io n ? F in a l ly ,  in what respects did Richelieu's  
defense of the state provide a foundation of pr incip les  and 
precepts for the practice of power p o l i t ic s  in internat ional  
r el at i ons?
A leading biographer of Richelieu points out that “the 
concept of reason of state was the most important 
contribution of Cardinal R ichelieu ’ s generation to the 
growth of p o l i t ic a l  thought in France."**** Along with the 
development of d iv in e -r ig h t  sovereignty, the formulation of 
a viable raison d7 £ta t  supplied the essential foundations 
for seventeenth century absolutism. The la t te r  concept was 
not new in that i t  concerned very old and continuing 
p o l i t ic a l  problems; moreover, many of the p o l i t ic a l  writers  
of R ichelieu ’ s period who were preoccupied with a new 
ju s t i f ic a t io n  <or the state ra re ly  transcended the 
in te l le c tu a l  categories that they had inherited from the 
past. By contrast, Richelieu stands out as one of the few 
great thinkers who was able to synthesize prevail ing  
p o l i t ic a l  concepts in order to ju s t i f y  the po l ic ies  he 
believed necessary to the continued success and expansion of
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the French state system. Before elaborating on the more 
specif ic  a t tr ib u te s  of R ichel ieu 's conception o-f ra i  son 
d ' # t a t . i t  is  important to take b r ie f  note of how reason of 
state in the service of French absolutism may be 
distinguished from the e a r l ie r  Mach1 ave l1ian version.
A number of ph11osophica1 and hi s tor lca l  consider atlons 
produced a s ig n if ic an t  evolution in the meaning of raison 
d' 61 a t from Machiave11i ' s I t a ly  to Richelieu's modern 
European state system. I t  w i l l  be recalled that the 
p o l i t ic a l  mechanism and agents that so intrigued Machiavelli 
were not yet state persona1i t i e s ; instead, they were 
personalit ies  of heroic figures who held a st ato in th e ir  
hands. For a l l  , rac t ic a l  purposes, in Machiave11l ' s
conception, the chief meaning of stato amounted to a power 
apparatus. Despite the insight Machiavelli provided into  
the inner structure of the state (as well as the link  
between national v i t a l i t y  and external p o l i t ic a l  power), he 
s t i l l  permitted the philosophical (or e th ica l )  
presuppositions that  lay behind the operations of power 
policy to fade out of the p ic t u r e .120 Rather than 
calculat ing these operations themselves, his task was 
l im ited to judging what was expedient in the actions of 
individual statesmen.131
In addition, i t  was not un t i l  the r is e  of the modern 
nation state system in seventeenth century Europe that  
raison d' &tat could provide a new f oundati on f or a more
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systematic account -for the in te rre la t ionsh ip  among state  
in terests .  The growing empirical s p i r i t  of the la t te r  
period moved p o l i t ic a l  thinkers to re-fine th e ir  perception 
that the supra—personal i nteressi di stato governed the 
conduct of individual states (uniting one, and disuniting  
another) . 132 The new thinkers and p o l i t ic a l  prac1111 oners 
inherited tiachiavel1i ’ s conviction that the movement of 
p o l i t ic s  proceeded from the deep-rooted v i ta l  forces of 
states; at the same time, however, they arrived at a much 
c1 earer understandlng that these v i t a l  forces had begun to 
d l f fe r e n t ia te  themselves more strongly from one another in 
European state rel  a t ions.
Although r ai son d' £t at was believed to be a motivating 
force for a l l  national units, at tent ion now turned to how 
various states began to shape th e ir  own special existence 
and destiny according to p ar t ic u la r  in terests and needs.
This produced an i mpu1se ln both p o l i t ic a l  thought and 
statesmanship to go beyond the purely subjective aspect of 
sta te c ra ft  and raw state egoism and id e n t i fy  the "objective" 
interconnections of state a c t iv i t y  beyond national 
borders.133 For the f i r s t  time, r ai son d * £tat was elevated 
to the level of a composite p lcture or prlnc i p1e of European 
state rel a t lons■ The f i r s t  attempt to put forth  th is  
p r inc ip le  was made in France during the era of Richelieu.
The precise nature of R ichel ieu 's contribution to 
raison d' £tat continues to e l i c i t  debate and disagreement
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among leading scholars and biographers. A number of authors 
tend to regard him as l i t t l e  more than a man of power, a 
Machiavellian statesman in Cardinal 's  c l o t h i n g . S u c h  a 
view unduly d is to r ts  the tension in R ichelieu '5 po lic ies  
between p o l i t ic s  and morals, power and p r in c ip le ,  ethics and 
expediency. While a master technician of power, his ideals  
and conception of the good state were such that he was also 
a man of higher p r inc ip le  as well .  The re l ig iou s  character 
of the French state for whose good he committed many 
high-handed acts serves to indicate the d is t in c t io n  between 
Richelieu 's worldview and the secularism of Machiavelli .  I t  
must be emphasised that the functions and objectives of the 
French state were shaped to a consi derab1e extent by i t s  
Christian t ra d it io n s ,  values, and purposes. As for  
Richelieu, himself, the s in cer i ty  of his re l ig ious  b e l ie fs  
is  generally accepted, and he was thoroughly convinced that 
they were in no way compromised by his often ruthless  
polic ies  for the good of the French s t a t e . 1
Cardinal R ichelieu 's use of power presented the problem 
of just government in a Christian monarchy and inspired  
widespread dnh-ife over the leg it im ate e:: or r is e  r>f royal 
power in both foreign and domestic a f fa i r s .  His version of 
raison d' £tat was b u i l t  on the concept of the unique r ights,  
nature, and purposes of the Christian state.  1 The first:
foundation of the happiness of the state, said Richelieu,  
was the establishment of the reign of God. The divinely
4 8
established relat ionsh ip  between church and state decreed 
t h a t , in  th e ir  sphere, the king and his minister were more 
knowledgeable than a l l  others concerning the proper measures 
by which to guide France to i t s  higher o b je c t iv e s . ia“ From 
F(i chel i euy s perspective, r ai son d ' £t at provided a kind of 
means-end r a t io n a l i t y  and succeeded in ju s t i fy in g  p o l i t ic a l  
measures that  were in themselves morally objectionable but 
which benefited the state as a whole.
The application of a means-end r a t io n a l i ty  to state  
conduct implied a sharp d is t in c t io n  between the public and 
private  spheres of ethical behavior. The c r i t i c a l  problem 
in R ichelieu ’ s l i f e  was the uneasy interact ion between 
public a c t iv i t y  and re l ig ious  standards. In an age of 
l i t t l e  fa i th  in human goodness, Richelieu was pessimistic 
about humanity. He was convinced that the ev i l  in man 
derived from a fa l le n  nature and a propensity to Bin.
Freedom in the early  seventeenth century meant in practice  
l icense; therefore,  freedom (in theory) had to give place to 
the concept of order, a notion which appears more often than 
any other in R ichelieu 's w rit ing .
R ichelieu ’ s approach, therefore, gave r ise  to a dual 
moral standard i n nat i onal and 1nternat i ona1 a f fa i r s .  In 
his Memoi re s . Richelieu acknowledged that "there is a 
difference between c iv i l  and p o l i t ic a l  prudence, and this is 
so great that the moral order r e a l ly  makes two separate 
v ir tues  of them. 1,130 He once wrote:
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In the course of ordinary a H a i r s  jus t ice  requires  
c la r i t y  and evidence o-f proof. But i t  is not the 
same when one is  concerned with a f fa i r s  of state,  
when one is  dealing with the summum rerun. for  
often conjectures must stand in place of proof, 
considering that  great designs. . .  can never be 
v e r i f ie d  except by th e ir  success or outcome.11* 1
The new force of raison d’ £tat in French foreign policy
and diplomacy i l lu s t r a te d  that peripheral or ad[ hoc methods
and aims of s ta te c ra f t  were gradually replaced by intensive
«nd centr a l i  z ed co n tro l . 11 was no 1onger suf f i c i ent f or
the statesman simply to possess a special knowledge of the
state i t s e l f  in the pursuit of t e r r i t o r i a l  independence and
sovereignty. Indeed, contemporary statesmanship rose to a
more comprehensive p o l i t i c a l  vision which brought within i t s
focus the state in i t s  re la t ions  with other states, how i t
is  governed, and the ie la t ionsh ip  between ru lers and
subj ect s. 13 =
The outbreak: of the Thir ty  Years War (1638-1648) and 
the s t i r r in g s  of a new great ambition on the part of France 
heralded a tendency toward pure power p o l i t ic s  which had 
already flourished at the time of Machiavel1i . However, the 
power p o l i t ic s  of Richpli eu can be distingui shed from the 
simple, egocentric prescr1ptions of Machiavelli by : (1) an
insight into Europe as a c o l le c t iv e  whole; (2) a clearer  
perception of the connection between unity within the state  
and the external manifestation of powers <3) a strong sense 
of the great and dominating powers; and (4) a conscious 
reaction against permitting ecclesiast ical  and
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denominational considerations obscure the simple interests  
o-f power. 133 The significance o-f r ai son dT £t at -for French 
power and independence in Europe can be i l lu s t r a te d  by 
France's entry into the Th ir ty  Years War in 1635 and the 
subsequent attempt to counter the imperial designs of the 
Spanish and Austrian Hapsburgs. The ju s t i f ic a t io n  for 
Richelieu ’ s po lic ies  centered around the tension between 
p o l i t ic s  and morals in the Cardinal’ s devotion to the 
national in terests  of France at a time when the ancient 
unity of Christendom was beyond repa ir .  That French 
diplomatic objectives in opposition to the formidable 
Hapsburg league were based on the in terests of power over 
re l ig ious  c r i t e r i a  is ,  however, subject to an important 
quallf  i cat i on.
As previously mentioned, raison d' 6tat in seventeenth 
century France assumed the character of a special means-end 
r a t io n a l i t y .  Questionable methods were often ju s t i f ie d  i f  
they served the s ta te  as a whole. At the same time, there 
is  l i t t l e  doubt that Richelieu operated upon the assumption 
that the purpose of the French state was essent la l ly  
r e l i  q i ous and that the cause of re l ig ion  might therefore be 
served by less than ethical acts in support of French in te ­
rests. In short, in R ichelieu’ s thought the subordination 
of moral-ethical factors to power considerations applied 
s p e c if ic a l ly  to the sphere of means, as opposed to ends.
I t  is  possible to id e n t i fy  b r ie f ly  a number of key
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diplomatic pr inc ip les  and objectives integral to Richelieu's  
successful defense of French interests in Europe. All 
p o l i t ic a l  w riters  of the period believed that the problem of 
1nternat i onal peace was best resolved by a theory of 
e q u i l ib r iu m .13'* France and the Hapsburgs were seen as two 
poles of power, evenly balanced. As Philippe de B£thune, 
the French ambassador in Rome, wrote: "The security  of
states consisting p r in c ip a l ly  in an equal counterpoise of 
power, and the aggrandizement of one prince implying the 
ruination of his neighbors, i t  is wise to prevent 1t . " 133 
The means for balancing Hapsburq aggression was R ichel ieu 's  
a l l ian ce  with the leading Protestant powers of Europe.
Moreover, Richeli eu7 s support of the balance of power 
p rin c ip le  derived from his conviction that the arsenal of 
diplomacy served as a weapon for the advancement of state  
in terests .  I t  is  important to view his be l ie f  in the 
eff icacy  of diplomacy within the larger h is to r ic a l  content 
of the "community of reason" character is t ic  of seventeenth 
century Europe. Richelieu was a man of the time of 
Descartes and C orneil le .  In his Testament Pol i t lgue he once 
wrote:
The l ig h t  of natural reason enables everyone to 
Enow th a t ,  since man is endowed with reason, he 
must do nothing except by reason, for otherwise he 
would act contrary to his nature, and as a resu lt ,  
contrary against Him who is  i t s  au thor.13*
What is  important, however, is  that Richelieu's confidence
in reason extended beyond the range of the national
community to the community o-f nations. I-f man was 
essent ia l ly  reasonable and would be guided by reason, then 
the way to obtain what one wanted for one's own country was 
to reason with the representatives of o th e rs .13"^
The tension between ethics and power in foreign policy 
is  ty p i f ie d  by R ichelieu ’ s position on the question of 
f i d e l i t y  to trea ty  obligations. As for the l i n g ’ s relat ions  
with fe l low  princes, Richelieu found i t  indispensable that  
he keep fa i th  and observe sworn t re a t ie s ,  once his word was 
p1 edged:
Kings should be wary of making t re a t ie s ,  but when 
they are made, they should re l ig io u s ly  observe 
them ... .But  without consider ing.. .what Christian  
fa i th  may teach against such ma::ims, I maintain 
that since the loss of honor is  greater than that  
of l i f e ,  a great prince should r isk  even his  
person and in terests  of the state rather than 
break his word which he cannot v io la te  without 
losing his good re p u ta t io n .13®
On the supposition that the "community of reason" applied to
the community of nations, the statesman could not afford to
disregard i t  by f a i lu r e  to negotiate or by f a i lu r e  to
observe the commitments entered into by way of diplomatic
negot i at i on.
By way of summation, Richelieu believed that he had 
forged a ju s t i f i c a t io n  for extensive application of 
discretionary power to achieve the s ta te ’ s higher purposes. 
The idea of a pure state in te res t ,  of the subordination of 
any fortu itous and in s t in c t iv e  impulse to the inexorable 
ru le  of ra i  son d’ 6 t a t « was tempered by a commitment to the
■fundamentally re l ig ious  end o-f the French state.  However, 
the subsequent evolution o-f the nature and practices o-f the 
state  gave rai  son d' etat a di-f-ferent meaning. With the 
further  development of state power and the expanding 
secular ization of European cu lture,  the exigencies of 
p o l i t ic *  eventually undermined the fusion of re l ig io n  and 
p o l i t ic s .  l 's'f When applied to the manifold relat ionsh ips of 
state power in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 
doctrine of ra i  son d76tat rap id ly deteriorated into a 
m a te r ia l is t1c a b i l i t y  for ca lcu la t ion , into a purely 
u t i l i t a r i a n  technique and mechanism of p o l i t ic a l  t r a d e .140
Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck: Appearing before the
Prussian Parliament in 18B1 for the purpose of defending the
growing m il i ta ry  budget and power of the empire. Chancellor
Bismarck (1615-1890) answered his progressive and l ib e ra l
opponents with the fallowing observation:
I have always had one compass only, one lodestar 
by which I have steered; sal us publi ca. the 
welfare of the s t a t e . . . . !  have always acted 
according to the question, "What is  useful,  
advantageous, and r i  ght for my Father1 and, and — 
for my dynasty, and today— for the German nation"7"
I have never been a th eo r is t .  The systems which 
bind separate part ies  are for me of secondary 
importance. The natmn comes f i r s t ,  i t s  position  
in the world and i ts  independence.1"*1
While the precise motives and h is to r ica l  consequences of
Bismarck's domestic and diplomatic machinations have long
been debated by scho lars ,143 few have denied his brazen
aff irmat ion of raison d7 6tat in the service of the Prussian
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s tate  and German uni f i c a t i m .
As with e a r l ie r  champions of rai  son d ’ &t at in world 
p o l i t ic s ,  i t  is  possible to formulate several preliminary  
questions in order to help id e n t i fy  the sa l ien t  themes 
contributing to Bismarck’ s defense of state object ive*  in 
internat ional a f fa i r s .  F i rs t ,  what h is to r ica l  developments 
and events in nineteenth century Europe and Germany were 
i nstrumental in the energet i c dr i ve to create a new German 
nation state? Second, to what extent did Bi smarck draw on 
more t ra d it io n a l  philosophical and p o l i t ic a l  arguments 
associated with ra i  son d’ £tat in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries? Third, in what ways did ra i  son 
d’ £tat function as the foundation for the diplomacy of 
Real do1l t i k ? In p a r t ic u la r ,  how was Bismarck’ s cabinet 
diplomacy and war policy affected by new, unpredictable  
f actors (e .g . ,  publie opin i on, popular pressures, or 
ideologies) which jeopardised the very s t a b i l i t y  of the 
Concert of Europe^* F in a l ly ,  how did the peculiar admixture 
of might and r ig h t  in Bismarck’ s "blood and iron" version of 
rai son d’ 6t at contribute to the ult imate collapse of the 
Hohenzollern Empire in 1918^
Bismar c k’ s r ls e  to power can be traced to the 
revolutionary fervor that swept over Europe in 1848. The 
new l ib e ra l  and democratic movement had shown i t s e l f  
power 1 ess to create a German national state.  Bi smarck’ s 
repudiation of democratic doctrines and his protests against
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the subordinate part played by Prussia in the th ir ty -e ig h t  
member German Confederation, which had succeeded the old 
empire in 1815 under Austr ia 's  continued hegemony, had 
already gained -for him the goodwill o-f the sovereign. 143 
Only under a p a r t ic u la r ly  favorable constellat ion o-f 
European powers could German nationalism r isk  a new attempt 
in th is  d irec t ion . Indeed, the danger of intervention by 
the great neighboring powers was a l l  the more serious, 
because the Hapsburg monarchy was determined to reassert i t s  
old hegemony over Germany and minimize Prussian aspirations  
for leadership.
Upon assuming the position of Minister-President in 
18£)2, Bismarck announced that he did not believe that the 
German problem could be solved in any way but through “blood 
and i r o n ." 1'*-  Rejected were the visionary hopes of his 
l ib e ra l  antagonists that Prussia could build a united 
Germany by "moral conquests" or by arousing the support of 
public opinion. Without an armed struggle against Austria, 
the Prussian monarchy had v i r t u a l ly  no prospect of asserting 
i t s  claim to German leadership. German nationalism provided 
the moral issue by which to ju s t i f y  a war with Austria, the 
moral el an by which to gain the v ic tory ,  and f i n a l l y  the 
centripetal  force with which to consolidate the new state  
which would then emerge.1*** The creation of a German nation 
state was f or Bi smarck not an ul t  i mate obj e c t lv e , but an 
incidental resu lt  of his s t r iv ing  for a more powerful
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state.
Convinced that  three wars must be fought before Prussia 
would be powerful enough to assert primacy in Germany, 
Bismarck sought and found occasions for them. The war with 
Denmark in 1864 gained for Prussia the duchies of Schleswig 
and Holstein. By defeating Austria in the "Seven Weeks War1 
of 1866, Bismarck was able to end Austrian control of the 
old German Confederation. In i t s  place the North German 
Confederation was formed under Prussian domination, with 
Austria and four southern German states excluded. F in a l ly ,  
the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 preempted French 
intervention in German a f fa i r s  and made possible the 
in tegrat ion  of a l l  the German states into a revived empire 
enlarged by the recovery of the old imperial t e r r i t o r i e s  of 
Alsace and Lorraine. Treaties were negotiated during the 
war s t ipu la t ing  that  a l l  of Germany should be united into a 
Hohenrollern empire. These agreements were given formal 
e f fe c t  in 1871 when king William I of Prussia was invested 
with the t i t l e  of German Emperor and Bismarck: became the 
f i r s t  Imperial Chancellor.
Machiavelli ’ s doctrine of ra i  son dJ£tat as the servant 
of p o l i t i c a l  necessity became the powerful weapon by which 
Bismarck ju s t i f i e d  the power needs of the Prussian state.
He rejected the admonitions of his conservative colleagues, 
that the guiding p r inc ip le  of state policy should be the 
ethical  command to res is t  revolutionary forces; and he
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argued that the ult imate norm o-f state behavior was derived 
■from the immediate in terests of the state i t s e l f .  Realis t ic
and successful policy could be 
statesman f i r s t  looked to the 
circumstances of his own state  
those needs could be realised  
1 nternati onal pol i t  i cs. 1‘* 7' In 
ignore e th1c a l~ p o l i t ic a l  doctr 
a l ien  to his own Prussian stat  
Bismarck claimed that the 
action pr im ari ly  from i t s e l f  a 
forbidding the state to consul 
self-deception or hypocrisy.1"* 
fundamental presupposi11 on of 
practiced in diplomatic a f f a i r  
nineteenth century p o l i t ic a l  r 
only healthy basis for a great 
egotism.. . . I t  is unworthy of a 
somethi ng which does not corre 
in t e r e s t s . " 14’’ I t  is  in terest  
eminent German h1st or i an of th 
von Ranke, coupled the premise 
idea of a moral purpose which 
Bismarck was much less concern 
questions and was inclined to 
state morai i t y . He contended
formulated only i f  the 
specif ic  needs and 
and then re f lec ted  on how 
within the arena of 
deed, Bismarck, could and did 
ines which transcended or were 
e.
s ta te  derived i t s  norms of 
nd viewed any doctrine  
t i t s  own interests  as either  
** State egoi sm was the 
the Realpol11i k which Bismarck 
s. In opposition to 
omanticism, he suggested: "The
s t a t e . . . i s  state  
great state to contend for  
spond to i t s  own 
ing to note that the most 
e nineteenth century, Leopold 
of state egotism with the 
the state must f u l f i l l .  1=10 
ed with such philosophical 
leave moot the question of 
that the p o s s ib i l i t y  of more
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pragmatic p o l i t ic a l  achievement obligated the prudent 
etstesman to think ex c1usi vel y in p o l i t ic a l  categor 1 es.
In addition, the s t r ic t  separation o-f p o l i t ic s  from 
morality was no more v iv id ly  exemplified than by the 
diplomatic maneuvers and foreign policy aims associated with 
Bismarckian Real p o l i t i k . Amid the great powers of the 
continent, there was no p o s s ib i l i ty  of "splendid 
isolationism" or insular aloofness typical of England's 
l ib e ra l  empire. Instead of calm repose and conei1ia t io n , 
the cardinal v ir tu e  of a statesman was s t r i c t  v ig i lance  and 
the exertion of a l l  energies an behalf of the state.
Bismarck ju s t i f ie d  the authoritar ian  nature of his state by 
the pressure of an internat ional  s i tuation  constantly 
threatened with struggles for power. 1131 Moreover, he argued 
that the foreign policy of such a state could be 
successfully conducted only under the completely 
unrestrained sovereignty o-f a monarchical government 
independent of f le e t in g  par 1iamentary m ajor it ies .  I t  was 
from th is  point of view that Bismarck's a t t i tu d e  on 
diplomacy, power, and war must be understood.
While William Gladstone was the extreme champion of 
English and insular s ta te c ra ft ,  B i s m a r c k  was perhaps the 
most powerful repr esentat l ve o-f a continental,  
hierarchica lly -organized , ac t ive ly  be l l igeren t  great 
power.‘ “3 In fa c t ,  the Chancellor was the last great 
representative of cabinet diplomacy which governed the fate
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of Europe from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century.
The resourcefulness and re s tra in t  of his diplomatic 
overtures re f lec ted  the trad it io n s  of Richelieu, Maserin, 
Kaumt: , and Metternich. These past masters of diplomacy 
operated on the basis of known quant i t ies—ru lers ,  
ministers, court favorites .  They did not have to concern 
themselves with such new pressures as pub l ie  opinion and 
m il i ta n t  ideology. Yet the time when these new elements 
could be ignored was drawing to an end; the age of mass 
communication and p o l i t ic a l  movements was rap id ly  
approaching.,H3 To Bismarck, diplomacy remained a technique 
whose prudent maneuvers ought not to be deflected by popular 
demands. In general, he f e l t  strong and secure enough 
either  to ignore or manipulate these forces, and 
dip lom atica lly  he was largely successful.
fit the same time, however, i t  is  important to take 
b r ie f  note of how Bismarckian cabinet diplomacy can be 
distinguished from the statesmanship and p o l i t ic a l  strategy 
associated with the "community of reason" which was to 
supply the foundation for the Concert of Europe. Following
the dissolution of the cnmm1 ■ n i t y of reason ? t the t i mo o +
the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, there was an 
attempt at the Congress of Vienna (1815) to revive i t  under 
the Concert of Europe. Concert members (France. England, 
Prussia, Austria, and Russia) were to act j o in t l y  to
maintain national " s ta b i l i t y "  through monarchical ru le  and
internat ional " t r a n q u i l i t y 1 through the balance o-f power. 134
On a number o-f occasions, however, concerted action was
possible only when i t  happened to concide with the several
national in terests  of the Powers.1®” In a famous remark
about Europe representing l i t t l e  more than a geographic
expression, Bismarck proclaimed:
That Europe cannot give way is  a proposition that  
I cannot accept, for I do not admit the conception 
of Europe as a jo in t  l i a b i l i t y .  The f iv e  powers 
have agreed on precise measures whose possible 
inadequacy was recognized from the very 
begi nni ng. 10*
In contrast to the cosmopolitanism of be tte rn 1ch,
Castlereigh, and Tallyrand, Bismarck lacked any sense of a
transcendent European community united by the “trad it io n s  of
c i v i l i t y . "  The only viable order l e f t  in the West, as far
as he was concerned, was the community of mutual fear ,  the
balance of power. xayr
As noted by George Kennan, Bismarck's European policy
was based on the maintenance of a reasonable balance of
power between Austria and Russia and the avoidance of any*
major co n f l ic t  between those two powers.1”*  The new German
Reich was a p o l i t ic a l  arrangement that Bismmark had found
necessary to create in order to assure what he believed to
be Prussia's proper place in the Central European scheme of
things. After emerging victorious from the war of 1670-
1871, Bismarck's diplomacy grew essent ia l ly  defensive with
the purpose of protecting a unif ied  Germany from the threat
of host i le  coa l i t ions .  S p e c if ic a l ly ,  he was concerned to
6 1
preempt a French war o-f revenge by depriving France of 
possible a l l i e s .  S im ila r ly ,  his diplomacy towards both 
Austria and Russia sought to deprive each power o-f any 
incentive to a l ly  with France or confront each other in the 
Balkans. The Three Emperors7 Alliance (Dreikaiserbund) 
among Germany, Austria, and Russia that was engineered by 
Bismarck in 1881 had the dual e f fe c t  of ending the chances 
for a revival of the European Concert and balancing the 
various national claims impinging on the destiny of Central 
Europe. 1
Bismarck's outlook on war did not or ig inate in the 
passions of a conqueror or unrestrained m i l i t a r i s t ,  but in 
the sober raison d7 6tat of a m i l i ta ry  state.  As Gerhart 
R it te r  points out, "he is a s p ir i tu a l  descendent of 
Frederick: the Great in a completely altered world. " 1AO As 
one of the last  great cabinet statesmen of European history,  
he represents a lonely f igure ,  somewhat alien in his own 
time. The European cabinets of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries waged war with a sober calcu lat ion of 
power in terests of the state,  in contrast to the moral and 
re l ig iou s  passions which had been aroused durino the age of 
re l ig ious  wars. For both R ichel ieu 's "community of reason" 
and MetternictVs "Concert of Europe," rai  son d7 £t at 
represented the harmonization of separate national interests  
with European-wide p o l i t ic a l  and cu ltura l  objectives.
By contrast, Bismarck's p o l i t ic a l  and m il i ta ry
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achievement consisted o-f harnessing ra i  son d * 4t at with 
specific  national aims, at a time when the vision of an 
organised in ternat iona1 order based on the w i l l in g  
partnership of self-governing units was i l lu s o ry .  For 
Bismarck, war was not seen as a crusade for the cause of God 
or some abstract sense of the nation, but as a p o l i t ic a l  
struggle to determine superior power,141 Even though 
Bismarck was somewhat harsh about human nature and progress, 
the causes of war were 1 ocated within an i nternatlonal  
environment where con f l ic t ing  power in terests cnu'i d be 
peacefully reconciled. In th is  sense, morality and p o l i t ic s  
were sharply d i f fe re n t ia te d  in his thought. This provided a 
viv id  contrast to the normal turn of m i l i ta ry  and diplomatic 
events since the French Revolution, when almost every 
p o l i t ic a l  c o n f l ic t  tended towards the "to tal"  antagonism and 
moral destruction of the opponent as an "enemy. " 1 *>=: What
separated Bismarck from his German nat iona l is t  successors 
was thus a devotion to prudent raison d”£ t a t . unobscured by 
passion, imposing firm re s tra in ts  on the deployment of 
power, and pursued with the s k i l l  of a born diplomat who 
k new the qr eat cour t s of Europe no other knew t he in. 1 
F in a l ly ,  in what ways did Bismarck's commitment to 
raison d'£ ta t  in both domestic and foreign a f fa i r s  
contribute to, or f a i l  to prevent, the collapse of the 
Hohenzollern Empire in 1919':> Such important figures as 
Jakob Burckhardt and Constantin Franz argued that Bismarck’ s
policy meant the v ictory o-f Mach1ave l1ianism over the 
princ ip les  of morality and ju s t ic e  in internat ional  
r e la t io n s .1A4 I t  le t  perish the higher and f in e r  things m 
cu lture,  due to a re lent less  s tr iv ing  a fte r  power and 
pleasure. On the other hand, there are a number of voices 
to defend Bismarcl. 14,0 They called at tent ion to a l l  the 
sim ilar  experiences of Machiavellian practices in the rest  
of Europe of that day and espec ial ly  to the fact  that  
Bismarck himself acknowledged some l im its  to his policy o-f 
force (e .g . ,  the defensive character of German diplomacy 
a f te r  1870). Moreover, Bismarck did not stand alone in the 
b a t t le  against Catholics and Progressives or in the b i t t e r  
struggle with the s o c ia l is ts .  Yet ne helped to determine- 
the nature of these struggles. Ir respective of whether or 
not he considered himself a "mater of h is to ry ,"  Bismarck did 
face a l te rn a t ives  and made conscious choices.
I t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to determine the extent to which 
Bismarck: shared the conception of a synthesis of power and 
culture as i t  was understood by leaders of the movement for 
German u n if ica t io n .  As Meinecke pointed out, however, the 
inev i tab le  resu lt  was that "in the synthesis o* power and 
cu lture ,  of the things of the state and the things of the 
s p i r i t ,  the preponderance stead ily  shifted further  over to 
the side of power and i t s  domain. 1 The center of gravity
between might and r ig h t ,  which was at best in a precarious 
balance, kept s h i f t in g  slowly towards the former. I t  was to
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become a serious omen -for the future that ideas about the 
all-powerful state and Mach1ave l1ian 1sm, at f i r s t  expressed 
as mere theories, might become potent weapons in the hands 
of the ru ling a u th o r i t ie s .147 In the end, Bismrrckian 
Realpoli t  i k knew no appeal to the imagination of the nation, 
no vision of a r icher future; nor did i t  exh ib it  an abiding 
fa i th  in humanity which gave true significance to the b ir th  
of the American and French Republics.1*®
Raison D 'etat and World P o l i t ic s  
The previous section of th is  study sought to provide a 
b r ie f  overview of some of the more in f lu e n t ia l  theoris ts and 
p ra c t i t ioners  of raison d ' £tat in world p o l i t ic s .  Attention  
was given both to the unique h is to r ica l  and p o l i t ic a l  
sett ing of each major representative thinker as well as to 
his underlying philosophical assumptions (both im p l ic i t  and 
e x p l ic i t )  influencing his conception of recurrent themes and 
princ ip les  of s tate  behavior in global a f fa i r s .  Of 
p art ic u la r  importance were such perennial topics as: the 
sources of internat ional  c o n f l ic t  and war; (2) power and 
morality in s ta te c ra f t ;  and (3) the contribution of 
d l p 1 oinacy and Lai ance of power to in ter nati on a 1 or aer and 
s t a b i l i t y .  The concluding section w i l l  attempt to summarize 
the essential tenets of the continental t ra d i t io n  of raison 
d"eta t  in international p o l i t ic s  and suggest how th is  
t ra d i t io n  raises important philosophical and theoret ical  
questions for the study of contemporary state re la t ions .
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An attempt care fu l ly  to inventory the primary 
assumptions and concepts associated with continental raison 
d * £ t at must acknowledge a number o-f s ign if ican t  caveats. At 
the outset, i t  is important to note that raison d?6tat  
defies the narrow l im its  of any one specif ic  doctrine or 
conceptual d e f in i t io n .  In one perspective, ra i son d * 61 at is  
a mixture of moral and power considerations, "a bridge 
between ethos and kratos. " ****’ In another l ig h t ,  i t  has been 
described as the valuing of power above law and morality.
In s t i l l  another and more comprehensive sense, raison d7 £tat  
is "the law governing the movement of the s t a t e . . . . I t  t e l l s  
the statesman what to do in order to maintain the s ta te ’ s 
health and v ig o r . " 1'70 The implication of determinism in 
th is  conception is  unmistakable, in that "to l iv e  in l ib e r ty  
and independence the state must...obey the laws dictated by 
ra i  son d 7 £t a t . 1-71
While subject to a number of in te rp re ta t ions ,  raison 
d' 6tat has also functioned as a description and explanation 
of state behavior in a wide var ie ty  of h is to r ic a l  and 
p o l i t ic a l  circumstances. Although i t s  e a r l ie s t  antecedents 
may be traced back to the c iv i l  s t r i f e  among Greek c i ty  
states (Thucydides), the f i r s t  attempt to provide any kind 
of detailed account of the underlying diplomatic norms and 
r e a l i t i e s  of in te rs ta te  behavior was supplied by Machiavel.li 
during the wars of u n if ica t io n  in f i f te e n th  century I ta ly .  
Machiavel1l 7s vivid  portrayal of the instrum ental it ies  of
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power in the service o-f s tate necessity was la te r  rein-forced 
by Hobbes7 elaboration o-f an anarchic international arena, 
bereft  o-f e f fe c t iv e  legal and ethical re s tra in ts .  Statesmen 
were seen to confront each other in the uneasy posture of 
combati ve g lad iators.
Both rai  son d7 £tat and divine r ight  sovereignty 
supplied the basis for seventeenth century absolutism. In 
defense of French national in terests  and the so-called  
European community of reason. Cardinal Richelieu interpreted  
ra i  son d' £tat as a special kind of means-end r a t io n a l i t y  
which would f u l f i l l  the unique r ig h ts ,  nature, and purposes 
of the Christian state.
Following the v ir tu a l  collapse of the Concert of Europe 
in the midst of nineteenth century revolutionary ferment, 
Bismarck's "blood and iron" method of unifying Germany 
sa t is f ie d  the conventional d e f in i t io n  of raison d' gtat as 
re l iance on armed strength for national ends. By ins ist ing  
that  the s tate derives i t s  norms of action pr im arily  from 
i t s e l f ,  he established a pattern of thought which expressed 
i t s e l f  in German diplomacy as a penchant for "ca l l ing  a 
spade a spade" and which in popular vocabulary came to be 
known as Realpol1t 1k . In short, the meaning and u t i l i t y  of 
raison d'£ ta t  for the statesman was largely determined by an 
evolving constel lat ion of p o l i t ic a l  and h is to r ic a l  forces 
impinging on a s ta te 's  diplomatic objectives at any 
p art ic u la r  time.
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Moreover, i t  would be somewhat misleading to suggest 
"that rai son d ^  £t at has al wavs functioned as an a pr 1 or 1 set 
of immutable diplomatic guidelines. The determinism 
t r a d i t io n a l1y associated with the concept has gone l i t t l e  
beyond the assumption that the imperative of s tate  survival 
might require moral or immoral actions; once that state was 
accepted as supreme, the ru ler  had no choice but to obey. 
However, the requirements of state survival and the 
necessity for e ither  moral or immoral measures were 
meaningful only in re la t io n  to specif ic  and concrete 
challenges and opportunities that confronted the statesman. 
Indeed, the assumption of state survival reveals l i t t l e  
about the signif icance of important domestic factors or the 
d is tr ib u t io n  of power in the 1n te rn a t1onal p o l i t ic a l  system 
that inev itab ly  influence the formulation and implementation 
of foreign policy goals. I t  was not un t i l  the r is e  of the 
modern European state system a fte r  Westphalia that the chief 
spokesmen for ra i  son d' £tat began to turn th e ir  at tent ion to 
a more object ive (and systematic) assessment of state  
a c t iv i t y  across national borders. I t  was only with 
Richelieu and Bismarck that one finds r a i son d ik ta t  elevated 
to the level of a composite worldview of European state  
rel at ions.
While being mindful of the often disparate h is tor ica l  
forces which help mold both personal it ies  and national  
p olic ies  over time, i t  is possible to iso la te  several key
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tenets or elements which distinguished a rai  son dJ#tat  
approach to world p o l i t ic s .  While by no means an exhaustive 
l i s t ,  the following concepts and themes received repeated 
attent ion and varying degrees of aff irmation by the major 
f igures di scussed thus far  in th is  study. Moreover, i t  must 
be admi11ed that theorists and p ract it ioners  of raison 
d'6 1at almost never sought to re la te  and develop a l 1 of 
these tenets into an integrated theory of international  
poli t ic s .
1. Nation St ates as Pr i mar v Actor s
The nation state represents both a moral agent and the 
most signficant "actor" in international p o l i t ic s .  As far  
back as the Greek c i ty  state system of Thucydides, the 
organized p o l i t i c a l  community was viewed, not merely as a 
co llect ion  of in s t i tu t io n s ,  but as an enduring moral e n t i ty  
that  could compel the loya lty  and service of i t s  c it izens .
Writing about the p o l i t ic a l  wor1d at the b ir th  of 
modern European theory, fiachiavelli  established the 
proposition that every other value must bow to the survival 
of the state: "When the safety of the Fatherland is at
sta'-p, there should be no question of re f lec t io n  whether a 
thing is just  or unjust, humane or cruel, praiseworthy or 
shameful. " 172 After the emergence of the modern European 
nation state,  both Richelieu and Bismarck echoed 
Machiavel1l ' s judgment that the statesman must only take 
that course of action which w i l l  secure the s ta te 's  l i f e  and
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l ib e r ty .  The c e n t ra l i ty  o-f the state tor international  
p o l i t ic s  received normative rei nforcement -from the -fact that  
values associated with and derived -from the s ta te 's  
emstence transcended ei ther  subnational or t  r ansnat i onal 
standards.
2. In ternat iona1 State of Nature
The necessities of a rai  son d '6 ta t  policy ar ise  from 
the unregulated competition of states. Sovereign states,  
recognizing no higher authority ,  are in a Hobbesian state of 
nature; the result ing  security dilemma forces them to l iv e  
in a condition of mutual competition and c o n f l ic t .  Rai son 
d' £tat  in internat ional  p o l i t ic s  represents a "natural 
tendency" of the state to r e s t r ic t  i t s  foreign policy  
behavior, therefore,  to the realm of s e l f - in te r e s t .  
P o s s ib i l i t ie s  for orderly and peaceful exchange between 
nation states are subordinate to the statesman's calculation  
of s e l f ish  and tangible advantages for the state.  In 
addition, for the figures included in th is  study, the 
perception of an anarchic internat ional  system is reinforced  
by a pervasive pessimism about man and human nature in 
general.
3. Ubiquity of Power
The "Machiavellian" or "Hobbesian" view of the 
in ternat ional p o l i t ic a l  system is geared to the assumption 
that  the broader aspects of in te rs ta te  p o l i t ic s  may be 
characterized by a re lent less struggle for and extension of
state  power. Each state seeks safety by relying  on i ts  own 
power and viewing with alarm the power o-f i t s  neighbors. 
Accordingly, the u l ta  rat i o reoum o-f sovereigns in dealing 
with other sovereigns is -force. Proponents of ra i  son d' ft ta t 
have generally emphasized that the "power" which is of prime 
concern to the statesman is ,  in the f in a l  analogy, m i l i ta ry  
power or f ig h t ing  capacity. Concern with m i l i ta ry  
c ap ab i l i ty  derives from the observation that each state can 
best preserve i t s  power by expanding i t  and can most surely 
guarantee i t s  own security by depriving others of the irs .
For the purposes of raison d”fttat . the pursuit of power 
tends to become an end in i t s e l f  rather than a means to 
other ends. No other end matters i f  the state lacks power 
to serve i t s  ult imate end: se l f -p re serva t ion .
4. Ethics and Foreign Policy
Nowhere does the contradiction between professed 
ethica l pr inc ip les  and actual behavior appear so patent and 
uni versal as in the conduct of f oreign r e la t i  ons. Down 
through the centuries, Machiavel11 anism has stood for a 
doctrine that places princes and sovereigns under the ru le  
not of ordinary morality , but of "reason of 5t a f r , " Unlike 
the s o l i ta ry  individual who may claim the r ight  to judge 
p o l i t ic a l  action by universal eth ica l guidelines, the 
statesman w i l l  always male his decision on the basis of the 
s ta te ’ s in terest  and surviva l.  Such ultimate measures of a 
s ta te ’ s worth as individual freedom and welfare of the
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community tend to be overshadowed by the more amoral 
necessities of state in teres t .
Perhaps the ult imate irony o-f the ethical dualism 
associated with ra i son d'&ta t  is the idea that p o l i t ic a l  
ambition could;, in a l imited sense, contribute to the 
strengthening of p art icu lar  moral values. Despite the tact  
that  tew could assert the ego ot the state in the ruthless  
tone ot M ach iave l l i , the F lorent ine 's  idealism expressed 
i t s e l t  in the thought that necessi t a — understood as the 
imperative ot su rv iva l— could conceivably provide the means 
to salvage the decline ot moral energies in the I t a l ia n  
state system. That p o l i t ic a l  ambition and the struggle tor 
power could augment moral values was echoed by Hobbes' 
assertion that one need not tear "that the Leviathan would 
misuse i t s  power. . .  because the power wielder would be 
compelled by his own in terests to ru le with reason and 
advance the public weltare. "*'7S In seventeenth century 
France, Richelieu suggested that the true in terests  ot the 
state required concess1ons ot t o 1erance to the Huguenots 1n 
order tc safeguard the freedom of the state from foreign  
influence and to develop i t s  internal strength.
At the same time, however, the precarious balance 
between considerat 1ons of national in terest  and moral 
conduct in state re la t ions  gradually shifted to accentuate 
the ro le  of the former. The thesis that state egotism is 
j u s t i f ie d  by the values i t  serves was brought in to  question
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by recurrent power struggles of the state, which tended to 
destroy the ethical and cu ltural values that might function 
as the s ta te 7s ult imate ju s t i f i c a t io n .  Indeed, Bismarchian 
Real do 111 1 1: represented the eclipse ot s tate necessity or 
in terest  from higher ethical or moral considerations.
5. Balance of F'ower
Perhaps no other concept or p r inc ip le  has been so 
frequently associated with raison d7 £tat as has the i l lu s iv e  
balance of power. Whi1e rai  son d7 £tat may be taken as an 
indication of the methods by which foreign policy is  
conducted and ra t io n a l ized ,  balance of power purports to 
explain the internat ional  resu lt  that such methods 
produce.17-* For many observers, i t  has become an "avowed 
p rinc ip le  of foreign policy, accepted and acted on so 
consi stent ly  by a l l  the great states that i t  may wel1 be 
viewed as the central theme about which the web of diplomacy 
is  woven."1713 I t  should be recognized that the precise 
orig ins  and operations of the balance of power have been 
subj ect to widespr ead debate. Among representat i ves ot the 
continental t ra d i t io n  in internat ional p o l i t ic s ,  the concept 
has functioned ambiguously as both a description of the 
ln te rn a t i onal system and as a prescription shaping the 
successful defense of state o b je c t iv e s .17*’
The p r inc ip le  of balance ot power has emerged more or 
less c lea r ly  in every system of states in which units have 
engaged with one another in the competitive struggle for
7power. In his essay on the balance,, David Hume traced the
orig ins  of the idea to the s h it t in g  coalit ions of Greek c i ty
states < poleis ? at the time of the Peloponnesian War.177 
J.M. Robertson, writ ing his biography of Emperor Charles V, 
made the case for the balance as the creation ot the 
f i f te e n th  century I t a l ia n  state system.
Although Machiavelli emphasized m il i ta ry  s e l f - re l la n c e  
and was skeptical about the balance of power as an etfectve  
technique to bring about I t a l ia n  unity, he also suggested 
that no prince can afford to disregard i t s  workings.
Indeed, he thought that the ru ler  was i l l -a d v is e d  to remain 
neutral in a c o n f l ic t  between two nearby powers. However, 
as Frederick Schuman pointed out, during the f i f te e n th  and 
sixteenth centuries the states of Europe pursued balance of 
power p o l ic ies  without the p r inc ip le  i t s e l f  receiving any 
clear and universal fo rm ula t ion .1^  Contrary to Hume’ s 
contention that the balance doctrine originated in 
an t iq u ity ,  S ir  Herbert B u t te r f ie ld  argued that the idea of a
balance operating throughout the international system as a
whole became implanted in European thought only in the 
seventeeth century, a1onq with the notion that European 
p o l i t ic s  farmed a single system.1-0 The key question 
affec t ing  both theorists and statesmen was the nature and 
degree of ln te r re l  atedness and rec iproc ity  of the new 
European order of states. I f  there was an international  
order (or society) ,  was i t  immune to the f o l l i e s  and
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incompetence of statesmen, or was i t  necessary to 
del ibera te ly  control the in ternational system7
Richelieu 's af f i r mat i on of a community of reason (une 
neooc i a t1 on cont i nuel1e > operating on diplomats and 
statesmen merged with the idea of '‘equil ibr ium 1 among major 
European powers. While state in terest  remains the essentia] 
guide for foreign policy, i t s  re a l iz a t io n  is made possible 
by the community of reason among nations that is  operative  
in the negotiations of diplomats. With France and the 
Hapsburgs seen as two poles of countervai1ing power, 
Richelieu sought to balance the Hapsburg threat by an 
a l l iance  system with the leading Protestant powers of 
Europe. The negotiations required by the community of 
reason (and the ob1igat i ons emanating theref rom) were simp1y 
conditions for the maintenance of a desired balance of 
power.l * 1 For both seventeenth and eighteenth century 
theoris ts ,  balance of power po lic ies  reflected the be l ie f  in 
a ra t io n a l ly  induced world, a diplomacy conforming to clear  
and often mechanistic rules productive of order among 
s ta te s .
S im ila r ly ,  Bismarck w?c the managing d irec tor  of a 
state which played the ro le  of a great power in the European 
system of f iv e  maj or powers and many smal1er power s. 
Bismarck's European policy aimed at the preservation ot a 
reasonable balance of power between Austria and Russia and 
the avoidance of any major c o n f l ic t  between these two
powers. I t  w i l l  be useful to reca l l  that an e f fo r t  was made 
to revive the community ot reason a f te r  the violence of the 
Napoleonic Wars at the Congress o-f Vienna. The f iv e  
predominant powers, acting as the "Concert of Europe," 
f requent1y resorted to balance of power t ac11cs based on the 
conception of Europe as a jo in t  l i a b i l i t y ,  an interdependent 
world of great powers united by " trad it ions  of c i v i l i t y . "
By contrast, Bismarck found the Concert formula inimical to 
the purpose of building a unif ied  German state in central  
Europe. Much l ik e  Machiavelli who worked to upset the 
balance of power in I t a ly  to create a unif ied  I t a l ia n  state,  
Bismarck’ s wars were designed to set up a new balance of 
power 1n Europe with a unif ied  Germany as one of i t s  
principal wei gh t  s . Bismarck’ s "bl ood and 1 r on '* N ea lpo li t ik  
was an at temp t to blend seeret dip!omacy and balance of 
power to the spec 1f 1c needs of the German power state.
6 . Raison D 'etat  as the Sport of Kings
The continental t ra d i t io n  of r aison dr Stat in 
ln te rnat lona1 p o l i t ic s  remained the sport of kings, or the 
preserve of cabinets— the last  refuge of secrecy, the last  
domain of large ly  hereditary castes of diplomat?. 1,:z The 
democratization of foreign policy was e f fe c t iv e ly  preempted 
on two counts. F i r s t ,  proponents of r ai son d1 6t at 
consistently  emphasized that the foreign policy of a state  
constantly threatened with struggles for power could only be 
conducted with the unrestrained sovereignty of a monarchical
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government independent of par 11 amentary m ajor it ies .  Second, 
only a w ell - t ra ined  core of a r is to c ra t ic  e l i t e s  could engage 
in the kind of diplomacy required by the balance of power 
p r inc ip le  without undue concern about the reactions of 
public opinion, the need to consider ideological values, or 
attention to the nat ion ’ s "image" in the minds of 
f orei gners.
F in a l ly ,  in what ways is  i t  possible to speak of 
continental rai son d * £t at as a d is t in c t iv e  theoret ica l or 
philosophical approach to the study of internat ional  
politics'^ On the one hand, e f fo r ts  at theoriz ing or 
speculating about the nature of in te rs ta te  re la t io n s  are 
quite old; some, in fa c t ,  go back to ancient times in India,  
China and Greece. However, the attempt to assess the 
patterns of c o n f l ic t  and cooperation among mutually a lien  
actors systematical1y received l i t t l e  sustained attention  
prior  to World War I .
While theoris ts and statesmen of raison d7 Stat 
attempted to describe a permanent logic of state behavior, 
most were careful to avoid e x p l ic i t  generaljzat ions,
" i f . . . t h e n "  propositions, and analytic  categorie= relevant 
to the sphere of ln ternat lonal p o l i t ic a l  behavior. Even 
though Machiavelli stands out in his b e l ie f  that p o l i t ic s  
has i t s  own laws, discernible by reason and rooted in 
p o l i t ic a l  in te re s t ,  he fa i le d  to develop any theory which 
would explain the operation of such laws beyond the level of
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the state i t s e l f .  What often passes for theory in the
continental t ra d i t io n  is  usually a mixture of statements in 
which concepts are i 11-def ined , the connections of the 
theory’ s components are loosely specified, and possible 
conclusions wear the guise of assumptions. Such problems 
reinforce  the strength of Wight’ s observation th a t ,  in the 
classical (European) t ra d i t io n ,  " international theory, or 
what there i s of i t ,  is scattered, unsystematic, and mostly 
inaccessible to the layman," as well as being " largely  
repellant  and in tra c tab le  in form. 111-4
A less stringent but perhaps more revealing inquiry  
into the patterns of coherence of r a i son d •' £ t  a t in 
in ternat ional p o l i t ic s  can be developed by in terpret ing  the 
continental t ra d i t io n  as governed by what Kuhn has termed a 
"metaphysical" or "philosophical" p a r a d i g m . F r o m  th is  
vantage point, ra i  son d 7 61at would constitute the wide- 
ranging assumptions and b e l ie fs  about the in ternational  
milieu (as well as i ts  iey components) shared by a community 
of scholars and statesmen. Reduced to i t s  essentia ls, the 
principal assumptlons and b e l ie fs  of raison d’ etat  may be 
summarized as follows: the r u l e r ’ s, and la te r  the s ta te ’ r.
ln te res t  provides the sprlng of act ion; the necessities of 
policy arise f rom the unregu1 at ed c ompet111on of states; 
ca lculat ion based on these necessities can discover the 
polic ies  that best serve a s ta te ’ s in terest;  success is  the 
ult imate test  of policy; and success is  defined as
7 8
preserving and strengthening the power of the state.
Raison d7 £tat id e n t i f ie s  the methods by which foreign policy  
is  conducted and provides a ra t io n a le  for them; the balance 
of power concept provides a rough explanation of the result  
that such methods produce.
Contemporary theoris ts and observers of international  
p o l i t ic s  have frequently assumed that the elements and 
reasoning of ra i  son d7 £tat have remained constant from 
l iachiavell i  through Meinecke and the postwar p o l i t ic a l  
" re a l is ts"  in America. The remaining chapters of th is  study 
w i l l  seel to assess the impact of the continental legacy on 
twentieth century p o l i t ic a l  realism in the American foreign  
policy experience. Although a few of the in f lu e n t ia l  
p o l i t ic a l  r e a l is ts  made s ig n if ic an t  contributions during the 
interwar period, our focus w i l l  largely be upon the 
substantive foreign policy problems and impulse to 
theoret ical  expression in the post-World War I I  era.
Within the in te l le c tu a l  t ra d i t io n  applicable to 
in ternat ional p o l i t ic s ,  is  i t  possible to plot a continuum 
encompassing the fundamental norms associated with raison 
d7 £tat since the time of Machiavell i ,  as well as the 
philosophical convictions of such contemporary thinkers as 
Walter Lippmann, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans J. Morgenthau. and 
George F. Kennan7* Is i t  possible to speak of an 
"Amerlcanlzed Rea1p o i l t l k " which emerges from the work of 
leading r e a l is t  scholars'7
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At th is  juncture, i t  is  useful to reca l l  the hypothesis 
which w i l l  shape our inquiry in the ensuing chapters: The
phi 1osophi c al substratum govern!ng the response of postwar 
re a l is ts  to many of the challenging foreign policy issues 
associated with an increasingly interdependent world d i f f er s 
from the classic ra t iona le or exposition of continental 
rai son d'6 1 a t . A f u l l  exploration of th is  hypothesis 
necessarily c a l ls  into question the method or ju s t i f ic a t io n  
bv which the European t ra d it io n  has been modified and 
adapted to the exigencies of postwar American foreign  
policy. Insofar as a large number of American r e a l is ts  have 
devoted considerable at tention to the evolution of the 
modern European state system and the diplomatic history of 
rai son d 7 £t a t . what facets of the Amerlcan d lp1omatic 
experience ju s t i f y  a philosophy of p o l i t ic a l  realism as a 
uni gue approach to foreign policy? In short, where does 
Eur opean rai  son d '£ ta t  end and American p o l i t ic a l  realism  
beg in?
Endnotes
1. Quoted in Richard S ter l ing ,  Ethics in a Wor1d of Power 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 239.
2. Ib id .
3. Fr iedr ich Meinecke, Mach l avel 1 l am sm: I he Doctrine of
Raison D '£tat  and i t s  Place in Modern H is tory , t ra n s .
D.Scott (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 1.
4. Hedley Bull ,  "Martin Wight and the Theory ot
In ternat ional R e la t ion s ," B ri t ish  Journal ot In ternat ional
Studies 2 (1976): 104.
5. Ib id.
6 . For additional commentary on the Machlavel1i an t ra d it io n  
o-f diplomacy and statesmanship, see Arnold Wolfers, 
"Statesmanship and Moral Choice," World P o l i t ic s  1 (January 
1949): 175-195; Arnold Wolfers, "P o l i t ic a l  Theory and
In te rnat lona1 Relations,"  in The Anglo-American Tradition i n 
Foreign A f fa irs ,  eds. Arnold Wolfers and Lawrence Martin 
(New Haven: Vale University Press, 1956); and Kenneth W.
Thompson, "The Limits of P r inc ip le in International  
P o l i t ic s :  Necessity and the New Balance ot Tower," Journa1 
of Pol i 11cs 20 (August 1958): 437-467.
7. Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds. The International  
System: Theoretical Essays (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1961), p. 1. See also H.V. Harrison, The Role of 
Theory in International Relations (Princeton, Van Nostrand, 
1964), pp. 3-14.
8 . Martin Wight, "Why Is There No ln te rn a t i onal Theory," in 
H. B u t te r f ie ld  and M. Wight, eds. Diplomatic In vest iga t i ons: 
Essays in the Theory of International P o l i t ic s  (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 17.
9. Kenneth W. Thompson, Masters of Int e r nat i ona1 Thought
( B a t o r  i- - j i . iy i  - . . .o . u  s i  a n . - .  1 L j . t e  U n i  v t  ... :i t  y P r o ' - -  1 V IJ 1,) j . p .. 5 5
10. Ib id .  p. 56.
11. Allan Bloom, The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic 
Books, 1960), pp. 337-344.
12. Eric Voegelin, The New Science of P o l i t ic s  (Chicago: 
University  of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 61-62.
1 3 .  I b i d .
d l
14. Michael Donelan, "The P o l i t ic a l  Theorists and 
In te rn a l1onal Theory," in Michael Donelan, ed. The Reason ol 
States (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), pp. 75-76.
15. Ib id.
1 6 . I b i d .
17. Gerhart Niemeyer, "Foreign Policy and Morality: A
Contemporary Perspective," The 1nterco1 I egi ate Review 15 
(Spring 1980): 77.
18. Ib id.
19. T. S. Kuhn, The Structure o-f S c ie n t i f ic  Revolutions 
(Chicago: University  of Chicago Press, 1970). See also 
Kuhn’ s "Reflections on My C r i t ic s "  in I .  Lakatos and A. 
Musgrave, eds. C r it ic ism  and the Growth of Knowledge 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University F'ress, 1970), pp. 231-278.
20. Arend L i jp h a r t ,  "The Structure of the Theoretical 
Revolution in International Relations,"  In te r national 
Studies Quarterly 18 (March 1974): 42-59.
21. Kuhn, The Structure of S c ie n t i f ic  Revolutions, p. 92.
22. M. Masterman, "The Nature of a Paradigm," in I .  Lakatos 
and A. Musgrave, eds. Cr it ic ism  and the Growth of Knowledge
(Cambridge: Cambridge University F’ress, 1970), pp. 61“66.
23. Li.jphart, "The Structure of the Theoretical [(evolution 
in International Relations,"  pp. 42-43.
24. Kuhn, The Structure of S c ie n t i f ic  Revolutions, pp. 175-182.
35. Michael F’o lanyi.  "L cmmentary on T.5. I uhn’ s The Functj 
of Dogma in S c ie n t i f ic  Research," in A.C. Gombie, ed.
5 c le n t l f ic  Change (London: Heinemann,1963), p. 375.
26. Peter Savigear, "European P o l i t ic a l  F'hilosophy and the 
Theorv of T rd -r-r iial i on*-’ 1 v t ione," 1 n rr-vor T ■: 1 - r . eh.
Appr oac.1 ies and Theorv in International Relations (London:
Longman Gr oup , 1978/, p . 32.
27. Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, p. 244.
2(3. Ib id .
29. Savigear, "European F’o l i t i c a l  F’hilosophy," p. 35.
30. 1b id . ,  p. 36.
01:
31. Ibid.
32. Machiavelli went -further and argued that the
contribution of the state was in some measure a response to
i ts  lnternatlonal environment. Fhus, " I t  was Rome's 
neighbors who in the ir  desire to crush her, caused her to 
set up ins t i tu t ions  which not only enabled her to defend 
herself but also to attack them with greater force, counsel 
and authority ."  See Machiavelli: The Chief Works And Others,
ed. and trans. Allan H. G ilbert ,  3 vols. (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1965), 1:269.
33. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. in The English Works of Thomas 
Hobbes of Malmesbury, ed. by Sir William Molesworth, 11 
vols. (London: J. Bohn, 1836-45), 3: 115.
34. Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. and June Savoy, "Hans J.
Morgenthau' s Version of R e a lp o l i t ik . " The P o l i t ic a l  Science 




38. Savigear, "European P o l i t ic a l Philosophy,1’ p. 37.
39. Ibid.
40. Stanley Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order: American
Foreign Policy Since the Cold War (New York: McGraw H i l i .
1980), pp. 106-108.
41. Peter J. Fleiss, Thucydides and the P o l i t ics  of 
Bipo la r i ty  (baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1966). p. v i i .
42. Thucydides, The F'e 1 oponnes l an War, trans. R. Warner
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1954). See also William T.
B 1 • mii, 1 kicor i es n t the k u J i 1. 1  c a I S'.. J ■ -J|! c l assics i t
P o l i t ic a l  Thought and Modern P o l i t ic a l  Analysis (Lnglewood 
C l i f f s ,  NJ: Prentice Hall ,  1965) and John H. Finley, J r . ,  
Thucydides (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942).
43. Louis J. Halle, C iv i l iza t io n  and Foreign Policy (New 
York: Harper, 1955), p. 265.
44. Ibid.
45. Ib id . ,  p. 272
6 J.
46. FI less, Thucydides and the P o l i t ic s  o-f b ip o la r i t y, pp.
t r  n /^ i-j *:o -
47. Ib id . .  p. l .
4Ci. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. R .  Crawley 
(New York: Everyman' 5 Library, IV10;, pp. 51-51:.
49. For a comprehensive overview o-f Thucydides' work, see
A.W. Gomme, A His to r ic a l  Commentary on Thucydides. 3 vols.
(D:ifordi Oxford University Press, 1945 and 1956>.
50. Fliess, Thucydides and the P o l i t ic s  o-f B ip o la r i ty , pp.
121-136.
51. Kenneth Waltz, Man. the State and War (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 216.
52. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. R. Crawley, 
pp. 3-7.
53. Quoted from Hans. J . Morgenthan, Po l i t i c s  Among Nations, 
5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 197 3), p. 8.
54. Neinecke, Machiavel1lanism. p. 3u. See also James 
Burnham, The Machia v e l1lans (New York: John Day, 1943);
Herbert B u t te r f le ld , The S ta tecra ft  of Machiavelli (New
York:: Macmillan, 1956); Roberto R id o lf i ,  The L i fe  of N l c c □ 1 o
Mach 1 ave111 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.);
and Leo Strauss. Thoughts on Machiavelli (Glencoe, 111: Free
Press, 1958).
55. Dante Germino, Machiavelli to Mar::: Modern Western
P o l i t ic a l  Thouoht. (Chicaqo: University ot Chicago Press,
1972), pp. 21— 22-
56. Neinecke, Machiavellianism. p. 30.
57. John Hal 1Dwel1, Main Currents in Modern P o l i t ic a l  
Thought . (New York: Henry Holt, 1950), p. 52.
58. Er i r VoegeJin, "Machi avel 1 i ■'s Prince: background and 
Formation, 1 I he Rev l ew of Po 1 i t ics 13. (ftp r l 1 1951): 145.
59. William Ebenstein, Great. P o l i t ic a l  Thinkers. Plato t o 
the Present. 4th ed. (Hinsdale, 111: Dryden Press, 1969), p.
2  E l ’■.
60. Ib id.
61. Meinecle, Machiavel 1 iam sm , p . 3-1 .
(34
62. Ib id. p. 29.
63. As one scholar has noted:
"The virt'li ot the conquering prince became the 
source o-f order, and since the Christian,  
transcendenta1 order of existence had become a 
dead le t te r  for the I t a l ia n  thinkers of the 
f i f te e n th  century, the v i r tu ordlnate of the 
prince, the only ordering force experienced as 
re a l ,  acquired human—d lv ln e , heroic
proportions. . . . The evocation of the mythical hero 
is at the center of h a c h ia v e l l r  s work in the 
sense that  the evocation of the philosopher king 
is at the center of P la to ’ s work." See Voegelin,
"Machi av e l1i ' Prince: Background and Formation,"
p. 16b.
6 4. Ib id.
6b. Meinecke, Machiavel1ianism, p. 31. Machiavelli broke 
with the d u a l is t ic  and s p i r i tu a l iz in g  ethic of C h r is t ia n i ty ,  
which depreciated the natural impulses of the senses. 
Although he retained some of i t s  structural ideas about the 
difference  between good and e v i l ,  he strove pr im ari ly  tor a 
new n a tu ra l is t ic  ethic which would follow the d ictates of 
nature impartial], y and resolutely.
6 6 .  I h l d  .
67. Germino points out that Machiavelli does not overtly  
ca l l  for the overthrow ot C h r is t ia n i ty  and i t s  replacement 
with a neopagan cu lt  ot the state.  He appears to have 
thought that C h ris t ian i ty  could be adapted to the needs of 
the modern p o l i ty .  At the most, he seeks to supplement the 
morality of the gospel wj + ’ the martial vigor of ancient
Rome. See Cermino, From it a u r i i a v e 1 1 j to Mar:;, pp. 42-43.
6(3. Meinecke, Machi avel 1 l an l sm. p. 33..
69. Mach l ayel_l__i : 1 he Ch i ef __Wor k s , pp. 411-12.
70. Meinecle, Machia v e l1iam sm, p. 36.
71. M ach lave l I l ’ s preoccupation with what is p o l i t i c a l ly  
expedient and the morality of p o l i t ic a l  action is  v iv id ly  
elaborated in a chapter ot The Prince en t i t le d  "How Princes 
Bhoul d Peep Their Pronu ses. " See Machiavelli:  The Chief
War k s . pp. 64—67.
72. In a famous passage, Machiavelli pointed out:
" . . .and  in the actions of men, and especially  
princes from which there is no appeal, the end
j u s t i f i e s  the means. Let the prince, therefore,  
aim at conquering and iriaintai ning the state,  and 
the means w i l l  always be judged honorable and 
praised by everyone.. ."  See Ib id . ,  p. 67.
7 3. Ib id . ,  p. 66.
74. Ib id . ,  p. 269.
75. J . E. Hare and Carey B. Joynt, Eth l cs__a nd Int e r nationa 1.
A ffa irs  (New York: St. Martin 's  Press, 1982), pp. 26-27.
76. Frant M. Russell, Theor i es of I nternat i o nal Re la t lo n s
(New York: App 1 et on-Len t ur y--Lrof t s , 1926), p. 121.
77. F Park i nson, The Philosophy of In ternat i onal Rela t io n 
A Study in the H istory of Thought (Beverly H i l ls ,  CA:
PU BL I SHER . 19777, pp. 38- 31 .
78. Savigear, "European P o l i t ic a l  Philosophy and 
International Relations," p. 36.
79. Machiavelli:  The__Chief Works, p. 62.
89. Russel 1, Theories of 1nternational Relations, p. 122.
Bl. Machiavelli:  The Chief Works, pp. 45-46.
02. John C. Dunne, " Rea 1 po.l l 11 k in the Decline ot the West 
The Review of P o l i t ic s  21 (January 1959): 135-36.
03. Machiavelli:  The Chief Works, pp. 78-09.
04. Dunne, "R ea lpo l l t ik  in the Decline of the West," p. 13 
85. Ib id.
86- Machiavelli:  The Chief Worts, p. 82.
87. Russel 1, Theories ot 1n ternat i onal Relations, p. 12 3.
08. Ib id.
89. See, tor e;; ample, Wolfers and Martin, eds. The Anq 1 o-
Amerlc an I r a d i1 1on in K oreiqn A f fa i r s .
90. Ibid.
91. James L. Wiser, P o l i t ic a l  Philosophy: A History of the
Search For Order (Englewood C l i f f s ,  NJ: Prent ice-Hal1,
1983), “pp.” 194-195.
86
92. John Aubrey, Br 1 ef_L1 ves, ed. Oliver L Dick (Ann Arbor:
University ot Michigan Press, 1957), pp. 147-59.
93. Hedley Bull,  "Hobbes and the International Anarchy," 
Social Research 48 (Winter 1981): 718.
94. Ib id . ,  p. 719. See also Ihomas Hobbes, Behemoth, o r  i ho-
Long Parliament, ed. P .  Tonnies (New York: Barnes and Noble,
1969), p. 144.
95. Thomas Hobbes, Lev 1 athan. ed. Michael Gak eshott (U;:ford: 
0::-ford University Press, 1947), p. 83.
96. Ib id . ,  p. 82.
97. Quoted in Russell, Theories ot Internat l onal Relations,
p. 159.
98. Ib id.
99. Bull,  "Hobbes and the In te rn a t1onal Anarchy," pp. 720—721
100. Hobbes, Lev1 athan. p. lo l .
101. Hobbes, Levi athan. p. 260.
102- Meinecke, Machiavel1lan1sm. pp. 207-216.
103. Bull points out that Hobbes' doctrine ot natural right  
was used by writers on ln te rn a t i anal law from the eighteenth 
century on as a means ot demolishing the claims ot
ln ternat lona1 society on i t s  member states, or at least 
showing that they had only a contingent or ten ta t ive  
v a l id i t y .  See Bull ,  "Hobbes and the International Anarchy,"
P . /
104. See Qaheshott’ s " In tro duct ion ," in Hobbes, Levi athan, 
pp. l v - l v i .
105. For Hobbes, the state was cer ta in ly  a personality;
however . 1 + wa-'E - ! ' 1 t 1 • 1 ! o n e ,  a 11 ui'i 2 ± " . * . .  • . 0 1 J1 e c .
fundamental 1 y a piece o-f clockwork machinery, manufactured 
by human ingenuity, in order to promote the objects ot men 
( i . e . ,  ot individual men). An important role is  assigned to 
the commoda v i t a e . the d e le c ta t io . the iucund1ssime et beate 
vi ver e ot the individual c i t u e n .  I t  was Hobbes7 opinion 
that  only in the proper frunctioning of the state as a whole 
could individuals be properly cared for .  There is already 
here a portert  of that "greatest happiness of the greatest 
number," which was later' to be proclaimed by Jeremy Bentham. 
See Meineck e, Mach1aveI I 1 an 1sm. pp. 213-214.
8 /
106. Ib id . ,  p. 215.
107. Ib id.
1OS. Bull, "Hobbes and the International Anarchy," p. 724.
109. Hobbes sought refuge under the umbrella o-f t ra d i t ion a l  
natural law as the ethical basis of re la t ions  between 
states. According to him, then, peace could not be achieved 
unless the law of nature was generally observed between 
states. Reason, he argued, was the principal element in the 
law of nature and implied a s t r iv ing  towards some some ot
ln te rnat lona1 order. See Parkinson, The Philosophv of
Int ernat i ona1 Re1 at lons. pp. 39-40.
110 . See Hobbes, Leviathan. Chapter 31. While states find  
themselves in a state of nature and have l i t t l e  chance ot 
escaping i t ,  there are s t i l l  l im ited measures that may be 
taken to mimimize the consequences of unrestricted anarchy. 
Hobbes acknowledged that men are driven by passions that  
in c l ine  them to peace: the fear of death, the desire of
tilings necessary for commodious l iv in g .  Men are equipped 
with "natural reason," which prescribes for them the rules  
they must follow i f  they are to a t ta in  peace, the rules 
which Hobbes called the "laws ot nature." While these 
dictates of r ight  reason are theore t ica11y availab le  in the 
state ot nature, they cannot be enforced. The statesman is 
ob1lged in practice  to fo i l  aw them only i f  i t  is  safe to do
so. Imperfect though they are, these laws of nature, the?
“a r t ic le s  of peace" as Hobbes called them, are the l i f e l i n e  
to which sovereign states must cling i f  they are to survive. 
These "a r t ic le s  ot peace" enjoin states to seek peace, honor 
agreements and covenants, and respect the immunity ot 
mediators and envoys. See Bull,  "Hobbes and the 
International Anarchy," pp. 728-729.
111. Ibid.
112. Dunne, "Real p a l l t ik  in the Decline of the West," pp. 
136-13 7.
113. Morgenthau. t o l l  t ic s  Among_Nat i ons . p. 27 2.
114. Carl J. Fr iedrich, The Aoe of Baroque. 1619-166*-' (New
Vork: Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 196.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
117. Ib id . .  p. 199.
88
118. William F. Church, Richelieu and Reason of State  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 11. Raison 
d7Stat was not new in that i t  concerned both very old and 
continuing p o l i t ic a l  problems; however, the w riters  ot 
R ichelieu ’ s period a r t icu la ted  new solutions and gave them a 
new ra t io n a le .  No one was more conscious ot th is  than 
Richelieu himself, and he keenly f e l t  the need to ju s t i fy  
the po lic ies  that he believed necessary to the continued 
success of the French state. As Church points out,
Richelieu and his supporters embarked on the f i r s t  concerted 
e f fo r t  in the history of French p o l i t ic a l  thought to develop 
a viable concept of reason of state.
119. Meinecke, Machlavel1lan lsm. p. 149.
120. Ib id.
121. According to Meinecke:
"This was one l im ita t io n  of his perception, and 
the o ther . . .w as that he re a l ly  only wanted to 
bring about what was typical and general in a l l  
p o l i t ic a l  conduct: that he wanted to establish
certain  ru les , d e f in i te  ma:;ims.. . for  every 
r u le r . . .a n d  th is  also led to the result  that he 
remained f i rm ly  under the influence of that view 
of history which held that everything human 
repeated i t s e l f . "  Ib id.
122. Ib id . ,  p. 150.
123. Ib id . ,  p. 151. In France people were forced out of th is  
petty preoccupation with s e l f - in te r e s t  by the b i t t e r  
experiences of the Huguenot Wars. I t  was, in fa c t ,  this  
profound re l ig iou s  and p o l i t ic a l  division of the nation that 
brought p o l i t ic a l  thought to f r u i t io n  and impelled i t  to 
seek nut a new in te l le c tu a l  and s p ir i tu a l  cohesive fo^ce for 
a state threatened with dissolution.
124. W.F. Reddaway, A History of Europe. lfalO-1715 (London: 
Metheuen, 1952>, p. 149.
125. Church, Richelieu and Reason of S ta te , pp. 8-12. I t  is 
important to note that R ichel ieu 's building ot state power 
and some of his ta c t ic s  opened the way for the growth of the 
modern state which eventua11y beeame a lawless and 
thoroughly secular a f f a i r ,  d e l ibe ra te ly  divorced from the 
re l ig ious  phase of human experience. As Church points out, 
however, th is  crucial development lay far in the future of 
Richelieu7s time and was t o t a l l y  unknown to him and his 
contemporari es.
126. Reddaway, A Hi story of Europe, pp. 149-141,
89
127. Church, Richelieu and Reason o-f S ta te , p. 503.
128. Reddaway, 0 History o-f Europe, pp. 140-141.
1 2 9 .  D . R .  O ’ C o n n e l l .  R i c h e l l e u  (New Y o r k :  W o r 1d P u b l i s h i n g
Company, 1968 >, p. 313.
130. Ib id.
131. Ib id. p. 314.
132. Meinecke, Machiavel1lanism. p. 153.
133. Ib id . ,  p. 162.
134. 0 ’ Conne11, R ichel i eu. p. 314.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
137. Dunne, " Rea 1 po 1 i 111 in the Decline o-f the West," p. 179.
138. Quoted in Chruch, Richelieu and Reason of S ta te , p. 5u 1 .
139. Ib id . ,  p. 509.
140. Meinecke, Machiavel1lam  sm. p. 184.
141. Quoted in Louis L. Snyder, The Blood and Iron
Chancel 1 or (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1967), p. 15.
142. See Andreas Dorpalen, "German Historians and Bismarck," 
Review o-f F 'o l i t ics  15 (January 1953): 53-67. Dorpalen 
provides a concise summation of such scholars as Erich Eyck, 
Arnold G. Meyer, Gerhart R i t te r ,  Fr iedrich Meinecke, F r; . 
Schnabel, Hans Rothfels, Ulrich Noack, Heinrich von Srbik, 
and Herman Oncken.
143.. F. Walter Wall ban):, A lastair  M. Taylor, George B.
Carson and M?rf Mancal 1 , Cy / i I_i_;.:at : ■ n F ■ O and 0^  ' 1  ^ 2
vols. (Glenview, i l l :  Scott foresman, 1969), 2:413-16.
144. Ib id.
145. Gerhart R i t t e r ,  "The Last Great Cabinet Statesman," in 
Otto von Bismarck. A Histor ica l Assessment, ed. Theodore 
Hamerow (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1972), p. 149.
146. Fran: Schnabel, "The Bismarck Problem," in German 
History: Some New Views, ed. Hans Fohn (Boston: Beacon
Press. 1954), pp. B2-B9.
90
147. Bterl ing. Ethic s in a World ot Power, p. 74.
1 48. Ib id . ,  p. 47.
149. Ib id . ,  p. 75.
1 50 . Meineck e. Machi avel 1 l am sm. PP . 377-392.
151 . F r ledr ich Meinec ke. The German Catastrophe: Reflections
and Recol1ec 11ons. trans. Sidney B. Fay (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1960). pp. 10-11.
152. R i t te r ,  "The Last Great Cabinet Statesman," pp. 147-148.
153. Dorpalen, "The German Historians and Bismarck," pp. 55- 
57.
154. Dunne, "Realpolit ik  in the Decline ot the West," p. 142. 
1 55. Ib id.
156. Quoted in W.N. Medlicott, Bismarck. Gladstone, and the 
Concert of Europe (London. 1956), p. 160.
157. Dunne, "Realpnllt it:  in the Decline ot the West," pp. 
143-144.
158. Geor ge F. Kennan, The Decline ot Bismarckjb Luropean
Order. Franco-Russian Reiat i ons«__1 875-1890 (Princeton:
Princeton University  Press,, 1979), pp. 27 7—27B.
159. Dunne, "Realpollt iP in the Decline ot the West," pp. 
143-144.
160. R i t te r ,  "The Last Great Cabinet Statesmen," p. 148.
161. G.P. Gooch, "The Divorce ot P o l i t ic s  From Morals," in 
Otto von Bismarck. A Histor ica l Assessment ,  ed. Theodore 
Hamerow (Le::inqton, Mass.: D-C. Heath, 1972). p. 164. See
also Ll'ljcL, "L -tel L: It . , .  . , , I- or lj l go nt t j. ai s j'.» kl95^>:
527-530.
162. R i t te r ,  "The Last Great Cabinet Statesman," p. 15<>.
163. Ib id . ,  p. 151.
164. Meinecke, The German Catastrophe, pp. 13-14.
1 CW . Ib id.
166. Ibid.
91
167. I b i d . ,  p . 15.
168. Do rpa1e n , "The German H i s t o r i a n s and Bismarc  k , " p . 6 7
169. S t e r 1i n g , E t h i c s  i n  a Wor ld o f Power . P* 234.
1 70. Mein eck e , Mac h i a v e l l i a n i s m . pp. Z — 5 .
171 . S t e r l i n g , E t h i c s  i n  a Wor ld o f Power , P ■
■* ■ "T
1 73. M a c h i a v e l l i ,  D i s c o u r s e s ,  P'AGE.
1 73. Quoted l n S t e r l i n g ,  E t h i c s  i n  a Wor 1 d of Po w er , p . 22
See a l s o  Me inecke .  M a c h i a v e l 1l a n l sm, PP ■ 3 1<J- 216.
174. Kenneth Waltz argues that i f  there is  any d is t in c t iv e  
theory of internat ional p o l i t ic s ,  balance of power theory is 
i t .  However, i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to find a statement of the 
theory that commands widespread acceptance. Ernst Haas has 
discovered eight meanings of the term, and Martin Wight 
found nine. Hans J. Morgenthau, in his lengthy analysis of 
the subject, makes use ot four d i f fe re n t  d e f in i t io n s .  In 
short, balance ot power is viewed by some as a law of 
nature; by others, as simply an outrage. Some view is cis a 
guide for the statesman; others, as a cl oaf: that disguises 
im peria l is t  po l ic ies .  Some believe that the balance ot 
power is the best guarantee of the security ot states and 
the peace of the world; others, that i t  has ruined states by 
causing most of the wars they have fought. renneth Waltz, 
Theorv of International P o l i t ic s  (Menlo Park, C a l i f . :
Addlson-Wesley, 1979>, p. 177. See also Ernst B. Haas, "The
Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or P’r opogand a , "
Wor 1 d P'ol 111 c s 5 (July 1953.): 361-300; Martin Wight, "The
Balance of Power and I n ternat i ona1 Order," in The Bases of 
Internat ional Order. ed. Alan James (London: Oxford
University  Press, 1973); Hans J , Nor g f'■ n f h a u , Po i j t. i e s f .mon ...
Natlons. 5th ed. (New York: knopf, 1973: and Urea Russel] ,
"Balance of Power in Perspective," In t er n ation a J Review of
History and P o l i t ic a l  Science J 1 (November 1904): 1-16.
1 “:’c" . ■ i i- ; i . 5c human , l ot or nat i - J. o 1 l t i c s  , ■ t  ! c ,i.
( New * or I : Mt br aw H i l l .  1 958 ) , p . 6o .
176. Savigear. "European P o l i t ic a l  Philosophy and 
International Relations," p. 41.
17 7. David Hume, "Of the3 Balance of Power," in Essays Mor al , 
P o l i t i c a l ,  and L i te ra ry  vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Green, ldUVJ.
178. Cited in Savigear, "European P o l i t ic a l  Philosophy and 
In ternat lona1 Relations," p. 41.
92
179. Schuman, In te rnational P o l i t i c s , p. 7O.
180. But ter-tied and Wight, eds. Diplomatic Invest igat ions, 
p. 133.
101. Dunne, "Healpol l t i  I- in the Decline o-f the West," p. 1411.
182. Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Eioc l a 1 Science: 
Internat ional Relations," Daedal us 106 (Summer 1977): 4.:'.
1 Et 3. Waltz, Theorv ot 1 n t er nat l on a 1 P o l i t i cs , p . 11 7 .
184. Wight, "Why Is There No International Theory"'" pp. 1 / -lfci.
185. Kuhn. The St r uc t ur e o-f Sci ent i f  ic Revolutions, pp. 175, 
182. Arend L i jphart  males the case that classical (or 
European) thinking about inter-national p o l i t ic s  constitutes  
the " tra d it iona l  paradigm" which prevailed in the d isc ip l ine  
u n t i l  the twentieth century. l ra d i t io n a l  thinking about 
world p o l i t ic s ,  according to L i jp h ar t ,  s a t is f ie s  Kuhn’ s 
concept o-f a paradigm in at least two ways: i t  provides the 
model for a coherent t ra d i t io n  of research, and research 
conducted under the psradigm resembles puzzle solving
(L. l j p h a r t ,  "The S t ru c tu re  of Theor et i c a 1 Revol ut. i on s in  
In te r n a t i o n a l  R e la t i o n s , "  p. 4 3 . ) .  At the same t ime,  
however , it. i s  l mportant t o  take note ot the ro l  e of 
" theo ry "  w i t h i n  the conte:: t  of Kuhn’ s d iscuss ion ot more 
g lobal  or p h i loso ph ica l  paradigms. On the one hand, i t  i s  
poss ib le  to  i d e n t i t y  the wide-rang ing assumptions, b e l i e f s ,  
and values of ra i  son d ’ £t  at as they apply to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
p o l i t i c s .  However, the t h e o r e t i c a l  s ig n i f i c a n c e  of these 
assumptions are c e r t a i n l y  open to  quest ion.  Even L i j p h a r t
admits tha t  the t r a d i t i  onal par adlgm does not s a t i s f y  Kuhn s
c o n te n t i on th a t  a paradigm i s  "a s ign of matur ing in  the 
development of any given s c i e n t i f i c  f i e l d . "  In mature 
s c ie n t i f i c :  communi t les, however, paradigms conta in  theo r ies  
in  the most. e;;act, formal , and o f ten  mathematical sense.
T heret ore, raison d ’ £t at as a "heurist ic  v is io n " or 
philosophical paradigm may be interpreted to represent a 
theoretical t ra d i t io n  a lbe it  a p r im it ive  one. See Richard 
5. Deal " I he or y and the Soienti t ic study ot Ii.i. national
Pq1i t i c e ,  " in I nternatlona 1 R e la t ions Theorv. Western and
Non—Wes tern Persper.ti ves. eds. P.P. Mi era and P. S. Deal (New
Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1980), pp. 31-32.
188. Waltz, Theory of International P o l i t i c s , p. 117.
187. Ibid.
C H A P T E R  I  I
WALTER LIPPMANN: REALISM AMD RATIONALITY IN DIPLOMACY
As America's most distinguished jou rn a l is t  ot the 
twentieth century, Walter Lippmann achieved a world-wide 
reputation as a discriminating thinker and c r i t i c  o-f pub l ie  
a f fa i r s .  His was, as Van Wyct: Brooks once observed, “the 
most b r i l l i a n t  career ever devoted in America to p o l i t ic a l  
w r i t in g . " 1 In appraising Lippmann's merit as a l i t e r a r y  
s t y l i s t ,  Richard Rovere argues: "As a s t y l i s t ,  he should be
studied not only by other jo u rn a l is ts  but by everyone 
interested in English prose, for he was surely as much a 
master of i t  as any modern Amer1 can w r i t e r . L i p p m a n n ' s 
in te g r i ty  as a jo u rn a l is t ,  as well as his a b i l i t y  to re la te  
national policy to the underlying values and philosophical  
roots of American society, helped set standards for  
p o l i t ic a l  commentators that few i f  any have equaled. As 
early as 1933, James Trust low Adams went so far  as to 
describe Lippmann as "one of the most potent politic-"!  
forces of the nation,"  as "the American phenomenon."3
Influence was Lippmann's stock in trade and what made 
him a powerful public f igure.  He was the author of more 
than twenty books— some of them "best s e l le rs " — scores of 
essays published in popular magazines and scholarly
journals, and countless newspaper e d i to r ia ls  and columns.'* 
Always able to plunge through the miasma of contention and 
grasp the essence of a s i tu a t io n ,  he preferred to analvze 
power rather than exercise i t .  By his own se l f-descrip t ion  
Lippmann was a man who led two d is t in c t  but in te rre la ted  
l iv e s ,  one of boots (philosophy) and one of newspapers 
(p o l i t ic s  and public po licy ) .  His unique career combined 
both activism and detachment; the combination made him 
d is t in c t iv e  and gave his voice an unparalled authority.®  
Only the b r ie fe s t  at tent ion may be given to the many 
facets of Lippmann's professional and public career. He wa 
born in New York City on September 23, 1E389, and died on
December 14, 1974, at the age of e ighty-four. The product
of an upper-midd1e -c 1 ass family, the young Lippmann was 
driven by his in te l le c tu a l  passions to the study of a r t .  
psychology, l i t e r a tu r e ,  and theology. He matriculated at 
Harvard College, attracted the attent ion of William James 
and George Santayana, and graduated with the celebrated  
class of 1910,*
Lippmann began his public career in the halcyon days 
before the f i r r t  Wot i a War, when human progress seemed 
unlimited and science promised a l i f e  of le isure and 
abundance for a l l .  Even in these ear ly  years, Lippmann was 
recognized in America as a force in journalism and p o l i t ic s  
Arthur Schlesinger, J r . ,  has written  of these years:
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Born in the Victorian t r a n q u i l i t ie s  o-f 1BB9, he 
was s t i r re d  by the ferment of the Progressive Era 
and became a s o c ia l is t  before he l e f t  Harvard in 
1910. His socialism soon evaporated in any 
dogmatic form, but i t  l e f t  behind a residue in the 
shape of a b e l ie f  in the necessity of rational  
planning and purpose to master the inc ip ien t  chaos 
of modern soci e ty . y
While many of Lippmann's writ ings rested on the s o c ia l is t
commitment to piann i ng in the ser vice of l ib e ra l
aspirations, he was essent ia l ly  conservative in his
preference for an orderly society and fa i th  in reason."
Li ppmann began his c areer in j ournalism as both editor
and frequent contributor to the Harvard Monthlv. In 1910.
he was recruited by the soclal c r i t i c  Lincoln S teff  ens to
help prepare a series of muckraking a r t ic le s  for Everybody7 s
Magas i ne. His success as a w ri ter  were soon to a t t ra c t  the
attention of those in te l le c tu a l  c irc le s  which were
i n f 1uent ia l  in the progr ess i ve c1lmate of the prewar year s.
His f i r s t  book, A Preface to P o l i t ic s  < 1913.) brought him
instant recognition and the opportunity to jo in Herbert
Croly and Walter Weyl in founding the weekly New Republie.
No longer a s o c ia l is t ,  yet one of the young "movers and
•rhaters" whose in te l le c tu a l  v ir tu e  made the period pr ior  to
World War I a seedtime of new ideas and l im it le s s  hope.
Lippmann found in the pages of the New Republie an outlet
for a r t ic le s  on almost any topic about which he chose to
w r i t e . ’
During World War' I .  in 1917, Lippmann served as an 
assistant to Secretary o-i State Newton D. Baker and was
9 6
la te r  appointed executive secretary of a postwar planning 
group, the so-called House In q u iry .40 As a captain in 
m il i ta ry  in te l l ig e n c e  in 191B, he worked on Wilson's 
Fourteen Points Program and on preparations for the Paris 
Peace Conference. In 1920, Lippmann le f t  the New Repub l ie  
to become an e d i to r ia l  w r i te r ,  and subsequently editor  
(1929), of the Democratic New Yor k WorId. The Wor1d stood 
in the forefront of those f igh t ing  against social and 
p o l i t ic a l  in ju s t ic e  and for l ib e ra l  reforms, both within  
American society and in in ternational re la t ions .
In 1931, Lippmann joined the Republican Her ald I n  bune. 
to which, for the next t h i r t y  years, he contributed his 
nat iona l ly  syndicated column, "Today and Tomorrow." I t  was 
in "Today and Tomorrow" that he offered the not- to -be -  
forgotten assessment of Franklin Roosevelt as "a pleasant 
man who, without any very important qu a l i f ica t io n s  for 
o f f ic e ,  would very much l ik e  to be p res iden t ."41 In the 
same column, he attacked the "revolutionary po lic ies" of 
the New Deal and endorsed Alf Landon for President in 1936, 
Dewey in 194B, and Eisenhower in 1952. Indeed, Lippmann's 
c r i t ic is m  o-t the New Deal arid his support for Repuolican 
candidates led some to renounce him as a re v is io n is t  who had 
lost or bartered away his l ib e ra l  p r in c ip le s .13
The years which followed raised even more questions. 
Lippmann opposed the deployment of American combat troops in 
Korea as well as the Senate hearings of Joseph McCarthy. He
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expressed admiration -for France's Charles DeGaulle with 
whom— as with the Soviet Union's N ik i ta  Khrushchev— he 
established re la t io n s  of personal confidence as had no other 
American of his t im e .13 In both his books and columns, many 
of Lippmann's insights have stood the test of time. During 
World War I I ,  he foresaw the m i l i t a ry  and p o l i t ic a l  presence
of the Soviet Union from the B alt ic  to the Balkans. He also
prophesied the in s t a b i l i t y  of the Chinese n a t io n a l is t  
regime. Even more s tr ik in g ,  Lippmann antic ipated the
problems that arose from the "un1versal 12at 1 on" of the
Truman Doctrine. 14 Although Lippmann exhorted his 
jo u rn a l is t ic  colleagues to keep th e ir  distance from those in 
public l i f e ,  his own p o l i t ic a l  activism remained a l i fe long  
character t r a i t .  For a time Lippmann was an avid supporter 
of Theodore Roosevelt's Bull Moose progress1vism. 1D 
Lippmann’ 5 e d i to r ia ls  for the Wor1d helped prevent an 
American invasion of Mexico, and his secret negotiations  
made possible a se tt  1 ement between revo 1 ut 1 onary Me;; 1 can 
1eaders and the Vatican, 14 His ta le n t  as a speechwr1 te r  was 
drawn on by such figures as John W. Davis, Al Smith, Dwight 
Morrow, and Newton D. Baker. In la te r  years. Lippmann 
counseled both Wendell W i l lk ie  and Dwight Eisenhower on 
president ia l p o l i t ic s ,  quarreled with the Dulles brothers on 
foreign policy,  and was enthus ias t ica l ly  sought out a f ter  by 
both presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson.
The tension in Lippmann's l i f e  between personal
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detachment and p o l i t ic a l  int ervention reached i t s  breaking 
point with protracted American involvement in Southeast Asia 
during the 19<bOs. While often portrayed by his c r i t i c s  as 
an "apologist" or "pundit" for the establishment, Lippmann 
turned b i t t e r l y  against the Johnson Admin1s t r a t 1 on’ s 
destructive obsession with the Vietnam W a r . R e p u l s e d  by 
the adm inistrat ion’ s imperial pretensions, and subsequently 
a lienat ing  himself from those who often f la t te re d  him,
Lippmann wanted his country to pursue i t s  own i deals; and he 
never t i r e d  of reminding his readers of them.
Lippmann and the American Public Philosophy 
At the outset, i t  is important to note that Lippmann’ s 
in te l le c tu a l  odyssey defies precise description and 
categorization. He was not one who can be eas i ly  associated 
with any p ar t ic u la r  "school “ or "approach" in the hi story of 
p o l i t ic a l  thought. In fac t ,  Walter Lippmann’ 5 in terest  in 
philosophy and p o l i t ic s  was an unending search, one that led 
him variously to socialism, to p o l i t ic a l  activism, to 
skepticism, to social detachment, to economic conservatism, 
to Cold War c r i t ic is m , and to social l ibera lism . At 
d if fe re n t  stages in Lippmann’ s career, he was variously  
1 dent 1 f 1 ed as a Mar;; 1 st , a l ib e r a l ,  a conser vat 1 ve, a 
pragmatist, an aesthet ic— and just plain confusing.1*
Sever a1 of his c r i t i c s  agreed with the assessment that he 
was an "obfuscator" who drugs "lazy minds" with "pompous 
nonsense," an "equivocstor who could be quoted on almost any
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side of a question,," and a disciple of Alexander Hamilton 
who was the f i r s t  "strong advocate of plutocratic  fascism in 
Amen ca. *' ***
Lippmann's in te l lec tua l  or ientation is especially  
d i f f i c u l t  to describe, since his p o l i t ica l  outlook rarely  
remained fixed for any extended period of time. Perhaps the 
ley to the successive sh if ts  in Lippmann's thought l ies  in 
his own statement that "every tru ly  c iv i l i z e d  and 
enlightened man is conservative and l ibera l and 
progressive,"ao What follows is an attempt to examine 
Lippmann's major works and to distinguish the d i f feren t  
stages in his in te l lec tu a l  development.
Walter Lippmann's years at Harvard had a deep and 
lasting impact on the subsequent development of his 
p o l i t ic a l  thought. He had come in contact there with 
soc ia l is t  ideas and, for a short time, was active in the 
campus soc ia l is t  movement. Fabianism and a future geared to 
socialism appealed to Lippmann because i t  embodied the 
desire of the middle class reformer to "level up" rather 
than "level down," to transform the poor into contented 
bourgeoisie. At the same time, however, he eschewed the 
more radical option of seizing the state apparatus and 
turning power over to a cloistered in te l lec tua l  e l i t e .
While at Harvard, Lippmann's zeal for moral reformism 
was matched by the in te l lec tu a l  impact of the ideas of both 
William James and George Santayana. James contributed to
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his young d isc ip le 's  interest in science and 
experimentation, persuaded him that science could be 
reconciled with re l ig ion  by empirical standards, and evoked 
realms of consciousness beyond everyday experience.31 I t  
was from James that the early  Lippmann inherited the 
commitment to social and p o l i t ic a l  meliorism, as well as the 
b e l ie f  in "p ract ica l i ty"  in a world of competing and often 
1rreconci1ab1e moral imperatives.
Perhaps even more decisive for Lippmann's thinking in 
la te r  years was the teaching of Santayana. As a Catholic 
freethinker who valued re l ig ion  aesthet ical ly ,  rather than 
as a guide to morality, Santayana challenged those 
nineteenth century shibboleths about progress that Lippmann 
had grown up b e l iev ing .33 In part icu lar ,  Santayana's 
Platonism led Lippmann to acknowledge an in v is ib le ,  
immutable, higher order of r e a l i t y ,  which structures and 
governs the flux of human experience.23 While traces of 
James’ radical emr 'cism may be found in the early  works of 
Lippmann, i t  was Santayana's realm of essences that  
increasingly took hold in the 1930s and 194'ts and became a 
centra] theme- in The Public Philosophy <195b>.
Two of Lippmann's early works—A Preface to P o l i t ic s  
(1913) and D r i f t  and Mastery (1914)— i l lu s t r a te  the gradual 
s h i f t  from socialism and progressi vi sm to pragmatic 
l iberalism. A Preface to P o l i t ic s  is the most important 
work:, for i t  embodies a protest against the empty formalism
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and legal ism of much p o l i t ic a l  discussion and shows the 
author's c r e a t iv i ty  in being among the -first to apply 
Freud’ s theory o-f personality to p o l i t ic a l  l i f e .  The 
student of Lippmann’ s p o l i t ic a l  philosophy may draw two 
basic conclusions from the many arguments presented in these 
early wor Is .  F i r s t ,  the most enduring theor ies of p o l i t ic s  
are those rooted in an e x p l ic i t  conception of human 
n atu re .24 Second, theories of morality are useful insofar
as they help to find a mode of l iv in g  which men w i l l
in s t in c t iv e ly  judge to be good. At th is  point in his 
career, Lippmann ref lected  James’ b e l ie f  that the c r i t e r i a  
of ethical judgment are subjective, residing in the mind of 
the agent.
Throughout the 1920s, Lippmann began to reformulate his 
position on the d e s i r a b i l i t y  of creating a rat ional society. 
In Li berty and the News (1920), his sense of the complexity 
of modern industr ia l  society convinced him that,  i f  people 
were denied the facts,  the common method of science could 
not hope to work.20 S p e c if ic a l ly ,  the concern for objective  
t ru th  was being overpowered by a concern for national
secur] ty ,  whi ch he tound to be just ar iother var ia t  i on on the
old doctrine that the end j u s t i f i e s  the means. To assess 
the flow of uncontaminated fa c t ,  Lippmann proposed creating  
technical research organizations which would help build "a 
system of information increasingly independent of opinion."  
The in te l le c tu a l  shou1d become the man, no 1onger of
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"passionate ideas," but o-f neutral -facts.
The arguments presented in both Putol1c Opinion (1922) 
and The Phantom Publ i c < 1925) -further develop his concern 
-for the ra t iona l basis o-f p o l i t ic a l  action in modern 
democracies. The overriding theme o-f both may be summarized 
by saying that government by the people is an unattainable  
ideal in modern industr ia l  society. Not a l l  men, he said, 
were reasonable, in-formed, or educated enough to discern and 
pursue the ir  own in te re s ts .3*  As a resu lt ,  Lippmann 
suggested that public opinion represented l i t t l e  more than 
"a moralized and codi-fied version at the facts. "27 The 
masses have l i t t l e  contribution to make to public a f fa i rs ,  
insofar as they are prone to consider -facts within the 
content of th e ir  own desires and stereotypes. In short, 
Lippmann shared A r is to t le 's  view th a t ,  in the ideal state,  
"the function of the governors is  to issue commands and give 
decisions (that is ,  to govern): the function of the governed 
is  to elect the gnvprnors."2*
Lippmann's A Preface to Moral* (1929) represented his 
f i r s t  foray into moral philosophy and ethics. The start ing  
point of his analysis was an;;iety and a l ienat ion:  social
in s t i tu t io n s ,  social codes, and social movements were 
collapsing. What he termed the "acids of modernity" had 
corroded re l ig ious  fa i th ;  science had demolished b e l ie f ;  and 
Freud had violated the sanctity  of the human s o u l .31* 
Lippmann's answer to the eclipse of any underlying moral
103
order in society moved in the d irect ion  o-f a non-
metaphysical, non-absolutist ethic by which ra t iona l  and
c iv i l i z e d  men could l iv e  together in a cample:: world. In
opposition to supernatural 1sm and the one-dimensional ism of
science, Lippmann offered his own special brand of humanism.
The humanism he proposed rested on detachment— a detachment
th a t ,  however appealing in theory, was most d i f f i c u l t  to
pract ice . Lippmann's "mature man" would be above vexing
emotion and not despair at fa i lu r e .
. . .s in c e  nothing gnawed at his v i t a ls ,  neither  
doubt nor ambition, nor fru s tra t io n  nor fe a r ,  he 
would move eas i ly  through l i f e .  And so whether 
he saw the thing as comedy, or high tragedy, or 
plain farce, he would a f f irm  that i t  is  what i t  
is ,  and the wise man can enjoy i t . 30
For modern man, the acceptance of in t r in s ic  authority  
in some "higher law" or divine sanction was impossible; 
man's own nature, and that of the world which he l ives ,  must 
provide the guidelines. Man has the potential to become 
mature, he thought, in the sense of being morally 
disinterested. Yet, having stated th is  moral imperative, 
Lippmann continued to doubt the multitude's a b i l i t y  to 
accept i t .  Whereas Lippmann had once urged in te l le c tu a ls  to 
become men Qf action, he now preached the v ir tues  of "a 
quiet indifference to the immediate and a serene attachment 
to the processes of inquiry and understanding."31
Lippmann's fa i th  in detachment against the ind if ferent  
storms of a p lu r a l is t ic  universe was jo lted  by the explosion 
of moral and in te l le c tu a l  energy accompanying the early
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years o-f the New Deal. The excitement of observing 
in te l l igen ce  at work in public decisions began to rekindle  
Lippmann's e a r l ie r  fa i th  in the ra t io n a l i ty  of society. The 
"ideal of a consciously controlled society was seen to 
express the deep ins t inc t  of men for the unity of 
c i v i l i z a t i o n . 3a:
Two key books of the ear 1y 1930s exemplified Lippmann's 
evolving position. In The Method of Freedom (1934). he 
expressed a confidence in human capacity to devise 
in t e l l ig e n t ,  compensatory po lic ies:  i t  thereby socialized
the ro le  of the in t e l l e c t u a l . 33 The following year, in The 
New Imperative (1935), he reaffirmed his b e l ie f  in the 
p o s s ib i l i ty  of ra t io n a l ,  orderly planning. Toward the end 
of 1935, however, Lippmann began to loose confidence in 
Roosevelt's p o l ic ies .  Though he retained a fa i th  in 
ult im ate patterns, he recoiled from the expression of such 
patterns in social planning.
In The Good Soci ety (1937), Lippmann's quest for a 
unifying vision went far beyond individual disinterestedness  
to embrace a higher, more objective authority . Under the 
influence of i-riedrich Huyek and Ludwig von Mises, he issued 
a broad indictment of "nearly every e f fo r t  which lays claim 
to being enlightened, humane and progressive" and involving 
"the premise of author i tar  l an c o l le c t iv is m ."3'* True 
l iberal ism , argued Lippmann, hinges on two mechanisms that 
are threatened by the c o l le c t iv is t  order--the  free  market
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and the law. Vet neither the market nor the law was, in 
i t s e l f ,  s u f f ic ie n t  as an impersonal means by which society  
could be regulated. Far from guaranteeing unity in society, 
th is  only pushed the problem back a step fu r th e r— to man 
hi msel -f .
I t  was not u n t i l  the publication of The Public 
Phi 1osophy (1955) that Lippmann affirmed the v i a b i l i t y  of a 
transcendent ethic founded, not on the moral const itut ion of 
man (as in A Preface to f lorals), but on the moral 
necessities of the universe.30 The text  revealed Lippmann 
in his most an t i -m a jo r i ta r ia n  mood. Mass opinion had 
corrupted government and contributed to "a morbid 
derangement of the true functions of power." Democracy was 
paralysed inasmuch as the people imposed a "veto upon the 
judgments of informed and responsible people. "3<* Not only 
were the people incapable of exercising th e ir  acquired 
power, but the governments they elected had lost the power 
which they must recover i f  they are to govern.
Lippmann’ s solution moved along two fronts:  
strengthening executive power and l im it ing  sovereignty on 
the* basis of natural law .57 A reinvigorated executive would 
emancipate governments from the stranglehold of special 
in terests .  A concern for natural law re f lec ted  Lippmann’ s 
contention that a large p lu r a l is t ic  society could not be 
governed "without recognizing th a t ,  transcending i t s  plural  
in terests ,  there is  a rat ional order superior to canon
1 0 6
law."3" I t  became the responsibi l ity  of the in te l lec tu a ls  
to propagate "a common conception of law and order which 
possesses universal va l id i ty"  and which would provide a 
standard for the public philosophy.
Even though Lippmann may not qualify  as an original  
philosopher, he viewed the sphere of practical p o l i t ic s  as 
his "laboratory" and used the insights gained from his years
of activism to probe beneath and beyond the headlines. He
re len t less ly  attacked enduring moral and p o l i t ic a l  
controversies, al ways taking care to lint; even his most 
abstract works to the rhythms of p o l i t ic a l  experience. Much
of Lippmann's lasting appeal derives from the l i fe long  
tension in his work between the committed a c t iv is t  and the 
detached thinker. Commenting on his reputation as both 
journa lis t  and p o l i t ic a l  thinker, one observer has 
c o n e 1 u d e d :
From the biographical standpoint alone, Lippmann's 
immersion in the abstruse problems of p o l i t ic a l  
philosophy is  of ut most in terest . The 
ambitiousness of his speculative projects, and his 
readiness to invoke concepts and dwell upon 
thinkers rare ly  deemed apropos of the discussion 
of power in Washington, indicate he derived 
rewards of a very special order from his 
communication with the ancients.3^
Realism and Internafional P o li t ics  
Numerous c r i t i c s  of Walter Lippmann's in te l lec tua l  
orientation as i t  moved into the realm of international 
p o l i t ic s  have argued against the p oss ib i l i ty  of specifying a 
consistent emphasis in his approach or philosophical
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perspective. In -tact, the confusion and ambiguity 
surrounding his philosophical roots and th e ir  relevance for 
American public policy are often seen to mirror periodic  
s h if ts  and transformations in his viewpoints on the history  
and conduct of American diplomacy.
A typical reading of Lippmann's career might be cast in 
the following terms. Lippmann's pre-World War I optimism 
expressed the b e l ie f  in a world subjected to the steady 
process of pac i f ica t ion  through reason, science, and the 
universa l iza t ion  of the democratic process.'*0 Following the 
war and throu gh out the 1920s, he inveighed against the 
dangers of public opinion and embraced a posture of Stoic 
detachment. In the 1930s, Lippmann retreated to a policy of 
isolationism in foreign a f fa i r s ,  s h i f t in g  to a Machiavellian  
policy of R ea lpo l i t ik  as World War I I  unfolded.41 F in a l ly ,  
in the Cold War era, he developed a "natural law" philosophy 
with authoritar lan  overtones, a position which amounted to a 
confession of bankuptcy regarding his youthful reformism 
and rad ica l i  sm.
While i t  is  possible to id e n t i fy  a var ie ty of 
in te l le c tu a l  facets shaping Lippmann's analysis of American 
foreign policy over a half -century , the emphasis in th is  
section w i l l  focus on his contribution to the emergence of 
" p o l i t ic a l  realism" as a new and d is t in c t iv e  American 
approach to global a f fa i r s .  How do such seminal themes as 
national in te re s t ,  power, balance of power, and diplomacy
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re la te  to the r is e  o-f America as a global power In the
postwar setting? To what extent can Lippmann's realism be
considered a reformulation or adaptation of the age-old
princ ip les  associated with European rai son d '£ ta t  ? Specific
consideration w i l l  be given to the arguments presented by
Lippmann in his U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic
(1943); U.S. War Aims (1944); Iso lat ion and Alliances
(1952); The Cold War (1947); The Communist World and Ours
(1958); The CominQ Test With Russia (1961); and Western
Unity and the Common Market (1962).
With the publication of U.S. Foreion Po l icy . Lippmann
moved away from the themes of internationalism and
isolationism that characterised much of his wort- in the
1920s and 1930s. In fa c t ,  the tent  may be r ig h t ly  judged to
represent one of the e a r l ie s t  attempts by an American to
develop a " r e a l is t , "  i f  not g eo p o l it ica l ,  sketch of the
past, present, and future of American s ta te c ra f t .  The s h i f t
in Lippmann's or ien tat ion  is  a f f irm r by a revealing s e l f -
assessment in the opening pages:
. . .w i t h  the hindsight I am c r i t ic is in g  others 
f o r . . . a  lack of foresight of which I also was 
g u i l t y . . . 1 should l ik e  to make i t  as pi^in us 
possi bl l1. . . that  nothing could be further  from my 
intention than to say to anyone that I told him 
so. For the conclusions I have set down in th is  
book: are drawn from ex per i ence. . . . I have come to 
them slowly over 30 years, and as a resu lt  of may 
fa lse  s tarts  and serious disappointments.'**
Reacting to the internat ional  conquests of H i t le r  along
with the mi 1i ta r is a t io n  of Japan, Lippmann argued that U.S.
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■foreign policy was "insolvent," our -former apparent security 
as a nation "unearned."*3 At the core of his thesis was an 
inquiry into both the h is to r ic  or ig ins , as well as the 
fu ture prospects, of the American national in te res t .
Ac cor ding to Lippmann, the p r1 mary act or 1n 
1nternat iona1 a f fa i r s  is the sovereign nation s t a t e . * *
While acknowledging that in ternat ional  commerce and contacts 
have been corroding f ro n t ie rs ,  he observed that the 
conditions of multiple sovereignty at the heart of 
in ternat ional  p o l i t ic s  were given and unalterable for 
pract ica l purposes, at least for the foreseeable future.
With no higher authority  above the nation state,  the 
instrum enta l i t ies  of coercion and violence represent 
enduring a t t r ib u te s  in the r iv a l r y  among nations. While i t  
may be feas ib le to mit igate the lawlessness and b ru ta l i ty  of 
the struggle, any e f fe c t iv e  program far peace must be based 
on the assumption that there w i l l  be sources of 
i nternat i ona1 c o n f l ic t  as fa r  as men can fo re see .*8
The precarious nature of American security on the eve 
of World War I I  was due, in no small part,  to fundamental 
misperceptions regarding the objective content of American 
national in terests  since the dawn of the Republic. Since 
the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1(323, argued 
Lippmann, Americans gradually succumbed to the i l lu s io n  
which had brought the nation into mortal p e r i l — "that 
concern with our f ro n t ie rs ,  our armaments, and with
i i o
all iances is immoral and reactionary. "4<l A century of 
iso lat ion  from Old World polit ics, ,  combined with the 
id e a l is t ic  pretense that America's priv ileged position was a 
reward for moral superior ity ,  had blinded Americans from the 
recognition that hard work is  a necessary s a c r i f ic e  for 
secur l t y .  The i l l  li si on wou 1 d now have to be redeemed with 
American blood and treasure at a time when America could no 
longer stand aloof and isolated from world a f fa i r s .
Moreover, Lippmann emphasized that the broad contours 
of U.S. diplomatic history reveal that American foreign  
policy interests have largely been shaped by factors  
external to America's own sense of "separateness" and moral 
accomplishment. He reminded his countrymen that even the 
American War of Independence had been waged with the 
assistance of the French, Spanish, and Russians. In 
addition, a careful reading of h istory would i l l u s t r a t e  that 
the United States had been more or less involved in every 
war since the seventeenth century in which the order nf 
power in the A t lan t ic  and P ac if ic  Oceans was at stake: the
wars of 16B8-1697, 1701-1714, 1740-1748, 1756-1763, 1812,
1 't 1 7 , and 1 vm 1. '
The v i a b i l i t y  of the Monroe Doctrine was predicated on 
the assurance of the B ri t ish  Foreign Secretary that the 
B rit ish  Navy would defend the independence of the nations of 
the New ’''or 1 d. After Monroe, Lippmann was only w i l l in g  to 
praise Theodore Roosevelt for- possessing a f irm grasp of
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America's overseas commitments and v u ln e r a b i l i t y . * "  
Furthermore, the le g a l is t ic -m o ra l is t ic  approach of President 
Woodrow Wilson's Administration obscured the extent to which 
American security ,  prior  to World War I ,  depended on Brit ish
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At the same time, however, Lippmann conceded that the 
national in terest  often defies precise ca lculat ion and is  
seldom uniform in i t s  application to a wide range of foreign  
policy si tuations. More often than not, several in terests  
may present themselves as potent ia l objectives of national 
policy.®3 A government must, therefore, l im i t  i t s  
objectives, arrange them in order of importance, and 
carefu11y wor k out a system of p r io r 111es. Whlie i t  is  true  
that some of the factors involved do not lend themselves to 
r e l ia b le  quant itat ive  measurement, prudent men must make 
informed guesses and estimates as to how such equations 
ba1ance.
Even though Lippmann defined the national in terest  with 
a strong accent on the variables of power, he admitted that  
national power may be seen as a combi nation of both tangible  
and intangib le factors. The acid test of whether a foreign  
in teres t  is  a v i t a l  national in teres t  l ie s  in whether or not 
the people consider i t  worth defending at the r is k  of war. DD 
The supreme national in te res t ,  he said, is  survival — 
security  of the nation in peace and war. The important 
material factors that contribute to a nat ion's defense of 
i t s  security include: i t s  armed strength, i t s  s t ra te g ic -
geopolit ica l  position, and i t s  a l l iances.
While strateg ic  and m il i ta ry  components may be viewed 
as the f ro n t l in e  of any nat ion's power, Lippmann assigned 
secondary importance to such intangible components as a
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nat ion's morale and constellat ion of values. Indeed, his 
d ef in i t io n  of survival does not end with mere physical 
existence; i t  means “ . . . t h e i r  fam il ies  and th e ir  homes, 
th e ir  v i l lages  and the ir  lands, th e ir  countries and their  
own ways, th e ir  a l te rs ,  th e ir  ■ lags and th e ir  hearths. ,,B*  
Moreover, Lippmann cautioned that any government would be 
foolish  to disregard the potentia l impact of ideals in i t s  
calculat ions of foreign policy. In order to survive— to 
preserve i t s  physical in te g r i ty — a nation must advance i t s  
f a i t h ,  i t s  moral values, i t s  ideals, and develop a fr iend ly  
ln ternational environment.07 Yet he also warned that  ideals  
often f a i l  as e ither  good or achievable goals of policy;  
they must be translated into concrete terms to be 
r e a l i s e d . F i n a l  1y , even though honest men may di f f er on 
the r e la t iv e  lmportance of mora1 and mat er i al f act or s in the 
calculat ion of the national in te res t ,  they cannot deny that 
physical survival is  a prerequis ite  for e i th e r ,  and is ,  
th e re fo re , the f i r s t  and foremost const i tuent element of the 
national in t e r e s t .0’
Lippmann"s approach to both the balance of power and 
diplomacy begins with the recognition that ensuring national 
survival and upholding lesser in terests presupposes 
America's a b i l i t y  to defend them against foreign  
encroachment.40 The instrument of both defense and 
aggression is  power defined as a nat ion 's a b i l i t y  to 
persuade others to do i t s  w i l l .  The c o n f l ic t  of in terests
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among states reduces to a struggle for power; armaments lead 
to counter-armaments, a l l iances to counter-al1 lances, and 
Issues tend to be judged not on th e ir  individual merit, but 
in l ig h t  of the ups and downs of r e la t iv e  power positions.  
Lippmann believed that nations, l ik e  individuals,  tend to 
restra in  th e ir  ambitions and see the l ight  of reason when 
they know that th e ir  a b i l i t y  to get what they want is  
l im ited , checked, and balanced— that force w i l l  be met by 
f o r c e . * 1 In surveying events both during and a f te r  World 
War I I ,  Lippmann considered the balance of power as the best 
availab le  means by which a nation could safeguard i t s  
independence, and by which a group of nations could hope to 
prevent a great, dynamic and aggressive power from 
establishing hegemony over them.
A number of Lippmann's biographers have pointed to the 
often contrad1ctory ways in which he employed the balance of 
power concept. Following World War I ,  he frequently used 
the term in a negative sense to re fer  to the old European 
order, wherein, he believed, in ternat iona1 relat ionships had 
been structured by bloc diplomacy and competitive 
armaments.42 Hi the same time, he could use the term in a 
more favorable l ig h t :  "I re a l iz e  that th is  sounds. . .  11ke the
doctrine known as the balance of power. That is  just what 
i t  is ,  and there is no need to be a fra id  of a bad name."*3 
Even pr ior  to his conversion to "realism" during World War 
I I ,  Lippmann would assert: "Where coercive force ex ists,  i t
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must e i ther  be neutralised by -force or employed in the 
in terests of what we regard as c i v i l i z a t i o n , " 44 This 
favorable sense in which he cited the balance of power 
represented an attempt by Lippmann to project a concept 
drawn from his understand1ng of domestic p o l i t ic s  into  
in te rn a t1onal re la t ions .  Despite the varying use of the 
concept, one central theme radiates through Lippmann's work 
on America's foreign policy prospects following World War I:  
"The old European order had collapsed, and Amer1ca could no 
longer stand aloof and isolated from world a f fa i r s .  1140
I t  was not un t i l  the spread of to ta l i ta r ia n is m  across 
Europe in the 1940s that Lippmann was inspired to re ­
evaluate more fu l ly  the balance of power p r in c ip le ,  in 
contrast to the Wilsonian worldview that influenced U.S. 
foreign policy thinking well in to the 1930s.
There is  the id e a l is t ic  t r a d i t io n . . . that th is  
country cannot with a good conscience recognise 
any settlement which rests on a balance of power 
and the existence of spheres of influence. The 
t ra d i t io n  holds that only one world of like-minded 
states is  to lerab le ,  and a l l  the arrangements that 
the diplomatists have made in the past, to 
accommodate the perpetual r iv a l r y  of nations, are 
in to lerab le .  This t r a d i t lo n . . . ls  not compatible 
with peace in a wor1d where great powers are not 
l i l.t.' minded, arid do not mean Llj be so.4'1"
Instead of responding to events with no guiding pr inc ip le
other than a pragmatic sense of what seemed feas ib le  in each
s ituat ion , he worked out a more consistent diplomacy based
on m il i ta ry  power, a l l iances,  spheres of influence, and a
"cold calculation" of American national in teres ts .
Combining Admiral Mahan's view o-f sea power with Nicholas 
Spykman's geopolit ics  and Clausewitz' s conception o-f war as 
the m i l i ta ry  conduct of diplomacy, Lippmann emerged as the 
new apostle in the United States of hardheaded 
Real pol 1 t i  k .
Of paramount importance in the postwar era was the 
establishment of a l l iances s u f f ic ie n t ly  potent to deter 
would-be aggressors. In 1943, Lippmann outlined three 
requirements for a successful postwar settlement: (1) the
formulation of a grand nuclear a l l ian ce  between the Soviet 
Union, B ri ta in ,  and America to preserve European security;  
(2) the n eu tra l iza t ion  of prewar Eastern European states as 
a mutual guarantee to both the Soviets and nations of 
Western Europe of th e ir  peaceful intention toward one 
another; and (3) the cooperation of a l l  members of the 
nuclear a l l ian ce  in a wider association of n a t io n s .**  I t  
was logical then that in December 1944, Lippmann endorsed 
the grant of "veto" to the members of the proposed Security  
Council of the future United Nat ions.**  Popular opinion, h 
further  counseled, had to become increasingly " re a l is t ic "  
and understand the necessity of great power coliuDoratlon, 
since the "elementary means by which a l l  foreign policy mus 
be conducted are the armed forces of a nation, the 
arrangement of i t s  strateg ic  position, and the choice of i t  
a l i i  ances. " ",0
Underlying Lippmann's proposal of an a l l iance  system
1 17
among the major powers was the assumption that the idea o-f 
peace can only be achieved by making a series of moves over 
a long period of time in order to establish and perpetuate a 
balance of power between the great r iv a l  s ta te s .yi In the 
absence of such a balance, i t  is  possible to ta lk  about the 
surrender of one side to the other, but not a sat is fac tory  
negot 1 ated se tt  i emen t. The basic i dea, as Li ppmann was to
express in 1955, is  that "when the ponderable forces are in 
balance, neither being able or w i l l in g  to enert decisive  
force, the imponderable means of reason become 
eff icac ious.
While aff irm ing the importance of the balance idea for 
postwar security  among the leading powers, Lippmann was no 
less ins is ten t  in suggesting that the existing balance of 
power in the la te  1940s was "unstable and unsatisfactory."  
Responding to Soviet designs in Eastern Europe and Asia, he 
cautioned that  the United States should seek the withdrawal 
of the Red Army from Europe and, at the same time, should 
develop the power to s t r ik e  at the v i ta l  centers of the 
Soviet Union.74 The need for the United States to redress 
the ex ist ing balance wac prompted by Soviet moves to 
incorpor ate F i n1 and and Cz echos1 oval la  lnto i t s  s tr  ateg i c 
o rb it  and dominate by force the area which the West would 
need to use i t s  superior m i l i ta ry  weapons. Lippmann 
believed the Soviet moves so great ly  imperiled Western 
security  as to warrant immediate American mobilizat ion— the
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restoration o-f se lect ive  service, the re-establishment of 
war power over industry, the resumption of lend lease, and 
the declaration of a state of national emergency.70
Lippmann's perception of Moscow's intention to upset 
the existing balance of power and render in e ffe c t iv e  
Amer ican deterrent cap a b i l i t y  was re i te ra te d  over the ne:: t 
twenty years. In 195u, he noted that the Soviets were 
t ry ing  to develop the ir  a ir  defenses to the point of being 
able to neu tra l ize  American power. 74 The logic of the 
s ituat ion  required that the United States must keep i t s  
s tr ik in g  power superior to Soviet defenses; the development 
of American defensive techniques must always stay ahead of 
Soviet offensive cap a b i l i ty .  Following his much publicized  
meeting with Khrushchev in 1958, Lippmann gained the 
impression that the Soviets were unwill ing to make any 
concessions that would give the United States even a s l igh t  
ta c t ic a l  advantage, not to speak: of a strateg ic  advantage, 
in case of war.77 Again in 1962 and 1963, following the 
repeated f a i lu r e  of negotiations for a nuclear tes t  ban 
t re a ty ,  he observed that neither the United States nor the 
Soviet Union was prepared to trust  each other with nuclear 
a u p e r ia r i ty .7*  Each power believed that i t  must have 
supremacy in order to have security .  Again, in commenting 
on the Soviet-backed conf1i ct in Korea, Lippmann greeted 
President Truman's decision to send American troops by 
saying: "Now that force is  being used to upset the existing
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balance o-f power in the Far East, -force must be used to 
r ig h t  i t  again.
Several key cansi der at i on5 shaped Li ppmann 1 s emphasi s 
on the balance of power throughout the postwar years.
F i r s t ,  when Lippmann advocated a policy of balance of power 
for the United States, he meant the establishment of a 
balance that would be decisively favorable to America. 
Second, he often submitted that the "third states" which 
might act as balances between American and the Soviet 
in terests  are bound to appear on the world p o l i t ic a l  scene. 
In 1950, he argued that the hazards inherent in the emsting  
b1po lar1zat 1 on of power could be minimized only by the 
"reappearance of independent powers, who have the energy and 
w i l l  to take th e ir  own course."-0  Supporting Winston 
C hurch il l 's  plea for a "supreme e f fo r t  to bridge the gulf 
between the two worlds," he observed that the world needed 
more than two spheres of in f luen ce .-1
Third, while the p o l i t ic a l  organization of the world 
remains unchanged, the balance of power represented the best 
avai lab le instrument which nations can employ to defend 
th e ir  v i ta l  in terests .  While complicated and often  
d i f f i c u l t  to operate, i t  is  a more re l ia b le  method of 
defense than such in s t i tu t io n a l  arrangements as co l lec t ive  
s e c u r i ty . - 3 The larger the number of great powers that can 
act as balancers, the greater the chance that the system 
w il l  endure and that the independence of member states wil l
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be preserved- The balance of power represented the best 
availab le  means by which a nation can safeguard i t s  
independence and counter the aggressive ambitions of a 
hegemonic power.™3
Equally important for the maintenance of in te rn a t1ona1 
equilibrium was Lippmann's approach to the problems and 
prospects of postwar diplomacy. I t  w i l l  be useful to reca ll  
that his formula for a solvent foreign policy was based on 
the following prescription: The statesman intent on
upholding peace must g i ve his f i r s t  at tent i on to the cold 
ca lculat ion of organising power. Lippmann's writ ing on both 
the meaning of diplomacy, as well as viable diplomatic 
options, o f fe r  a number of valuable insights into his 
understanding of both the leg i t im ate  and i l le g i t im a te  
projection of American power abroad in service of the 
national in te re s t .  In p a r t ic u la r ,  the conduct of American 
diplomacy in the nuclear age provided Lippmann with a theme 
by which he was often c r i t i c a l  of the periodic in a b i l i t y  of 
American decisi on-makers to find a reasonable balance 
between th e ir  commitments (or opportunities) and th e ir  
power. A number of h is to r ic a l  e;; amp les may be ci ted to 
i l l u s t r a t e  Lippmann's position,
Lippmann sharply attacked the policy of "containment" 
of the Soviet Union, as that policy was formulated in an 
a r t i c le  signed "X" in the July, 1947 issue of Foreiqn 
Aff a i r s . In The Cold War; A Study of U.S. Foreign Po licy .
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he argued that a policy of containment would commit the 
United States to an "ideological crusade" designed to make 
"Jeffersonian democrats out of peasants.. . and t r ib a l  
c h ie f ta in s ." " *  Taking issue with George kennan’ s proposal 
to contain Russia with "unalterable counterf orce at every 
poin t ,"  Lippmann objected to the im p l ic i t  suggestion of 
globalized m il i ta ry  confrontation with the Soviet Union.
Such an approach to great power r iv a l r y  would require a 
v ir tu a l  garrison state and bring the United States to "a 
policy of ceaseless intervention in the a f fa i r s  of weaker 
and disorderly states. "**=
Rather than containment on the periphery, Lippmann 
urged that America and the Soviet Union commit a l l  the ir  
diplomatic energy to a p o l i t ic a l  settlement in Europe. 
S p e c if ic a l ly ,  he enhorted American leaders to propose a 
jo in t  withdrawal of Soviet and American troops, encompassing 
a reunif ied  Germany with s t r i c t  guarantees of 
demi1i t a r 3zat 1 on. The history of diplomacy, he reminded
kennan, is  "the history of re la t ions  among r iv a l  powers, 
which did not enjoy p o l i t ic a l  intimacy, and did not respond 
to appeals to common purposes. Diplomacy is  simply a  
method of managing re la t ions  among r iv a ls ,  with the goal 
being a condition of balance wherein no power has the 
prospect of successful aggression. Furthermore, Lippmann 
pointed out:
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Nevertheless there have been some settlements.
Some of them did not las t  very long. Some of them 
did. For a diplomat to think that r iv a l  and 
unfriendly powers cannot be brought to a 
settlement is to forget what diplomacy is  a l l  
about. There would be l i t t l e  for diplomats to do 
i f  the wor1d consisted of par tners , enj oying 
p o l i t ic a l  intimacy, and responding to common 
appea1s . m7
The policy of containment, in short, would imply the 
abandonment of diplomacy and the destruction of the United 
Nations. Through diplomatic channels, Lippmann urged the 
Un i ted St ates to rea ff i rm  i t s  commi tment to the Uni ted 
Nations, to the autonomy of a l l  nation states, and to the 
assistance of the economic reconstruction of Europe.®**
Lippmann echoed a sim ilar  theme in his c r i t ic is m  of 
U.S.-Soviet re la t io n s  throughout the 195C>s. While he 
accused the Truman Administration of foreign policy by 
manufactured crises, he was no more enthusiastic about the 
doctrine of "brinkmanship" and the threat of "massive 
re ta l ia t io n "  developed during the Eisenhower years. Once 
again, Lippmann questioned whether the Administration’ s 
strateg ic  doctrine was in balance with the p ro l i fera t lon  of 
defense trea ty  commitments as a means of ro l l in g  bad the 
Communist furnace. The d isparity  wa„, v iv id ly  displayed by 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles ’ suggestion that the 
United States might resort to dropping a few atomic bombs on 
the Vietnamese in 1954, and to r a t t l in g  the bomb at Peking 
for  shelling two Chiang—held islands off  the China coast. A 
foreign minister, he reminded Dulles, was "one who uses
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words precisely which mean genuinely what they say," while a 
diplomat who peddled propaganda was " l ik e  a doctor who se lls  
patent m e d i c i n e , A s  a behind-the-scenes advisor to Adlai 
Stevenson in 1956, Lippmann stressed that the incumbent 
admi n i s tr  a 11 on should be taken to task -for "our m i l i ta r ize d  
diplomacy," Japan's d r i f t  toward neutralism, the 
"alienation" of India, and Soviet " p o l i t ic a l  penetration" of 
the Middle East.
That diplomacy must supplement any balance of power 
among the superpowers re f lec ted  Lippmann’ s b e l ie f  that 
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could win in 
a d irect  war, in any conventional or meaningful sense of the 
term. After interviewing Khrushchev in 1956, he found the 
Soviet leader to be a highly s k i l le d  p o l i t ic a l  strategist.,  
who u t i l i z e d  ideology in service of the nat ion’ s in te res t .  
Recognizing the r e a l i t y  of power and balance of power, 
Khrushchev was a man who could be dealt with through 
negotiations and diplomacy.''0 While a revival of 
col 1aboration typica l of the war years was impractical,  
Lippmann pointed to the principal diplomatic objectives on 
the American toreign policy agenda: i l )  the necessity of
reaching agreement with the Soviets on dem il i ta r iz ing  
Central Europe and removing nuclear weapons from the area;
(2) the need for v iable diplomatic in i t i a t i v e s  to counter 
the influence of the Soviet and Chinese examples for the 
developing nations; and <3) the imperative of avoiding
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costly and unmanageable overseas commitments < i . e . ,  in 
addition to America's r ig h t fu l  defense needs within the 
A tlan t ic  All iance) which would require the nation to "stake 
our own security  and peace of the world upon s a te l l i t e s ,  
puppets, c l ie n ts ,  agents about whom we can know very 
1 i t t l e .  ,"ri
In wars of national l ib e ra t io n ,  Lippmann suggested that  
the intervention of American m i l i ta ry  force must only be 
used in subordination to diplomacy and the goal of a 
negotiated settlement. "The test  of any extension of war is  
whether i t  produces a n e g o t i a t i o n . M o r e o v e r ,  the scope 
of any negotiated settlement in remote areas is contingent 
on the extent to which v i ta l  American in terests are at sta le  
as well as the impact of conditions supporting a local or 
regional balance of power. As a prominent and outspoken 
c r i t i c  of President Johnson's Vietnam policy, Lippmann found 
such calculations absent from the stated objectives of 
American decision-makers. In supporting a gradual 
withdrawal of troops as the only tenable solution, Lippmann 
remained unconvinced that v i ta l  American security  interests  
were in jeopard/ or t h a t  American m il i t a ry  cap ab i l i ty  was 
adequate to sustain protracted g u e r i l la  warfare in Southeast 
Asian jungles.
The lesson of Vietnam only dramatized Lippmann's 
fa m il ia r  assertion that American foreign policy has never 
reached a "stopping point" between the two a l ternat ives  ol
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"gl obal i sm" and "isolationism. " Administration o t t i c ia ls  
were blind to the r e a l i t y  that China was the dominant power 
in that region of the world. For the United States to have 
expected South Vietnam to survive within the confines of a 
Chinese sphere of influence, and expect security  from 
r e t a l ia t io n ,  constituted a v io la t io n  of the ground rules of 
diplomacy.^'* Successful diplomacy, according to Lippmann, 
should seek accommodation between r iv a l  powers rather than 
provocation. For the United States to e x tr ic a te  i t s e l f  from 
a war that could not be won, Lippmann saw only one rational  
solution: f i r s t ,  to disentangle American m il i ta ry
commitments from Southeast Asia since they were 
overextended; and secondly, to seek a p o l i t ic a l  settlement 
with China regarding the en t ire  a rea . ’ 0
Lippmann' 5 conversion to a more " re a l is t ic "  stance in 
i nternat i onal a f fa i r s  (during and a f te r  Wor1d War I I ) can be 
i nterpreted as a clar  i on ca ll  to the nation to shake off the 
f in a l  vestiges of immaturity and prolonged innocence in a 
worId from wh i ch America could no 1onger qui e t ly  escape. 
Whether in his weekly column or in the presence of world 
leaders, his message was powerful and straightforward: power
and not protestations of morality are the basic ingredients  
of diplomacy. Peace and s t a b i l i t y  were not the resu lt  of 
promul gating grandlose schemes involving no real 
commitments, but the product of continually  maintaining an 
e v e r - f ra g i le  balance of power. In commentlng on the
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t ra d i t io n a l  American d istrust  of power p o l i t ic s ,  Lippmann 
warned:
There is no place in th is  ideal pattern of the 
world for the adoption of l im ited ends or l im ited  
means, for the use of checks and balances among 
contending forces, for the demarcation of spheres 
of influence and of power and in te res t ,  for 
accommodation and compromise and adjustment, for 
the s ta b i l is a t io n  of the status quo, for the 
restorat ion of an equilibrium. These are the 
substance and matter of an e f f ic ie n t  diplomacy.^
R ea lpo l i t ik  Reconsidered: Morality  and American Diplomacy
In c a l l ing  upon the United States to face up to the
often harsh r e a l i t i e s  of international l i f e ,  Lippmann has
frequently been associated with other " rea l is ts"  advocating
a return to the methods and precepts of classical diplomacy
as the only viable modus ooerandi for America as a great
power. In fa c t ,  Lippmann considered such an objective to be
the on 1y responsi ble basis f or a sett  1ement between the
United States and the Soviet Union in the postwar period.
I f  we w i l l  not or cannot use the classic procedure 
of diplomacy which is  always a combination of 
power and compromise— then the best we can look 
forward to is  an era of d isintegrat ion in the 
c iv i l is e d  world, followed b y . . . a  war which once 
begun, would be savage, universal, and 
in d ec is ive . ’ 7
National preparedness, not vaporous hopes for world peace, 
was to Lippmann’ 5 mind the appropriate American foreign  
policy posture in the postwar wor1d; henceforth, the country 
would have to be v ig i la n t  in augmenting i t s  securlty--which  
in i t s e l f  was an invaluable contribution to the cause of
wor1d peace.
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At th is  junrta re ,  i t  w i l l  be important to inquire into
the philosophical roots underlying Lippmann's af f irmat ion of
a consistent diplomacy based on m i l i ta ry  power, a l l iances,
and spheres of influence. More s p e c if ic a l ly ,  do the
formative in te l le c tu a l  sources in his internat ional  thought
distinguish him as a modern proponent of Rea1p o l l t i k  in
world a f f a i r s 9 In view of the fact  that European raison
d * £ta t  rested on a number of central tenets’ *  adapted to
varying geographical and p o l i t ic a l  circumstances, how was
Lippmann able to reconcile the ear 1ier  t ra d i t io n  and
assumptions with American foreign policy prospects following
World War I I"1 F in a l ly ,  to what entent can the Real pol 111 k
elements in Lippmann’ s approach be construed as a ruthless
assault on the democratic ideology that underlay the
d octr ina ire  moralism typical of Wilsonian i nternatlonallsm'1
Lippmann discovered a p ra c t ic a l ,  i f  not pragmatic,
ju s t i f ic a t io n  for a philosophical approach to the lessons of
American foreign policy:
For i f ,  as our society ins is ts ,  philosophy is  the 
guide to l i f e ,  then in philosophy we ought to find  
the guide to the great d i f f i c u l t y  which the 
American people have e ppnenced — parti cul a r ly  in 
the last  fo r ty  years— in forming a good and 
workable foreign policy. I have come to think  
that the root of our d i f f i c u l t y  is to be found in 
our philosophy.”
In surveying American diplomatic history from Wilson’ s 
Fourteen Points to Truman's emphasis on containment,
Lippmann was struck by an ei: t r  aord l nary paradox : the
contrast between the American r is e  to preeminence and the
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subsequent in a b i l i t y  to deal successfully with the actual 
course of events. That American diplomacy has frequently  
miscarried can be a t tr ibuted  to the absence of any coherent 
vision for deciding when, where, how, and for what ends such 
enormous power should be exerted. The diplomatic debris and 
wreckage of hopeful policy declarations commensurate with 
America's emergence as a superpower are symptomatic of 
erroneous assumptions and b e l ie fs  about the prevention of 
war and the maintenance of peace in a world with few 
recognized moral absolutes.100
The fa i lu r e  of American diplomacy, asserted Lippmann, 
was not to be found in material circumstances but in “our 
own habits of thought" and "ideological p icture of the 
world." The prevail ing  American worldview constituted a 
"philosophical framework: of preconceptions" which 
"misrepresent the nature of things, f a ls i f y  our judgments of 
events, and in h ib i t  the formation of workable po l ic ies  by 
which ava ilab le means can be devoted to re a l iz a b le  ends."101 
Indeed, such preconceptions are the byproduct of "our age of 
1nnocence. . . when we were isolated, and when we were 
sheltered from the r iv a l r i e s  of states and empires.
That Lippmann judged the American preoccupation with 
1egali s t 1c-mor a l l s t  i c norms in in ternat lona1 a f f a i r s  to be 
both "imaginary and false" is supplemented by his own vision  
of human nature as we11 as the nature of lnternat lonal  
soc ie ty .
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Although Lippmann’ 5 inquiry in to  the eth ica l basis of 
human action exhibited periodic in te l le c tu a l  shi-fts and 
■frequently contrasting viewpoints, he affirmed the 
c e n t ra l i ty  of human nature for any understandlng of domestic 
or 1nternat1onal p o l i t ic s .  In A Preface to P o l i t i c s . 
Lippmann acknowledged that each of the p o l i t ic a l  
philosophers of the past, from Plato down to Bentham and 
M i l l ,  had his own view of human nature which formed the 
basis of his del iberations on p o l i t i c s . T o o  often 
p o l i t ic a l  sc ien t is ts  were inclined to discuss p o l i t ic a l  
in s t i tu t io n s  without an accompanying analysis of "man" who 
makes them and l ives  under them; indeed, Lippmann condemned 
th is  indif ference  to the study of human nature and argued 
that observations on the subject are the only part of the 
thought of the past and present which can claim last ing  
mer i t . 1C"*
In sp ite of the almost radical  changes which Lippmann’ s 
view of human nature underwent from 1913 to 1955, his 
estimate of the common man’ s moral and in te l le c tu a l  a b i l i t y  
remained p ra c t ic a l ly  unchanged. Except in rare cases, most 
men cannot comprehend the r e a l i t y  of complex things; they 
are ever-insurgent against reason, and th e ir  natural 
impulses cannot be trusted to create the good l i f e .  The 
p o l i t ic s  of human reconstruction. Lippmann warned, can bear 
f r u i t  only among people who are educated and who are w i l l in g  
to subject the ir  prejudices and t ra d it io n a l  ways of thinking
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to c r i t i c a l  exam inat iD n .100 In v iv id  contrast to the
"mature man" whose reason rules his lust and impulses, the 
vast majority of men is  uncivi l ised — -foolish and re f ra c to ry  
against reason— or only p a r t ia l l y  c iv i l i z e d .  Most 
ind ividuals never -face the fact  that " . . . t h e i r  is  ev i l  which
is as genuine as goodness, that there is ugliness and
violence which are no less real than joy or lo v e .1' 10** Among
the immature, argued Lippmann, the be l ie f  that ev i l  is  
unreal becomes a deep preference for not knowing the tru th ,  
an hab11ua1 desi re to 1i ve out in utopla.
The d is t in c t io n  Lippmann developed in his la te r  work 
between man's f i r s t  and second nature provides an important 
ne::us to his out loot' on the nature and structure of 
in te rn a t lon a1 society. In The Public Philosophy, he defined 
reason as an instrument for the fu l f i l lm e n t  of impulses.
When reason no longer represents society within the human 
psyche ( i . e . ,  indicating the ends of action and providing 
cr i te r  i a of j  udgment), then i t  becomes a victim of appet i t e 
and passi on At th is  st age of his wor k, Li ppmann no
longer regarded the natural impulses of man (his f i r s t  
nature) as pure, innocent and neutral . In the so-called  
t ra d i t io n  of c i v i l i t y ,  they must be subordinated to man's 
second, acquired and more ra t iona l  nature.
I t  is  important to note that Lippmann traced the 
fee l ing  of n a t io n a l i ty  to the loves, hates, and prejudices 
of man's f i r s t  nature. I t  gives men self-confidence and a
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sense of belonging to a higher and greater authority  than
th e ir  own individual p e rs o n a l i ty .10® Like a magnet, the
nation a t tra c ts  that vast -fund of loya lty  that men desire to
bestow on an e n t i ty  more permanent and extensive than the ir
personal 1ives .
National patriotism , where i t  is  directed against 
foreign powers, unites men otherwise divided by 
re l ig io n ,  by party, by class and occupation.
Nationalism is more powerful, being rooted so 
profoundly in human nature, than any ideology 
which has recently  been propounded by a party  
congress and is  being imposed by propaganda on the 
top of men's heads. . . . Being so powerful, 
nationalism is ,  of course, powerful both for good 
and evi 1 . 1
By emphasizing the separateness and sovereignty of 
nations, the weight of nationalism stands in contrast to the 
utopian idea of a c iv i l i z e d  world state in which diverse 
n a t io n a l i t ie s  find l ib e r ty  and ju s t ic e  under a system of 
equal laws. As a re su lt ,  in ternat ional  p o l i t ic s  w i l l  
r e f le c t  a d iv is ion  of the world into sovereign nation states  
with d i f fe re n t ,  and often co n f l ic t in g ,  in terests .
In addition, the popular American philosophy refuses to 
recognize that " r iv a l ry  and s t r i f e  and c o n f l ic t  among 
states,  commuf 11f iec, and f a c t i o n s  is  the normal condition o 1 
mankind.110 The p o l i t ic a l  philosophy that informs the 
public conscience was viewed by Lippmann as a remnant of 
democratic idealism, conceived in the eighteenth century and 
defective as a r e a l i s t i c  estimate of both power and interest  
in the p o l i t ic a l  sphere in general and in foreign policy in 
p a rt ic u la r .  * 1 * American foreign policy, he added.
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o sc i l la ted  among three patterns of conduct: (1) in a posture
of n e u t ra l i ty  which assumes that struggle can be ignored or
avoided; (2) in se lf -r ighteous moral crusades which assumes
that by defeating the chief troublemaker the struggle for
existence w i l l  be non-problematic; and ( 3 >  in the
sponsorship of a universal society which assumes the
struggle can be leg is la ted  out of existence. Such i l lus ions
have spawned an American ideology that:
. . . d i s t o r t s  our judgment when we deal with the 
problems of power. I t  d is to r ts  our judgment when 
we determine our aims. I t  d is to r ts  our judgment 
when we have to calculate how a balance can be 
struck between our aims and our power to re a l is e  
them. 1 1 —
Expressed in the terms above, Lippmann' s arguments can 
be taken to imply that the national in terest  is a 
consider atlon super i or to a l l  others, that i t  is an absolute 
value to be def ended according to the 1ogi c of Rea1pol i 11 k . 
By emphasi zing the ubi qui ty of power and conf1ic t  as wel1 as 
the primacy of the national in te re s t ,  had Lippmann spoken in 
a way to ju s t i f y  the doctrine that "might makes right?" Had 
he arrived at a theoret ica l ju s t i f i c a t io n  for another 
variant of oppression, for the projection of unbridled 
American ambition, se lf -def ined and s e l f - re g u la t in g ,  on a 
weakened world9 Had he propounded a modern apology for 
Machiavellian rai son d' § ta t— that nations were in the hands 
of demonic forces, with l i t t l e  margin i f  any to rescue moral 
values from a sea of t rag ic necessity0
These questions were put to Lippmann by the French
philosopher Jacques Maritain during an e;:traordi nary
exchange of le t te r s  in 1943. At issue was whether Lippmann
had succeeded in preserving the d is t inct ion  between "true
realism, grounded on ju s t ic e  and moral standards," and
"pseudo-reallsm" or "Machiavellianism." S p ec if ic a l ly ,
Maritain pressed Lippmann on the subject of why he avoided
addressing "the ultimate end" toward which the Western world
should aspire. For the " re a l is t ic  a l l iance" would, in the
estimation of Marita in ,
be l ia b le  to fa i lu r e  and a r isk  of new wars, i f  i t  
did not embody a solemn pledge to prepare a world 
organization, a federation of peoples, inspired by 
a heroic idea l;  i f  such a dynamism of the ultimate  
were lacking in the work of peace, the fear of 
utopia would become more utopian than utopia 
11 s e l f . 1 1 3
While Lippmann conceded that the problem of the 
"ultimate end" represented an unresolved consideration in 
U.S. Foreign Folicv and U.S. War Ai ins, he advised Maritain  
that  the question could not "be approached unless m il i ta ry  
power has f i r s t  been organized for  security against the 
threat of great wars."11'* Moreover, he took: exception to 
M a rita in ’ 5 b e l ie f  that a m i l i t a ry  and p o l i t ic a l  settlement 
in Europe could somehow substitute for the creative work of 
c iv i l i z a t io n  in constructing the good l i f e .  The policeman 
is  not always a potent ia l p r ies t;  indeed, he should be 
confined to the task of preserving an order within which the 
priest  and teacher can proceed.1X0 in a revealing passage, 
Lippmann elaborated on why his endorsement of a l l iance  among
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the victors e::cluded the p o s s ib i l i ty  of awarding America
carte bl anche to impose i t s  own vision o-f s p ir i tu a l
development wor1dwi de:
I-f I was to propose. . .  the ult imate temporal end of 
society, I would hope to make an h is to r ic a l  and 
philosophical argument against the notion that i t  
was the mission of the a l l ie d  powers to ru le  the 
worId in order to promote my end. My v ie w . . . i s  
that security  against aggression and not promotion 
of c iv i l i z a t io n  is  the function of the great power 
a l 1iance. . . . In view of the fact that power 
corrupts men's minds, I was. . .  concerned to avoid 
the suggestion that the power we must exercise is 
an instrument for the attainment for u lt imate  
ends. That could lead o n ly . . . t o  a new version of
Kipling and the white man's burden.1
At the same time, however, Lippmann was far from warmly 
embracing the position that the "necessity of the state"  
deprived statesmen and nations of a margin of freedom to 
choose the r ight  path ( i . e . ,  to decide for the good ends and
pursue them with the least ev il  of ava ilab le means) in the ir
external conduct. That there is  a degree of compatib il i ty  
between service to the national in terest  and moral choice in 
foreign policy represented a persistent ,  i f  not sometimes 
ambiguous, theme in his observations on the ro le of ideals  
and values in in ternat iona1 p o l i t ic s .  Even as a harsh 
c r i t i c  of Wilson’ s internatlonalism and the excessive 
moral ism during the interwar years. Lippmann was always 
sensit ive  to both the strengths and weaknesses of American 
values projected abroad.
In both Publie Dpinion and The Public Philosophy.
Lippmann argued that ideals can be a powerful factor in both
domestic and internat ional  p o l i t i c s . 117 Between man and his
environment, he observed, there e::ists a pseudo-environment
which consists of the ideas and images of the world. From
th is  pseudo-environment, man receives the stimuli that move
him to action. Indeed, the way in which the world is
perceived may determine at any given time what men w i l l  do,
what direct ion th e ir  e f fo r ts  w i l l  ta le ,  and where the ir
hopes w i l l  be focused.1*** I t  follows that no p o l i t i c a l
s c ien t is t  can afford to disregard the power and influence of
1 deas , 1 dea Is ,  and i deol og les in the a f fa i r s  of men . 1 1 ■*
The b e l ie f ,  at times expressed by Lippmann, that the
United States was a cu ltural  and p o l i t ic a l  bactwater had
been shattered by the events in Europe. Certainly with the
f a l l  of France in 1940, America toot on new luster as the
reposi tory not only of material and mi 1l ta ry  strength but of
the imperiled s p ir i tu a l  l i f e  of the West as well.  1:20 in
U.S. War Aims. Lippmann defended the pervasive national
values that shaped the history of American foreign policy:
The persistent evangel of Americanism in the outer 
wor1d. . . r e f 1ects the fact that no nation, and 
cer ta in ly  not th is  nation, can endure in a 
p o l i t i c a l l y  a l ien  arc! mora 11 y host i le  env 1 r onment; 
and the profound and abiding truth  is that a 
people which does not advance i t s  t ru th  has 
already begun to abandon i t .  1SS1
Both the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door stood for  
the American way of l i f e  projected abroad. The fact  that 
the United States supported China and sympathized with the 
struggle of colonial people re f lec ted  that "Americans. . .are
1 3 6
opponents o-f imperialism wherever they encounter i t .  "iaa 
Lippmann concluded that United States foreign policy  
commi t  men t s are sup p or ted, in the f in a l  analysis, not. by the 
instruments of d)plomacy— tre a t ie s  and declarations—but by 
the fact that they e n l is t  underlying l ib e ra l  and dem cratic  
norms.123
Many of these same themes were espoused by Lippmann in
the content of the emerging Cold War between the two
superpowers. In p a r t ic u la r ,  he suggested that "fr iendly"
re la t ions  between the two countries could not develop u n t i l :
. . . t h e  basic p o l i t ic a l  and human l ib e r t ie s  are 
established in the Soviet Union. Only then w i l l  
there be f u l l  confidence and free intercourse on 
the basis of f u l l  equality .  For between states  
that do not have free in s t i tu t io n s  and those that 
do have them, in ternat ional re la t ions  must 
necessarily be special and r e s t r i c t e d . ,a4
In fa c t ,  as ear ly  as 1919, Lippmann opined that cordial 
re la t io n s  cannot ex ist  between countries whose foreign  
p olic ies  are motivated by incompatible ideals and b e l ie f  
systems. 1 The " inequality  of diplomatic discourse" 
between the two maj or powers means there can only be a 
"modus vi vendl. only compromises, bargains, specif ic  
agreements, only a diplomacy of checks and balances. "1* 4' 
While Lippmann harbored no i l lu s ion s  about the Soviets as 
s k i l le d  p rac t i t ioners  of power p o l i t ic s ,  he nonetheless 
urged United States declslon-makers to counter Soviet 
ideological fervor with the vigor of American idealism.
"They must develop and apply the ir  pr inciples,  not abandon
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t h e m . "
Many o-f these propositions would seem to enfeeble 
Lippmann's assertion, noted e a r l ie r ,  that a government 
should pursue the national in terest  largely to the exclusion 
of id e a l is t ic  c r i t e r i a .  Yet that th is  contradiction may by 
more apparent than real is suggested by two prominent themes 
in evidence throughout much of his work. F i rs t ,  Lippmann 
was indisputably an " in te rn a t io n a l is t"  from f i r s t  to las t .  
Although a t i r e le s s  dissenter from Wilson's global 
pretensions, he attempted to build a blueprint of defense 
for the postwar generation that would more e f fe c t iv e ly  
harmonize American declarations of policy and the power to 
achieve them. Integral to his 1nternat1ona1 vision was a 
recogn1tion of the l im its  governlng the projection of 
American power and national pr inciples  abroad. Second, the 
geopolit ica l  teachings of Nicholas Spykman were in f lu e n t ia l  
in Lippmann’ s attempt to calculate the re la t iv e  weight and 
signif icance of moral principles in the formulation of 
American national in terests .  Lippmann argued that the ra t io  
of p r inc ip le  to power in s ta te c ra ft  w i l l  be predicated on 
the timeless assumption that i t  is  impossible to abolish the 
r iv a l r y  of nations and establish a universal id e n t i ty  of 
in te res t  in world peace.
Lippmann ? s stature as an 1nter natlona1ls t  c an be 
distinguished by his l i f e - lo n g  commitment to a
"cosmopolitan" vision of world a f fa i r s .  In commenting on
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Lippmann15 search -for a cosmopolitan philosophy responsive 
to twentieth century problems, one leading scholar points 
out:
The designation means...that his views were 
unconstrained by the preoccupations and 
prejudices 0+ his homeland: that he was receptive  
to diverse currents of opinion from abroad: that  
the values, ideals, and in terests of many 
societies were interwoven with his methods and 
conclusions; and that he pleaded for  widespread 
adoption of such a mental outlook by his 
contemporaries.1
Lippmann believed that under the imperatives of modern 
warfare, people everywhere abandoned the ir  b e l ie f  in 
reasoned discourse, in the free  exchange of ideas and 
values, and in the p o s s ib i l i t ie s  for collaboration among 
diverse societ ies . throughout the world, the m ult ip l ica t ion  
of more sophisticated weaponry supplanted the former search 
for s p ir i tu a l  f o r t i f i c a t io n ;  even the domain of ideas had 
been swamped by the logic of fear to which m il i ta ry  
preparedness responded.130
Indeed, the Realpol1t l k  theories of the 1940s t ru ly  
make sense when they are interpreted as defending Lippmann"s 
cosmopolitan ideals. The odious features he found in 
author 1 tar 1 an societies — th e ir  disregard for the var ie ty  of 
human personality and motivation, th e ir  axiomatic 
combativeness— shaoed Lippmann’ s subsequent thinking on the 
strateg ic  and ta c t ic a l  problems of the postwar era. 
Ident ify ing  t o t a l 1tarianism as the arch-enemy of a l l  
cosmopolitan v ir tues ,  he was never reluctant in portraying
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the A ll ied  cause as the protector of these same v i r t u e s .1-31 
In fa c t ,  the language of m i l i ta ry  power and balance of power 
strategy prominent in both U.S. Forei on Pol icy and U.S. Ular 
Aims functioned as a s e l f -a c t iv a t in g  brake on renegade 
actors who dared to fo is t  th e ir  aims on the world through 
m il i ta n t  aggression and the i r ra t io n a l  resort to fo r c e .132
In te re s t ing ly  enough, Lippmann’ 5 balance of power 
codes, couched in the language of American m i l i t a ry  strength 
and devoted to cosmopolitan goals, could also function as a 
de facta regulator of presumptive American omnipotence— of 
adventurism, imperialism or belligerence from th is  side of 
the A t l a n t i c . 133, To speak, as he did, of great power 
combinations and countering force with force was to imply 
that  the conditions that preempted aggression by America’ s 
enemies also circumscribed America’ s own foreign policy  
behavior .13"* His balance of power theory allowed that there  
may be a modicum of reason or legitimacy in the position of 
an adversary. No nation can lay claim to a monopoly o-f 
t ru th  and ju s t ic e .  I t  was th is  1arger cosmopolitan vision,  
grounded on a r e a l is t i c  appraisal of American power, that  
gave Lippmann’ s postwar commentary on internat ional  
re la t io n s  i t s  distinct iveness and unique f 1avor.
Contemporary U.S. Foreign Folicv Agenda
Before turning f in a l l y  to an assessment of Lippmann’ s 
phi 1 osophy of internat ional p o l i t ic s ,  i t  may be useful 
b r ie f ly  to examine his position on a number of fundamental
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issues that have assumed increasing si gn 1 f 1 c ance on the 
American postwar foreign policy and diplomatic agenda.
S p e c if ic a l ly ,  consideration w i l l  be devoted to: (1) nuclear
p ro l i fe ra t io n  and arms control; (2) ln ternat iona1 
organiz at 1on and g1oba1 s e c u n ty ; (3) American dip!omacy and
the Third World; and (4) human r ights  in American foreign  
policy. While i t  would be feas ib le  to expand the inventory 
of postwar policy topics that received thoughtful attention  
by Lippmann, these tour substantive concerns represent 
recurrent themes throughout his published wort. Moreover, 
i t  should be noted that , for a l l  practica l purposes, 
Lippmann's comment ar y on United St ates f oreign policy and 
ln ternational p o l i t ic s  ended with his c r i t ic is m  of Ameri can 
i nvo1vement in the Vietnam War.
The concept of a nuclear a l l iance  at the core of a 
reinvigorated A t lan t ic  community grew out of Lippmann's 
condemnation of his own part i c i pat ion , along with so many 
others of his generation, in the push for disarmament and 
f or collec11ve strategy through the League of Natlon s in the 
1920s. As he frequently pointed out, i t  was the nuclear 
"balance of te r r o r ,"  not the United Nations or any abstract 
disarmament schemes, that kept America and the Soviet Union 
from w ar.130 He advised that the United States should hold 
onto the bomb as the "one most dependable guaranty that  
atomic weapons w i l l  not be used against us." Throughout the 
19SOs and 1960e , Lippmann endorsed the American monopoly of
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nuclear power (and in opposition to French President Charles 
DeGaulle's proposed force de frappe) as an indispensable 
prerequisi te  -for the security and prosperity of the Atlantic  
a l i i  ance.
We cannot allow th is  power to be set in motion by 
others. We must keep the ult imate r igh t  to decide 
whether and when 1t shal1 be used. A weak and 
i ndependen t nurlear f or ce within the Western 
a l l iance ,  a force which could s ta rt  a world war 
but could not -finish i t ,  would be a danger to the 
peace o-f the world and to our own national 
secur 1 t y . 1
Reflecting on his own experience in the 1920s and 
1930s, Lippmann could never again see disarmament as a way 
of preventing war. His postwar pessimism was rooted in 
several key factors. F i rs t ,  i t  would be v i r tu a l ly  
impossible to supervise and control far-reaching arms 
reduction accords e f f e c t i v e l y . * 3 '  S p ec if ica l ly ,  no 
supranational organization or agency could ever hope to 
acquire the delegated authority  to ta le  appropriate action 
against those who might v io la te  the terms of an agreement. 
Second, disarmament in i t i a t i v e s  in the service of global 
harmony are frequently se lf -d e fe a t in g ,  inasmuch as they f a i l  
to recD'yn'e the *■' ' i 'igglu for power as the- cuprtvr and 
inexorable fact of internat ional p o l i t ic s  in a world which 
is  organized into nation states. Furthermore, Lippmann 
argued that "arms control" or "arms l im ita t ion"  can never be 
separated from a general settlement of the outstanding 
p o l i t ic a l  or t e r r i t o r i a l  questions that divide major 
powers. In r a i l in g  against the p a c if is ts  of an e a r l ie r
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era, he pointed out that a more studied objective Mould be
to "confront power with power at a selected point where a
decision is in a m i l i ta ry  sense possible, and then to use1
the unstable and delicate equilibrium as an opportunity to
be seized tor constructive and magnanimous negotia t ion ."1***
the inescapable dilemma o-f balancing morality and
geopolitical factors is also i l lu s t ra te d  by Lippmann’ s
outlook on the contribution of international organization to
an orderly world society. Americans, he said, had a
trad it iona l  d istrust  of power p o l i t ic s  and believed that
"security and peace require a universal order of equal laws,
and can never be had in a mere equilibrium of sovereign
st at es. " 1 ,ao Since the supreme authority in human a f fa i rs  is
the universal law of nature, men should not l iv e  the ir  l ives
in so many "civic republics" separated from one another by
d if feren t  systems of justice; they should a l l  be fellow
cit izens  in "one l i f e  and one order" under one jo in t  law.
It  is a v ig i la n t  dream which must be realized i f  
this planet is to f u l f i l l  man's best hopes. I t  is 
clear ly  the goal of human p o l i t ic a l  endeavor, and 
no c iv i l i z e d  man can afford to sneer at i t ,  or lay 
i t  altogether outside his mind. , *'1
Yet such a cosmopolitan assessment can only serve as an 
in te l lec tu a l  point of reference by which the makers of 
policy must formulate "workable" polic ies in the face of 
immediate r e a l i t y ,  where the majority of men act without 
recourse to reason and seek to rea l ize  the ir  desires by the 
resort to force. In opposition to the id ea l is t  be l ie f  in
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wor1d law and in ternat ional parliaments, Lippmann stressed 
that peace lay in great power cooperat i on < e .g . , in a 
nuclear a l l ia n c e ) ,  not in resolutions from international  
assemblies. "The great object of ln ternat  l onal organization  
in the next generation is to hold together the a l l iance  and 
to hold i t  together at any c o s t ." ,43 Lippmann remained 
pessimistic in expecting that the major powers would 
w i l l in g ly  delegate resp o n s ib i l i ty  to a world society which 
does not ex ist  or has just barely been organized.
In answer to those who saw the United Nations as an 
lnetrument f or contain1ng the Soviet Union, Lippmann 
insisted that  peace had to rest u l t im ate ly  on great power 
arrangements and respect for spheres of influence. He 
maintained that an organization such as the United Nations 
should be viewed as a meeting place for the
p1enipotent iar les  of national governments, as a "voluntary 
association of diplomats who c o n fe r ."11*3 In addition, i t  
should re f ra in  from ta t ing  up the substantive problems of 
i nternational peace and security; i t  should eschew issues 
which bear on the v i ta l  in terests  of states, with the 
possible exception of those on which the great powers are 
w i l l in g  to cooperate. 1 *•* in short, Lippmann sought to l im it  
UN a c t iv i t y  to such non-po li t ica l  functions as promoting 
cultural  and s c ie n t i f ic  exchanges among member states as 
well as encouraging internat ional  cooperation in the 
so1u t i on of economic, soci a1, and educat i ona1 prob1ems
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facing mankind. The United Nations should be devoted to the 
"arts of peace" and attempt to solve the problems of 
individual rather than national security .
Both in the immediate postwar era and over the next 
twenty years, Lippmann exhibited l i t t l e  sustained in terest  
in the panoply of problems indigenous to the emerging 
nations of A fr ica , Asia or Latin America. Immediately a f ter  
World War I I ,  he stated that the primary area of American 
re sp o n s ib i l i ty  was l imited to the A t lant ic  basin on both 
sides, and the P ac if ic  is lands— in other words, the At lant ic  
community plus a "blue water" strategy of naval bases and 
roaming f l e e t s . 1'*** Along similar  l ines, he took exception 
to those in terp retat ions  of the Truman Doctrine that would 
commit "American power to the defense of a heterogeneous 
col lec t ion  of unstable governments and contending part ies  
and factions which happened to be opposed to the Soviet 
Union.1-*** Intervention in the name of the balance of power 
was ju s t i f ie d  and necessary; 1ndiscr1 minate intervention in 
support of unstable c l ie n t  regimes was wasteful and 
dangerous. In viewing the theme of containment in re la t ion  
to the developing countries, he concluded that the greatest 
danger in Africa and Asia was not Soviet expansionism, or 
even subversion, but a too—hasty collapse of former 
empi res. 1 *'7'
However, Lippmann”s general approach to American 
intervention and influence in the Third World was marked by
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contradictions. As early  as 1950, he urged America to 
recognize the r is ing  strength o-f the "nonaligned powers" and 
"work: to assist th e ir  development, both -for th e ir  interests  
and our own, in a world passing out o-f the nightmare of a 
two-power w o r l d . E m p h a s i z i n g  the hazards inherent in 
the prevail ing  b ip o la r1zation of power, Lippmann added that 
a settlement between the two powers could endure only i f  
both sides acknowledged "the r ig h t  and need of many smaller 
powers to ev:ist, and act as buffers and mediators, and.. .  as 
guardians of the balance of power. "141’
While the break-up of the two-power system may have 
been "predestined and appointed," Lippmann continued to 
harbor doubts regarding the capacity of new entrants in the 
arena of world p o l i t ic s  to occupy the position of "balancer" 
among the r iv a l  powers. In p a r t ic u la r ,  he appeared to 
challenge his own assessment by observing that technological 
developments in the mid-twentieth century rendered the smal1 
states altogether too small to manipulate the balance of 
power or even to pursue an independent p o l i c y . * ■ Beyond 
the suggestion that emerging powers might, at some point,  
challenge the d ic tates  of Moscow and Washington, Lippmann 
provided few specif ics  regarding the future economic and 
diplomatic agenda of e i ther  Third World or nonaligned 
n a t l o n s .
The same sense of equivocation prevailed in Lippmann 
analysis of the l im i ts  governing American intervention in
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emerging nations threatened by Soviet-backed forces, On the 
one hand, he argued that nationalism was tar  more powerful 
than ideology in many developing countries and that global 
containment of communism by the United States would lead to 
unending wars of intervention and support for weak c l ient  
regimes. Nonetheless, he supported aid to the Greek 
monarchy, a i r  and naval intervention in Korea (though not 
troops), and backing for the French in Indochina. Whenever 
containment was put to the test  as a policy choice where the 
balance of power seemed to be involved, he went along with 
the containment strategy. His only important qua 11f 1ca11 on 
was that American troops not be sent to f ig h t  proxy wars, as
1 n Korea . 1551 The bata l l ions of what he once called "Weste
Chrlstendom" should not be committed unt l 1 the Soviets sen
th e i r  own. He believed America ■'s Col d War po lic ies  were
e s se n t ia l ly defensive and that the pr ob 1 em of containment
was pr i mari 1y one of execution rather than conception. 1
Even i n Lippmann’ s la t te r year s , when he emerged as a
staunch c r i t i c  of the Johnson Administrat1 on *s Vietnam 
policy , he acknowledged that the real problem was not simply 
containing communism in Southeast Asia. Indeed, he could 
never completely bring himself to absolve the United States 
of a l l  resp o n s ib i l i ty  from aiding various developing 
countries on the verge of a communist takeover. Rather, 
American policy-makers had fa l le n  victim to the i l lu s io n  of 
pursuing a m i l i ta ry  victory while eschewing diplomatic
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leverage that would permit negotiations to achieve a truce 
of s u ff ic ie n t  duration to allow Vietnamese national 
reconc i l ia t ion  and to prevent i t  from becoming a m i l i ta ry  
appendage o-f China. While he sharply challenged a
"globalist"  strategy of containment during the -f irst f ive  
years of the Cold War, a f te r  1950 and un t i l  1965 he 
essent ia l ly  accepted the consensus underlying containment, 
even while c r i t i c i z in g  some of the ways i t  was implemented.
Although Lippmann's declining health and subsequent 
death precluded any contribution to the debate over human 
r ig h ts  and American foreign policy which gained momentum in 
the la te  1970s, his preoccupation with the l im its  and 
opportunities of the so-called American mission abroad yield  
a number of in terest ing conclusions. In his approach to the 
moral content of the American national in te res t ,  Lippmann 
started with two major propositions about the nature of man~ 
-ore normative and the other empirical.  The eth ica l goal of 
human development is maturity, which is the stage where 
reason governs human conduct. In fac t ,  Lippmann understood 
reason to be the supreme authority  in the "ideal" state of 
human a f fa i r s .  1Si* The d ictates of reason are both universal 
and valid; i t s  authority  must be coextensive with mankind. 
Pressing th is  point to i t s  logical conclusion, Lippmann 
argued that a world state predicated on the law of reason-- 
or the Law of Nature and of Nature's God— must be the 
ultimate ideal of a l l  rat ional men. From an exclusively
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e th ica l standpoint, Lippmann could suggest that nationalism 
is  barbaric, the r iv a l r y  o-f nations is cr im inal,  and the 
balance o-f power is  the structural  pr inc ip le  of public order 
in the good soc ie ty . 100
In the same breath, however, Lippmann acknowledged that  
in ethics there is  always a p o l i t ic a l  dimension, for dead 
men only walk in ghost stor ies . In looking at the immediate 
r e a l i t y ,  he found that most men are immature, that  they 
seldom reason, and that both individuals and groups seek to 
r e a l iz e  th e ir  desires by force. In the content of human
nature as ij^ i_s, in a world where r iv a l r y  and s t r i f e  are a
fa c t ,  survival cannot be ensured unless power is  confronted
with power, unless i t  is  checked and balanced. Since
survival must be a prerequisite  for the re a l iz a t io n  of other 
ideals and values, a policy which imperils survival (as 
well as the prospect of progress toward the id e a l> is  both 
inexpedient and immoral. 104
The American "fundamentalist mentality" in foreign  
policy for which he reprimanded Wilson was precisely what 
the country had to avoid in the ensuing years; not fervid  
chest—thump1ng, not missionary work on behalf of the 
American way of l i f e ;  and not jingoism disguised as a plan 
for universal salvation should underpin United States 
diplomacy.*'3'7. The lesson of Wi 1 soni an 1 sm, Lippmann 
believed, was that America’ s internat ional commitments could 
no longer be animated by the same dispositions and values
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that  nurtured the nation 's isolationism and parochialism
formerly. l °"  While -fundamental human r igh ts  and trad it iona l
American values may const itute noble diplomatic goals.
Lippmann warned that  diplomacy, where the stakes can be l i f e
and death, c a l ls  for practica l judgments whose c r i t e r i a  are
always re la t iv e .
Whatever the wea1th , the power and the prest i ge of 
a nation may be, i t s  means are always l im ited .
The prob1em of the maker of policy is  to select  
objectives that are l im ite d — not the best that  
could be desired but the best that can be rea lized  
without committing the whole power and the whole 
wealth and the very existence of the nation.
Lippmann. R e a lp o l i t ik .  and Realism 
In a long career punctuated with periods of both 
p o l i t ic a l  activism and detached p o l i t ic a l  re f le c t io n ,
L i ppmann consi stent 1y inf ormed publie op ini  on on the 
in t r ic a c ie s  and c omplenities of i nternatlonal re l  atlons. As 
a responsible and thoughtful c r i t i c ,  his condemnation of the 
American inc l in a t io n  to moralize and substitute noble 
intent ions for e f fe c t iv e  and r e a l is t i c  action has been 
salutary. The old pacifism and isolationism of the interwar 
years were given severe jo l t s  in the Wurid War I i
period, and Lippmann played a leading ro le  in supplying the 
coup d' grace■ Perhaps even more s lg n i f 1 cant was his insight 
in to  the functions and p o s s ib i l i t ie s  of diplomacy in seeking 
to maintain a stable balance of power for a perilous atomic 
age. Indeed, Lippmann may be r ig h t ly  judged to have been i n 
the h is to r ica l  forefront in helping to l i f t  Americans out of
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the ideological stupor o-f an e a r l ie r  "Age o-f Innocence" and 
introducing a subsequent generation o-f Americans to the 
princ ip les  and assumptions necessary -for national survival 
in a world of h o s t i l i t y  and armed might.
By way of conclusion, at attempt w i l l  be made to 
summarize b r ie f ly  the d is t in c t iv e  a t tr ibu tes  of Lippmann's 
p o l i t i c a l  realism in i t s  re la t io n  to American foreign policy  
and a theory of international p o l i t ic s .  Of c r i t i c a l  
importance is  the e::tent of his in te l le c tu a l  debt to the 
various precepts and pr inciples  of European raison d"£ t a t .
In view of the fact  that numerous historians and scholars 
have interpreted his U.S. Foreign Policy and U.S. War Aims 
as contemporary renditions of Realpoli t i t  . in what ways did 
Lippmann adapt the norms of the European t ra d it io n  to the 
emerging prospects and l im ita t io n s  of American foreign  
policy foilowing WorId War I I?  Was his i nvoc at 1 on of 
classical diplomacy, couched as i t  was in the language of 
m il i ta ry  power and a l l iance  systems, l i t t l e  more than a 
cynical celebration of hard-headed power p o l i t ic s  eviorcised 
of a l l  moral content7
In his writ ings on the past and future of American 
foreign policy,  Lippmann never claimed to be a "theorist" of 
in ternat ional p o l i t ic s .  Despite various incursions into the 
realm of moral and p o l i t ic a l  philosophy, he never developed 
what could be described as a systematic or comprehensive 
system of thought. In attempting to analyze the nature and
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structure of the "state system," he t r ie d  to bring a 
knowledge o-f p o l i t i c a l ,  h is to r ic a l ,  economic, demographic, 
geographic, and strategic -factors to bear on the e f fo r t  to 
understand the actual evolution of foreign po l ic ies  among 
the major powers. While i t  could be argued that Lippmann 
often presented an ins ightfu l  analysis of trends and 
patterns of internat ional p o l i t ic s  relevant to certain  Ley 
concepts, his methods reflected a more specif ic  in terest  in 
United States diplomatic h istory. I t  was ty p ic a l ly  from the 
standpoint of the "lessons of history" approach 
(p a r t ic u la r ly  among the "great powers") that his thought 
moved on to encompass such new concepts and categories as 
nationalism, 1mper1 a11sm, regional integrat ion, arms 
control,  and propaganda. Unfortunately, i t  was Lippmann's 
own death in the mid-1970s that probably prevented a more 
sustained c r i t iq u e ,  not only of the novel sources of change 
and transformat 1 on within the lnternational system, but also 
of new strategic and economic developments on the American 
foreign policy agenda.
At the core of Lippmann's message was a commentary on 
the t ra d it io n a l  American d is trust  for power p o l i t ic s  and the 
substitution  of 1 ega1 ism and mor allsm f or ef f ec11ve 
p o l i t ic a l  strategy in an anarchic global arena. American 
national security ,  as well as the survival and independence 
of i ts  European a l l i e s ,  requlred the Un11ed States to 
establish and maintain a global equilibrium of power v is -L -
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vis the Soviet Union. To insure the -future defense of 
America's v i ta l  in terests ,  Lippmann promulgated a concept 
which he called the A t lant ic  Community. Because Western 
c iv i l i z a t io n  now revolved around the nations of the North 
A tla n t ic ,  he thought i t  highly appropriate that America 
should provide the leadership to consolidate the e n t ire  area 
into a united e n t i ty  which would have s u f f ic ie n t  power to 
maintain the s t a b i l i t y  of the whole world.
Although the A t lant ic  Community has not progressed 
exactly  as Lippmann envisaged, i t  constituted a grand vision 
of America's place in the world of the future. The 
p o s s ib i l i ty  of America's reaching the status of a new Rome, 
capable of s ta b i l iz in g  the A t lant ic  world in much the same 
manner as the ancient Romans did the Mediterranean area, and 
the further  p o s s ib i l i ty  of being the conveyor of the 
" trad it io n s  of c i v i l i t y "  as Rome transmitted the classical  
heritage, represented both feas ib le and worthy ideals to 
pursue, 140 In placing these- objectives before the American 
people, Lippmann sought to endow American idealism with a 
pract ica l bearing which is thoroughly grounded in h is to r ic  
and geographic r e a l i t y .
Supplementing Lippmann's vision of a united At lant ic  
Community was his in terest  in diplomacy— i t s  nature, 
requirements, rules,  and problems. While observing that  
Americans have looked with a jaundiced eye on the diplomatic 
t r a d i t io n ,  he contended that negotiations have in large
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measure stood the test  of time. I t  is  the fundamental 
purpose of diplomacy, wrote Lippmann, not to attempt the 
impossible but to deal r e a l i s t i c a l l y  with the exist ing  
balance of power. I t  would be naive, he hastened to add. to 
assume that empires, a l l iances, and m i l i ta ry  power could be 
eliminated by the simple resort to reasoned discourse. The 
classic procedure of diplomacy— always a combination of 
power and compromise— enta i ls  the reconc il ia t ion  of 
co n fl ic t in g  in terests  by careful negotiation. Insofar as 
the essence of diplomatic negotiations rests upon practical  
judgments of r e la t iv e  cost and benef i t ,  the statesman's task 
is to select l im ited objectives that can be rea lized  without 
jeopardizing the power and security  of th€? nation. In 
short, Lippmann wanted the United States to build up 
strength and unity within the A t lan t ic  Community and then 
male adjustments to other power blocs of the world to 
achieve peace and s t a b i l i t y .  This, he believed, could be 
ach1eved through negotiat ion5 and diplomacy r at her than by 
global confrontatlon and armed c o n f l ic t .
In addition, Lippmann d i f fe red  from a number of other 
re a l is ts  in maintaining throughout his thought a greater 
awareness of the actual l im its  of American power.
Throughout the Cold War era, he suggested that American 
policy-makers ran the risk of sett ing th e ir  goals too high, 
p o l i t i c a l l y ,  m i l i t a r i l y ,  and ideo log ica l ly .  In Korea. 
Formosa, Yugoslavia, Poland, and China, the superpowers were
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no longer able consistently  to determine the outcome o-t 
events.
The Kennan approach to containment was c r i t ic iz e d  -for 
over-e;: tend 1 ng American power in order to stop communism a l l  
over the globe. In a similar vein, he tool exception to the 
Eisenhower Administration 7s promulgation of “massive 
r e t a l i a t i o n , " since i t  relegated the exercise of American 
nuclear power to a dangerous zero—sum game by which the 
•forces o-f good and evi l  are c le a r ly  distinguishable. In 
objecting to President Johnson7s Vietnam policy as "the 
greatest disaster that has happened to th is  country since 
the C iv i l  War," he believed that i t  was an "impossible task" 
to reach across the Pacif ic  and impose the American w il l  
upon such a remote (and non-v i ta l )  region as Southeast Asia. 
Instead, he maintained that America should seek to res tra in  
i t s e l f  to a more "normal and n a tu ra l" sphere of operations. 
Although i t  is  possible to detect equivocation and ambiguity 
in Li ppmann 7 s obser va li  one on the nature and timing of U. 5. 
in tervention  abroad (especially  when the logic of 
containment was invoked), his basic c r i t iq u e  of American 
foreign policy helped to give Americans a better insight and 
sense of proportion about the extent of the nation 's  
c a p a b i l i t ie s  to achieve i t s  aspirations.
Unquestionably, Lippmann7s often harsh and pessimistic 
assessment of the quality  and e ff ic ien cy  of American 
diplomacy drew upon many of the central assumptions of
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continental ra i  son d'£ t a t . That a number of commentators 
have hailed his writ ings on American foreign policy both 
during and a fte r  World War I I  as a modern ju s t i f ic a t io n  of 
Rea1poli t  i k is  largely the resu lt  of his emphasis on: (1)
the i r ra t io n a l  constituent of human nature; (2) the 
permanence of r iv a l r y  and s t r i f e  in both domestic and 
in ternat lona1 p o l i t ic s ;  (3) the lawless character of 
international society; (4) the importance of c lassical  
methods of diplomacy; (5> the nation state as the operative 
and primary actor in world p o l i t ic s ;  (6) the supremacy of 
the national in te res t  as a ra t ional guide to foreign policy;  
and (7) the i l lu s io n  of moral and ideological absolutes in 
in te rs ta te  re la t io n s .  As the previous discussion of r aison 
d * 61 at in the continental t ra d i t io n  indicated, however, i t  
would be misleading to suggest that these postulates possess 
some se lf -ev ident  meaning with respect to spec if ic  policy  
i n i t i a t i v e s  ta i lo re d  to a p ar t ic u la r  period in the evolution 
of the Western state system.
In addition, the above themes in Lippmann's thought 
should be evaluated in the l ig h t  of his own recognition of 
the gradual diffus ion of power and p o l i t ic a l  influence in 
the postwar i nlernationa1 environment. Under such 
clrcumstances, neither the United States nor the Soviet 
Union could eas i ly  ignore the increasing l im ita t io n s  in 
th e ir  a b i l i t y  to shape events and outcomes in the smaller, 
less powerful nations around the globe. In looking back:.
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Lippmann found Wilsonian internationalism inundated with a 
horrid sense of provincial superior ity ,  a doctr ina ire  
moralism, and a patent disregard for the great d ivers i ty  of 
new and developing societ ies . Wilson, and the s tra in  of 
values for which he stood, re f le x i  vely looted inward when 
what the country demanded was just  the opposite. In 
contemplating the future, Lippmann could conceive of no 
other r e a l i s t i c  a l te rn a t iv e  than the superpowers acting to 
maintain a f r a g i le  balance of power through the demarcation 
of spheres of influence. Yet even the requirements of power 
p o l i t ic s  were in s u ff ic ie n t  without the restorat ion  of a 
diplomatic posture that made room for accommodation and 
compr omise among r i va ls who do not l ive  in the same mor a1 
order.
That Lippmann's repudiation of Wilsonian 
internationalism was seen by many c r i t ic s  to culminate in a 
cynical departure into ruthless ‘'Machiavellianism,'1 devoid 
of a l l  moral standards, misrepresents his outlook on the 
objectives and l im i ts  of American power in the postwar 
sett ing . Responding to M a r i ta in ’ s query as to why he 
avoided discussing the "ultimate end" of the Western 
a l l iance ,  Lippmann retorted that security against 
aggression, and not the promotion of c iv i l i z a t io n ,  was the 
function of the great power a l l ian ce .  He rejected the 
b e l ie f  that out of the more l imited and spec if ic  assignment 
of providing security  against "world conquerors," the
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creative work of c iv i l i z a t io n  could evolve. Nothing could 
have been more anathema to Li ppmann than attempts by the 
United States, or any power, in seeking to enforce i t s  own 
version of p o l i t ic a l  and s p ir i tu a l  development worldwide.
The structure of the order which the Western a l l i e s  could or 
should in s t i tu te ,  the laws or covenants they could or should 
subscribe to, the procedures they could or should agree 
upon— these matters were l e f t  unresolved in his w rit ing .  
Indeed, Lippmann ventured l i t t l e  further than the 
observation that "the great powers must become the 
organizers of an order in which peoples f i n d . . . th e i r  
l ib e r t ie s  recognized by laws that the great powers respect 
and that a l l  peoples are compelled tc obrerve. "1<1‘
While Lippmann may have been reluctant to discuss the 
ult imate c iv i l i z in g  task of the A t lant ic  a l l iance ,  he did 
distance himself from Machiavel11 an r ai son d 7 £t at by 
opposing the extension of se lf -def ined  American ambition and 
martial superior ity  on a vulnerable world. The tra d it io n a l  
d is t in c t io n  between "realism" and "idealism1' in 
in te rnat iona1 thought is of l i t t l e  service in try ing  to 
specify the in te l le c tu a l  referents which shaped Walter 
Lippmann7s observations on the prospects of American foreign  
policy during and a f te r  World War I I .  Indeed, how can such 
broad labels explain the apparent contradiction between his 
recommendation that the national in teres t  should be pursued 
largely to the exclusion o-f id e a l is t ic  c r i t e r i a  and his
158
simultaneous warning that "a people which does not advance 
i t s  truth has already begun to abandon i t "?
I t  was th is  sense of contradic11 on. th is  tension 
between the actual and the more i l lu s iv e  desirable, which 
marled the beginning and not the end of Lippmann’ s 
preoccupation with the power and purpose of American foreign  
policy.  As a self-admitted in te rn a t io n a l is t ,  he attempted 
to reconcile the logic of power p o l i t ic s  with his l i fe long  
commitment to a cosmopolitan vision of world a f fa i r s .  This 
resulted in his being unable to endorse provincial national 
sympathies and moral aims without a concomitant recognition  
of the values, ideals, and in terests  of many other 
societ ies . In p a r t ic u la r ,  Lippmann believed that the 
globaliza t ion  of m i l i ta ry  confrontation, as well as the 
technology of modern warfare, inh ib ited  any kind of reasoned 
discourse which could sustain the free exchange of b e l ie fs  
and values among diverse societ ies.  The logic of fear ,  
associated with the imperative of m i l i ta ry  preparedness, had 
brought c iv i l i z a t io n  to the brink: of disaster.
In short, the idea that Lippmann took: his insp irat ion  
solely from Machiavellian raison d’ £ta t  or Dismarckian 
Rea 1 pol 111 k: is at best a h a l f - t r u th .  The methods of 
classical diplomacy and the enlightened ca lculat ion of 
American national in terests represented the only practical  
means to defend and salvage his cosmopolitan ideals.  The 
language of m i l i ta ry  power, spheres of influence, and
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balance of power provided a system of checks and balances 
(though a] ways precar 1ous) designed to function as a s e l f -  
act iva ting brake on both imperial adventurism and the 
i r ra t io n a l  resort to force. In a world where no nation can 
lay claim to a monopoly of truth and jus t ice ,  Lippmann 
reminded his many readers that the resolution of p o l i t ic a l  
and t e r r i t o r i a l  questions are inseparable from the 
successful pursuit or moral desiderata in foreign policy.
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C H A P T E R  1 I  I
TRANSCENDING SELF-INTEREST IN NATIONAL BEHAVIOR:
RE INHOLD NIEBUHR’ S CHRISTIAN REALISM
Certain1y, Walter Lippmann may be counted among the 
f i r s t  American r e a l is ts  who sought to adapt the canons of 
power p o l i t ic s  and classical diplomacy to United States 
foreign policy objectives in the postwar era. Although 
Li ppmann may be unsurpassed in seeking to rescue a 
generation of wartime Americans from the moralist ic  
pretenses of the 1 nterwar years, i t  was a F'rotestant 
theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, who established a r e a l is t  
philosophy which synthesized his study of history and 
p o l i t ic s  with a theory of human nature. Throughout his 
l i f e ,  Niebuhr had a close relat ionship with and deep 
influence on the r e a l is t  school of American p o l i t ic s  
associat ed with such think er s as Han s J. Mor genthan, C. B. 
Marshall, George F. Kennan, and Kenneth W. Thompson. I t  is 
not without s ignificance that these authorit ies  owe an 
important in te l le c tu a l  debt to Niebuhr who, as ear 1 y as 193IV 
in Moral Man and Immoral Society, elaborated a r e a l is t  
theory of international p o l i t i c s . 1
The indebtedness of these scholars and others has been 
widely acknowledged. Lippmann placed him "in the very
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highest ranks o-f thinkers in th is  country during this  
century."3 George Kennan e n t i t le d  Niebuhr "the father of us 
a l l . " 3 Hans Morgenthau considered Niebuhr "the greatest 
l iv in g  p o l i t ic a l  philosopher o-f America, perhaps the only 
creative p o l i t ic a l  philosopher since Calhoun."4 F in a l ly ,  
Arthur Schlesinger, J r . ,  summed up the views of a panel at 
the 1974 meeting of the American P o l i t ic a l  Science 
Assoc i at i on by saying: "No one has taken his place or the
ro le  he performed from the 1930s to the 196(15.
I t  should be noted that Niebuhr's work can be studied 
from the perspective of theology, ethics, or p o l i t ic s .  For 
our purposes, however, special emphasis w i l l  be given to 
Niebuhr's commitment to what he termed "Christian realism" 
and i t s  s ign if icance for his understandlng of international  
p o l i t ic a l  re lat ionships. At the ph i1osoph l cal core of his 
posi t i on was an i dentif  l c at i on of the prob1ems and 
l im ita t io n s  in re la t in g  an absolute, transcendent norm to 
the contingencies of pa rt icu la r  p o l i t ic a l  s ituat ions. With 
the increasing c o n f l ic t  and d is in tegrat ion  of international  
society in the 1930s and 1940s, Niebuhr became preoccupied 
v-.: f 1 * t ppr ■ ’ ■ : : . g  f u s i o n  o f  uni v o r  .1 ideals and s e l f -  
in te res t  in national behavior. In b r ie f ,  his Christian  
realism can be distinguished by i t s  attempt to transcend the 
tension between the national in terest  as a primary fact of 
in ternat ional  p o l i t i c s  and devotion to princ ip les  of jus t ice  
and est ab11 shed mutuallt ies in the communit y of nations.
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To what extent did Niebuhr's p o l i t ic a l  philosophy and 
his standard of Christian realism e i ther  subsume or take 
exception to the fundamental tenets of raison djjttat? How 
did his preoccupation with the dramas of man and the 
dynamism of h istory contribute to the understanding of such 
concepts as power, national in te re s t ,  and imperial ism7 I f ,  
in Niebuhr's words, " pol 11. i c s . . . i s bound to be a contest of 
power," do the demands of s e l f - in te r e s t  and national s e l f -  
protection override the moral impulse in foreign po licy0
Pilgrimage of a Christian Realist
Only b r ie f  a t tent ion  can be given to the many 
highpoints of Niebuhr's long and distinguished career. Born 
on June 21, 1892 in Wright C ity ,  Missouri, he received his
formal education at Eden Theological Seminary and Vale 
D iv in i ty  School. In 1915 he was ordained a minister in the 
Evangelical Synod of America and served un t i l  1928 as pastor 
of Bethel Church in D etro it ,  Michigan. I t  was during his 
tenure as pastor for a working class congregation that lie 
challenged the mighty Henry Ford and became concerned about 
problems of social in jus t ice  in a bourgeois democracy.
During th is  ear ly  period, he wrote p r o l i f i c a l l y  for the 
A tlan t ic  Monthlv. The Chr i st i an Century. 7 he Nat i on. and
publlshed his f i rs t  book, Does C iv i l i z a t io n  Need Religion0, 
in 1927. *
In 1928, Niebuhr joined the facu lty  of the Union 
Theological Seminary in New York City where he remained
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un ti l  retirement in 1960. Throughout the 1920s and ear 1y 
193 Os, he adopted a p a c if is t  stance in global a f f a i r s  and 
generally supported the domestic p o l i t ic a l  agenda of the 
S oc ia l is t  Party. His in terest in social ju s t ice  and l ibe ra l  
C h r is t ia n i ty  reached i t s  peal: in 1932 with the publication
of Moral Man and Immoral Society. The te::t assail ed 
1ai 5se:- f a ire  capitalism and the ethics of a l ib e ra l  society 
and church. This ear ly  stage of Niebuhr's career reached 
i t s  culmination in 1934 with the publication of Ref 1ec t i ons 
on the End of an Era.^
Events in Europe during the 1930s, as well as a world 
depression, challenged both his p a c if is t  and so c ia l is t  
convictions and marked a turning point in Niebuhr's career. 
His C h r is t ia n i ty  and Power P o l i t ic s  (1940) portrayed an 
a f f i n i t y  for p o l i t ic a l  realism and a philosophy based on the 
e q u i l ib ra t io n  of power." Such works as An In terp re ta t ion  of 
Christian Ethics (1935) , Beyond T r aqedy <1937) , and his two- 
volume The Nature and Destiny of Man (1941-43) established  
Niebuhr as one of the most si gn i f lcan t  p o l i t i c a l  and soc i a1 
thinkers in the twentieth century.*' Integral to a l l  of 
these seminal works was his attempt to formulate a Lhi i c 11 : i
philosophy of h istory rooted in the d ia le c t ic a l  tension 
between the law of love and the r e a l i t y  of man.
Niebuhr' s 111erary ach1evements on 1y in te n s if le d  his 
l i fe lo n g  in teres t  and p art ic ipa t ion  in public a f f a i r s .  In 
addition to serving as the vice president for the Libera]
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F'arty of New York: and chairman of the Union of Democratic 
A ctio n ,10 he helped to establish such organizations as the 
Committee for Cultural Freedom; the American Association for 
a Democratic Germany; the American Christian Palestine  
Committee; and the Resettlement Campaign for Em i 1ed 
Professionals. In the la te  1940s, he served as an advisor 
to the State Department's Pol icy Planning Staff  and worked 
act ive ly  with such individuals as George Kennan, Hans 
Morgenthau, and Paul Nitze.
Niebuhr's in te l le c tu a l  productiv ity  continued unabated 
both during and a f te r  WorId War I I .  Both The Children of 
Light and the Children of Darkness ( 1944) and The Irony of 
Amer i can Democracv (1952) evaluated the American l ib e ra l  and 
democratic legacy at a time when the Western democracies 
were facing fundamental ideological and s p ir i tu a l  
chal1enges.11 His Christian Realism and P o l i t ic a l  Problems 
(1953) focused on such topics as Marxism, socialism,
1i bera1i sm, and f orei gn policy in the nuc1 ear age. 12 In his 
las t  publi shed book:, The Structure of Nations and Empires 
(1959), he examined the whole sweep of history to show how 
ttit? configurations of power in nat.iLM_ and empires seek 
ju s t ic e  and promote in jus t ice  at the same time and make 
history a continuous battleground in the struggle for 
power. 13
Following a series of small strokes, Niebuhr re t i red  
from his un ivers i ty  position in 1960 and lived out a
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turbulent decade in quiet -fashion in Stockbridge, 
Massachusetts. Though at a much slower pace, he continued 
to support a var ie ty  of c i v i l  r igh ts  organizations and 
opposed American m il i ta ry  intervention in Southeast Asia.
The recipient of many honorary degrees and awards, Niebuhr 
died on June 1, 1974.
Rea1i sm. C h r is t la n i tv . and P o l i t ic s
While a number of in terest ing  works more f u l l y  
chronicle the evolution of Niebuhr’ s philosophy and 
theology, th is  section is pr im ari ly  concerned with how his 
standard of Christian realism contributes to his philosophy 
of p o l i t ic s .  Christian realism, for Niebuhr, implied a 
clear recognition of the l im its  of morallty and reason in 
p o l i t ic s ;  acceptance of the fact  that p o l i t ic a l  r e a l i t i e s  
are power r e a l i t i e s  and that power must be countered by 
power; and awareness that s e l f - in te re s t  is the primary datum 
in the actions of a l l  groups and nations. Following a br ie f  
p r o f i le  of the various in te l le c tu a l  currents that were 
i n f 1uent i a1 in Ni ebuhr’ s wor k dur i ng the 1920s and 193Gs, 
consideration is given to the central propositions of his 
Christian realism and how these have impacted on his  
observations of American foreign policy.
Throughout the 1920s, Niebuhr's approach to p o l i t ic s  
was shaped by his c r i t i c a l  in terest  in twentieth century 
l ibera l ism , as well as by l ib e ra l  Protestant theology. 
Reflecting a rather conventional be l ief  in l ib e ra l
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philosophic assumptions (many of which he would la te r  cast 
aside), he endorsed such l ib e ra l  tenets as support -for the 
League of Nations, rac ia l  tolerance, and sympathy for labor 
unions.14 Exemplifying the social idealism of l ib e ra l  
Protestant i sm--as expressed in the t ra d it io n  of men l i f e  
Washington Gladen, Francis Peabody, and Walter
Rauschenbusch— Niebuhr ref lected  on the sorry predicament of 
the person swallowed up by an impersonal technocratic  
society. Witnessing the harmful impact of American industry 
on the laboring class of D etro it ,  he c r i t ic is e d  
Protestantism for stressing metaphysics at the expense of 
social ethics. The central tast of social reconstructlon, 
according to Niebuhr, involved resistance against the 
tendency of technocratic culture to reduce men to functions 
in a social process.10
While Niebuhr never t i r e d  in his search for a social 
ethic exposing the moral crudity of 1aissez- fa i re  
capitalism, his writ ing in the 1930s steadily  moved toward a 
more radical p o l i t ic a l  o r ientat ion  and a more conservative 
theological position.  Observing the economic stoppages and 
s g l I ' - i h'' n .< I down in th-. ear i > 1930s, tit- i."came c u n  . i t il eel
that modern l ibera lism , whether in i t s  secular or re l ig ious  
version, could not be expected to provide any relevant  
guidance for social and p o l i t ic a l  reconstruction. Indeed, 
for a time, his e a r l ie r  fa i th  in "the growth of re l ig io u s ly  
inspired goodwill" gave way to a new social realism based on
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the consequent appeal of Marxism.1* While Marxism 
u lt im ate ly  proved to be a transient  a l ly  in Niebuhr's search 
for the basis of ju s t ic e  in society, i t  nevertheless 
propelled him to rethink fo rc e fu l ly  the re la t io n  between 
ethics and p o l i t ic s  at a l l  levels of human existence.
As ear 1y as 1929, Niebuhr expressed his doubts on some 
basic l ib e ra l  tenets, and by the time of the publication of 
Ref 1e c t i ons on the End of an Era (1934), th is  c r i t i c a l  
approach had reached i t s  fu l l  growth.17 Summarising the 
diverse in te l le c tu a l  origins of American l ibera lism , Niebuhr 
fastened upon six a r t ic le s  of the l ibe ra l  creed which blind  
i t  to the real world. The philosophical core of l iberalism ,  
he suggested, may be reduced to the following propositions: 
(1) that in jus t ice  is caused by ignorance and w i l l  y ie ld  to 
education; (2) that  c iv i l i z a t io n  is  gradually becoming more 
moral; (3) that individuals,  rather than social systems,
w i l l  guar antee ju s t ic e  in soc le ty; (4) that appeaIs to love,
brotherhood, and goodwill can be e f fe c t iv e  in the end; (5) 
that  goodness males for happiness and increased knowledge 
w il l  overcome human greed; and (6) that wars are stupid and 
w il l  y ie ld to renaoii.118 'The consequence is that modern, 
secular l ibera lism  has fa i le d  to appreciate the power of 
s e l f - in te re s t  in both individual and group re la t ions ,  
depreciated the significance of organic processes in the 
attainment of ju s t ic e ,  and constructed abstract schemes 
i r re levant  to the necessities of the concrete s i t u a t io n .19
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Nor did Niebuhr -find Protestant l iberal ism  and i ts  
charac ter is t ic  expression in the "social gospel" movement to 
be any less bankrupt. According to Niebuhr, proponents of 
the social gospel progressed l i t t l e  beyond ident i fy ing  the 
Kingdom of God with the ideal society which secular l ib e ra ls  
expected to develop through a ra t  1onal and evoluti onary 
process. Their simple confidence in p o l i t i c a l l y  incarnating  
the absolute imperatives of the Gospel, and th e ir  radiant  
optimism about the moral p la s t ic i t y  of human nature, 
represented proof of the s p ir i tu a l  dependence of Christian  
l ib e ra ls  upon the secular p iety of bourgeois idealism .30 In 
short, both secular and re l ig ious  l iberal ism  fa i le d  to 
acknowledge the exigent fac t  of power as the decisive  
r e a l i t y  in the re la t io n s  between men.31
I t  was not u n t i l  the publication of Moral Nan and 
Immor al Soc1et y (1932) that Niebuhr's indictment of secular 
and re l ig iou s  l ibera l ism  gave way to a new social realism, 
drawing much of i t s  insp irat ion  from Marxism. A far  more 
"radical" and " re a l is t ic "  understanding of the nature of 
power rel at 1ons was necessary i f  the r e a l i t i e s  of the socla1 
order w l - i  e to be c lear ly  undo stciod and 11 ttv.. Christian  
f a i th  was to male any contribution to meaningful social and 
p o l i t ic a l  reform. Given the self-regarding impulses that  
govern social re la t ions ,  social ju s t ice  w i l l  be guaranteed 
not by improved educational mechanisms or a more e th ic a l ly  
rigorous re l ig io n  but only by a system of checks and
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balances designed to assure a more balanced equilibrium of 
power among competing groups in s o c ie ty .33 Niebuhr's 
contention was that  the ordering of society is a matter of 
p o l i t ic s ,  not of pedagogy.
Niebuhr's growing disenchantment with modern l iberalism  
was largely  influenced by his a t t rac t io n  to fundamental 
Marxist precepts. The dogma of progress, the notion that  
power re la t io n s  were a tran s ito ry  phenomenon, the idea that 
social in ju s t ic e  could be resolved by appeals to love, 
reason, and the operations of the free  market— these 
i l lu s io n s  were challenged by Marxist thought. Marxism came 
to seem to Niebuhr an "essent ia l ly  correct theory and 
analysis of the economic r e a l i t i e s  of modern society, 
correct in i t s  theory of class c o n f l ic t , "  correct in 
regarding pr iva te  ownership of the means of production as 
the basic cause of economic c r is is  and in ternat ional war, 
correct in ins is t ing  that "communal ownership of the 
productive process is  a basic condition of social health in 
a technical age."33
Yet Niebuhr's allegiance to Mar:; ism throughout the 
1 v'j'JS w • « .• i way l im ited . For ex ,.tmpi e, he never harbor eu
any i l lu s io n s  about the potentia l p e r i ls  inherent in Marxist 
dogma. Even by the early  1930s, he alluded to the "demonry" 
which followed from the fana t ica l  messianism engendered by 
the communist movement at home and abroad.24 Central to 
Niebuhr's re jec t ion  of Mar:; ism as a messianic creed was his
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b e l ie f  that the communists found the Kingdom of God in 
h i stor y ; they perceived the Sovi et Un i on as an i ncarnat ion 
of the absolute.®® That he could simultaneously witness 
both the strengths and hazards of Marxist doctrine in his 
re jec t ion  of Christian l ibera lism  resulted from a f lee t ing  
appreciation of the possible social value of the communist 
error as an indispensable myth working to r e c t i f y  the 
in ju s t ic e  of c a p i ta l is t  society.®4 By 1935, however, his 
tolerance for Marxist myth was repudiated with the sobering 
observation: "I once thought such a fa i th  to be a harmless
i l lu s io n .  But now I see that i t s  net resu lt  is to endow a
group of oilgarchs with the re l ig io u s  sanetlty  whlch 
p r im it ive  pri es t-k i  ngs once held. "
In addition, the Marxist vision fa i le d  to sa t is fy  
Niebuhr's theory of power in intergroup re la t io n s .  Not only 
did communist utopianism breed fanaticism and tyranny, but 
communist economic reorganizatlon jeopardized the conditions 
of freedom. Marxism provided no more than a p a r t ia l  
perspective, weakened by the b e l ie f  that human c o n f l ic t  and 
struggle w i l l  end with the hi s to r i c al ec1i pse of 
c a p i t  * 1 i m . ~*,a opeci i l td!  | > , Niebuhr distinguished between 
the c a p i ta l is t  aggravation of the problem of ju s t ice  and i t s
perennial nature in a l l  human societ ies.  By viewing the
desire for power as man's ineradicable f a i l i n g ,  he argued 
that e f fo r ts  to establish "an economic equilibrium through 
socla1 owner ship" might wel1 create "a new dlsproport i on of
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power.. . .The new and stronger centers of p o l i t ic a l  power 
w il l  be new occasions for and temptations to in ju s t ic e ."
The Moscow t r i a l s  of 193B and the H i t 1e r -S ta l in  pact of 1939 
were, for him, an unambiguous disclosure of the corruption 
at the very center of the international communist movement.
In terms of the American p o l i t ic a l  landscape of the 
1930s, Niebuhr's f l i r t a t i o n  with Marxism and skepticism 
about the capacity of capitalism to resolve i t s  own ev i ls  
led him i n i t i a l l y  to underestimate the pragmatic character 
of the New D ea l .30 At a time when Franklin D. Roosevelt was 
devising a compromise program based on the social 
aspirations shared by Niebuhr, the p o l i t ic a l  philosopher 
found Roosevelt the p o l i t ic ia n  hesitant and v a c i l la t in g  in 
his convictions. While Niebuhr was generally open to 
Marxist pessimism about bourgeois society during the f i r s t  
eight years of the Roosevelt Administrati on, i t  was not 
u n t i l  the end of the decade that issues of foreign policy  
led him to see the dangerous irrelevance of the Social is t  
Farty 's  isolationism. The impact of S ta l in 's  purges and the 
r is e  of d ic tators  across Europe led Niebuhr to appreciate 
R-.■osevelt s c ra fty  expediency as precisely the kina ut 
r e a l i s t i c  exercise of power that he had always regarded as 
the mark of p o l i t i c a l  sagacity. Perhaps no other error in 
Niebuhr's thinking has influenced so profoundly the 
development of the last or more pragmatic stage of his  
ph i1osophy. 31
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Niebuhr's e f fo r t  to re la te  his p o l i t ic a l  thinking to a 
more posit ive  and conservative theological position  
i n i t i a l l y  coincided with his re jec t ion  of conventional 
Christian pacifism and his resignation from the Fellowship 
of Reconciliation in 1934. He accused his p a c if is t  
colleagues of f a l l in g  victim to sentimental perfectionism, 
in thinking that the ethic of agape embodied in the Sermon 
on the Mount yields a proximate stratagem for action— "the 
p o l i t ic s  of love"— relevant to social exigencies.32 For 
Niebuhr, nonparticipation in c o n f l ic t  was not so much a 
p o l i t ic a l  a l te rn a t iv e  as i t  was an outright abdication from 
social and p o l i t i c a l  respons ib i l i ty .  Once again, he 
reminded his l ib e ra l  c r i t i c s  that the underlying dilemma of 
c o l le c t iv e  existence consisted of arranging a to lerab le ,  i f  
only temporary, armistice between competing factions within  
society and seeking ways to invoke coercive measures against 
those who would v io la te  the armistice.
The main outlines of Niebuhr's theological convictions 
were ca re fu l ly  documented in fin In terpretat ion  of Christian  
Ethics and expanded on in Beyond Tragedy and Chri st i am ty
and F’gc  t c l  i t i c s . Be ) xk 1 y summarized, N i e L -  I Ji 11, 1
the self-reqard ing and sinful propensity of man v i t ia te d  any 
reasonable prospect for implementing a social ethic derived 
from the sel f-emptying love, exemplified by the l i f e  and 
death of Jesus Christ.  The ideal of love could not be 
rea l ized  in human h istory, yet i t  was relevant to that
history because i t  revealed 
standards and l i f t e d  other 
tension between the ideal 
C h ris t ian 's  fa i th .  While N 
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and place. With a memory spanning the ages and a vivid  
imagination playing on the -fringe of e te rn i ty ,  man can also 
r is e  above the structure and coherence of nature and history  
by mating them the instruments of his ln t e n t io n a ] i t y .37 In 
b r ie f  , man performs an act of self-transcendence as the self 
makes 11 se lf  the obj ec t of i t s  own thought. 11 1s prpclsely
in th is  condition of being suspended between f in i tu d e  and 
freedom that Niebuhr located the essential "prob1ematic" of 
se lf  hood.
In terms of understanding p o l i t ic a l  behavior, Niebuhr 
emphasized the psychological consequence of man's 
involvement in the parado- of f in i tu d e  and freedom. Human 
anxiety is  prompted by the in d iv idu a l 's  own sense of 
v u ln e ra b i l i ty  to the self- regard lng ambitions of others. 
Unable to precisely assess his creative  in te l le c tu a l  
potent ia l  and freedom because of the f in iteness of his own 
reason, man seeks to augment his own security by seeking 
influence and power over others. However, the ult imate  
paradox i n both human and group ex: l stence l s that the 
res t less  quest for  security  stimulated by the "w il l  to 
power" t: r, never be completely s a t is f ie d .  The margin of
power is never enough to guarantee absolute security  and the 
struggle for power sp ira ls upward as both men and nations 
are caught in a trag ic  dilemma.
Moreover, the p o s s ib i l i ty  of force or coercion is  even 
more pronounced in the realm of man’ s c o l lec t iv e  behavior.
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ft sharp d is t in c t io n  must be made between the moral and
social behavior o-f individuals and social groups; and th is
d is t in c t io n  necessitates p o l i t ic a l  po lic ies  which a purely
in d iv id u a l is t ic  ethic must always -find embarrassing. The
orig in  and strength of c o l le c t iv e  egoism in human a f fa i rs ,
according to Niebuhr, is  a d irect  resu lt  of the tendency of
groups to express both the v ir tue  and selfishness of i t s
members. On the one hand, appeals are made to the p a tr io t ic
devotion and s e l f - s a c r i f i c i a l  loya lty  of the individual;  on
the other, the frustrated  aggression of the masses compels
man to proj ect his ego upon the nati on and to indulge hie
anarchic lust v ic a r io u s ly .40 Therefore, the egoism of the
group or nation has a double force inasmuch as society
"cumulates the egoism of individuals and transmutes th e ir
individual a ltruism into c o l le c t iv e  egoism."'41 Integral to
his p o l i t ic a l  theory is the conviction that:
The re la t io n s  between groups must. . . a1 ways be 
predominately p o l i t ic a l  rather than e th ic a l ;  that 
is ,  they w i l l  be determined by the proportion of 
power which each group possesses at least as much 
as by any ra t iona l and moral appraisal of the 
comparative needs and claims of each group.42
F in a l ly ,  Niebuhr's p o l i t ic a l  philosophy was marked by
increasing concern for the “pragmatic" c r i t e r i a  involved in
r e la t iv e  moral judgments as well as the Christian dimension
of his p o l i t ic a l  realism. Before turning to his
1nterpretat ion of Christian pragmatism, i t  is  important to
further  develop the in te l le c tu a l  dilemma Niebuhr confronted
in seeking to re la te  a transcendent b ib l ic a l  ethic to the
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cont i ngencles and irra t io n a l  p o s s ib i l i t ie s  inherent in
p o l i t ic a l  l i f e .  The significance of his Christian
perspective for the establishment of both jus t ice  and order
within a p o l i t ic a l  system is a prerequisite -for assessing
his estimation of the moral problem in foreign policy and
international p o l i t ic s .
A philosophical perspective of p o l i t ic s  based
exclusively on the enduring elements of r iv a lr y  and s t r i f e
in human relationships was hardly an acceptable endpoint for
a self-proclaimed professor of social ethics. As much as
Niebuhr ra i led  against those theologians who interpreted the
ethic of aoape as an immanent h is tor ica l p o s s ib i l i ty ,  he
drew his inspiration from an attempt to salvage b ib l ica l
fa i th  (the "law of love") in fu l l  view of man’ s dignity
before God. In commenting on the f ina l norms of both
individual and co l lec t ive  existence, Niebuhr acknowledged:
The problem of the individual and the community 
cannot be solved at a l l  i f  the height is not 
achieved where the sovereign source and end of 
both communal and individual existence are 
discerned, and where the l im its  are set against 
the idolatrous self-worship of both individuals  
and communities.1* 3
Niebuhr approached the final nm .■ for l idh individual 
and communal existence by drawing on ethical and b ib l ica l  
precepts that transcend the purely p o l i t ic a l  sphere of human 
selfishness and co l lec t ive  ego. Man s t i l l  l ives  and acts 
under a norm that transcends the fragmentary r e a l i t ie s  with 
which he must responsibly deal. Lust tor power, while
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universal,  cannot be normative, +Dr man is also a being who 
transcends himself indeterminably and is  saved only as love 
draws him beyond sel f -1 ove. * *  Love is  also the primary 
e x is te n t ia l  norm -for the community, which i t  seeks to 
actua lize  (or approx 1 mate) in structures ok ju s t ic e .  In 
b r ie f ,  i t  is Niebuhr’ s approach to both the majesty and 
misery of man that led him to conclude that the discernment 
of agape represents the only v iab le norm -for man in his 
freedom and leads to the establishment of conditions of 
ju s t ic e  f or man in his t i  me. "*”
By always seeking to re la te  the dimensions of jus t ice  
to culture and h is to r ic a l  v i t a l i t i e s ,  Niebuhr arrived at a 
general formulation of ju s t ic e  by which the laws of ju s t ice ,  
taking sinful s e l f - in te r e s t  for granted, aim to establish  
equitable divisions between c o n f l ic t in g  in teres ts . '* *  He was 
able to avoid a descent into n ih i l ism  and cynicism by 
holding up aaape as a f in a l  standard against which interest  
and power can be measured, beguiled, and deflected for the 
ult im ate end of creating the most inclusive community of 
order and ju s t ic e .  More importantly, a transcendent ethic  
of love n u r t u r e s  a s p i r i t  of c o n t r i t i o n  arid h u m i l i t y  by 
which implacable contestants i n  the p o l i t ic a l  struggle can 
emancipate themselves from self-centered pretensions and 
accommodate the fragmentary character of human values and 
in te r e s ts . * >
Supplementing the e f fo r t  to bring Christian realism t o
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bear on the tension between love and jus t ice  in p o l i t ic a l  
l i f e  was Niebuhr’ s evolving pragmatic or ientat ion to matters 
of public policy. Owing a debt to such American 
philosophers as William James and John Dewey, Niebuhr 
endeavored to synthesize pragmatism with Christian theology. 
He once defined Christian pragmatism with the observation 
t h a t :
. . .C h r is t ia n  pragmatism is merely the application  
of Christian freedom and a sense of respons ib i l i ty  
to complex issues of economics and p o l i t ic s ,  with 
the firm resolve that inherited dogmas and 
generalizations w i l l  not be accepted, no matter 
how revered or venerable i f  they do not contribute  
to the establishment of ju s t ice  in a given 
s itua t ion .
The resu lt  of the pragmatic method in the world of 
contingent decision and action re la t iv iz e d  a l l  social 
programs in l ig h t  of the absolute claims of the gospel. Yet 
theological absolutes could be corrupted, and Christian  
absolutes had been corrupted repeatedly; but properly used 
they could provide an ultimate in te l le c tu a l  defense against 
tyranny and anarchy.', ‘i' Religion, therefore, could be a 
source of error as well as wisdom and l ig h t ;  i t s  proper role  
should be to question and inculcate a sense of humility  
before the facts .  Recognizing such precepts as the 
authority  of God beyond the authority  of a l l  men as well as 
the moral law revealed as the law of love in Christ,  Niebuhr 
found the pragmatic impulse an e f fe c t iv e  deterrent to the 
self -r ighteous dogmas of the l e f t  and r ig h t .  His Christian  
pragmatism demanded that men, f ree  of a l l  ideological
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i l lus ions  that the ir  choices represent the appearance of
pure good in hi story, make responsible decisions between
p o l i t ic a l  a1te rn a t iv e s . 00
In summary, Niebuhr's realism c lear ly  points to the
l im its  of morality and reason in p o l i t ic s  as well as the
ubiquity of s e l f - in te r e s t  in the actions of a l l  groups and
nations. Kennan’ s observation that "he was the father of us
a l l "  re f le c ts  the fact that  few colleagues ever equaled
Niebuhr’ s d i l ig e n t  e f fo r t  to more precisely address the
theological and philosoph1c postu1 ates that shape the
in te l le c tu a l  worldview of the p o l i t ic a l  r e a l i s t .  According
to Hans J. Morgenthau, Niebuhr’ s contribution to p o l i t ic a l
l i f e  in America takes shape as the rediscovery of p o l i t ic a l
man in f ' ve d i f fe re n t  respects.
He has rediscovered the autonomy of the p o l i t ic a l  
sphere. He has rediscovered the in te l le c tu a l  
dilemma of understanding p o l i t ic s  and acting 
within the p o l i t ic a l  sphere. He has rediscovered 
the moral dilemma of p o l i t ic a l  action. He has 
restored the organic relat ionsh ip  between 
p o l i t ic a l  thought and p o l i t ic a l  action. F in a l ly ,  
he has rediscovered the tragedy which is  inherent 
in the p o l i t ic a l  ac t .®1
International F’o l i t i c s  and Christian Realism 
Reinhold Niebuhr’ s root assumptions about man and 
p o l i t ic a l  society culminated in a d is t in c t iv e  philosophical 
orientat ion  by which to assess the nature of international  
p o l i t ic s ,  as well as the objectives on the American foreign 
policy agenda concomitant with i t s  emergence as a preeminent 
power' in the postwar world. As an admitted r e a l i s t ,  he
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sought to elevate the relat ionsh ip  between ethics and 
p o l i t ic s  -from a narrow-minded preoccupation with national 
sel f - i  nterest or the instrumental l t i e s  o-f power; indeed, 
upon turning to e ither  domestic or internat ional  p o l i t ic s ,  
Niebuhr's thought emphasized the d ia le c t ic a l  balance between 
the princip les  o-f morality influencing the responsible 
choice o-f policy in i t i a t i v e s .  Following a b r ie f  account of 
the genesis of Niebuhr’ s p o l i t ic a l  realism during the 
int.erwar years, attent ion turns to several recurrent 
concepts ( i . e . ,  national in te re s t ,  power, and balance of 
power) providing him with the in te l le c tu a l  resources to  
re la te  theoret ica l re f le c t io n  and policy recommendation. As 
w i l l  be seen in a subsequent section, the ethical c r i t e r i a  
underlying the expression of American national in te res t  in 
world p o l i t ic s  provides a basis from which to compare and 
distinguish Niebuhr's realism from Machiavellian raison 
d7 £ t a t .
At a minimum, i t  should be re i te ra te d  that Niebuhr's 
ambition to formulate the broad philosophical out lines of a 
r e a l is t  approach to American foreign policy was a gradual 
and often amL 1 yuuus process that consumed the f i r s t  thirty-  
years of his adult l i f e .  Not surprising ly,  most, of his 
commentary on the princip les  and practice of American 
behavior abroad often mirrored s h if t in g  in te l le c tu a l  
currents, re f le c t in g  the twists and turns in his p o l i t ic a l  
philosophy for wel1-over a ha lf -century.  Two part icu lar
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determinants, however, were au th o r i ta t iv e  tor his subsequent 
internat ional thought. The t i r s t  was the uneasy balance o+ 
optimism and cynicism shaping his estimate ot the p o l i t ic a l  
consequences ot World War I .  The second was the unavoidable 
part ic ipa t ion  ot American in World War I I ,  as well as the 
need to provide a detense ot democratic toreign policy in 
the immediate postwar environment.
Although Niebuhr began by supporting the l ib e ra l  and 
universal aspirations governing America's entry into World 
War I ,  he quickly became disenchanted with what he perceived 
as the d iscont inu ity between the s t e r i l e  id e a l is t ic  rhetoric  
and bloody r e a l i t i e s  ot war. Reflecting on the Versa i l les  
Conference and i t s  p o l i t ic a l  aftermath, he judged Wilson's 
diplomacy as inappropriate for what amounted to a contest 
for power dictated by se lf ish  economic motives and the 
caprice of statesmen.®2 By 1925, Niebuhr’ s position had 
evolved from "trying to be an optimist without f a l l in g  into  
sentimentality"  to "a r e a l is t  t ry ing  to save myself from 
cynicism."D3 At th is  early  juncture, however, his  
profession of realism represented l i t t l e  more than a 
r e a c t i o n  tc the mural incantations ot a Bankrupt l ib e ra l  
ideology rendered obsolete in the face of unrestrained s e l f -  
in terest  and undisciplined power in both human and group 
in terac+ jn.
Several general observations can be made regarding the 
evolution and ambiguity of Niebuhr's incipient realism in
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the f i r s t  decade fallowing World War I .  F i rs t ,  his 
indictment of Wilson's reforming pr inc ip les  in foreign  
policy did not signal a complete disavowal of a l l  ethical  
content and purpose in the service of American national 
in te res t .  S p e c if ic a l ly ,  Wilson's f a i lu r e  issued from an 
in a b i l i t y  to harness l ib e ra l  idealism and nationalism in 
such a way as to moderate the se l f-serv ing  machinations of 
major European powers,04 The question of eth ica l desiderata 
in foreign policy, according to Niebuhr, must i n i t i a l l y  
confront the enduring egoism ot the nation state before i t  
is  possible to explore a l te rn a t iv e  po lic ies  transcending 
national s e H - i n t e r e s t , 33
Second, Niebuhr's post-World War I vision was mar ted by 
a l ingering , i f  i l l - d e f in e d ,  idealism. Following the 1919 
peace settlement, Niebuhr expressed hope that  the ideas 
being expressed would eventually mold r e a l i t y  even i f ,  in 
the short term, they were being used cynica lly  as ideology. 
"Man is not unwill ing to male sacr i f ices ,  but he has never 
longed for more issues that w i l l  hallow his sacr i f ices  and 
make them worth while ."®* Yet Niebuhr could go l i t t l e  
further  th.'-n suggest a .-ague eth ica l potenti “ ! for 
s ta te c ra f t  without more precisely s t ipu la t ing  the manner in 
which id e a l is t ic  resources could be u t i l i z e d  to shape 
specif ic  policy aspirations. While admitting that the only 
escape from cynicism encompassed the moral q u a l i f ic a t io n  of 
group egoism, he could only propose greater in teract ion of
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ra t ional and re l ig iou s  considerations as a qu a l i f ica t io n  of 
blind national in t e r e s t .97
Third, Ni ebuhr 7s ear 1y i nvonat i on of r ea1 i sm was i t s e l f  
qual if ied  by a skeptical estimate of several concepts which 
would la te r  become indispensable components of his more 
mature Christian Realism following World War I I .  For 
er; amp 1 e , he d i st r ust ed the counsel s of p o l i t ic a l  prudence as 
a re l ia b le  guide to diplomacy.®** Conceding that the Tr ip le  
Entente and T r ip le  Alliance represented prudent measures in 
response to an anarchic i nter natlona1 environment, he j udged 
such all iances as part ly  responsible for casting Europe into  
war. Another fami 1la r  tenet of realism— the balance ot
power was rejected by Niebuhr as an obsolete remnant of
l ibera lism  and incapable of improving the prospects for 
in te rnat lona1 concord. Although the balance of power, in 
time, would be a prescript ive cornerstone of Niebuhr's 
philosophy of internat ional  p o l i t ic s ,  he was i n i t i a l l y  
reluctant  to exp lo it  f u l l y  the crea tive p o s s ib i l i t ie s  within  
the framework of t ra d i t io n a l  power po li t ics .®^
Throughout the 1930s, Niebuhr's realism gained in depth 
as a resu lt  of a number ot in te l le c tu a l  breakthroughs, as 
well as being influenced by a deter lorat ing international  
climate that  propelled the United States into a second world 
war. P a r t ic u la r ly  important was Niebuhr's liar x i s t - i  nsp i r ed 
c r i t iq u e  of l ibera l ism  that further  shaped his p o l i t ic a l  
ethic concerning the morality ot individual and group
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re la t ions .  Probing new avenues ot re s tra in t  on the 
destructive potent ia l  ot group egoism, Niebuhr invoked 
Marxist class consciousness to moderate national passions. 
More importantly, his acceptance ot the Marxist perspective 
on class c o n t l ic t  and the catastrophic demise ot capitalism  
made i t  impossible tor him to deny the possible resort to 
violence among torces pressing tor social change.AO All 
claims tor social morality by both individuals and groups 
had to be judged according to c r i t e r i a  ot s e l t —1n te re s t .
Niebuhr’ s ethic was in harmony with Mar::, the 
s o c ia l is t ,  who emphasized the need tor public ownership and 
planning, but i t  was in opposition to Mar::, the utopian 
revolut ionary, who envisioned a society without in jus t ice  
and c o n t l i c t . * 1 As our ear 11er review ot his p o l i t ic a l  
philosophy suggested, Niebuhr accepted a "trank dualism" in 
ethical  matters by pointing to the tensions between the 
transcendent Christian law ot love and the contingencies ot 
p o l i t ic a l  l i t e  understood in Marxist terms. Such a 
dua l is t ic  eth ic pointed to a sharp d is t inc t ion  between the 
standards ot individuals and group morality. The ethic ot 
Jesus and st„-1 -f - sacr i t i ce was a poss ib i l i ty  t or the 
regulation ot personal l i t e  beyond the requirements ot 
social coercion in the p o l i t ic a l  order; however, moderating 
group egoi sm in the p o l i t ic a l  arena was much more the 
product ot r e la t iv e  p o l i t ic a l  and moral judgments.** The 
essential l ndepena -?nce ot a Christian ethic from p o l i t ic a l
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cu lture led Niebuhr to resurrect the balance of power as the 
kind of prudential response, appropriate for the re a l iza t io n  
of jus t ice  in society. Parado- ica lly ,  as expressed in Moral 
Man and An 1n te rp re ta t1 on of Christian Eth ics , the 
development of Niebuhr's theology and philosophy led him to 
endorse certain pr incip les of p o l i t ic a l  realism <e.g.,  
prudence, proximate moral judgments, and the equi1ibration  
of power) he had once considered dubious.
Throughout the 1930s, the gathering war clouds in 
Europe and Asia drove Ni ebuhr to chal1enge lnterwar 
is o la t io n is t  sentiment and je t t is o n  many of the lingering  
Marxist remnants that shaped his view of domestic and 
in ternat lonal  p o l i t ic a l  r i v a l r i e s .  During the early  1930s, 
Niebuhr espoused a policy of s t r i c t  American n e u tra l i ty  
toward the emerg i ng p o l i t ic a l  and ec onomic r iv a l r i e s  of 
Europe.-*3 While c r i t i c a l  of German and I ta l ia n  fascism, he 
also saw the United States as a potentia l threat to world 
peace i f  i t s  own m il i ta ry  power tempted America to protect  
and expand economic p ro f i t  abroad. However, by the time of 
the Munich Agreement (1930) and the Nazi invasion ot Poland 
(1939), Niebuhr less sanguine about r-ntierican abstention
from the enveloping c o n f l ic t .  He accepted the p o s s ib i l i ty  
that c a p i ta l is t  economic motivations would l ik e ly  draw 
America into the war.-"- In addition, experience in 
Manchuria, Ethiopia, Spain and China i l lu s t ra te d  that the 
democracies were i l l —equipped to make c o l lec t iv e  security
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wor k .
By 1940, Niebuhr had modified his stance by supporting 
Roosevelt's program of m i l i ta ry  preparedness and ca l l ing  for 
extensive American aid. With the Japanese assault on F'earl 
Harbor in 1941, however, history had overtaken the debate 
between is o la t io n is ts  and in tervent ion ists ;  and Niebuhr war. 
compelled to accept the necessity of war.*0 He ac t ive ly  
supported resistance to the Nazi threat and considered the 
def eat of Hi11er as the sine Qua non f or a return to health 
of Western c i v i l i z a t i o n . * *
While Niebuhr's re f lec t io n s  on American diplomacy 
during the i nt erwar year s were of ten overshadowed by 
fundamental s h i f ts  in his philosophy and theology, his 
writ ing  a f te r  1945 more s p e c if ic a l ly  focused Dn the 
oper at i ve concepts lntegr a1 to the re a l i  st worIdview of 
l nternat i onal a f f a i r s .  With the ev:pansion of American power 
and prestige abroad, these concepts provided a useful 
vehicle by which he could in tegrate  theoretical  re f le c t io n  
with policy evaluation. Moreover, concepts such as national 
in terest  and the balance of power proved useful for  
Niebuhr's e f fo r t  to d i fferent ia te  but ween h is to r ica l  
part icu lars  and the more enduring patterns of internat ional  
p o l i t ic s .
Before turning to his analysis of central foreign  
policy concepts, i t  is important to note a number of 
features and l im ita t io n s  which distinguish his thought from
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the contributions of other re a l is t  scholars. F ir s t ,  
Niebuhr’ s far-reaching in te l lec tua l  interests sustained an 
approach to foreign policy which free ly  draws on the 
perspectives of theology, ethics, and p o l i t ic a l  philosophy. 
Few re a l is ts  can claim to have plowed the in te l lec tua l  
depths of the ir  t rad i t ion  so deeply.
Second, the current tendency to bifurcate international  
p o l i t ic a l  theory into normative and empirical halves 
obscures the extent to which Niebuhr judged both facets 
relevant to his task. More so than many of his colleagues, 
he staked out a clear and moderate position in anticipation  
of the debate between the so-called "scientists" and 
" trad it io n a l is ts "  in the disc ip line of international  
relat ions.  On the one hand, his thought on American foreign 
policy was heavily influenced by his broader philosophical 
treatment of p o l i t ic s  (e .g . ,  assumptions about man's purpose 
and destiny); however, he also argued that theological and 
moral re f lec t ion  must always be supplemented by empirical 
studies in spheres where p o l i t ic a l  choices are often swayed 
by powerful ideological appeals.*1’
Third, much of Niebuhr's writing on American foreign 
policy in the postwar period took the form of abbreviated 
p o l i t ic a l  essays. Few other re a l is ts ,  with the possible 
exception of Lippmann, exhibit the kind of tension between 
broad philosophical re f lect ion  in the standard texts and 
commentary on immediate p o l i t ic a l  topics often subject to
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the exigencies of e d i to r ia l  deadlines. In trying to 
chronicle the general development of Niebuhr’ s thought at 
any one stage, i t  is  important to grasp how he s ta r ts  with a 
general p r in c ip le  or moves from the part icu lar  in the 
direct ion of p r inc ip le .
Fourth, Niebuhr's in te rp re ta t ion  and d e f in i t io n  of 
p o l i t ic a l  realism is often less exact and precise than the 
approach taken by other American r e a l is ts .  For example, 
Niebuhr does not define p o l i t ic s  with the precision of a 
Morgenthau, who speaks of p o l i t ic s  as the "pursuit o-f 
in terest  defined in terms of power." Perhaps one reason 
that could be suggested for the absence of systematic 
expression in Niebuhr’ s thought was his preoccupation with 
the i r ra t io n a l  side of p o l i t ic s ,  a world r ipe  with l im it le ss  
contingencies that make the application of moral precepts to 
group behavi or both pr ec a r1ous and tent a t iv e .
The f i r s t  few steps taken in the dir ection of 
"theorizing" about recurrent patterns in foreign policy grew 
out of e f fo r ts  by a number of American r e a l is ts  to id en t i fy  
the fundamental character1s t 1cs of international p o l i t ic s .  
Influenced largely by phi 1 osoph i ■: u! 1 ■ :npt i on s about mar,
and p o l i t ic s ,  these scholars sought to i l lumine analyt ical  
categories useful for investigat ing the re la t io n  between 
generalizations about state behavior and the actual facts of 
specif ic  p o l i t i c a l  actions. While the r e a l is t  
in te rp re ta t ion  of theory has inv ited  considerable c r i t ic ism
an a number of counts,*8 the pr 
a theoret ica l ju s t i f ic a t io n  
perplei: and divide commentat 
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survive and preserve i t s  in te g r i ty  are often guided by the 
perceptions of national actors at any one time.
While Niebuhr’ s approach to moral values in foreign  
policy w i l l  be discussed at greater length in a future  
section, i t  w i l l  su ff ice  to b r ie f ly  mention his out loot: on 
the national in terest  as a problem in p o l i t ic a l  ethics. At 
the outset, Niebuhr argued that a foreign policy geared to 
the national in terest  presents the statesman with a genuine 
par ado;: .
Every nation is  guided by s e l f - in te r e s t  and does 
not support values which transcends i t s  l i f e ,  i f  
the defense of those values imperils i t s  
existence. A statesman who sought to follow such 
a course would be accused of treason. On the 
other hand, nations do become bearers of values 
which transcend th e ir  national in te re s ts .73
At issue is  the dilemma of reconciling necessity with
princ ip le :  the necessity is  that of protecting the in terests
of a group for which one serves as trustee, and the
p rin c ip le  is  that of undif ferent ia ted  loya lty  to such values
as ju s t ic e  and l ib e r ty .  In fa c t ,  Niebuhr raised the ethical
problem of r ai son d ’ #t at by pointing to the d i f f i c u l t y  of
adjusting moral claims la id  upon the statesman by his
al 1 egi an re  t o  the  n.L<t j onal c o m m ; + wi th  r i ■ 1 i ai ms that.
derive from his loya l ty  to communi t le s  transcending the
national community. Although the re la t io n  of Niebuhr’ s
ethica l dualism to a si mi 1ar standard embodied in raison
d’ ^ ta t7* w i l l  be explored in la te r  pages, his thought
cont inually  emphasized both the l im ita t ion s  and
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opportunities associated with the moral ju s t i f ic a t io n  of a
nation 's in teres t  in world a f fa i r s .
National s e l f - in te r e s t ,  on the one hand, constituted an
inescapable r e a l i t y  from which no state could demur.
Soc ie ty . . .merely cumulates the egoism of 
individuals and transmutes th e ir  individual  
altruism into c o l lec t iv e  egoism so that the egoism 
of the group has a double force. For th is  reason 
no group acts from purely unself i sh or even mutual 
in te re s t ,  and p o l i t ic s  is therefore bound to be a 
contest for power.7®
Yet he was also convinced that no state can adhere to s e l f -
in teres t  without claiming to do so in obedience to some
general scheme of values. The very behavior of nations
proves th e ir  periodic acknowledgment of a higher loyalty
than that of s e l f - in te r e s t .  Few states f a i l  to leg it im ize
s e lf - in te re s te d  motives by claiming that such polic ies  serve
mankind, universal values, or a c iv i l i z a t io n  transcending
that of a nation i t s e l f . 7*  He concluded that  cynicism and
pretension are two parts of a s ingle problem— a continuing
amb1valence towar d the respons i b i l i t y  of nations seen at one
moment as having no obligations beyond th e ir  own interests
and, at the next, engaging in a high moral crusade without
r egard  f o r  -f ; f * c r i c p r n s , 7 7
As a moderate or pragmatic r e a l is t ,  Niebuhr defined
American national in terests following World War I I  in rather
broad and f le x ib le  terms. He interpreted national interest
to represent the goals of foreign policy given shape by the
p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, and cu ltural  heritage of each national
2 U 1
actor. The primary goal of United States foreign policy in 
the postwar era, according to Niebuhr, hinged upon the need 
to preserve internat ional order through the maintenance of a 
r e la t iv e ly  stable balance o-f power. Vet he was also
cognizant that such a statement of American national 
in terest  raised a number of d i f f i c u l t  questions regarding 
the re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  and l im ita t io n s  on the e::ercise of 
United States power abroad.
In p a r t ic u la r ,  he was skeptical whether America 
possessed e ither  the w il l  or the capacity to police the 
world and successfully moderate a l l  the f i r e s  of 
revolutionary sentiment in distant regions. Relevant here, 
for example, was Niebuhr's concern that the g1obal1z a t1 on of 
Cold War h o s t i l i t i e s  would e f fe c t iv e ly  s a c r i f ic e  the 
national objectives of developing societies at the expense 
of unbridled Soviet and American imperialism.7**' Beyond the 
avoidance of nuclear ann ih i la t ion , he also suggested that 
American national in teres t  encompassed the preservation of 
open societies  that have not succumbed to Communist 
c o n tro l . -0  In general , the bulk of his writ ing on 
internat ional p o l i t ic s  pressed for reform in tr aue polic ies  
and 1nternat1ona1 organizations, and for the lessening of 
ln ternat lonal r iv a l r i e s  while, at the same time, preserving 
the system.-1
I t  remains to b r ie f ly  consider how Niebuhr's general 
observations on the national in teres t  of the United States
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was more sp e c if ic a 11y affected by his reaction to several
major events and developments in American foreign policy
throughout the postwar period. Selective a t tent ion  is ,
therefore, devoted to Niebuhr's views on: (1) NATO and the
Marshall Plan; (2) American intervention in Korea; (3)
A l l ie d  disunity and the Suez Cris is ;  and (4) American
objectives in Vietnam.
Niebuhr's support for the stationing of American
m i l i ta ry  forces on European soil under the aegis of NATO in
1949 followed from his b e l ie f  that  world peace would have to
be maintained for years to come by the preponderance of
power in the Western world. Beyond purely m i l i ta ry
considerations, however. Western power consisted pr im ari ly
of the moral unity and economic health of that world.
Describing the Marshal 1 Plan as "a Kind of turning point in
postwar h is to ry ,"  Niebuhr wrote:
America could function in the in terest  of 
democracy only i f  i t  were ready to give economic 
support to the continent without seeking to 
prevent the establishment of systems which sought 
to combine c o l le c t iv e  forms of economy with 
p o l i t ic a l  freedom. This i s . . . t h e  only p o s s ib i l i ty  
of preventing the continent from turning to 
b o l s h e v i  s m . * *
The American commitment to the r e v i ta l i z a t io n  of 
democratic forces in Europe represented an act of 
statesmanship in which "prudent s e l f - in te r e s t  was united 
with concern for others in a fashion which represents the 
most a t ta inab le  v ir tu e  for n a t io n s ." *1* Admitting a mi;; of 
id e a l is t ic  and se l f ish  motives in American policy, Niebuhr
was quick to point out that the deciding factor in
in i t i a t in g  the Marshall Plan was the b e l ie f  that economic
aid to Europe would promote the p o l i t ic a l  and economic
interests of the United States. Warning against the
fa m il ia r  American temptation to re ly  exclusively on the
wel 1 springs of generosity to e>rplain United States foreign
policy behavior, he argued:
Generosity is  probably beyond the moral capacity 
of c o l le c t iv e  man. I t  i s . . . f o o l i s h  for powerful 
nations to pretend to i t .  The pretension w i l l  
merely e l i c i t  cynical reactions. But i t  is  not 
impossible for nations to f ind th e ir  point of 
concurrence between s e l f - in te r e s t  and a wider 
in terest  than th e ir  own."'*
The Korean War was a new kind of experience for  the 
American public, inasmuch as the c o n f l ic t  represented an 
early  case study on the re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  and l im ita t io n s  of 
America's new position in the world. Although supportive of 
e f fo r ts  by the United States to res is t  communist aggression, 
Niebuhr was more s p e c if ic a l ly  concerned with the manner in 
which the war was fought and i t s  ram ifications for the 
global containment of communism. M i l i ta ry  h o s t i l i t i e s  in 
Korea took the form of a l im ited war fought for l im ited  
purposes with l im ited weapons. This stands in v iv id  
contrast to America's great wars waged for more or less 
unlimited purposes, for independence and freedom, to male 
the world safe for democracy, and for unconditional 
surrender.**  Niebuhr admitted that the m i l i ta ry  containment 
of communism, while a necessity, would not u lt im ate ly
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resolve the growing in s ta b i l i t y  among the African and Asian 
nations; nevertheless, the security  o-f the world depended on 
American resolution in conducting a l imited war -for limited  
purposes.
The debate prec ip itated  by General MacArthur's desire 
to expand the war by a ir  attacks on China exposed the danger 
o-f -failing to gauge the l im its  o-f m i l i ta ry  power in opposing 
communism. By viewing the struggle in Korea in almost 
exclusively m i l i t a ry  terms, MacArthur became a symbol of 
American heedlessness by conveying the impression that the 
United States was more concerned with winning the next world 
war than preventing i t . " *  To m il i ta ry  power, according to 
Niebuhr, must be added the moral and p o l i t ic a l  wisdom that 
in ternat ional  problems y ield  few f in a l  solutions. The 
patience to bear the re s tra in ts  of great power must be 
supplemented with an a b i l i t y  to d1f fe re n t ia te  among the 
d if fe re n t  dimensions ( i . e . ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  ideo logica l,  m i l i ta ry  
and economic) in the American struggle with international  
commun 1 sm. m~*
Niebuhr's w ri t ing  on the Suez Crisis of 1956, perhaps 
more than any other postwar e.ent,  ref lec ted  the many 
in te l le c tu a l  facets in his assessment of both the errors and 
strengths of the American approach to foreign policy.  Our 
consideration must be l imited to Niebuhr's id e n t i f ic a t io n  of 
the foreign policy fa i lu re s  characterizing the Eisenhower 
Administration's reaction to B ri t ish  and French m il i ta ry
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intervention in Egypt. His indictment of Dul1es-Eisenhower 
diplomacy exemplified an underlying concern for the 
requirements of power and morality influencing America’ s 
ro le  as leader of the Western world.
In b r ie f ,  Niebuhr joined other r e a l is ts  such as Ernest
Lefever and Hans J. Morgenthau in objecting to the moral ism 
and legalism which shaped the Eisenhower Administration's  
attacl: on i t s  strongest a l l i e s .  By trying to force the 
Is ra e l is ,  French, and B ri t ish  to honor the pr inc ip les  of the 
United Nations Charter, the Administration signaled the 
relaxat ion  of American leadership of the Western a l l iance  in 
order to pose as a benign moderator in the East-West 
struggle. Niebuhr noted several drawbacks associated with 
American policy and ac t ion .
F i rs t ,  the Administration perpetuated the misconcep11 on 
of the United Nations as a system of world government. "Our 
devout expressions of loyalty  to i t . . .becam e but a screen 
for our i r re s p o n s ib i l i ty ;  for the United Nations can do 
nothing without the leadership of the Western powers.
What drove B r i ta in  and France from Egypt was not
Hitcrnat 1 onal moral sanction Liul t. t ie  implied threat of force
behind a Soviet-Amerlcan a l l ian ce .
Second, Niebuhr also objected to the p a c i f is t  sentiment 
involved in the Administration's position disavowing the use 
of force to resolve 1nternat1onal disputes. To re trea t  to a 
new isolationism from the unthinkable nature of nuclear war
206
played into the hands of the Soviets and strengthened 
Nasser's intransigence."*^ The ult imate bankruptcy o+ the 
Admi n 1 str at i on ’ s position was revealed by preaching 
m oralist ic  homilies about the use o-f force to her a l l i e s  at 
the very moment when Russian troops were crushing a 
Hungar i an cha11enge to Sovi et m i l i ta ry  and p o l l t ic a l  
domination of Eastern Europe.
In commenting on the Administration’ s misapplication of 
ethics in foreign policy, Niebuhr advised that "evidence has 
been accumulating for some time that the President has some 
very naive ideas about the re la t io n  of power to morality in 
p o l i t i c s . " ^ 0 Doth Eisenhower and Dulles viewed the c r is is  
from a le g a l is t ic -m o ra l is t ic  perspective that re f lected  the 
1i ber a1-democratic theory of r e l i  ance on co l lec t  i ve 
security .  L ega lis t ic  p la t itudes invoking the language of 
the UN Charter and i t s  emphasis on a "community of mankind" 
l e f t  l i t t l e  room for diplomacy which recognized American 
s e l f - in t e r e s t ,  in addition to such other factors as Soviet 
penetration in the Middle East and escalating Egyptian 
nationalism. As a re s u lt ,  the Administration’ s 
preocxupai i on aj th jhsol ute moral values obscured tlit: tic-ud 
for more discriminating and prommate moral judgments which 
the complexities of the modern p o l i t ic a l  world required. 
Shortly a f te r  the Suez C r is is ,  Niebuhr concluded:
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Something has ce r ta in ly  gone wrong with the moral 
influence theory of diplomacy,. . .The moral is  that 
idealism in p o l i t ic s  is  in e f fe c t iv e  i f  i t  is  not 
implemented in detailed policy. I t  1s. . .  dangerous 
when a great imperial power greater than that of 
Rome, namely, our own nation, is informed by such 
vague and fatuous idealism. Perhaps one ought to 
add that Marcus Aurelius was, in addition to his 
other v ir tues ,  an in te rn a t io n a l is t  who said "as an 
Antonine my c i ty  is  Rome but as a man my c i ty  is  
the world," but the world did not p r o f i t  by the
confusion in which he le f  
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accept defeat at the hands of the Viet Cong or to advocate 
immediate American m i l i t a ry  withdrawal. However, his more 
specif ic  objections concerning the l im ita t io n s  of American 
power in Southeast Asia suggested, at the very least ,  some 
qual1f i c a t  1 on of America's obligation to promote free and 
open societ ies  abroad.
A number of considerations entered into his c r i t iq u e  of 
the Johnson Administration' s escalation of United States 
troop presence in Vietnam. Niebuhr attacked the 
Administration's pretense of v ir tu e  in the c o n f l ic t ;  and he 
believed i t  un l ike ly  that America could e ither  ex tr ic a te  
i t s e l f  from a policy of growing escalation or achieve a 
decisive m i l i ta ry  v ic tory .  In addition, Niebuhr rejected  
the idea that pr inc ip les  of democracy and self-determination  
were being v a l ia n t ly  defended in Vietnam. American foreign  
policy became increasingly "ideological" by i t s  hypocrit ical  
use of moral language to obscure other geopolit ica l  
i n t e r e s t s . O n  the one hand, he admitted that concern with 
a v iab le "defense perimeter" in Asia miQht serve a number of 
purposes such as: access to harbors, forward bases in any 
c o n f l ic t  with Lhina, and a basis from which to supply and 
aid non-communist states on the Asian per iphery .’ *  On the 
other, he claimed that such in terests  were not worth the 
price  being paid to maintain them and that the American 
m il i ta r y  e f fo r t  fa i le d  to meet the test of 
p r o p o r t i o n a l l t y . S h o r t  of unconditional withdrawal,
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Niebuhr hoped for a lessening o-f the ideological issues and 
a compromise diplomatic settlement that would be responsive 
to the national in terests  of China, Russia, and the United 
S tates .
Niebuhr*5 views on these and other 1ssues 0+ 
contemporary -foreign policy ref lected  his underlying 
philosophical outloof on two key concepts: power and the
balance of power. While several modern American re a l is ts  
surpassed Niebuhr in trying to subject these two concepts to 
more rigorous and systematic d e f in i t io n ,  few have fa i le d  to 
endorse his insights on the moral ambiguity of power or the 
re la t io n  of balance of power to the problem of p o l i t ic a l  
j ust1ce.
The contest of power, according to Niebuhr, is the core 
of p o l i t ic a l  l i f e .  To understand p o l i t ic s  is to recognice 
the various elements of power which underlie a l l  social 
structures— the play Df power which may be obscured or 
submerged, but which cannot be d e n i e d . H o w e v e r ,  his 
p o l i t ic a l  philosophy exemplifies various approaches to the 
concept of power. From one perspective, power represents a 
f i e l d  of  v i t a l i t y ,  e l a b o r a t e d  i n  many  f a r m s  w i n c h  a r e  
re la ted  to each other in terms of both mutual support and 
potentia l c o n f l ic t .  Both the s p ir i tu a l  and physical 
fa c u lt ie s  of man create an endless var ie ty of types and 
combinations of power, from that of pure reason to pure 
physical f or 0 e . x00
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But power cannot be ev il  o-f i t s e l f  unless l i f e  
i t s e l f  be regarded as e v i l .  For l i f e  is power.
L i fe  is  never pure form or reason. I t  is  
inherently dynamic. Even the purest reason is  
power. According to the Christian fa i th  perfect  
power and goodness are united only in God. 101
A more l im ited understanding of power emphasizes the
se lf is h  side of man's ego and his attempt to gain security
by dominating others. From th is  horizon, power is
equivalent to force and reduces to the imposition of one
man's w i l l  on others. The potentia l for coercion in social
re la t io n s  is rooted in two character 1s t 1cs of the human
s e l f .  Niebuhr id e n t i f ie d  the f i r s t  a t t r ib u te  as "the unity
of v i t a l i t y  and reason, of body and s o u l , T h i s
component t e s t i f i e s  to man's rat ional capacity to transcend
the p a r t ic u la r  in terests  of the se lf  and control egoistic
purposes through moral and legal re s tra in ts .  "The force of
reason mates for ju s t ic e ,  not only by p1ac1ng. . . re s tra in ts
on the desires of the s e l f . . - b u t  by judging the cl a im s. ..o f
individuals from the perspective of the to ta l  community."103
The second character is t ic  is  the persistent human
in c l in a t io n  to sin, the tendency "to regard ourselves as
more important than anyone else and to view a common problem
from the standpoint of our own in t e r e s t . " 10'* Even reason is
always to some extent the servant of s e l f - in te re s t  and may
be the instrument of the ego in advancing i t s  claims against
another. A ra t iona l  solution to a c o n f l ic t  may be a very
unjust one, i f  the more robust has "overpowered" the weaker
i ntel 1 ect . 1 OB
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. . . t h e  perfect accord between l i f e  and l i f e  is  
constantly spoiled by the inordinate concern of 
each l i f e  for i t s  own weal, especially  as 
expressed in the corporate egoism of contending 
groups. Human society is  f u l l  of the f r ic t io n  of 
cross purposes. Indeed, i t  is in a perpetual 
state of war.
While the moral connotations of power exh ib it  some 
varie ty  in Niebuhr's writ ing , the importance of the concept 
for his p o l i t ic a l  thought must be emphasized. S p ec if ica l ly ,
he regarded p o l i t ic a l  power as "the a b i l i t y  to use and
manipulate other forms of social power for the purpose of 
organizing and dominating the community. 'Jig'7 The struggle 
tor power in the p o l i t ic a l  arena is  a purposive a c t iv i ty  by 
which individuals seek control of in s t i tu t io n s  and forces m
order to maximize s e l f - in te r e s t .  The preponderance of
p o l i t ic a l  power in any society is  usually held by those who 
command the most s ign if ican t  type of non-po l it ica l  power; 
these include m il i ta ry  prowess, p r ie s t ly  prestige, economic 
ownership and an a b i l i t y  to manipulate the technical 
processes of the community.10"
In addition, p o l i t ic a l  power can be achieved by ei ther  
force or au thority .  "Power, though i t  is the i n i t i a l  
element in establishing leadership, cannnf maintain j te?]f  
very long i f  prestige is  not added as a source of 
a u th o r i ty ." 10** Reflecting on the balance between force and 
authority  in foreign policy, he responded to American 
intervention in Vietnam by saying:
No doubt m i l i ta ry  action must frequently be the 
ultima rat  i o in a struggle with a foe. We saved 
the whole si tuat ion  by prompt m i l i ta ry  action in 
Korea. But t h e . . .s i tua t ion  in Vietnam 
should.. . in s tru c t  us on the l im its  of m i l i ta ry  
power in the cold war. . . . Mi 11tary power 
i s . , . in e f fe c t iv e  when i t  lacks a moral and 
p o l i t ic a l  basis . 110
Two of the most important sources of prestige for a larq t
nation, according to Niebuhr, include a reputation tor
ju s t ic e  based on achievement and a reputation for prudence
in the exercise of power.
Niebuhr’ s r e a l i s t  philosophy stressed the endless
varie ty  and combinations of power in human society. The
main forms of social power (e .g . ,  m i l i ta ry ,  p r ie s t ly ,
economic, and ideological)  are determined by a var ie ty of
h is to r ic a l  developments from the technical to the re l ig ious
level of existence. P a r t ic u la r ly  relevant here was
Niebuhr’ s conviction that Marxist theory floundered on the
assumption that economic power represents the dominant form
of power from which a l l  other types are merely
d e r iv a t iv e .111 In general, the Marxist solution to the
problem of pr ivate property was burdened with two i l lus ions .
F i r s t ,  i t s  utopian ideals of id y l l i c  re la t ions in post—
re v o lu t1onary society underest1 mates the perennial character
of human egoism i n group rel at 1ons and the necessity f or
coercive measures to preserve p o l i t ic a l  order. Second, i t
id e n t i f ie s  economic power too absolutely with the power of
pr ivate  ownership. The development of a managerial class in
the Soviet Union, combining economic with p o l i t ic a l  power.
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is  a h is to r ic  re fu ta t ion  o-f the Marxist theory. 112
Niebuhr's re l iance on the balance o-f power pr inc ip le
re f lec te d  his concern for the re la t io n  between order and
security  in both domestic and 1nternat1onal p o l i t ic s .
Some balance of power is the basis for whatever 
ju s t ic e  is achieved in human re la t ions .  Where the 
disproportion of power is  too great and where an 
equilibrium of social forces is  lacking, no mere 
rat ional or moral demands can achieve j u s t i c e . * 121
. . . t h e  domination of one l i f e  by another is  
avoided most successfully by an equilibrium of 
power and v i t a l l t i e s , so that  weakness does not 
in v i te  enslavement by the strong . 11*
The statesman, as the a r t fu l  contriver ,  avoids 
tyranny by balancing the v i t a l i t i e s ,  powers, 
in terests  of l i f e  into a to lerab le  equi libriuin. 110
Moreover, the successful operation of the balance depends on
an organizing center within a given f ie ld  of social
v i t a l i t i e s .  By means of both power and prestige, the center
must coerce submissi on to the socla1 pr ocess by super 1 or
power i f  reason and moral incentives f a i l  to su ff ice ;  and i t
must seek to redress the disproportions of power by
conscious s h if ts  of the balance whenever they make for
l nj ust i c e . 11*
Furthermore, Niebuhr's re f le c t io n  on the balance of
power was informed by a number of important q u a l i f ica t io n s .
F i r s t ,  the equilibrium of power constituted a conscious
p o l i t ic a l  contrivance in human history to m itigate conf l icts
and enlarge the mutualit ies of social existence. Niebuhr's
estimate of the higher p o s s ib i l i t ie s  within human nature
never permitted him to t re a t  the balance p r in c ip le  as the
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end or -final norm of human existence. Generally, he
considered the balance of power as a minimum precondition
f a c i l i t a t i n g  the subsequent u t i l i z a t io n  of moral and
normative re s t ra in ts  for preventing in ju s t ic e  and
enslavement. * 4 ^
Second, Niebuhr rejected a l l  r ig id ,  s ta t ic ,  and
unidimensional in terpretat ions  of the balance of power and
cited  a number of potentia l problems in trying to achieve
perfect e q u i l ib r ia  of power. That the balance could assume
various forms and structural conf1gurat1ons followed from
his observations on the many modalities of power and the ir
indeterminate? combination in p o l i t ic a l  society. Gn the one
hand, the balance may degenerate into domination and tyranny
by creating a coerced unity of society in which the freedom
and v i t a l i t y  of i t s  members are impaired. On the other, an
equilibrium has the per il  of anarchy in i t  i f  i t  is not
continuously manipulated and directed. Commenting on the
uneasy re la t io n s  between the balance of power and higher
moral p o s s ib i l i t ie s  in human existence, Niebuhr cautioned:
I t  is important to recognize the higher 
p o s s ib i l i t ie s  of ju s t ice  in every h is to r ic  
s i tua11 on and to I r ■ w t h af 1.1i e t wl n pc n i ls  of 
tyranny and anarchy can never be completely 
overcome in any p o l i t ic a l  achievement,. . . There is 
no p o s s ib i l i ty  in making h ls to ry . . . safe against 
e ither  occasional co n f l ic ts  of v i ta l  in terests  
(war) or against the misuse of power which is  
intended to prevent such co n f l ic ts  of in te r  est 
(tyranny > . 4 4 **
Although the balance of power does not f igure  as 
prominently in Niebuhr's writ ing on foreign policy as i t
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does in the thought o-f some other re a l is ts ,  i t s  ro le  is  very
s ig n if ic a n t .  In the sphere of in ternational p o l i t ic s ,  the
balance of power represents an accommodation of in terests of
nations re la t iv e  to th e ir  power which is s u f f ic ie n t  to
prevent major outbreaks of w a r . H i s  general
id e n t i f ic a t io n  of the functional necessity of the balance of
power in world p o l i t ic s  was a logical outcome of his concern
with the importance of power at a l l  levels of social
organization, in addition to the moral ambiguity of national
s e l f - in t e r e s t .
. . . t h e  internal ju s t ice  of a community is  never so 
perfect and the accommodation of in terests so 
complete that any society could dispense with the 
al loy  of coercion in the amalgam of i t s  social 
peace. Nor is i t  possible to secure the external 
peace of a community in the p a r t ia l ,  and sometimes 
to ta l ,  anarchy of nations, without balancing power 
against power in times of peace and without 
setting power against power in times of w a r .1
In his evaluation of the international balance of
power, Niebuhr drew on the contributions of David Hume and
Edmund Burke for a r e a l is t i c  account of the structures of
power that stand between the nation and the community of
mankind. For example, Hume grasped the underlying ra t ionale
for the balance of power by recognizing that the statesman
is forced to d i f fe r e n t ia te  between the morality of
individuals and nations.
There is a maxim very current in the world, which 
few p o l i t ic ia n s  are w i l l in g  to avow, but which has 
been authorized by the practice of a l l  ages, that  
there is a system of morals calculated for 
princes, much more free than that which ought to 
govern pr ivate persons., . 121
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Niebuhr admitted the need tor such a d is t inct ion ;  yet the
r e a l is t  t a i l s  prey to the dangers o-f Machiavelli i-f he makes
the d ispari ty  too great or absolves the state from a l l
et. h l c a 1 ob 1 i gat l on .
In addition, both Hume and Burke offered classical
estimates of the balance of power in opposition to the
universalism and self-righteousness of democratic-
l ibera l ism . Judging s e l f - in te r e s t  to be an unchanging
a t t r ib u te  of state behavior, Hume observed:
But whether we ascribe the sh if t ing  of s id e s . . . to  
jealous emulations or cautious p o l i t ic s ,  the 
e ffec ts  were a l ike  and every prevail ing power was 
sure to meet with a confederacy against i t ,  and 
that often composed of fr iends and a l l i e s . 122
Burke, informed by the same r e a l is t ic  estimate of the
p o s s ib i l i t ie s  and l im ita t io n s  of international morality,
spoke of the duty of nations to enforce common standards of
ju s t ic e  (e .g . ,  against Napoleonic imperialism) and declared:
I f  England shows herself in d i f fe re n t  or 
unconcerned when these powers are combined against 
the enterprises of France she is to look with 
certa in ty  to the same l nd i f 1 er ence of tht^e- powers 
when she may be at war with that n a t io n .123
Moreover, Niebuhr suggested that Burke's pr inc ip les  of
c m k  deration and cooperate jh which prompted the ..>11 iancc
against Napoleon also describe the motives behind the
postwar Western a l l iance  against the Soviet Union.
America's postwar national in te re s t ,  according to Niebuhr,
required the creation of a new and s ta b i l iz in g  balance of
power as the only r e a l is t i c  a l te rn a t iv e  to the danger of
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in ternat ional  anarchy.
The world must -find a way of avoid! ng. . .  anarchy in 
in ternat ional l i f e ;  and America must find a way of 
using i t s  great power responsibly. These two 
needs are organically  related;  for the world 
problem cannot be solved i f  America does not 
accept i t s  f u l l  share of respons ib i l i ty  in solving 
i t . 134
At th is  point, however, i t  is important to note that 
Niebuhr’ s treatment of the balance of power in international  
p o l i t ic s  was often vague and insulated from systematic 
invest igat ion .  F i r s t ,  he devoted l i t t l e  attent ion to how 
the structural  and operational features of the "new" postwar 
balance d i f fe red  from i t s  t ra d i t io n a l  application during the 
heyday of c lassical  diplomacy in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Second, he neglected to consider the 
wide array of conditions and forces affecting  the potential  
s t a b i l i t y  and in s t a b i l i t y  of a balance of power ta i lo re d  to 
the trends and transformations of global p o l i t ic s  in the 
postwar years, especial ly  the emergence of the "Third 
World." F in a l ly ,  his d e f in i t io n s  of power and equilibrium  
were largely  developed within the domain of p o l i t ic a l  
philosophy, thereby endowing them with only l im ited  
rifie'.ancc- ior the many inter nal ai id external determinants 
impinging on a s ta te 's  foreign policy at any one time.
In fa c t ,  Niebuhr went l i t t l e  further than observing 
that  the new balance of power is  global, b ipo lar ,  and 
enforced by nuclear te r ro r .  I t  resulted from the Soviet 
Union and the United States assuming responsibi1l t y  far a
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double hegemony of p o l i t ic a l  authority  and m il i ta ry  
influence in the world community. Much of his postwar 
writ ing emphasized three d is t in c t iv e  themes relevant for the 
type of foreign policy commitments any prospective balance 
of power might serve. F i rs t ,  Niebuhr stressed the primacy 
of European security  for American foreign policy and based 
his case on the fact  of a shared culture and kindred 
const itu tional systems.128 Second, he argued that America's 
pursuit of power in distant parts of the world was limited  
by the degree of soundness of the p o l i t ic a l  regimes she 
supported. F in a l ly ,  Niebuhr looted to the "nuclear 
umbrella," a metaphor he coined, as a potentia l source of 
re s tra in t  and moderation in the superpower m i l i ta ry  balance. 
Since only the great powers had the capacity to launch a war 
ending in nuclear ann ih i lat ion ,  they must learn to respond 
circumspectly to one another's diplomatic and m il i ta ry  
l n i t l a t i ves.
Continuing Mot a1 Dllemmas on 
the American Foreign Policy Agenda
In th is  section, select ive  and b r ie f  enamination is  
given to such topics as: <1) nuclc ■ ..ar .-nd d r  armament;
(2) American influence in the Third World; and <3) 
in ternat ional organization and world community. Since 
Niebuhr approached many of these top i cs from the standpoint 
of r e a l is t  ethics, i t  w i l l  be useful to develop a concluding 
assessment on how his concern for the moral potentia l in
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foreign policy e i th e r  affirms or denies the assumptions of 
classical raison d ‘ a t . In what ways does his Chr1s t 1 an 
ethic point to pract ica l moral p o s s ib i l i t ie s  beyond the 
narrow f i l ia t ion  with national se lf - in teres t '^
For the most part,  Niebuhr's re f lec t io n s  on morality  
and foreign policy in the postwar period revealed a concern 
for a bipolar world dominated by heightened Cold War 
tensions and superpower r iv a l r y .  To some degree, his more 
specif ic  observations on the opportunities and l im ita t ions  
shaping American foreign policy in the la te  1950s and 1960s 
have been eclipsed by more recent internat ional p o l i t ic a l  
trends over the 1ast decade. C r i t ic s  point out that Ni ebuhr 
never appreciated the forces mailing for incip ient  
m u lt ip o la r i ty  in world p o l i t ic s ;  and perhaps he 
underest i mated the w i l l i  ngness of the superpowers to engage 
in meaningful dialogue with respect to the dangers of an 
unrestrained arms r a c e .124 An even more conspicuous 
omission was Niebuhr's v ir tu a l  neglect of current trends in 
the world economy and the many issues which have since 
characterized the emerging North-South debate. While 
contpmporary events have often outdistanced Niebuhr'': 
vision , diplomats and scholars can surely p r o f i t  from his 
more general investigation of the use and abuse of moral 
norms in national behavior.
The long history of c o n f l ic t  among communities, whether 
national or imperial,  reached a c r i t i c a l  turning point in
the Cold War and the nuclear dilemma o-f the present day.
Nuclear m i l i ta ry  cap ab i l i ty  has raised m il i ta ry
destructiveness to a level of such suicidal and lethal
e f f icacy  that neither superpower has yet been tempted to
in s t iga te  the "unthinkable." On a more profound leve l ,  the
balance between the creative  and destructive p o s s ib i l i t ie s
inherent in man's mastery over natural forces would seem to
have been d e s t r o y e d . S u m m a r i z i n g  the moral predicament
of statesmen in the nuclear age, Niebuhr declared:
We have come into the trag ic  position of 
developing a form of destruction which, i f  used by 
our enemies against us, would mean our physical 
ann ih i la t ion;  and, i f  used by us against our 
enemies, would mean our moral ann1h11 a t 1 on. . . . Yet 
we are caught in the dilemma of doing the "evil  
that we do not want," namely, running the r isk  of 
ann ih i la t ion  in a global nuclear w ar.120
The challenge confronting policy-makers has been to
discover some f r a g i le  middle ground between nuclear war and
cap itu la t ion  to tyranny. Niebuhr rejected grandiose
pac i f 1st schemes f or comp 1ete d i sarmament on two count s. 1
F i r s t ,  tt.cy erroneously assume that nations can simply
renounce the power of th e ir  defense and avoid destruction.
Nations, unlike individuals,  seldom possess the a l t r u is t ic
capacity tor s e l f - s a c r l f 1ce. Second, p a c if is t  proposals
often carry an untenable assumption about human nature.
"Man cannot win freedom by renouncing the freedom to
destroy, he can win freedom only by mastering that
freedom."130 Niebuhr looted to the wisdom in the Gospel of
divine mercy over i l l  usor y dr earns of lmmanent ear th 1y
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redemption by man becoming more "pious" and " s c ie n t i f i c 1 in 
his quest to resolve the p erp lex i t ie s  of human existence. 
Indeed, the p o s s ib i l i t y  of even l im ited , proximate moral 
gains in the nuclear struggle depends on the recognition  
that any f in a l  solution is  beyond the competence of moral 
men. 131
At the same time, the u lt im ate moral ambiguity of the 
nuclear nightmare did not prevent Niebuhr from endorsing a 
number of general measures to f a c i l i t a t e  meaningful 
negotiations on arms control. At a minimum, negotiations on 
strateg ic  levels could not be conducted in iso la t ion  from 
other diplomatic and m il i ta ry  pressure points in the Soviet-  
American global struggle. Both the United States and the 
Soviet Union, according to Niebuhr, would l ih e ly  "view the 
disarmament problem in terms of th e i r  to ta l  power re la t ions ,  
which includes both m i l i ta ry  capacity and the p o l i t ic a l  
prestige of each in and across the continents of the 
w orld ."133 He ca lled  upon American leaders to pursue a 
balanced defense program to counter both Soviet diplomatic 
gains in the Third World and th e i r  s tra teg ic advantage in 
1 p'^ge TCBMs. The capacity of the superpowers to wage a l l -  
out nuclear war may deter the outbreak of the "ultimate  
war"; yet, he argued that the American a b i l i t y  to deter 
expansive communism depended on an a b i l i t y  to wage limited  
war with conventional weapons.133 F in a l ly ,  the prospects 
for peace would be enhanced i t  both major powers "were not
only more conscious of the common danger which transcends 
th e i r  enmities-, but also i f  they refrained from a t t r ib u t in g  
to the other side the intention of beginning an atomic 
conflict ,,  which neither side r e a l ly  believes of the 
other. " 13*
Niebuhr's w rit ing  on American foreign policy prospects 
among the developing nations of Africa and Asia was 
s im ila r ly  shaped by the exigencies of Cold War competition 
between East and West. The specif ic  challenge confronting 
America’ s national in terest  was to encourage the l ib era t in g  
movements of nationalism and modernisation while seeling to 
preserve open societies from external communist control.
Yet Niebuhr was also cognizant of the l im ita t io n s  
confronting e f fo r ts  by American policy-makers to re a l iz e  
both objectives in tandem. For example, he regarded both 
1ib e ra 1-democrat 1c and Marxist ideologies as unsuitable for 
the needs of developing societies; he stressed that  each 
country possessed i t s  individual needs and urged that  
dogmatism about developmental patterns be avoided.13® 
Moreover, he cautioned the West against overestimating i ts  
awn moral authc-ri’ , among the new nations. Indiscriminate  
m il i ta r y  intervention to oppose a l l  communist overtures in 
the Third World rnuld function to obscure other important 
economic and diplomatic dimensions in the Western co n f l ic t  
with communism.
The problem of exporting democracy to A frica  and Asia
also raises -fundamental questions about reconciling  
competing p o l i t ic a l  values within developing societies that 
are in various stages o-f revolt  against the trappings of 
Western technology and c iv i l i z a t io n .  At least in the short 
term, Niebuhr considered democracy to be a dubious 
proposition -for many new nations lacking the essential 
conditions -for a t ta in ing  ju s t ic e  and s t a b i l i t y  within the 
framework o-f a f ree  s o c ie ty .13** Many developing countries  
do not have a re l ig ious  or cu ltural foundation that would 
promote a wide var ie ty  of individual l ib e r t ie s .  Even 
assuming that  an appreciation for the value of the 
individual could emerge in time, the problem then becomes 
one of balancing individual l ib e r ty  with the requirements of 
communal ju s t ic e  and order. The impact of modern technical 
c i v i l i z a t i o n  on these older organic cultures often renders 
the feudal structure of these societ ies  morally and 
p o l i t i c a l l y  untenable.137.
On the whole, Niebuhr's conclusions about the prospects 
of l ibera l-dem ocratic  government in the developing nations 
were not overly opt im ist ic .  While his preference was 
c 1 par 1 v -for open rr . ' iP t ie s  based on representative  
in s t i tu t io n s  and res tra in ts  on governmental power, he 
conceded that some form of socialism was probably necessary 
to insure that a large percentage of the gross national 
product would be invested in machine tools and industr ia l  
in fras tru c tu re .  *’ ■ Yet the wellspnngs of nationalism could
•function as a break on the p o l i t ic a l  excesses of communism 
much as the need for capital accumulation would counter the 
l ib e ra l  emphasis on unrestrained in d iv id u a l i ty  in the free  
mar k e t . By the mid-1960s, Niebuhr j udged that the 
developing nations were entering a po st- l ib era l  and pDst- 
Mar::ist age, in which the claims of both capitalism and 
communism were large ly  i rre levan t  to the var ie ty  of 
devel op men t al patterns and chang i ng soc 1 al structures _ » 
Ult im ately,  he argued that the American national 1nterest 
could best be served by countering overt communist 
imperialism, as well as by allowing the new nations to 
evolve th e ir  own answers to meet th e ir  singular needs.
During World War I I ,  Niebuhr looked favorably on 
prospects for increasing national interdependence and 
economic in tegrat ion  within Europe following the defeat of 
H i t le r .  However, in the aftermath of the war, he became 
much more vocal about the many obstacles in h ib i t in g  genuine 
p o l i t ic a l  and economic u n if ic a t io n  on a global basis. He 
pointed to such practica l constraints as: Cl) the uneven
d is tr ib u t io n  of p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, and m i l i t a ry  power in 
the postwar world; (2) the resurgence of nationalism among 
developing societ ies;  <3) the lack of posit ive  incentives  
for the voluntary s a c r i f ic e  of national sovereignty by 
strong and weak powers a l ike ;  (4) the g loba l ira t ion  of Cold 
War h o s t i l i t i e s ;  and (5) the a t trac t ion  of competing 
ideologies among the most diverse p o l i t ic a l  c u l tu re s .140 In
his b r ie f  ra le  as advisor to Kerman’ s Policy Planning Staff  
at the State Department, he played the ro le  o-f unflappable 
c r i t i c  when proposals for world government were debated.
Niebuhr's c r i t iq u e  of world government emphasised two 
major themes. The f i r s t  is that governments are not created 
by f i a t  (though they can be imposed by tyranny) . 1 * 1 His 
philosophy stressed the organic factors creating national 
communities, rather  than legal structures finding expression 
in modern social contract theories. Communal authority  is  
not so much the product of a contract as i t  is  a re f le c t io n  
of such v i t a l  organic t ie s  as economics, language, race, 
re l ig io n ,  and a shared h is to r ic a l  consc 1 ousness. 1 * = Niebuhr 
saw few such organic cohesions beyond national borders that 
would sustain the type of consensus leg i t im iz ing  
supranational p o l i t ic a l  authority  for an integrated world 
community.
A second fa l la c y  of world government is  that  
governments are e f f icacious instruments in in tegrat ing  a 
p o l i t ic a l  community.11*3 The community, according to 
Niebuhr, is  pr ior  to law: government is a function of 
: ommunity and cn1y sec ondari1y a cr eat nr of i t .  In the l y 
run. some rudimentary form of ln ternatlonal community may 
evolve from accelerated economic interdependence, fear of a 
nuclear d isaster ,  and a sense of obligation that enlightened 
men have about a common f a t e . 144 But Niebuhr regarded these 
forces as minimal when measured against the strength of
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persistent national s e l f - re g a rd .
Unfortunately, Niebuhr’ s a ir  o-f pessimism about world 
government tended to overshadow a more balanced and 
charitab le  account o-f the United Nations as a productive 
■forum -for internat ional  diplomacy. While unable to prevent 
war or le g is la te  morality , i t s  specialised agencies do 
valuable work in promoting cu ltura l  understanding and 
devising "functional " solutions to a var ie ty  o-f technical  
and economic problems affect ing  member states. 140 In the 
realm o-f superpower re la t io n s ,  the UN provides a diplomatic 
bridge keeping the l ines o-f communi cat i on open between the 
West and Russia. I t  furnishes the meeting ground -for the 
-free nations; the aegis -for ad hoc arrangements -for 
defensive communities; and as a forum for world opinion to 
check the po lic ies  of would-be aggressors. However, Niebuhr 
warned that the UN was i l l - f i t t e d  to promote more 
t ra d i t io n a l  diplomacy. Indeed, diplomacy by microphone can 
eas ily  deqenerate into h is tr io n ics  and give r ise  to 
in f le x ib le  positions among disputants.
Attempting to bridge the gap between power and moral 
p rin c ip le ,  hie affirmed the l o /a i t y  of the Christian churches 
to the purposes of the United Nations as outlined in i t s  
charter.  Yet such loya lty ,  he believed, becomes problematic 
i f  i t  functions as an abstract substitute for  "concern for 
those acts of da ily  f i d e l i t y  through which an international  
community comes into bei ng. " 1 Emphasizing ttie re la t ion
between Christian ethics and internat ional  resp o n s ib i l i ty ,
Ni ebuhr argued:
We ought therefore as churches, emphasize not so 
much the abstract p r in c ip le  of in ternat ional  
re sp o n s ib i l i ty ,  as we ought to bring Christian  
resources to bear upon the tremendous problem of a 
great and rich nation re la t in g  i t s e l f  to le ra b ly  to 
a weakened and impoverished w orld .147
C ertain ly  Niebuhr spoke as a r e a l is t  on matters of
in ternat ional p o l i t ic s  and American foreign policy. I t  must
be emphasized, however, that  his writ ing  on the responsible
and prudent exercise of American power represents not so
much a celebration of classical ra i  son d' 6tat but the ca ll
for  a r e in te r p r e ta t1 on of American idealism.
Niebuhr's re f le c t io n s  on Machiavelli and his philosophy
of rai  son d”6tat  i l l u s t r a t e  his concern for the errors
resu lt ing  from an overly consistent realism or idea l ise .  in
p a r t ic u la r ,  he c ited  both Machiavelli and Hobbes as leading
examples of secular r e a l is ts  who were excessive in th e ir
estimate of the egocentrlc l ty  of man. Both thinkers fa i le d
to recognize that human rat ional facu lt ies  always display
both crea tive  and destructive tendencies.14*  I t  w i l l  be
reca lled  that Machiavel1i advised the prince of his c i ty
s ta te  how to achieve and maximize power in his dominion; and
Machiavelli suggested i t  is  s u f f ic ie n t  to observe the
outward forms of morality i f  the pr ince's policy is  actually
in the service of the state. Post-medieval p o l i t ic a l
realism, whether expressed in the cynical terms of
Machiavelli or the m a te r ia l is t ic  terms of Hobbes, culminated
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in an irresponsible a t t i tu d e  toward the problem o-f achieving 
standards o-f discriminate ju s t ice  in the p o l i t ic a l  o rd e r .1'*'*’ 
The defic iencies  of r aison d * £ta t  as an approach to the 
moral issue in p o l i t ic s  were affirmed by Niebuhr, who 
argued:
The r e a l is ts  were a l l  proponents of the parochial 
commun1t y ; and the prob1em of the 1arger order 
between parochial communities disappears from the 
moral horizon. The r e a l i t i e s  of power and 
in terest  are recognized but only for the sale of 
ju s t i fy in g  a coercive power which w i l l  bring order 
into the c o n f l ic t  of in te res ts .  . . .  In a sense, the 
bridging of th is  chasm by pull ing  p o l i t ic a l  
realism into the service of j u s t i c e . . .remains one 
of the paramount problems of an adequate p o l i t ic a l  
et h i c s . 1 *9C*
Machiavellian r a i son d * t^tat exposes the danger of a
cynical preoccupation with the sources of individual and
c o l le c t iv e  egoism, to the exclusion of moral resources and
p o s s ib i l i t ie s  in human nature. While Machiavelli viewed
man's moral potent ia l  as issuing in a hypocrit ical pretense
of dubious v ir tu e ,  Niebuhr pointed out:
Self-deception and hypocrisy is  an unvarying 
element in the m_; al l i f e  of a l l  human beings. I t
is  the t r ib u te  which immorality pays to morality;
or the device by which the lesser se l f  gains the 
consent of the larger self  to indulge in 
impulses.. .which the rat ional self can approve 
only when they are disguised. . . . Ttif dishonesty of 
nations is  a necessity of p o l i t ic a l  policy i f  the 
nation is  to gain the f u l l  benefit  of i t s  double 
claim upon the loya lty  and devotion of the
ind iv idua l ,  as his own special and unique
community which embodies universal va lues . lo *
In contrast to Machiavel1i 7s secular realism,
therefore,  Niebuhr understood the egoism of nations as a
charac te r is t ic  of the s p ir i tu a l  l i f e  and not just, the
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ei'pression of the natural impulse for survival.  The 
s p ir i tu a l  manifestation of national egoism is exemplified by 
such typical expressions of behavior as lust for power; 
pride (including considerations of prestige and honor); 
contempt toward the other; hypocrisy (the pretension of 
conforming to a higher norm than s e l f - in te r e s t ) ;  and the 
claim of moral autonomy by which the s e l f -d e i f ic a t io n  of the 
soc i al group 1s made e x p l ic i t  by i t s  present at 1 on of 11se1f 
as the source and end of ex is tence .102 Nations, l i f e  
i ndividuals, are caught in the fundamental predicament of 
ju s t i fy in g  se lf -assert lon  by the primary r ight  of surviva l,  
while claiming to be the bearer a* in terests and values 
larger than th e ir  own. Since nations constitute an extreme 
case of the sinfu l pride of groups, Niebuhr could only hope 
that " + hey w i l l  moderate th e ir  hypocrisies by a s l igh t  
measure of real ln ternat iona1 achievement and learn how to 
accommodate wider in terests than the ir  own."1'33
The relevance of moral claims to p o l i t ic s  can be 
established only when certain l im ita t ion s  are observed. 
F i r s t ,  the lnternat lonal environment is largely anarchic and 
devoid of any moral or p o l i t ic a l  agency able e f fe c t iv e ly  to 
formulate and enforce community-wide o b je c t iv e s .104 In such 
a s i tu a t io n ,  nations have l i t t l e  recourse but continually  to 
reinforce  th e ir  security  by adding increments of power at 
the expense of r iv a ls  and a l l i e s  a l l  be. Morality ,  then, 
beeomes l i t t l e  more than an i dealogical a l ly  in the quest
tor superior power.
Second, under conditions o-f global anarchy, a nation’ 
pursuit of s e l f - in te re s t  is  increased by the in terests of 
i t s  c i t izen s .  Social unity is b u i l t  on both the virtuous 
and se l f ish  side of man’ s nature; the twin elements of 
c o l le c t iv e  strength of a nation become s e l f - s a c r i f 1 0  al 
lo y a l ty  and the frustrated  aggressions of the masses.1®” 
fallows that internat ional p o l i t ic s  is the more contention 
and ruthless because of the unselfish loya lty  and 
commitments of group members, lo y a l t ie s  that become laws 
unto themselves, unrestrained by th e ir  obedient and 
worshipful members.
A th ird  problem is the tendency of moral values in a 
nat ion ’ s foreign policy to provide an expedient ra t ionale  
for the s e l f ish  ambitions of subnational and in f lu e n t ia l  
in s t i tu t io n a l  forces within the national community. The 
"national in te re s t"  is neither se lf -ev ident  nor formed 
within a vacuum. Beyond the question of preserving 
t e r r i t o r i a l  in te g r i ty  and sovereignty, decision-makers in 
both democratic and authoritar ian  societies can seldom 
a t ic .. .  ■ ■ the gc 1 s of a nation without re t t :  ence to the
sometimes co n f l ic t in g  aspirations of powerful domestic 
lobbies or entrenched in terests within a governmental 
bureaucracy. Even a national in terest  seemingly at odds 
with more sensit ive moral estimates may have the e f fec t  of 
promoting vested p o l i t ic a l  and economic in teres ts within a
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given s o c ie ty .1” 7,
A -final factor  l im it ing  the moral impulse in global
p o l i t ic s  is the r e la t iv e  absence of sanctions and incentives
able to subdue the potentia l anarchy of in terests  into a
to lera b le  harmony. In p a r t ic u la r ,  the forces of law,
custom, and re l ig io n  which may be operative in the personal
re la t io n s  of more intimate communities e l i c i t  few consensual
moral standards among nat1ons. In ref 1ecting on the
prospect of any genuinely “ultimate" judgment for
h1s to r lc a 11y-cond11 i oned man, Ni ebuhr cone 1uded:
Modern hi story has gi ven us a vivid i l lu s t r a t io n  
of the fac t  that the h istory of community 
accentuates, rather than mitigates, the moral 
ambiguities of our existence, p a r t ic u la r ly  the 
ambiguities of our common l i f e .  Only a re l ig ious  
fa i th  and humanism more powerful than many extant 
v a r ie t ie s  can make sense out o f . . .  those facts  
which prove that a l l  h is to r ic  re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  
must be borne without the certa in ty  that meeting 
them w i l l  lead to any ult imate solution of the 
probl em. lt3“
Niebuhr argued chat the moral issue in in ternational  
p o l i t ic s  revealed i t s e l f  along two dimensions: (1> should
the nation be bound by any moral p r in c ip les7 and (2) how can 
the nation be prevented from claiming inordinate v ir tue  for  
l t r  - r t  ion s"' At the outset, Ni of > hr rejected classical  
philosophical standards which define the good as equivalent 
to a pre-established ontological pattern of b e ing .1”'* In 
the realm of social ethics, he recognised that the freedom 
of man, and the wide var ie ty  of h is to r ic  patterns he is  able
to elaborate, male i t  necessary to s tr iv e  for a more
f le x ib le  d e f in i t ion  of the good. This moral ambiguity is 
raised to a special height in in te rn a t1onal p o l i t ic s  
"because the national community is so large and imposing, 
from the viewpoint of the individual,  that i t  constantly 
males claims upon his conscience, according to which i ts  
good is the end of the moral question."***0 In an era shaped 
by both growing interdependence and new forms of co n f l ic t ,  
the ultimate challenge for men and nations is how the good 
of the nation may f i t  into a more general and universal 
scheme of values.
In approaching the moral dilemma for nations, Niebuhr 
drew on both the resources of transcendent Christian fa i th  
and a pragmatic out loot: on the values of the American 
11beral-democratic heritage. The overarching good for the 
community of nations can te n ta t ive ly  be defined in the 
phrase of Santayana as "the harmony of the whole which does
not destroy the v i t a l i t y  of the p a r ts ." 1*** This def in it ion
excludes a l l  tyrann i c al 1 y—enf or ced harmonies; and i t  maf.es 
freedom of each party to assert i t s  own v i t a l i t y  the 
cr i te r ion  of moral value. Translating this to the level of 
world p o l i t ic s ,  lUebuhr admitted ciiai the national interest  
may ult imately be a source of discord; however, i ts  
expression is necessary to prevent the harmony of the whole 
from destroying the v i t a l i t y  of the parts. He emphasized 
the need for an approach to global harmony which males
just ice , informed by the transcendent principles of l iberty
and equality ,  the c r i te r io n  of 1 nt er nat i onal morality . 14,2 
Moreover, both l ib e r ty  and equality  are only regulative  
princ ip les  of ju s t ic e .  Community at any level is  not 
possible without a certain degree of subordination of one 
member to another, and without a modicum of coercion. Given 
the persistence of individual and c o l le c t iv e  s e l f - in te r e s t ,  
the responsi b 1 e ex ere i se of power provides a count er we 1 ght 
against power in the in terest  of ju s t ice  as well as the 
necessary coercion underlying the order of a community.
Niebuhr warned that the pursuit of the national  
in terest  must be harnessed with the in terests of others in 
order to be moral. Recognition of the equal claims of 
others represents the beginning of moral re f le c t io n  in 
statesmanship. I t  was the famous dictum of George 
Wash1ngton that "a natlon was not to be trusted beyond i t s  
own i n t e r e s t . 1' Washington’ s insight , according to Niebuhr, 
represented a h a l f - t r u th  and ought to be supplemented by the 
wisdom that excessive concern tor the national in terest  
obscures another side of the equation— that self-concern can 
be as defeating in c o l le c t iv e  as in individual l i f e . 1*13 
Nations as we] 1 as men stand under the law: “ Who- ..u ever
seek eth to gain his l i f e  w i l l  1 ose i t . " 1 On ly a fa i th
that gives due regard to the ev i l  of s e l f - in te re s t  in 
national behavior can moderate the moral pretensions of 
c ontestants.
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Nations are, on the whole, not generous. A wise 
s e l f - in te r e s t  is  usually the l im i t  of th e ir  moral 
achievement; though i t  is  worth noting that  
nations do not achieve a wise s e l f - in te re s t  i f  
generous impulses do not help to drive them beyond 
the l im its  of a too narrow sel f — i nt e re s t . 1 *,ts
In summation, the statesman cannot reasonably be
expected to ignore the demands of s e l f - in te r e s t ;  however,
his mural obligation  is to recognize that since a l l  nations
l iv e  under a common peri l  as well as under one ultimate
norm, he must pursue po lic ies  which transcend, as they
f u l f i l l ,  the national in te re s t .  The art of s ta te c ra f t ,
therefore, is  to seek a pragmatic balance, the point of
concurrence, between the national and 1nternat1 ona1 common
good . x
Cone 1 uslon
By his own admission, Niebuhr never attempted to 
formulate an a l l - in c lu s iv e  theory of internat ional  p o l i t ic s  
and foreign policy. His writ ing on the subject was more 
s p e c if ic a l ly  directed toward churchmen, pollcv-malers, and 
members of the educated public. Certainly his works have 
been widely cited  by internat ional  re la t ions  scholars for 
the purpose of e i ther  defending or c r i t i c i z in g  v a r l ous 
perspectives in theory and methodology. However, he 
remained skeptical of a l l  s inq le -fac to r  approaches and 
"mast er key " t  heor i es seek ing to e:;plain and pr ed i c t  a l l  
in te rnat lona1 behavior. Niebuhr took exception to the grand 
designers, whether Marxists or World Federalists; and he
objected to more s c ie n t i f ic  and quant itat ive  e f fo r ts  that 
reduced contingent p o l i t ic a l  behavior to a group of 
parsimonious, systemic formulas. In teres t ing ly  enough, he 
was equally uncomf or tab 1 e with the arguments of a number- of 
other r e a l is ts ,  including Margenthau' s claim that the 
p o l i t ic s  of nations could achieve systematic and empirical 
expression by simply following the dictates of in terest  
defined in terms of power. 1 At best, Niebuhr approached 
the debate about applicable theory in in ternat ional p o l i t ic s  
as an ongoing dialogue from which to evaluate the 
philosophical assumptions of both the r e a l is t  and id e a l is t  
worldviews. His contribution, however, was made through his 
influence on the r e a l is t  school and his study of human 
nature and the ro le  of normative thinking in international  
po l l t l C S .
In addition, c r i t i c s  point out with some ju s t i f i c a t io n  
that Reinhold Niebuhr's treatment of realism and idealism 
poses a number of prob1ems for the development of a theory 
of ln ternat iona1 p o l i t ic s .  The strength of any theory is 
i t s  capacity to impart order and meaning for a mass of data 
which i- :■! ‘ L d other w i  ^ ~ ■ j n c D n n e c t e d .  Students of
ln te rn a t i onal p o l i t ic s  are obliged to wonder how Niebuhr's 
rather vague d e f in i t io n  of realism ( i . e . ,  accounting for a l l  
factors in a social or p o l i t ic a l  s ituat ion  that o f fer  
resistance to established norms) contributes to serious 
theoret ica l invest igation . At a minimum, his d e f in i t io n
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■fails to suggest v iable standards by which to d i f fe re n t ia te  
the study o-f p o l i t ic s  -from other d isc ip l ines  such as 
economics, sociology, or aesthetics. More substantively,  
what did Niebuhr mean by "established norms" and th e ir  
re la t io n  to a concrete p o l i t ic a l  situation"1 What does the 
norm of just ice  (which Niebuhr construed as requiring that 
each man be given his due) mean in practica l terms"1*,s What 
established norms are operative in a world of sovereign 
states threatened by the p e r i l  of global anarchy'1 What, tor  
instance, is  due a South African regime which l ives  on a 
painful legacy of apartheid and a disenfranchised majority  
of i t s  c i t izen s  barricaded in "homelands" and labor camps"1 
Niebuhr was ce r ta in ly  correct in suggesting that the moral 
dilemma in p o l i t ic s  frequently e n ta i ls  proximate and "on 
balance" choices among competing understandings of r ight  and 
wrong. What troubles some of Niebuhr’ s most devoted 
students was his in a b i l i t y  to specify more f u l l y  the means 
by which moral standards can be made more accessible to 
s e lf - in te re s te d  part ic ipants in the p o l i t ic a l  arena.
Niebuhr’ s credent ia ls as a moderate r e a l is t  can be 
substantiated by his use of such recurrent concepts as the 
national in te re s t ,  power, and the balance of power. He 
j  udged nat1onal 1nterest to be the primar y datum of 
in ternat ional  p o l i t ic s  and opposed e f fo r ts  to define a 
n at ion ’ s f oreign policy goals in s ta t ic  and unchanging t orm. 
An enlightened approach to United States national in te res t .
from Niebuhr’ s perspective, was one that attempted to 
maMimize the degree o-f mutual in te res ts ,  while defending 
American cu lture and p o l i t ic a l  in s t i tu t io n s .  The concept of 
power was central to Niebuhr’ s p o l i t ic a l  thought inasmuch as 
i t  involved the capacity -for the ma;: 1 mi z at 1 on o-f certain  
sel -f -1 nter est s whether by authority  or -force. On the level 
o-f in ternat ional  p o l i t ic s ,  he stressed the l im it le s s  
combination o-f factors which produce power and how the 
national in teres t  may be enhanced by m il i t a ry ,  re l ig ious ,  
economic, and ideological resources. F in a l ly ,  Niebuhr found 
the persistence of the national in terest  so strong in world 
p o l i t ic s  that the only possible harmonies were those 
managing to neu tra l ize  r iv a l  forces through balances of 
power. In general, he treated the balance of power as a 
means to accommodate the r e la t iv e  power positions of nations 
in order to prevent the outbreak of a major war. The 
postwar balance d i f fe red  from a l l  previous balances in that  
i t  was global, b ipo lar , and based on the theory of the 
assured destruction of major powers in a nuclear 
conf rontat 1 on.
While often suggestive, Niebuhr ’ 5 conceptualization as 
a p o l i t i c a l  r e a l is t  suffered from the lack of rigorous 
d ef in i t io n s  and from a general reluctance to consider new 
theoret ica l horizons that might make his concepts more 
meaningful for the actual conduct of foreign policy.
Several examples may be b r ie f ly  mentioned. With other
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r e a l is ts ,  Niebuhr's habit of explaining foreign policy  
events by reference to the requirements o-f national interest  
obscures how -foreign policy is actual ly  made and executed. 
His neglect o-f any find o-f decision-mating frameworl; results  
in an in a b i l i t y  to iden t i fy  the p art icu lar  mix of domestic 
and external pressures (including the perceptions of fey 
actors) operative in ei ther  the formulation or execution of 
foreign policy i n i t i a t i v e s .
Moreover, Niebuhr's rather vague re f le c t io n s  on the 
signif icance of the postwar balance of power fa i le d  to 
c l a r i f y  several important considerations. He viewed the 
balance of power as rough1y equiva1ent to the nuclear 
balance of te r ro r  perpetuated by the superpowers. From such 
a perspective, the balance becomes more a matter of m i l i ta ry  
and stra teg ic  calculat ion than a basis for creative  
diplomatic e f fo r ts .  While Niebuhr recognized that  Soviet-  
American r iv a l r y  was played out on various leve ls,  he 
stopped short of assessing the r e la t iv e  weight of economic, 
p o l i t i c a l ,  and ideological variables in the evolving global 
balance. What find of power was being equil ib ra ted  and 
under wti t^ pec Hr., conditions'1 Niebuhr never fu l i>  
appreciated the relevance of new, non-mi 111ary, sources of 
power ava ilab le  to both the developed and developing nations 
a l ik e .  Never comfortable with the prospects of detente 
between the major nuclear actors, his tendency to cast the 
balance of power in bipolar and global terms often
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misrepresented the extent to which American foreign policy 
actually  promoted the s ta b i l iz a t io n  of more regional 
balances and defensive arrangements. At the end of a long 
and distinguished career, Niebuhr provided few insights on 
how future prospects of the balance and i t s  bipolar  
character would be shaped by the p ro l1fe ra1 1 on of nuclear 
actors, as well as by emerging p o l i t ic a l  and economic 
strength in Europe and Asia.
Despite theoret ica l and conceptual d i f f i c u l t i e s  
inherent in Niebuhr's p o l i t ic a l  realism, few have surpassed 
his penetrating analysis of the moral dilemma in individual 
and group behavior. He exposed the hypocrit ical  use of 
morality as ideology and t r ie d  to discover a way to make 
moral claims relevant to 1nternat iona1 p o l i t ic s .  Niebuhr 
viewed p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  as morally ambiguous and contingent 
because of his respect for an absolute love ethic and the 
degree to which history proves a l l  princ ip les  of social 
morality r e la t iv e .  Yet Niebuhr never permitted the 
persistence of s e l f - in te re s t  to obscure the la ten t  capacity 
for moral action on the part of self-regarding  men and 
f -t i on s.
In p a r t ic u la r ,  Niebuhr judged Machiavel1lan raison 
d 7 £ta t  as a d e f ic len t  stand ard f or postwar Amerlcan foreiqn  
p o l ic y . The egoism of the state is  recognized, but i t  
cannot be accepted as normative. I t  is the recognition of 
norms beyond the s e l f - in te r e s t  of nat i ons whi ch helps to
l_’4u
qual ify  a nat ion's egoism and prompts statesmen to act for 
the good of the whole community. For Niebuhr, moral 
re f le c t io n  in foreign policy begins with the recognition of 
the equal claims of others and the accommodat1 on of 
co n fl ic t in g  in terests .  While nations cannot be expected to 
espouse a more universal value at the expense of i t s  
in te re s ts ,  the p o s s ib i l i t y  of re a l iz in g  proximate moral 
standards in foreign policy hinges on e f fo r ts  of the prudent 
statesman, who rea l izes  that the moral act is  the wise act 
which considers the in terests at those affected by the act. 
Summarizing Niebuhr's preoccupation with the moral problem 
in p o l i t ic s ,  one perceptive scholar has writ ten:  "The ideal
of the love of Christ and the r e a l i t y  of Machiavel1ian 
p o l i t ic s  are the poles within which he discusses man's 
social hopes and p o l i t ic a l  s trategies .
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C H A P T E R  I V
HANS J. MORGENTHAU AND A THEORY OF POWER POLITICS
Both Niebuhr .and Lippmann c lear ly  rejected classical
r a1 son d 7 £ta t  as an appropriate standard for United States
foreign policy; at the same time, however, they deplored the
tendency of id e a l is ts  to s a c r i f ic e  the prudent calculation
of American national in terest far  promoting moral absolutes
in internat ional p o l i t ic s .  In summarizing the r is e  of
p o l i t ic a l  realism as i t  applied to American foreign policy
in the postwar era, one scholar has written:
. . . i d e a l  goals are not obtained in the real world 
of co n f l ic t in g  national purposes by moral fervor  
alone but only by a pragmatic calculation of the 
means to an end, by a ra t iona l an t ic ipation  of the 
actual consequences of a given a c t io n .1
As an emigr£ who f 1ed Na: 1 Germany, the career of Hans 
J. Morgenthau stands as a vivid  testament to rea lism 's moral 
s e n s ib i l i ty  to American s e l f - in te r e s t  in world a f fa i r s .  
Unlike Lippmann and Niebuhr, Morgenthau was a professor of 
p o l i t ic a l  science whose writ ings in the f i e ld  of 
lnternationat p o l i t ic s  has been at the forefront  of the 
d isc ip l in e  for wel1-over t h i r t y  years. Throughout his long 
career, Morgenthau reminded his colleagues of the normative 
element in a l l  p o l i t ic a l  analysis and i l lu s t r a te d  how the 
commitment of a "value free" p o l i t ic a l  science is i t s e l f  a
philosophical predisposition rooted in b e l ie fs  about man's 
nature and the meaning of his p o l i t ic a l  existence. For 
Morgenthau, p o l i t ic a l  science is  based upon a to ta l  
worldview— re l ig io u s ,  poetic, as well as philosophic in 
nature— the v a l id i t y  of which i t  must take for granted.3
Morgenthau drew upon the resources of both classical  
and modern p o l i t ic a l  philosophy in developing a theory of 
p o l i t ic s .  Both his c r i t iq u e  of modern social science in 
S c ie n t i f ic  Man vs. Power P o l i t ic s  (1946) as wel1 as the "six 
princ ip les  of p o l i t ic a l  realism" outlined in P o l i t ic s  Among 
Nat i on s t 1948) spec l f y the c ontent and boundarles of an 
American philosophy of power p o l i t ic s .  The point of 
departure for  Morgenthau’ ? r e a l is t  philosophy is  the 
proposition that "power p o l i t ic s ,  rooted in the lust for 
power, which is  common to a l l  men, i s . . . inseparable from 
social l i f e  i t s e l f .  The truth of p o l i t ic a l  science, he
claimed, is the tru th  about power, i t s  configurations, and 
i t s  laws.
Morgenthau applied to pract ica l a f fa i r s  a philosophy of 
in ternat ional p o l i t ic s  that recognized the many forms, and 
st r essed the l im its ,  of power . Dipl omac: y, peace, arid war ■ 
the conditions of the ir  existence and the reasons tor their  
success or f a i l u r e — were for him the fundamental ingredients  
of i nternatlonal l i f e . *  His many books and essays probed 
the l im its  and p o s s ib i l i t ie s  of statesmanship for a postwar 
world in which American policy-makers face the increasingly
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d i f f i c u l t  task of reconciling security  in terests with 
transcendent pr inc ip les  that have sustained the country's  
previous projections of power abroad.
In addition, Morgenthau was perhaps the f i r s t  r e a l is t  
to develop a systematic and broad-gauge theory of 
in ternational p o l i t ic s .  Any internat ional p o l i t ic a l  theory, 
he argued, is  a re f le c t io n  of certain  philosophic 
propositions. In discussing the normative element of 
p o l i t ic a l  theory and the moral commitment of the p o l i t ic a l  
s c ie n t is t ,  he suggested: "For w ith o u t . . . the assumption that
object ive , general truths  in matters p o l i t ic a l  ex is t  and can 
be known, order and ju s t ic e . . . beeome the mere by-products of 
ever-changing power re la t io n s .
This chapter assesses Morgenthau's theory of 
in te rnat iona1 p o l i t ic s  and i t s  re la t io n  to the philosophy of 
ra i son d '£ t a t . To what extent did his p o l i t ic a l  thinking  
draw on the insights of e ither  Machiavelli or Hobbes in 
order to ju s t i f y  America's pursuit of power in postwar 
in ternat ional p o l i t ic s ?  While sometimes portrayed as an 
advocate of R e a lpo l i t ik  in foreign policy, how was 
Morgenthau ahl {■ to reconcile the reformist values of the 
American diplomatic t ra d i t io n  with his a f f irm at ion  of the 
sovereign national in terest  and the relevance of balance of 
power techniques in today's changing world'7 From 
Morgenthau's perspective, what are the ethical obligations  
of the statesman and how do these af f ect  h is  under stand1 ng
o-f the l im its  of power in American diplomacy?
The Education on an American Realist
While often v i l i f i e d  by his c r i t i c s  as an expositor of
"Old World" power p o l i t ic s ,  Morgenthau's career can be
considered something of an American success story. Much of
his reputation was earned by pointing to basic problems with
the pr inc ip les  and problems of American foreign policy.
Aga 1nst a crusading, ideo log ica l ly -or iented  foreign policy,
he called for a more r e a l is t i c  worldview emphasizing
national in te res t  in terms of a nat ion 's  power v is -A -v is
other nations. Morgenthau also c lea r ly  valued America's
l ib e ra l  and democratic heritage. One of his least read, but
most important volumes, The Purpose of American P o l i t ic s
(1960) affirmed his strong commitment to America's unifying
national purpose, which he defined as, "achieving equality
in f r e e d o m . I n  his revealing interview with Bernard
Johnson, Morgenthau concluded with the rather sentimental
conviction that:
There is  no d o u b t . . . th a t  I would never have been 
able to establish myself as a scholar were i t  not 
for the opportunity offered me by the United 
S t a t u s . . . . !  did have the opportunity to show what 
I could do and by showing i t ,  was able to advance.
I t  is th is  uniqueness which from the very 
beginning has been the most d is t in c t iv e  
char ac t  er 1 st i c of American s o c ie ty .7,
Morgenthau was born in 1904 in Coburg, a small town in 
central Germany and now part of northern Bavaria.
Morgenthau's own re f lec t io n s  of his early  l i f e  were clouded
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with painful d i sappoi ntmen t and f r u s t r a t io n .8 While 
exhib it ing  a promising young mind in the classroom, he 
suffered from frequent i l ln ess  and inveterate shyness.
Raised a Jew in an au thoritar ian  family committed to uneasy 
coexistence in German society, he was often the victim of 
gross anti-Sem itic  provocations and discrimination. Unlike 
Lippmann who retreated from his Jewish roots, Morgenthau’ s 
sense of deep in ju s t ic e  over re l ig ious  persecution remained 
a prominent concern throughout his l i f e .  The support he 
would la te r  o ffer  to a Jewish homeland with secure borders 
was strengthened by many of these ear ly  memories.
Morgenthau’ s formal academic tra in ing  began in 1923 
when he enrolled at the University  of Frankfurt. He 
t ransferred in 1924 to the University  of Munich in order to 
concentrate in the f ie ld s  of public law and European 
diplomatic h is tory.  In p a r t ic u la r ,  the heritage of 
Bismarck’ s diplomacy was especial ly  s ign if ican t  for 
Morgenthau’ s thinking on the princip les of foreign and 
m il i ta ry  policy. "For the f i r s t  time, I f e l t  the impact of 
a coherent system of thought.. .a  d i s t i l l a t io n  of Bismarck's 
Real pol i t U . In addition, Mai: Weber’ ?-: ..icial and
p o l i t i c a l  philosophy provided Morgenthau with a model for 
the practic ing p o l i t ic a l  s c ie n t is t .  He summarized Weber’ s 
importance by writ ing: "While as a c i t iz e n  he was a
passionate observer of the p o l i t ic a l  scene and a frustrated  
part ic ipant  in i t ,  as a scholar. . . viewing p o l i t ic s  without
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pass ion .. .o r  p o l i t ic a l  purpose beyond the in te l le c tu a l  one 
of understanding."10
After passing his law exam in Munich, Morgenthau 
returned to the University of Frankfurt in 1929 to obtain 
his doctorate. The t i t l e  of his d isserta tion  read: "The
Internat ional Judicial Function: I ts  Nature and i t s  L im its . '1
Against those who sought to outlaw war by noble covenants, 
Morgenthau argued that what re a l ly  mattered in the relat ions  
of nations was not 1nternationa1 law but in ternational  
p o l i t ic s  and the pursuit of power.
With H i t l e r 's  r is e  to power in 1933, Morgenthau l e f t  
Germany to teach in Madrid from 1935 to 1936. His 
emigration to the United States in 1937 led to teaching 
appointments at the University of Chicago (1943-1971) and 
the New School For Social Research in New York <1975- 
198l ) . 11 His lectures on American foreign policy were 
always contentious forums of debate concerning America's 
m il i ta ry  and diplomatic re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  in a postwar world. 
In addition, his commitment to a philosophy of p o l i t ic s  and 
d is tru s t  of a quantified p o l i t ic a l  science represented a 
'harp do pot ur e  from the d is c ip l in e 's  prevail iny  or t. hod ox > 
of behavior a1 sclence.
Morgenthau exemplified the p o l i t ic a l  sc ie n t is t  who 
stood both within and outside the p o l i t ic a l  arena.
Encouraged by George Kennan, he joined Niebuhr and others as 
a consultant to the State Department's F'olicy Planning
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S ta f f .  For a l l  practica l purposes, however, his association 
with the State Department came to an abrupt halt  in 1951.
He also served as a consultant to the Pentagon from 1962 to 
1965, only to be f i re d  because of his opposition to the 
Vietnam War. In fa c t ,  his c r i t ic is m  of American 
intervention prompted the Johnson Administration to 
establish a desk known as "Project Morgenthau," an in-house 
operation to d iscred it  him far  which, he claimed, McGeorge 
Bundy and Zbigniew Brzezinski became the o f f i c ia l  
spokesmen.12 In his f ina l  years, Morgenthau grew 
increasingly skeptical about the power of t ru th  to move men.
In the area of international p o l i t ic s ,  Morgenthau's 
scholarship helped to set an agenda of theory and research 
for p o l i t ic a l  sc ien t is ts .  His d is t in c t iv e  contribution to 
the study of lnternational p o l i t ic s  was twofold. F i rs t ,  
such works as S c ie n t i f ic  Man vs. Power P o l i t ic s  probed the 
underlying philosophy for a r e a l is t  theory of p o l i t ic s  and 
i t s  reievance to the r e la t i  ons of states that define the ir  
national in te res t  in terms of power. Second, his commentary 
on American foreign policy (e .g . ,  In Def ense of the Nat ional 
In ter  est *3 and A New Foreign Policy for the United Stalps14) 
exposed the in te l le c tu a l  confusions about the r e a l i t i e s  of 
the i nternational environment in which the United States 
would have to pursue i t s  security  a f te r  World War I I .
Morgenthau’ s F'hilosophy of Power F’o l i t i c s
While best known for his contributions to international
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p o l i t ic s  and American -foreign policy, Morgenthau’ s primary
in te l le c tu a l  in terest  -from the outset of his career has not
been foreign policy or even p o l i t ic s  in general but
philosophy. Following World War I I ,  his decision to focus
on American foreign policy was based on the pract ica l
con vi ct i on that  1 the ex 1 stence of the Uni ted St ates
and.. .manlund depended on a sound foreign p o l ic y . " 1® He saw
l i t t l e  point in philosophic speculation for a world that
couId be reduced to rad i oac11ve rubble in a matter of year s
or decades. Commenting on the consequences of those
p o l i t ic a l  sc ien t is ts  who seel to emancipate the s c ie n t i f ic
study of p o l i t ic s  from "value-laden" p o l i t ic a l  philosophy,
Morgenthau warned:
Contemporary p o l i t ic a l  science, predominatel y 
id e n t i f ie d  with a p o s i t iv is t ic  philosophy which is  
i t s e l f  a denial of v i r t u a l ly  a l l  of the 
philosophic t ra d it io n s  of the West,
has .. .mutilated i t s e l f  by refusing i t s e l f  access 
to the sources of insight ava ilab le  in the great 
philosophic systems of the p a s t .1*
For the l im ited purpose of our study, specif ic  attention
w il l  be devoted to the assumptions and princ ip les  of
Morgenthau's r e a l is t  philosophy of p o l i t ic s .
According to Morgenthtnu, p o l i t ic s  is  inherently  a
phi 1 osophical d is c ip l in e  in that "man.. .cannot l iv e  without
a philosophy which gives meaning to his e x is t e n c e . . . . " 11
Vet he was equally cognisant of several l im ita t io n s
affect ing  the philosophers  contribution to p o l i t ic a l  l i f e .
F i rs t ,  the requirements of formal p o l i t ic a l  phi 1 osophy are
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d if fe re n t  from those which inform p o l i t ic a l  r e a l i t y .
Philosophy interpreted as a ra t io n a l ly  consistent set of
in te l le c tu a l  assumptions is  ty p ic a l ly  s ta t ic  and often
betrayed by a p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y  rep lete  with empirical
contingencies and systemic i r r a t i o n a l i t i e s . S e c o n d ,
p o l i t ic a l  phi 1 osophy is exposed to two finds of corruption:
e i ther  of becoming subservient to the existing p o l i t ic a l
r e a l i t y  by ra t io n a l iz in g  i t ,  or of becoming subservient to
an antic ipated and desired future r e a l i t y  by ju s t i fy in g
i t . 1^  From th is  standpoint, p o l i t ic a l  philosophy f a i l s  when
i t  is  reduced to e i ther  ideology or utopia.
In view of the contrast between the systematic
r a t io n a l i t y  of philosophy and the contingencies that
determine the r e a l i t y  of p o l i t ic s ,  Morgenthau argued in
favor of an "issues oriente d" phil osophy that applies the
theore t ica l  p r inc ip les  of p o l i t ic s  to a wide var ie ty  of
p o l i t i c a l  issues. Seeking to reconcile the dispassionate
contemplation of the philosopher and the pract ica l art  of
the statesman, Morgenthau wrote:
The sum to ta l  of such re f le c t io n s  constitutes a 
p o l i t ic a l  philosophy in substance; for these 
re la t ions  seek 1n an issues-or iented form the same 
kind of coherent theoret ica l understanding which 
is the obvious aim of systematic philosophies.
They try  to compensate for hhe lack
o f . . . systematization with th e ir  avoidance o f . . . the 
more obvious ideological and utopian temptations 
and with th e ir  d irect  relevance for the p o l i t ic a l  
concerns of the t im e .30
In an attempt to speak the tru th  to power, he assessed
p o l i t ic a l  action not by the levels of expediency but
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according to certain  higher standards and pr inc ip les  that 
are true but can never be f u l l y  rea lized  in practice.
Noteworthy also was Morgenthau-’ 5 powerful dissent from 
almost a l l  of the prevail ing  b e l ie fs  shaping the theory and 
pract ice  of contemporary social science. His Sc i enti f 1 c Man 
vs. Power P o l i t ic s  was much more than a narrow t re a t is e  on 
methodology; rather i t  sought to evaluate the many 
philosophic currents that brought the s c ie n t i f ic  study of 
social phenomena into being. Referring to the r is e  and f a l l  
of the Roman Empire, Morgenthau found that the p o l i t ic a l  
c r is is  confronting the West in the f i r s t  half of the 
twentieth century resided in "the general decay in the 
p o l i t ic a l  thinking of the Western world. 1121 S p e c if ic a l ly ,  
Morgenthau took exception to "the b e l ie f  in the power of 
science to solve a l l  problems and, more p a r t ic u la r ly ,  a l l  
p o l i t ic a l  problems which confront man in the modern age. "2:! 
The underlying philosophy of modern Western c iv i l i z a t io n  
(whether in the guise of "rat ionalism ," "scientism,"  
" l ibera l ism ,"  or "pacifism") sought answers for the great 
human problems with abstract mechanical formulas, blind to 
the fact of ev il  s t i l l  at work, in the world arid, therefore,  
disarmed by i t .
Morgenthau ' s sweep1ng and of ten 1 oosely-worded 
indictment of the social and p o l i t ic a l  philosophy of modern 
Western thought was based on a number of der i va t1ve and 
coro llary  ideas which can be b r ie f ly  id e n t i f ie d :
— The modern philosophy of rationalism is rooted in two 
erroneous assumptions: the conception o-f the social and 
physical world as being i n t e l l i g i b l e  through the same 
rat ional processes, and the conviction that  
under st and i ng in terms o-f these processes is  a l l  that 
is  needed -for the rat ional control o-f the social and 
physical world.
— The ra t io n a l is t  mode o-f thought supports a
philosophical structure which gives the appearance of 
yielding eternal v e r i t ie s .  The principles o-f 
s c ie n t i f ic  reason are always simple, consistent, and 
abstract; by contrast, p o l i t ic a l  society is  always 
complicated, incongruous, and concrete.
--Modern l ib e ra l  reason misunderstands both the nature of 
man and his p o l i t ic a l  existence. I t  does not see that 
man's nature has three dimensions: b io log ica l ,  
s p i r i tu a l ,  and ra t io n a l .  By neglecting the biological  
and s p ir i tu a l  facets, i t  misconstrues the function  
reason f u l f i l l s  within the whole of human existence, 
d is torts  the problem of ethics, and perverts the 
natural sciences into an insti , ienl of social 
salvation. This approach f a i l s  to recognize that the 
i r ra t io n a l  pursuit of se l f- in teres t ,  and power is  
inseparable from social l i f e  i t s e l f .
— Modern rationalism trea ts  the social s c ie n t is t  as a 
detached, passive observer Df social events; but this
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obscures the impact of "purposive action" and "the 
creative influence of the human mind" on the i n i t i a l  
stages of knowing the social world. Nature is  subject 
to human action; i t  is the human mind which actually  
creates i t ,  and the creation must bear witness to the 
quality  of the creator.
— I t  is  the mega t.h aumaz i n— the "great wonderment," the 
shock of inconQruity— which according to A r is to t le  is  
at the beginning of a l l  philosophy. That shock feeds 
on two common experiences— one in te l le c tu a l ,  the other 
moral. The in te l le c tu a l  experience is doubt about the 
meaning of h istory in terms of i t s  recurrent and unique 
elements. The moral dilemma results  from the tendency 
of man to claim for his position in h istory more in 
terms of his moral d ignity than he is  e n t i t le d  t o . 33 
A r e a l i s t  p o l i t ic a l  philosophy, according to 
Morgenthau, is  distinguished by several important 
princ ip les .  F i r s t ,  the r e a l is t  believes that p o l i t ic s  forms 
an "autonomous" f i e l d  of behavior and inquiry. Against 
those who would apply natural science methods to the study 
of po 1 11 i i- ;i 1 he ha ■ i c-i , the r e a l is t  holds 1 hat t h e  h i s t o r i L  
arena— the human universe— is essent ia l ly  d i f fe re n t  from the 
natural universe. Therefore, the in te l le c tu a l  methods which 
are capable of understanding p o l i t ic s  and society are bound 
to be d i f fe re n t  from the methods which apply to the 
discovery of the secrets of nature .24 The concept of power
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allows the observer "to distinguish p o l i t ic s  from other 
social spheres, to or ient himself in the maze of empirical 
phenomena which make up the -field, and to establish a 
measure o-f ra t iona l order within i t . ”30
Second, a r e a l is t  theory of p o l i t ic s  evolves from 
certain  philosophical conceptions about the nature of man 
and p o l i t ic a l  society. In rather s im pl is t ic  fashion, 
Morgenthau reduces the history of Western p o l i t i c a l  thought 
to the story of a contest between two schools which d i f fe r  
in their  conception of man, society, and p o l i t ic s .  One— the
horizon of p o l i t ic a l  idealism— assumes the essential  
goodness and i n f i n i t e  m a l le a b i l i ty  of human nature; i t  
blames the fa i lu r e  of the social order to measure up to the 
ra t ional standards of a progressive society on 1ack of 
knowledge and antiquated in s t i t u t io n s .3*  By contrast, the 
t ra d i t io n  of p o l i t ic a l  realism acknowledges that forces 
inherent in human nature prevent man from achieving a 
thoroughly ra t iona l  or moral p o l i t ic a l  o rd er.27 The r e a l is t  
views man as a s e l f - in te re s te d  creature whose ego is  
inev itab ly  contaminated by the propensity for sin and evil . 
In s e e k i n g  t undamen t. a 1 p o l i t ic a l  changes, the statesman 
"must wort: with those forces, not against them. ,,:sm
Third, the r e a l is t  believes that p o l i t ic s  is  governed 
by objective laws that have th e ir  roots in human nature.
For re a l is ts  the p o s s ib i l i ty  e::ists, therefore, of 
developing a rat ional theory of p o l i t ic s  that re f le c ts .
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however imperfectly , these objective laws. For Morgenthau, 
the concept of power "provides a kind o-f ra t iona l  out line o-f
p o l i t ic s ,  a map o-f the p o l i t ic a l  scene.1'2’  In commenting on
the rat ional requirements of any p o l i t ic a l  theory, he 
observed:
Such a map does not provide a complete description
of the p o l i t ic a l  landscape as i t  is in any
part icu lar  period of h istory. I t . . .provides the 
timeless features of i t s  geography d is t in c t  from 
th e ir  ever-changing h is to r ic  s e t t i n g . . . . 30
In expounding his theory of 1nternational p o l i t ic s ,
Morgenthau exhorted the student to assume the position of
the statesman who is called upon to meet a certain problem
of foreign policy under spec if ic  circumstances. In so
doing, "we ask ourselves what the rat ional a lte rn a t ive s  are
from which a statesman may choose who must meet th is  problem
under these circumstances.. .and which of these rat ional
a lte rn a t ive s  th is  p ar t ic u la r  statesman.. . i s  l i k e ly  to
choose."31 The v a l id i t y  of a r e a l i s t  theory, Morgenthau
believed, does not hinge on i t s  s t r i c t  conformity to
preestablished methodological c r i t e r i a ;  ra ther ,  i t  is
subject only to the "pragmatic" requirement that i t  broaden
our knowledge and deepen our unu ; standing of -.fiat is worth
k nowing,32
Fourth, Morgenthau^s theory of internat ional  p o l i t ic s  
also contains a normative element. The p o l i t ic a l  r e a l is t  
values the ra t iona l  elements of p o l i t ic a l  action for  
pract ica l reasons: P o l i t ic a l  realism assumes that a rational
f or ei gn policy is ,  of nec essi t y , oood -f or ei gn policy.  I t
minimizes r isks and ma:: 1 mi z es benef i t s  and , hence, comp l ies
with the moral precept of prudence and the p o l i t ic a l
requiremen t of success. 33
F if th ,  realism trea ts  the concept of in te res t  defined
as power as an objective category which is  universa lly
v a l id ,  but i t  does not endow the concept with a meaning that
is  fixed once and for a l l . 3"* Taken in iso la t io n ,  the
determination of a nat ion 's in teres t  in a concrete situat ion
is r e la t iv e ly  simple: i t  encompasses the in te g r i ty  of a
nat ion 's t e r r i t o r y  and p o l i t ic a l  in s t i tu t io n s ,  and of i t s
c u ltu re .30 However, an object ive determination of a foreign
policy designed to insure national survival in a part icu lar
period depends on the specif ic  mi;: of p o l i t ic a l  and cultural
factors impacting on the decision-making process.
Morgenthau warned:
While the r e a l i s t . . . b e l1 eves that in terest  is  the 
perennial standard by which p o l i t ic a l  action must 
be directed, the contemporary connection between 
in terest  and the nation state 1s a product of 
history, and is .. .bound to disappear. Nothing in 
the r e a l is t  position m il i ta te s  against the 
assumption that the present d ivision  of 
th e . . .w o r ld  into nation states w i l l  be replaced by 
1 . . _jui uni tb .  . . ii. j: ; i . I e:ep i ng ■ i th
the . . . potent1a l i t 1es and the moral prerequisites  
of the contemporary world.3-1
Sixth, p o l i t ic a l  realism holds that multiple factors  
affec t  moral reasoning and that "universal pr inc ip les  cannot 
be applied to the actions of states in the ir
abstract. . .formulation, but.. . .  must be f i l t e r e d  through the
2 6 7
concrete circumstances o-f time and place. M;57 Therefore, 
moral pr inc ip les  can never be f u l l y  rea l ized ,  but can only 
be approximated through the temporary balancing of interests  
and the precari ous set11ement of conf1i ct s . 3Q Whereas the 
individual may ju s t ly  claim the r ig h t  to s e l f - s a c r i f ic e  in 
defense of moral law, the state has no r igh t  to le t  i ts  
moral disapprobation get in the way of successful p o l i t ic a l  
a c t i on. For Morgenthau, there is  no genui ne p o l i t ic a l  
morality without the prudential consideration of the 
probable consequences following from d if fe re n t  courses of 
ac t lo n .
F in a l ly ,  p o l i t ic a l  realism does not id e n t i fy  "the moral 
aspirations of a p ar t ic u la r  nation with the moral laws that  
govern the universe ."3* Morgenthau held that crusading and 
pretentious idealism contains two principal defects. On the 
one hand, the id e a l is t  f a l l s  victim to world-embracing 
ideals which, because of th e ir  vagueness and genera l i ty ,  can 
provide no national guidance for resolving concrete 
p o l i t ic a l  problems. On the other, the id e a l is t  dresses 
parochial in terests  in the garb of universal moral 
pi inrip l '-1- nd t-k presumes that tht: rest of the world, in
refusing to grant his policy cosmic righteousness, is i psn 
f acto less moral (or ra t io n a l)  than he.40
Morgenthau'5 observations on a just world community and 
operative supranational values in re la t ions  between states  
raises a number of problematic questions, not least of which
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was his judgment o-f r ai son dJ 6 t a t  as a basis tor- American
diplomacy both past and present. While th is  theme w i l l  be
explored at greater length in a following section, i t  w i l l
be useful to introduce his approach to the moral dilemma of
in ternat ional p o l i t ic s .  At a minimum, Morgenthau' s thought
exhibited a curious ambivalence and sense o-f contrad 1 ct 1 on
regarding the gap between national in terest  and v iab le  norms
transcending state in te re s t .
In a more pessimistic assessment, Morgenthau once
wrote: "There is a profound and neglected tru th  hidden in
Hobbes' extreme dictum that the state creates morality as
well as law and that there is  neither morality nor law
outside the s ta te ." ' *1 Universal moral pr inc ip les ,  such as
ju s t ic e  and equali ty ,  apply to concrete situat ions only in
the measure in which they are given content by a p art icu lar
society. Reflecting on what has euphemistically been termed
the "society of nations," Morgenthau remarked:
Not only are there no supranational moral pr inciples  
concrete enough to give guidance to the p o l i t ic a l  
actions o f . . . nat1ons; there is also no agency on 
the in ternat ional scene to promote the in terests  
of the individual nations themselves*5*
Yet, in opposition to those c r i t ic s  who have portra,.. J 
his in ternat ional thought as Machi avel 1 i an or Hobbes i an . * 3, 
Morgenthau retorted :  "I have always maintained that the
actions of states are subject to universal moral pr inc iples  
and I have been careful to d i f fe r e n t ia te  my posit ion.. . f roffi  
that of Hobbes. He consistently  stressed that moral
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reasoning in the p o l i t ic a l  sphere does not imply a simple
choice between a moral p r in c ip le  and a standard o-f action
which is  morally irre levan t  or even immoral.
Moral rules do not per mi t certai  n pal ir.i es to be 
considered at a l l  -from the point o-f view o-f 
expediency. Such ethical  inh ib i t ion s  operate in 
our time on d i f fe re n t  levels and with d i f fe ren t  
effectiveness. Their restra in ing  function is  most 
obvious . . . in  aff irming the sacredness of human 
l i f e  and peace in our time. ■*“
ft Rea list  Theory of Internat ional P o l i t ic s  
fts the previ ous chapters emphasi z ed, the r ea l i  st 
worldview was informed by philosophical convictions 
regarding the nature of man, his existence in p o l i t ic a l  
society, and the moral problem in a decentralized world of 
sovereign na t1 on st at es. More so than his predecessors, 
however, Morgenthau u t i l i z e d  the philosophical and moral 
resources of realism in order to specify the l im ita t io n s  and 
prospects of a theory of 1nternat 1onal p o l i t ic s .  His 
attent ion  focused on such objectives as: (1) ident i fy ing  fey
concepts and categories of analysis; (2) weighing the impact 
of science, philosophy, and ethics on generalizing about 
in ternat ional p o l i t ic a l  behavior; and ( 3 )  s t ipu la t in g  the 
in te l le c tu a l  and p o l i t ic a l  functions a theory of 
l nternat ional re ia t  i ons ought t o per f orm.
Before examining Morgenthau's conceptual framework, i t  
is  necessary to discuss b r ie f ly  his position regarding the 
p o s s ib i l i ty  of theoriz ing about in ternat ional p o l i t ic s .  
Morgenthau cited a number of in te l le c tu a l  and h is to r ica l
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•factors to explain why, un t i l  very recently , no e x p l ic i t
theory of 1nternat iona1 re la t ions  has existed. One reason
for the absence of international p o l i t ic a l  theory can be
found in the philosophic out 1 oof: that  prevailed u n t i l  the
end of the Napoleon i c Wars.44 From thi s perspect i ve,
re la t ions  among nations were seen as a fact  of nature or a
datum of history impervious to human w i l l  and co n tro l . The
best the p o l i t ic a l  philosopher could hope to achieve was to
describe the s tate  of nature (which resulted from the nature
of man) as well as the precarious legal order presumed to
ex is t  among nations.
. . . t h e  in te l le c tu a l  p o s s ib i l i ty  of a theory of 
ln ternat ional  re la t ions  depended on the 
recognition that re la t ions  among nations are not 
something which is given to man. . . .  ra th e r , i t  is  
that the re la t ions  among nations have been created 
by the w i l l  of man and...can be manipulated and 
changed...by the w i l l  of man.47
Theorising about in ternat ional re la t ions  was also s t i f l e d  by
the reformist or ientat ion that  pervaded commentary on
foreign policy in the nineteenth and f i r s t  decades of the
twentieth century.4 -  The main theoret ica l concern focused
on developing legal e n t i t ie s  and supranational agencies that
wo1'.id supersede the e v i ls  of t ra d i t io n a l  "power p o l i t ic s . '
Another f actor in h ib i t ing  the development and
usefulness of internat ional  theory concerns both the
rat ional and contingent elements inherent in p o l i t ic a l
behavior. Morgenthau argued that there is  a ra t ional
dimension in p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  (e .g . ,  in terest defined as
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power) that makes p o l i t ic s  susceptible to theoret ical
analysis. His commitment to in te rn a t1onal theory was rooted
in the b e l ie f  that "i nternat i onal p o l i t ic s  is  the realm of
recurrence and re p e t i t io n ."  The re p e t i t iv e  character of
in te rn a t ion a1 p o l i t i c s  — the configurat 1ons of the balance of
power lends i t s e l f  to theoret ica l syst emi z at 1 on .
Yet Morgenthau was equally sensit ive  to those
contingent and unforseen elements which may obviate the
p o s s ib i l i t y  of theoret ica l understanding. The forces of
1r r a t io n a l i t y  and insecurity  a f fe c t  the choice to be made
among sever a1 possi b i l i t i e s . ® °  The theorls t  seeki ng to
disclose the ra t ional demeanor of any specific p o l i t ic a l  act
must take account of Morgenthau’ s caveat that:
The statesman must cross the Rubicon not knowing 
how deep and turbulent the r iv e r  i s . . . . H e  must 
commit himself to a . . .course  of action in 
ignorance of i t s  consequences, and he must be 
capable of actlng dec i s ive ly in sp i te  of that  
ignorance. . . . Rather than seeking unattainable  
knowledge, he must reconcile himself to 
ine luctab le  ignorance.” 1
U lt im ate ly ,  Morgenthau advised that a rational theory of
ln ternat ional p o l i t ic s  or foreign policy "must abstract from
those i r ra t io n a l  elements" and seek “to paint a p icture of
foreign policy which presents the rat ional essence to be
found in experience." A theory of internat  1ona1 p o l i t ic s
can do no more than review the l i k e ly  consequences of
choosing one a l te rn a t iv e  as opposed to another; and i t  must
involve calculat ions concerning the conditions under which
one a l te rn a t iv e  is more l ik e ly  to occur, and be successful,
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than the o th e r .as*
For Morgenthau, the calculus of the national in terest  
functions as the central concept for a theory of 
in ternat ional p o l i t ic s .  "All successful statesmen of modern 
times from Richelieu to Church il l ,"  he wrote, "have made the 
national in te res t  the ultimate standard of th e ir  
po l ic ies ."® 3 In in ternat ional  p o l i t ic s ,  the national 
in terest  is  shaped by the "struggle for pow er. . . fo r  national 
advantage." For general purposes, Morgenthau7s observations 
on the importance of national in teres t  in world p o l i t ic s  can 
be c la s s i f ie d  according to three c r i t e r ia :  (1) problems of
d e f in i t io n  and c la s s i f ic a t io n ;  (2) American diplomatic 
history and competing versions of American national 
in te re s t;  and (3) American national in terest  in a changing 
postwar global setting .
I t  should be noted that Morgenthau refused to consider 
the national in te res t  as a s ta t ic ,  se l f-ev ident  p r inc ip le  of 
s ta te c ra f t  whose formulation is  immune from the comple:: 
in teract ion  of domestic and external influences on the 
decision-making process in foreign policy. Like the "great 
genera l i t ies"  in the United States Constitution (e .g . ,  due 
process and general w elfare ) , the concept of the national  
in teres t  "contains residual meaning,. .inherent in the 
concept i t s e l f ,  but beyond these minimum requirements i t s  
content can run the whole gamut of meanings that are 
lo g ic a l ly  compatible with it.. "B4 Therefore, the spec i f i c
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content of the national in terest is affected by the 
p o l i t ic a l  trad it ions  and the overal1 cultural context within 
which a nation formulates i t s  foreign policy.
Morgenthau emphasized that the concept of national 
interest contains two elements, one that is log ica l ly  
necessary and re la t iv e ly  permanent, and one that is variable  
according to changing c1r c u m s ta n c e s .W h a t  he regarded as 
the permanent "hard core" of the national interest stems 
from three c r i t e r ia :  <1) the nature of the interests to be
defended; (2) the international milieu within which the 
interests operate; and (3) the rational necessities l im it ing  
the choice of means and ends by a l l  foreign policy actors. 
The survival of the p o l i t ic a l  id en t i ty  of the nation is the 
i rreducible minimum, the necessary element of i t s  interests  
vis-ei-vis other nations.’ 4 In a global setting where a 
number of sovereign nations compete for power, the foreign 
polic ies of a l l  nations s tr ive  to protect the ir  physical and 
cultural ldenti ty against the aggressi ve desi gns of r iva l  
forces. Moreover, Morgenthau stipulated that the nature of 
the threat to which the hard core is  exposed remains 
re la t iv e ly  constant over long periods of time. For example, 
the successful defense of American national interest has 
encompassed such goals as unrivaled American superiority  in 
the Western Hemisphere and preserving a balance of power in 
both Europe and Asia.B7
The rational character of the national interest derives
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from the reasoning by which the statesman translates
abstract goals in to  concrete foreign policy options.
Governments throughout hi story attempted to uphold a
natj on' 5 core in terests by pursuing such po l ic ies  as
compet i t i ve armament s , balance of power t act 1c s , def ensi ve
a l l iances , and subver si on. In comment 1ng on the re la t io n
between ra t iona l necessities of foreign policy ( i . e . ,
selecting one of a l imited number of a l ternat ives  through
which to bring the nation's power to bear upon the power of
other nations) and the universal character of the national
i n te re s t , liorgenthau remar ked :
I t  is th is  assumpt1 on of uni ve rs a l l ty  of the
national in terest  in time and space which enables
us to understand the foreign po lic ies  of
Demosthenes and Caesar, Kautilya and Henry I I I ,  of
the contemporary statesmen of Russia and Ch1na.
Regardless of a l l  the differences in
p e rs o n a l i ty . . . and environment, th e ir  thinking was
predetermined.. .when they were faced
w i t h . . .p ro te c t in g . . . the  rat ional core of the
national in t e r e s t .0"
In b r ie f ,  Morgenthau calculated that the ra t iona l character
of the national in terest could be detected and understood by
thinking as the statesman must have thought and by theorists
"putting th e ir  thoughts into the content of the ir
personal1t le s  and social environment."
Morgenthau' 5 id e n t i f ic a t io n  of the c r i t e r i a  serving as
the r e la t iv e ly  permanent hard core of the national interest
r aises the quest i on of th e ir  app1lc ab l111 y in ter  ms of
actual choices in spec if ic  foreign policy s ituat ions. He
po3nted to the d i f f i c u l t y  of measuring accurately a l l  the
^  7 E:.
crosscurrents Df personalit ies , public opinion, and partisan 
p o l i t ic s  that impact on the -formulation o-f a nat ion 's  
in terest  at any one time.®^ The national in te res t  can 
function as a meaningful standard in foreign policy only i f  
statesmen impose some hierarchical  order upon the values 
that make up the national in terest  and among the lim ited  
resources committed to them.
The precondition for th is  rat ional assessment, 
accord1ng to Morgenthau, "is a cl ear under stand i ng of the 
d is t in c t io n  between the necessary and var iable elements of 
the national in te re s t ."  Especially in democratic countries, 
where the var iable elements of the national in te re s t  tend to 
be the subj ect of cont en11ous debate, a ra t iona l  concept1 on 
of the national in terest  requires that a l l  external 
objectives (actual or potent ia l)  be subjected to scrutiny  
and assigned an approximate place in the scale of national 
val ues. 4,0
In his lengthy writ ing on United States diplomatic  
history,  Morgenthau emphasized that history represented an 
essential foundation for the study of in ternat ional  p o l i t ic s  
and foreign policy; indeed, h is to r ic  events important for an 
understanding of in te rn a t1ona1 p o l i t ic s  are generally  
manifestations of social and p o l i t ic a l  forces that re f le c t  
the timeless pr inc ip les  of human nature. His attempt to 
outl ine  d is t in c t iv e  "phases" of American diplomatic history  
was largely  based on the extent to which policy-makers
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ju s t i f ie d  American conduct abroad by reference tD the 
permanent and var iable elements of the national in te re s t .
In th is  respect, he took exception with those who sought to 
characterize the American national purpose as exempt from 
the s e l t - i  nterest ed pursuit of power and nat1 onal advantage 
that shape the struggles of international l i f e .
Morgenthau focused upon opposing r e a l is t  and id e a l is t  
conceptions of in ternational p o l i t ic s  in American 
ex perienc e . For ex amp1 e , the idea that "a nati on can 
escape.. . from power p o l i t ic s  into a realm where action is 
guided by moral pr inc ip les  rather than by considerat 1ons of 
power is deeply rooted in the American mind."*** From 
Washington's Farewell Address to Woodrow Wilson's global 
democratic crusade, American statesmen distinguished th e ir  
foreign p o l ic ies  from other nations in terms of moral 
superior i ty .  The t o i l s  of European r iv a l r y  and ambition 
offered a s tr ik in g  contrast to American diplomacy which 
appeared as a l t r u i s t i c  and seeking the general welfare of 
mankind. Commenting on the American inc l ina t ion  to invoke 
abstract moral princ ip les  to ju s t i f y  concrete national 
in teres ts ,  Morgenthau wrote: "We ha - u acted on the
1nternational scene, as a l l  nations must, in power-po1i t 1ca1 
terms; but we have tended to conceive of our actions in non- 
p o l i t i c a l ,  m oral is t ic  terms.
Morgenthau' s b e l ie f  in the enduring importance of power’ 
and s e l f - in te r e s t  in American foreign policy was based on
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the notion that "underneath th is  p o l i t ic a l  d i le ttant ism ,  
nourished by improvidence and a sense of moral mission, 
there l ives an almost in s t in c t iv e  awareness of the perennial 
in terests  o+ the United States. 1,4,3 On the basis of these 
two opposing ronceptions, Morgenthau specified three periods 
of American -foreign policy: (1) the r e a l i s t i c — thinking and
acting in terms of power; (2) the ideological or utopian — 
thinking in terms o-f moral principle? but acting in terms of 
power; and (3) the m ora l is t ic— thinking and acting in terms 
of moral p r in c ip le .
Morgenthau prai sed the Federallst  1eadershi p of the 
17905 for recognizing the primacy of in terest  and power in 
world a f fa i r s .  In his "Paci ficus" and " Amer i t: anus" essays 
written  in support of Washington’ s proclamation of 
n e u tra l i ty  in the War of the F irs t  Coalit ion against France. 
Alexander Hamilton invoked the in terest  of the United 
Stat es:
Self-preservat ion is  the f i r s t  duty of a nation; 
and though in the performance of s t ipu lat ions  
regarding to war, good fa i th  requires that i t s  
ordinary hazards.. .be f a i r l y  met. . . yet i t  does not 
require that extraordlnary and extreme hazards 
shoul d be run .
Hamilton's emphasis on American national in terest  was rooted 
in the conviction that the United States would gain l i t t l e  
and r isk  everything by siding with France against almost a l l  
of Europe.
The ideological phase of American foreign policy began 
with Jefferson’ s accession to the presidency and lasted
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u n ti l  the Span1sh-Amer1can War at the close of the 
nineteenth century. In many public utterances, Jefferson ’ 5 
dedication to abstract morality contributed to his contempt 
for the European balance of power and support for the 
e g a l i ta r ia n  aspirations associated with the French and 
American revolutionary causes. However, in the f in a l  decade 
of the Napoleonic Wars, Jefferson's 1nternat1onal thought 
pointed to the ever-changing d is tr ibu t ion  of power in the 
world rather than immutable moral pr inciples . Speat mg in 
1(312, Jefferson said: "We...ought to pray that the powers of
Europe be so poised and counterpoised.. . th a t  th e ir  own 
security  may require the presence of a l l  the ir  forces at 
home, leaving the other quarters of the globe in undisturbed 
t r  an qu i 1i t y . "
John Quincy Adams represented "the classic example of 
the p o l i t ic a l  moralist in thought and word, who cannot help 
being a real 1st in action."  During the Adams
Administration, the legal p r in c ip le  of freedom of the seas 
became a weapon to safeguard American independence from the 
B rit ish  f le e t ;  the p r in c ip le  of non-intervention in the 
Mon roe Doctrine was a negative coiiditi un for the c-n during 
greatness of the United States; and the idea of Manifest 
Destiny became a moral ju s t i f ic a t io n  for the westward 
expansion of the United States.
The moralistic  phase of American diplomacy began with 
American involvement in the Span 1sh-Amer1 can War and reached
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i t s  zenith in the p o l i t ic a l  thought of Woodrow Wilson.
Seeing the hand of God in America's decision to annex the
Phil ipp ines,  William McKinley committed American power
beyond the confines of the Western Hemisphere, ignorant oi
the bearing of th is  step on the national in t e r e s t . * 7,
Wilson's thought not only rejected the national in terest  but
was e x p l i c i t l y  apposed to i t  on moral grounds. As early  as
1913, Wilson alluded to the moral f a i lu r e  of the national
in te res t  in world a f fa ir s :
We dare not turn from the p r inc ip le  that mar a1l ty  
and not expediency. . . must guide us and that we 
w il l  never condone inequity because i t  
i s . . . convenient to do s o . . . . I t  is a very perilous  
thing to determine the foreign policy of a nation 
in . . . te rm s  of national in t e r e s t . * 6*
In conceiving of American national in terest  in moral and
legal terms, Wilson led the United States to war, not to
secure the balance of power, but to protect in te rn a t i ona1
law and morality .  Wilson fa i le d  at Versa i l les ,  Morgenthau
believed, because he faced the A l l ie d  powers with moral
p r inc ip les  to the neglect of the nation's h is to r ic  in terest
in the p o l i t ic s  of Europe.*^
Morgenthau’ s outlooh on American foreign policy during
the interwar years examined the impact of two forms of
utopianism, isolationism and in ternat iona1ism. The fa l lacy
of isolationism, Morgenthau suggested, was in viewing
iso la t ion  as a fact  of nature, where freedom from
entanglement in Europe followed from the mere act of
abstent ion .70 By contrast, the ear ly  p o l i t ic a l  re a l is ts
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treated iso la t ion  as an objective of policy, resu lt ing from 
both p o l i t ic a l  conditions outside the Western Hemisphere and 
pol ic ies  contrived and executed in th e ir  support.
When internationalism triumphed in the la te  193-Os, i t  
did so by reviving the moral horizon Wi1 sonian1sm. The 
relevance of the balance of power and spheres of influence  
for American national in terest  was rejected and subordinated 
to i l lu s o ry  expectations regarding the promotion of 
democratic reform throughout the world. In short, the 
debate between isolationism and internationalism in the 
1930s turned on whether the United States had a moral 
obligation  to promote peace by jo in ing the League of Nations 
Dr whether i t  was morally incumbent on the United States to 
oppose Fasc i sm ln Europe and uphold i nternational 1 aw 1n 
Asi a .
S im i la r ly ,  Morgenthau was c r i t i c a l  of the moral 
postulates shaping American po lic ies  during and immediately 
a f te r  World War I I .  Beyond the goal of "unconditional 
surtender" of the Axis powers, Americans looked to a brave 
new world free of war and the struggle for power. Returning 
from the Moscow Conference in 1"13, Seer etary of State 
Cordell Hull declared that new forms of in te rnat lona1 
organization would cast aside balance of power p o l i t ic s  and 
usher in a new era of ln te rnat iona1 cooperation. F in a l ly ,  
the American commitment to a to ta l  m i l i ta ry  v ic tory  ignored 
the many concrete p o l i t ic a l  issues dividing the victorious
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A ll ie d  powers at the war's end.7,1 While American national 
in te re s t  was served by the m i l i ta ry  defeat of Germany and 
Japan, i t  was jeopardized by the -failure to address the 
problem of creating a new, viable postwar balance of power.
In contrast to his assessment of United States 
diplomatic history prior to World War I I ,  Morgenthaurs 
w rit ing  on American national in terest  in the postwar setting  
gave greater weight to specif ic  foreign policy outcomes and 
th e ir  implications for American power in a changing 
in ternat ional  environment. Considerations of space prohibit  
comprehensive treatment of Morgenthau' s observations on a l l  
the diplomatic and internat ional developments a f fect ing  
American national in teres ts throughout the postwar era. A 
1 ater sect l on of th is  chapt er w i l l  mor e fu l l y  assess 
Morgenthau'5 conception of the national in terest in terms of 
such contemporary foreign policy problems as nuclear 
strategy, American intervention abroad, Third World 
re la t io n s ,  and human r ights .
Until  World War I I ,  the United States could pursue i t s  
national in terests within the framework of the trad it ion a l  
state s', stem. 8ir.ce the s i 1 er-nt h century, this la, was
characterized by con f l ic ts  among several European nations of 
appr o;i i mat el y equa 1 st r eng t h . Nat l ons promoted th e ir  
in terests  by jo in ing  al l iances and coal it ions to surpass the 
strength of would-be aggressors and equalize the balance of 
power. What transpired in Afr ica or Asia simply mirrored
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the underlying struggles -tor power among major European 
powers. Since the beginning o-f th is  century, the 
Eurocentric state system has been so transformed that today 
hardly anything is  l e f t  of i t .
Morgenthau pointed to four basic changes in the 
t ra d i t io n a l  Western state system a f te r  World War I I ,  that 
had radical consequences for the national in terests  of 
nations both within and outside Europe.72 F i r s t ,  what was 
once a European p o l i t ic a l  system has been transformed into a 
world system where a l l  the nations of the world have become 
vocal part ic ipants in the struggle for power. Second, the 
system has been transformed q u a l i ta t iv e ly  in that Europe has 
lost i t s  p o l i t i c a l  predominance in the world. Third, the 
t ra d i t io n a l  balance of power system composed of a 
m u lt ip l ic i ty  of states with appr o:: i mat el y equal strength has 
been replaced by a bipolar system of world power. Fourth, 
the collapse Df colonial empires foreclosed the opportunity 
f or European powers (including the Un i ted States and Sovi et. 
Union) to seek p ro f i ta b le  overseas expansion without 
necessarily in te r fe r in g  with each other's  in terests .
In view of these revolutionary developments in 
1nternat iona1 p o l i t ic s ,  Morgenthau maintained that the 
United States had one primary national in terest  in i ts  
re la t io n s  with other nations: the security of i t s  t e r r i to r y
and p o l i t ic a l  in s t i tu t io n s .  Beyond th is basic requirement, 
however, the United States had a number of secondary
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in terests in the world, such as promotion of peace and 
security  everywhere, support for democratic governments, the 
containment of communist governments, the r e l i e f  of poverty, 
hunger, and disease.73 However, these more var iable  
in terests are subject to two l im ita t io n s .  They should never 
be pursued at the expense of the primary in teres t  of 
national security  and they can be pursued only within the 
narrow l im its  of ava ilab le  wisdom and power.^
The primary in terest  of national security  in the 
postwar period required the United States to rea ff i rm  i t s  
t ra d i t io n a l  commitments of maintaining American superior ity  
in the Western Hemisphere and preserving a balance of power 
in Europe and Asia. Regarding Soviet-Amer1can r iv a l r y ,  "the 
basic objective of our policy is  to contain. . . the Soviet 
Union within the 11 mits. .  . estab11 shed by the l ines  of 
m il i ta ry  demarcation at the end of the Second World War."70 
Morgenthau heralded the i n i t i a l  formulation of containment, 
the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshal 1 Rian as evidence of 
America's pragmatic a b i l i t y  to act decisively in the face of 
an obvious p e r i l .  Vet the crea tive  improvisation 
distinguishing Amerlr vt foreign po! irv in 1947 whs short­
l ived. Ever since the Korean War, he argued, successive 
presidentia l administrations "transformed m il i t a ry  
containment and foreign aid, devices which in 1947 
successfully met specif ic  s ituat ions ,  into remedies of 
absolute v a l id i t y ,  adequate for any and a l l  international
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e x ig e n c ie s .C o m m e n t in g  on the new challenges to American 
foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s, he wrote:
The great innovations of 1947 became the routine  
responses of the f i f t i e s  and s i x t i e s . . .unable to 
meet the need for new p o l ic ies ,  as presented. . .  by 
Khrushchev's new foreign policy,  or the 
opportunities for such p o l ic ies ,  as presented.. . in  
the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the 
disintegrat ion of the colonial empires.. .and the 
pre-revolut ionary state in which much of Latin  
America finds i t s e l f . 77
Perhaps the central tenet of Morgenthau'5 c r i t ic is m  of 
Un i ted States f oreign policy since the end of War 1d War 11 
was that American policy has "aimed at standing s t i l l "  and 
preserving an indefensible status quo in the nations ot 
Africa  and Asia. When m il i ta ry  containment sh itted  to Asia 
a f te r  the Korean War, Morgenthau stressed the l im i ts  of 
m il i ta ry  power, both as an instrument of policy and as an 
analyt ical  tool for understanding the r e a l i t i e s  of 
in ternat ional  l i f e . 7" Morgenthau"s staunch c r i t ic is m  of 
United States involvement in Vietnam was based on the 
American government’ s neglect of a proper conception of the 
national in te re s t ,  defined in terms of the balance of 
power. 7,1 Not only did he judge the c o n f l ic t  as only 
marginal], re lated to American security , but he u k u  to ■ ud 
the logic of containment of dubious value in seeling to 
resolve a national revolution on the periphery of Asia.
Equally important for Morgenthau's theory of 
in te rnat iona1 p o l i t ic s  is the concept of power. In speaking 
of power, Morgenthau meant "man’ s control over the actions
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and minds o-f other men. "“°  At the international leve l ,  the 
r e la t iv e ly  constant relat ionsh ip  between power and national 
in te res t  is  the basic datum -for purposes o-f theoret ica l  
analysis and p o l i t ic a l  p ra c t ic e ." 1 According to Morgenthau, 
the struggle -for power in service of a nation 's in terest  
c ry s ta l l iz e s  in to  three basic patterns: to keep one's power
(policy of the status quo); to increase one's power (policy 
of imperialism); and to demonstrate one's power (policy of 
prest ige ) .® a In general, he contended that the struggle for  
power could be waged by two d i f fe re n t  means: diplomacy and 
m il i ta ry  force. When nations m i l i t a r i l y  compete for power, 
they engage in an armaments race or war. A l te rn a t iv e ly ,  
sustained peaceful in teractions among them contribute to a 
process of in s t i tu t io n a l iz e d  diplomacy.
Morgenthau's typology of national power included both 
tangible and intangible components. Foremost among the 
former are geography, natural resources, industria l  
capacity, m i l i t a r y  preparedness, and population. Important 
in tangib le  factors include national morale, national  
character, qua li ty  of diplomacy, and quality  of 
govern(r-''ri t . 87 ]r, c^n age haunt d by the specter of yiuti.d
nuclear devastation, he c r i t ic iz e d  attempts to stress  
m il i ta ry  force or material strength over more intangible  
facets of national power. Especially during the 1960s and 
1970s, Morgenthau pointed to the increasing ideological  
embodiment of power in world p o l i t ic s  and wrote:
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The ideological contest between host i le  
philosophies,, social and p o l i t ic a l  systems. . . wi11 
u lt im ate ly  not be decided by p o l i t i c a l ,  
m il i ta ry .  . .and economic interventions o-f the 
contestants in the a f fa i r s  of other nations, but 
by t h e . . . v ir tues  and vices of th e ir  respective  
p o l i t ic a l  , ec onomi c , and soc i ai syst ems .
Commenting on the transformat i on of American foreign
policy since the end of the Second World War. Morgenthau
singled out the quality  of a nat ion 's diplomacy as perhaps
the single most important factor in calculat ing national
power. "The United States,"  Morgenthau believed, "must
resort to the time-honored diplomatic method of fashioning a
legal and viable community of interests" to secure the
coherence of the Western a l l i a n c e ,  accommodate the economic
and p o l i t ic a l  development of Germany and Japan, and counter
communist control of colonial revolutions throughout the
Third World.-=
Morgenthau's view that postwar developments required
the vigorous application of t ra d i t io n a l  diplomatic practices
followed, in large part,  from the revolutionary impact of
nuc1 ear weapons on the use of f orce in internat lonal
po l i t  i c s. Pr i or to 1945, conventlona1 weapons couId be used
as a rational instrument of  f o r e i g n  policy. After the
acquisit ion of unlimited nuclear power by both the United
States and the Soviet Union, however, Morgenthau observed:
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. . . t h e  rat ional re lat ionship that existed, p rJ or 
to 1945. between force as a means and the ends of 
foreign policy does not apply to nuclear 
weapons. . . .  I f  they were used as instruments of 
national policy, nuclear weapons would destroy the 
tangible objectives of policy and the be l l igerents  
as well .  In consequence, they are not susceptible 
to rat ional use as instruments of national 
pol 1 cy . "**
In the nuclear age, Morgenthau argued that a rational  
defense policy must move on two d i f fe re n t  and separate 
levels: the conventional and the nuclear. Even in the
nuclear age, " i t  is  impossible to support national in terests  
e f fe c t iv e ly  without the ult imate resort to m i l i ta ry  
fo rc e ." *7 Morgenthau never called  on American leaders to 
impair or dismantle the system of mutual deterrence; he 
warned that deterrence must be s tab il ised  to the point that  
no one power f e l t  safe enough to seriously threaten an 
e f fe c t iv e  f i r s t - s t r i k e  without fear of a paralysing 
response. Yet, nuclear weapons in the hands of both 
superpowers only provides assurance that national in terests  
must be supported by conventional diplomatic and m il i ta ry  
methods.**® That America could f ig h t  a l im ited nuclear war 
in conventional fashion was the arguable premise of such 
proposals as the "clea1-" H bomb, tac t ica l  nuclear vj.~r, 
graduated deterrence with " f i r e b r e a k ,  " and counterforce 
stra tegy .
An important corol lary  of Morgenthau's conception of 
power is the p r in c ip le  of the balance of power. In his 
v i ew:
2 8 8
A configuration, such as the balance of power, is 
a general social phenomenon to be found on a l l  
levels of social in te ra c t io n . ’ 0
. . . t h e  balance of power, far  from being just an 
a rb it ra ry  device of diplomats and liachiavel 1 ian 
scholars, is  the very law of l i f e  for independent 
units dealing with other independent un its— 
domestic or 1nternat1onal— that want to preserve 
th e ir  1ndependence. w1
The aspi r atlon f or power on the part of sever a1
nations, each trying e ither  to maintain or
overthrow the status quo, leads of necessity to a 
c o n fig u ra t io n . . .ca l led  the balance of power and to 
polic ies  aimed at preserving i t . ’ a
Dver the years, Morgenthau' s analysis has emphasised: (1)
the main patterns of the balance of power; <2) the d i f fe re n t
methods of the balance of power; (3) the changing structure
of the balance of power; and (4) the i n f l e x i b i l i t y  of the
new balance of power.
On the basis of the h is to r ic a l  evidence. Morgenthau
id e n t i f ie d  at least f iv e  re q u is i te  conditions for the
successful function of the classic balance of power.*’ 3
F i r s t ,  there was a s u f f ic ie n t ly  large number Df independent
states to make a l l iance  formation and dissolution readily
possible. Second, European diplomats shared in a common
p o l i t ic a l  culture that permitted a moral consensus regarding
the rules of the game to be observed in both peace and war.
Third, the in ternat lona1 system was limited to a
geographi c a l1y confined area of the globe. Societies in the
Middle East, A fr ica,  and Asia were important only insofar as
they f i t  within the objectives of European foreign po lic ies .
A fourth requirement was the a v a i l a b i l i t y  of a weapons
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technology which inhibited  quick: mobilization -for war,
prevented the pursuit of prolonged wars, and reduced the
prospects of wars of ann ih i la t ion . F i f th ,  there was freedom
of action for the central dec 1 si on-makers of the states in
the system. These e l i t e s  were largely  unaffected by the
dictates  of public opinion, the need to consider ideological
values, or the domestic costs of foreign policy commitments.
In conjunction with these primary conditions, several
other aspects of the classic balance of power can be
id e n t i f ie d .  As a ru le ,  Great B r i ta in  played the t ra d it io n a l
ro le  of the "balancer" as i t  threw i t s  support toward one or
another coa l i t ion  to assure that no one bloc achieved
predominance.'** In addition, the balance of power was
regu lar ly  interpreted as a mechanical, se l f - regu la t ing
p rin c ip le  ( i . e . ,  a system-derived impulse toward s t a b i l i t y
that occurred automatical ly) .  Furthermore, a l l iances in the
classic balance of power were not based on friendships or
permanent lo y a l t ie s ,  but on ever-changing " interests" and
"capabi1i 11e s ."
The balance of power of that period was amoral 
rather than immoral. The technical rules of the 
art of p o l i t ic s  were i t s  only standjrd. I ts  
f l e x i b i l i t y  was the resu lt  of imperviousness to 
moral considerations, such as good fa i th  and 
lo ya l ty ,  a moral deficiency which to us seems 
deserving of reproach.*0
Before turning to Morgenthau's analysis of changes in 
the balance of power structure over time, i t  bears repeating 
that he considered the maintenance of the balance of power
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in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and Asia as America's 
fi;;ed national in te res t .  As his survey o-f American 
diplomatic h istory suggested, even American statesmen (e .g . ,  
Jefferson, Wilson, and Franl 1 in Roosevelt) who rejected the 
p r in c ip le  in thought were somehow compelled to accept i t s  
inescapable logic in practice. The United States,
Morgenthau asserted, entered both world wars (regardless o-f 
the ideological ju s t i f i c a t io n )  with the c o n v i c t i o n  that the 
triumph of any one nation in Europe would put the very 
safety of the United States in the Western Hemisphere in 
jeopardy. In addition, he argued that the balance of power 
ra t io n a le  shaped America's m i l i ta ry  and p o l i t ic a l  
containment of the Soviet th re a t ,  armed intervention in 
Korea, and diplomatic goals in the Middle East.^* His 
opposition to American involvement in the Vietnam War 
stemmed in part from a conviction that pol icy-ittakers lost  
sight of the t ra d it io n a l  goal in Asia, which would require a 
spheres of influence agreement with Red China— preservation  
of the balance of power.’ 7
The century-and-a-half from 1015 un t i l  the Second World 
War saw the gradual e tenuon of *■ European balance of 
power- into a worldwide system. Morgenthau referred  to three  
important structural  changes in the tra d it io n a l  or classic  
balance of power.
— The reduction in the number of states able to play a 
major ro le  in i nternat lona1 p o l i t ic s  has deprived the
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balance Df power o-f much o-f i ts  - f le x ib i l i ty  and 
uncertainty. The - f le x ib i l i ty  of the classic balance of 
power resulted from the u n re l ia b i l i ty  of a lliances  
which made i t  imperative for the major actors to be 
cautious and limited in th e ir  moves.’ " The disparity  
in power between major and minor nations is  so 
pronounced that the la t te r  have lost the ir  a b i l i t y  to 
t ip  the scales or provide e f fec t ive  barr iers to the 
l im it less  aspirations for power.
—No nation or combination of nations can be expected to 
perform Breat B r i ta in 's  t rad i t iona l  role of "balancer" 
in the bipolar distr ibut ion of power. Following the 
Second World War, Morgenthau doubted whether any third  
force (e .g . ,  DeGaulle^s France, a united Europe, or 
nonaligned Third World) was sim ilar ly  detached and 
strong enough to exert a decisive influence on the 
foreign policy of e ither superpower.”
— The disappearance of the colonial f ro n t ie r  throughout 
the twentieth century has rendered the classic balance 
of power obsolete. Prior to the F irs t  World War, great 
powers could deflect their r i v u l i 1es from their mutual 
f ron t ie rs  to the po lit ica l ly-em pty spaces of Africa or 
Asia. As the balance of power became worldwide, 
however, the dichotomy between the center and the 
periphery disappeared. In the developing world, the 
issue is  not primarily the projection of diplomatic
leverage or the conquest of t e r r i t o r y ,  but rather a 
struggle between conf l ic t ing  ideologies and ways of 
l i f e .  * 0 0
Morgenthau' s assessment of the balance of power and i t s  
app1ic a b i1l t y  to postwar internat ional  p o l i t ic s  is  both 
enigmatic and r ipe  with ambivalence. Admittedly, he 
acknowledged that the p ro l i fe ra t io n  of nuclear capab i l i ty  
has led to a much more comple;; d is tr ib u t io n  of global power. 
However, "the in s t a b i l i t y  of the international balance of 
power," he believed, "is due not to the fau l t iness  of the 
p r in c ip le  but to the p art icu lar  conditions under which the 
p r in c ip le  must operate in a society of sovereign 
n a t io n s ." 101 Par ado;: l cal 1 y , Morgenthau discussed the 
eclipse of the classic balance of power and simultaneously 
affirmed that the "underlying principles" involved in 
maintaining the balance of power remained va lid  throughout 
11 me.
While convinced that the o r ln c ip 1e of balance of power 
can be found at a l l  levels of social in teract ion , Morgenthau 
is  much less ins truc t ive  regarding i t s  function and value in 
poe,t war g 1 ob a 1 a f fa i r : - . .  H is  own invent or y of the 
l im ita t io n s  and weaknesses of the concept is  divorced from 
any sustained discussion of how the balance may be expected 
to operate in l ig h t  of developments that point to i ts  
obsolescence. Four basic l im ita t io n s  may be c ited .
F i r s t ,  the idea of the balance of power " is  a metaphor
taken from the -field of mechanics. . . , " However, any such 
mechanical equilibrium must possess a recognizable
quant ita t ive  c r i te r io n  by which power can be compared. What
makes the balance of power inherently  uncertain, Morgenthau 
believed, is  the r e la t iv e  imprecision involved in 
calculat ing such intangible components of power as national 
morale and character of government.102
Second, Morgenthau believed that "the uncertainty of 
a l l  power calculations not only makes the balance of power 
incapable of pract ica l application but le a d s . . . to  i t s  very 
negation in pract ice . 1,103 Even during the heyday of the 
classic balance of power, the concept was open to at least 
two 1nterpretat  1ons. I t  could s ign ify  e i ther  equal11v of 
power (e .g . ,  as B ri ta in  or the United States t r ie d  to
maintain in Europe) or superlor lty  of power (e .g . ,  as the
United States sought in the Western Hemisphere since the 
early nineteenth century). Morgenthau recognized, however, 
that the object ive of complete balance or equivalence in 
power is a dubious prospect for any nation. Because no 
nation can be certa in  that i t s  calculat ion of the 
d is tr ib u t io n  of power at any one time is correct, po licy­
makers tend to err on the side of preserving an ample margin 
of safety in amassing the power necessary to counter the 
power of r iv a ls .  1° ‘'  By equating the balance with 
superior i ty ,  preventive war between nations becomes a 
natural tendency of the balance of power.10*
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Realism and Raison D 'etat
Morgenthan7s p o l i t ic a l  realism and i ts  normative 
ra t io n a le  represent a forceful testament to both power and 
in terest  backed by power as the crowning essence of 
1nternat1ona1 p o l i t ic s .  C r i t ic s  of his internat ional  
thought are quick to deplore what is  perceived to be an 
admixture of Machiavellian and Hobbesian sentiments 
l im it in g ,  or perhaps sa c r i f ic in g ,  the positive force of 
moral conviction in a tragic social drama from which man has 
no escape. From th is  vantage point, Morgenthau is  often 
viewed as a modern advocate of ralson d '£ t a t . As a leading 
theorist of in ternat ional  re la t ions  has written: "From
Machiavelli to Meinecke and Morgenthau the elements of the 
approach and reasoning remain cons is ten t ."110 As emphasized 
in Chapter One, the concept of raison d' £tat in foreign  
policy has stressed: (1) the statesman's in terest  in s e l f -
preservation as the primary determinant of action; <2> the 
unregulated r iv a l r y  of states in an anarchic environment;
(3) the standard of success as the guide for expedient 
p o l i t ic a l  action; (4) the trag ic  presence of ev i l  in a l l  
p o l i t ic s ;  and (5) the exemption of p o l i t ic a l  action from 
ethical  l im i t a t i  ons.
While c r i t i c s  and commentators have correc tly  singled 
out numerous problems in Morgenthau's theory of 
international p o l i t ic s ,  few have wrestled with the more 
challenging issue of the philosophy or conception of
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p o l i t ic a l  ethics underlying the theory. This neglect is  
p a r t ic u la r ly  acute in l ig h t  of Morgenthau's re jec t ion  of 
classical raison d * £tat as a basis for calcu lat ing the moral 
dignity of American national in teres t  in world a f fa i r s .  I t  
is  a d is to rt ion  and gross oversim pl if icat ion  of Morgenthau's 
work to conclude that he epitomizes the European legacy of 
Realpol11 i k with i t s  in t r in s ic  denial of ethical constraints  
upon the statesman. Admittedly, one can detect the s p i r i t  
of a Machiavelli or Hobbes (not to mention A r is to t le ,  St. 
Augustine, Burke, Niebuhr and other thinkers) in certain  
facets of his appraisal of human nature and p o l i t ic a l  
society. What Morgenthau e x p l ic i t l y  disavowed, however, was 
the idea that  the primacy of s e l f - in te re s t  and power at a l l  
leve ls of human conduct is  exempted from the ineradicable  
moral impulse of man to submit p o l i t i c a l  action to ethical  
evaluat1 on.
Such ear 1y texts as S c ie n t i f ic  Man vs. Power P o l i t ic s  
and P o l i t ic s  Among Nations c le a r ly  demonstrated Morgenthau's 
understanding of ra i  son d * 6 t a t . as i t  was revealed in the 
theories and practices of such European statesmen as 
Richelieu, Frederick the Great, and Bismarck. Once again, 
however, i t  must be re i te ra te d  that Morgenthau acknowledged 
the paradox that European raison d ' £tat was often ju s t i f ie d  
according to normative assumptions about human nature and 
p o l i t ic s  that he, himself, invoked as integral to American 
p o l i t ic a l  re a l i  sm. His appreciation of America's l ib e r a l -
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democratic ideals and the re la t ion  of those values to United 
States -foreign policy led him to recoil from the ethical  
dualism evident in European raison dJ £ ta t . In his f i r s t  
comprehensive t re a t is e  on American foreign policy, In 
Defense of the National In te res t . Morgenthau insisted:
"The choice is not between moral principles and the national 
in t e r e s t . . .but between one set of principles divorced from 
p o l i t ic a l  r e a l i t y ,  and another set o f . . . p r inc lp1es derived 
from p o l i t ic a l  r e a l i t y . " 111
Throughout his career, Morgenthau devoted considerable 
attention to r iv a l  ethical perspectives in both classical 
and modern p o l i t ic a l  philosophy.111' Vet i t  remains 
d i f f i c u l t  to associate clear ly  the many strands of his own 
thinking with any one particu lar  school of ethics or moral 
reasoning. In analyzing competing ethical orientations, his 
observations were often cast in summary form and influenced 
by the re la t iv e  deficiencies associated with a l ternat ive  
philosophical conceptions of human nature and p o l i t ic s .  
Morgenthau believed that "the history of p o l i t ic a l  thought 
is  the history of the moral evaluation of p o l i t ic a l  
power. "11 ®
For our purposes, i t  is instructive to concentrate on 
Morgenthau7s treatment of the national in terest as a problem 
in p o l i t ic a l  ethics. The lingering remnants of idealism and 
utopianism in United States diplomatic history reinforced 
Morgenthairs conviction that American statesmen have
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pers is tent ly  mi sunderstood the nature of foreign policy and
i t s  moral s ignif icance . In p a r t ic u la r .  American moral
judgment has been corrupted by imagining that the tension
between foreign policy and morality , always evident in
immediate experience, could eas i ly  be made to disappear in
favor of more non-violent, harmonious forms of internat ional
cooperation. This is i l lu s t ra te d  by the American temptation
to v isua lize  the foreign policy process in mutually
ex elusive terms:
□n the one side, there is  the r e a l i s t ,  the 
Machiavellian bargainer, who conceives of foreign  
p o l i c y . . . i n  terms of power and for whom the 
end. . . j l ist  1 f i ed the means employed; on the other 
side, there is  the moral 1s t . . .  whose a b i l i t y  to 
bargain i s . . .circumscribed.. .by his insistence  
upon pr inc ip les  which must be re f lec ted  in the 
bargain but cannot be made i t s  o b je c t .11"*
From the horizon of p o l i t ic a l  ethics, th is  fa lse  dichotomy
points to the dilemma of t ry ing to reconcile the statesman’ s
obligation to protect the in teres ts  of the national
community and his loya lty  to values and ideals transcending
the national community. Fundamental to Morgenthau7s e f fo r t
to bridge th is  gap are his c r i t iq u e  of raison d7 £t at and his
"sense of transcendence" regarding the moral input into
foreign policy.
The philosophy of raison d ’ £ t a t . Morgenthau asserted,
is  betrayed by the error of d i f fe re n t ia t in g  the p o l i t ic a l
sphere, from the pr ivate,  for purposes of ethical
e v a lu a t io n .110 In matters of foreign policy,  the state is
subject to no ru le of conduct but the one which is dictated
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by i t s  own s e H - in te r e s t .  Sal us pub 1 i ca suprema 1 e>i.
Ethical prohib it ions,  as proponents of ra i  son d' 6tat
believed, are v i t ia te d  by the statesman's obligation  to
pur sue nat i onal goals, de-f l ned l n terms of power ,
successfully in a world devoid of substantive multinational
norms. While an ind iv idua l 's  moral nature may be ref lected
in pr iva te  l i f e ,  p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  is  free of such ethical
l im ita t io n s  and is  immoral by nature. This dual standard of
morality was s t r ik in g ly  formulated by one of the greatest
11a1ian statesman, Cavour, when he said: " I t  we had done f or
ourselves what we have done for I t a ly ,  what scoundrels we
would have been."11** In no uncertain terms, Morgenthau
summarised his objection to raison d'£ ta t  by saying:
The importance of th is  conception has been 
l i t e r a r y  rather than p ra c t ica1 . . . . P o l l t lc a 1 
philosophy from the Greeks to our time has started  
with the assumption that man in the p o l i t ic a l  
sphere is  not allowed to act as he pleases and 
that his action must conform to a standard higher 
than. . . suecess. I t  has even made th is  conformity
the test  of leg it imate p o l i t ic a l  power. . . .  As the 
1 es; Sal i c a put i t :  "King thou w i l l  be i f  thou
follow the law. I f  thou do nr,f follow the law, 
thou w i l l  not be k in g ."117
Morgenthau’ s rejection  of the dual moral standard 
embodied in ra i  son d' £ t. a t raises the more problematic issue 
of his own conception regarding the moral basis of a l l  
p o l i t ic a l  conduct. Morgenthau was certa in ly  no p o s i t iv is t ,  
who considered moral questions as ei ther unreal or only 
subjective preferences to be invoked with ideological  
passion. While never denying that  normative systems of
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thought frequently function as subterfuges to ra t io n a l iz e  an
in d iv idu a l 's  lust for power, he toot seriously the ro le of
morality in c o n f l ic ts  of power.
P o l i t ic a l  ethics i s . . . t h e  ethics of doing 
e v i1 . . . . Neither science nor ethics nor p o l i t ic s  
can resolve th is  c o n f l ic t  between p o l i t ic s  and 
ethics into harmony. . . .  To know with despair that  
the p o l i t ic a l  act is  inev i tab ly  e v i l ,  and to act 
nevertheless is  moral courage. To choose among 
several expedient actions the least ev il  one is  
moral j udgment. 11•
For Morgenthau, the popular juxtaposit ion of "power"
p o l i t ic s  and "moral" p o l i t ic s  is  fundamentally mistaken. fit
the basis of th is  juxtaposit ion, he f e l t ,  was the optimistic
b e l ie f  in the in t r in s ic  goodness of the ra t ional individual
and the pessimistic conviction that p o l i t ic s  is  the seat of
a l l  i r r a t i onal i ty and e v i l .  However, the opposition between
man and society is "a mere f igure  of speech" in that  " i t  is
always the individual who acts, e i ther  with reference to his
ends alone or with reference to the ends of o th e rs ." 11**’
Morgenthau suggested that the d if ference  in moral character
between a p r iva te ,  as over against a p o l i t i c a l ,  action is a
rel  at ive  one and devoid of the absoluteness wh i ch
contemporary doctrine a t t r ibu te s  to i t .  Commenting on the
ethica l quality  of p o l i t ic a l  conduct, he wrote:
. . . t h e  p o l i t ic a l  actor h a s . . .a  general moral 
respons ib i l i ty  to act w ise ly . . .and  for him 
expediency becomes a moral duty.. . .What is  here 
done with good intentions but unwisely and .. .w ith  
disastrous results is morally defective, for  i t  
violates  the ethics of respons ib i l i ty  to which a l l  
action affect ing  others and. . . p o l i t ic a l  action par 
excel 1 ence is  subject. 1580
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Many students of Horgenthau's thought have
under st andab1y f ound a troubling amb i va1ence in his
r el at i onsh i p of in te res t  and p r in c ip le .  For e:: amp 1 e , one
c r i t i c  notes that "the overa l1 impact of Morgenthau’ s
writ ing  is  to maintain a separation of the p o l i t ic a l  sphere
and the moral sphere, though judgments are made about the
immorality of p o l i t i c s . " 131 At times, his terminology ( i f
not his thought) tends to portray the moral dilemma of
p o l i t ic s  in rather extreme terms. Surely, Morgenthau's
objective to a f f irm , yet l im i t ,  the boundaries of moral
choice in public l i f e  appears suspect in l igh t  of such
categorical observations as:
The invocation of moral p r inc ip les  for the support 
of national po lic ies  is always and of necessity a 
pretense. 133
I t  is  i mpossib1e . . .  to be a successful p o l i t ic ia n  
and a good Chr i s t la n . 133
There is  no escape from the ev il  of power 
regardless of what one does. Whenever we act with 
reference to our fe llow men, we must s in . . . .T h e  
p o l i t ic a l  act is  inev itably e v i l . 13*
The unqualified character of these "musts" and
"inev itab les ,"  together with his trag ic  perspective on the
human condition, have le f t  Morgenthau vulnerable to the
accusation of surrendering to Machiavellian cynicism.
Mor genthau ' s somet l mes-e;: treme accentuation of the
"autonomy of p o l i t ic s "  and "paramountcy of the national
in terest"  in foreign policy must also be evaluated within
the context of his stern denunciation of le g a l is t ic  and
moralistic  approaches to internat ional  p o l i t ic s .  In taking 
strong exception to the pretentious idealism of these 
approaches, he seemed to jeopardise his own case tor the 
morality a-f p o l i t ic a l  action. Elsewhere in his w ri t ing ,  
however, Morgenthau was more restrained and informative  
about the? ethical -failure o-f p o l i t ic a l  idealism and the link: 
between morality and public policy. From an ethical  
standpoint, the id e a l is t  in p o l i t ic s  erred in assuming "that 
the princ ip les  of morality have the same substantive quality' 
a s . . . th e  pr inc ip les  of p o l i t ic s ,  economics, or la w ." l2B In 
the arena of internat ional  p o l i t ic s ,  the id e a l is t  
jeopardizes the national in terest  by promoting world- 
embracing pr inc ip les  which are too vague and general to 
provide guidance to policy (e .g . ,  "defend and promote 
democracy" or "freedom and the r igh ts  of man"). This 
approach only strains  re la t ions ,  worsens c o n f l ic ts  of 
in terests  by investing them with moral content, and results  
at the end in a moral crusade. 1 '•**'
While the id e a l is t  dichotomizes and u lt im ate ly  
substitutes the princ ip les  of morality for those of 
p o l i t ic s ,  Morgenthau refused to consider morality as just  
another branch of human a c t iv i t y ,  coordinate with other 
substantive in te l le c tu a l  d isc ip l ines .  To the contrary, 
mor al 11 y "is super i mposed upon them, l im it ing  the choice of 
ends and means and delineating the leg it im ate sphere of a 
p art ic u la r  branch of action a l to g e th e r ." 1^ ' This
restra in ing  function is espec ia lly  important in the 
p o l i t ic a l  sphere, he argued, "tor the p o l i t ic a l  actor is  
pecu l iar ly  tempted to blind himself to the l im its  ot his 
power and to overstep the boundaries ot both prudence and 
m o ra l i ty .”128 Based on th is  logic, Morgenthau could label 
rai  son d * £ t  at a "figure of speech" insofar as: ""The moves
and countermoves in the struggle for . . .pow er must be 
i n t e l l i g i b l e  as a d ia le c t ic  movement toward the re a l iza t io n  
of j u s t i c e . " 1^
Unfortunately, many c r i t i c s  of Morgenthau"s work have 
gone l i t t l e  further  than offer ing a summary c r i t iq u e  of the 
broad pr inc ip les  and concepts shaping his r e a l is t  theory of 
in ternational p o l i t ic s .  The wi del y--hel d assumption that he 
has simply updated Hobbes does Morgenthau serious in jus t ice .  
He was aware of th is  popular fa l la c y  and acknowledged: 
"Disregarding the voluminous evidence, some ot them have 
picked a few words out of th e ir  content to prove that 
realism in internat ional  a f fa i r s  is unprincipled and 
contemptuous of m o ra l l ty ." 130 P a r t ic u la r ly  troubling for 
some c r i t i c s  was his reference to the dictum of Hobbes that  
"there is neither morality nor law outside the s ta te ."  Not 
so widely reported was his observation that: "Universal
moral pr inc ip les ,  such as ju s t ice  and equality ,  are capable 
of guiding p o l i t ic a l  action to the extent that they have 
been given concrete content and. . . r e 1 ated to p o l i t ic a l  
situations by s o c ie ty ." 131 Indeed, Morgenthau has always
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maint ai ned that the actians of states are sub 3 ect to 
un i versal mora1 p r1nc1p1es. I t  is  possible to id e n t i fy  f iv e  
basic themes or concepts on the basis of which Morgenthau' s 
ideas on in ternat ional morality d if fered  from those of 
Hobbes.
1. Cosmic H um il ity . While Morgenthau considered
national in te res t  as the perennial standard by which foreign
policy must be judged and directed,, he also affirmed the
requirement of cosmic humility with regard to the moral
evaluation of states. Such a standard obliges the realist.
to view the moral s ignificance of p o l i t ic a l  action as a
product of the ineluctable tension between the moral command
and the requirements of p o l i t ic a l  success. "To know that
states are subject to the moral law is one thing; to pretend
to know what is  morally required of states in a p art icu lar
s itua t ion  is quite another," 132 Throughout h is tory,
statesmen have often yielded to the temptation of
id en t i fy ing  the moral aspirations of a p ar t ic u la r  nation
with the moral laws that govern the universe.
The lighthearted equation between a part icu la r  
nationalism and the counsels of Providence is  
morally indpfenc! b ] p . . . fo r  i t  is  l ia b le  to 
engender the d is to rt ion  of judgment which, in the 
blindness of crusading frenzy, destroys nations 
and c iv i l i z a t io n s — in the name of moral p r in c ip le ,  
ideal,  or God h im s e lf .1,3
In one respect, therefore, the gap between moral p r inc ip le
and p o l i t ic a l  expedience functions as a brake on the
temptation to pretense and hypocrisy.
Mor a111 y As A System Of Restraint s■ Morgenthau’ s 
awareness ot the "irremediable Q&P" between "the moral ideal 
and the tacts ot p o l i t ic a l  l i t e "  was also qua l if ied  by his 
b e l ie f  that there are moral absolutes that are not to be 
trespassed under any circumstances in the pursuit of 
national in te re s t .  "Moral rules do not permit certain  
pol ic ies  to be considered at a l l  from the point of view of 
expediency." 134 Into th is  category. Morgenthau included 
pol ic ies  of mass extermination and the t i l l i n g  of c iv i l ia n  
populations in war. C r i t ic s  raise a leg it im ate point of 
debate by re fe rr in g  to Morgenthau’ s often categorical 
formulation of the moral dilemma in a l l  p o l i t ic a l  action. 
Paradoxically, i t  is  th is  "irremediable gaP" that Morgenthau 
wished to transcend when he wrote: "Certain things are not
to be done on moral grounds, even though i t  would be 
expedient to do them."13B
In re la t in g  moral re s tra in ts  to p o l i t ic s ,  Morgenthau 
echoed Burke’ s vision of prudent statesmanship. The ro le  of 
prudence for Morgenthau, as for burP.e, was that of adjusting  
p r inc ip le  to circumstance. "There can be no p o l i t ic a l  
morality without prudence.. .without consideration of the 
p o l i t ic a l  consequences of seemingly moral action. 11136 
Prudence, therefore, becomes an important procedural 
standard i f  policy ends are to be made consistent with 
policy means.
3. Mor a 1 11 y And 1 he P'r agmat l c Ang 1 p-Amer i can Tradition .
Morgenthau7s emphasis on prudence in policy-making was 
para lle led  by his preference for the pragmatic q u a l i t ies  of 
the Anglo-American p o l i t ic a l  t ra d i t io n .  In contrast to the 
philosophic polemics characterizing the debate between 
raison d7 £ta t  and mor al pr incip les  on the European 
continent, the p o l i t ic a l  theory of the English-speak 1ng 
peoples developed “not in comprehensive systematic e f fo r ts  
but in a series of debates concerned with the pract ica l  
merits of l im ited concrete issues ."1*'3'7' As a series of cases 
debated in the forum of public opinion, the Anglo-American 
approach exhibited: (1) the preference for empirical
procedures aiming at immediate pract ica l results over 
theoretical consistency: (2) the a b i l i t y  to see in any
concrete issue the instance of a general proposition rather 
than empirical proof for a pr i or 1 abstrac1 1 ons; and ( 3 )  the 
prominence of public debate determining a decision in l ig h t  
of the rat ional merits of the case. In lnternat lonal  
p o l i t ic s ,  universal norms must always be f i l t e r e d  through 
circumstances of time and place which l im i t  th e ir  
applicat ion. In his "Fragment of an In te l le c tu a l  
Biography," Morgenthau summarized his position by saving: 
"This aversion to a dogmatism that sacr if ices  pragmatic 
effectiveness for logical or ideological consistency ha? 
remained a persistent element of my in te l le c tu a l  
at t  i t ude . 11 3t*
4. Forei qn F’ol icy And T r anscendent P r in c ip le s . Often
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neglected by 1nternat1ona1 re la t io n s  scholars also was 
Morgenthau-' 5 own "sense 0+ transcendence"; th is  served both 
to i l lum inate and to complicate his thinking on foreign  
policy norms. Perhaps one reason why th is  part icu lar  theme 
has fa i le d  to stimulate much debate is that Morgenthau’ 5 
transcendent frame of reference is  admittedly vague, more 
im p l ic i t  than e x p l ic i t ,  and without c lea r ly  defined roots in 
any phii1osophical or theological system. Nowhere does he 
ex pi i c i t i y  develop a transcendent internat ional p o l i t ic a l  
ethic or a normative calculus by which to rank and evaluate 
a lte rn a t iv e  ethical objectives in world p o l i t ic s .  By 
neglecting to further  develop the transcendent source of 
applicable universal norms in foreign policy, his "sense of 
transcendence" tends to function as an indiscriminate  
standard of ana1ys1s; at most, 11 provides a negat1ve
judgment on sinfu l man while f a i l in g  to af f irm  the posit ive  
moral potentia l of the prudent statesman. For those 
detractors who ind ic t  Morgenthau as a modern spokesman tor 
rai  son d •" £ t  a t . his insistence on the l im i ta t i  ons of mor al 1 t y 
in p o l i t ic s  ta les  precedence over the fact that he could 
never f u l l y  escape the judgment made by transcendent norms 
upon every p o l i t i c a l l y  expedient act.
From Morgenthau's perspective, the p o l i t ic a l  realm is a 
d ia le c t ic a l  f ie ld :  i t  is animated by the in terp lay  between
the farces ot s e l f - in te re s t  ( i . e . ,  the lust for power) and 
i t s  ethical denial,  in the form of universal moral
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principles. Morgenthau’ s char act er i z at 1 on o-f the dilemma, 
however, leaves one in doubt about the re la t iv e  significance  
of either pole. Contrast, for example, his frequent 
assertion that "po li t ics  is interest defined in terms ot 
power" and his less widely-quoted statement, that "po lit ica l  
action can be defined as an attempt to real ice moral values 
through the medium of p o l i t ic s ,  that is ,  power. 1 1:”  The 
s t 111-d1f f i c u l t  question for students of foreign policy 
concerns the e::tent to which Morgenthau introduced norms to 
direct and judge interest from a moral vantage point beyond 
the operative polit ical,  r e a l i t y  of the nation. In other 
words, is the parochial national interest the ultimate and 
exclusive standard from which a l l  principles derive'1
Despite Morgenthau7s observation that "moral 
p r in c ip le s . . .must be derived from p o l i t ic a l  practice and not 
imposed on i t , "  one could plausibly argue that his
discussion of the national interest could not help but
invoke transcendent norms as a d is t inc t ive  force in the l i f e  
ot nations. In denying the application of any c r i t e r ia  for 
judging state behavior, other than those derived from 
nn] i t i  rai necesci+y, the re a l is t  must end up =■ cynic. Vet , 
Morgenthau was anything but a confirmed cynic, even i t  he 
never e:: plained how or why such norms entered into his view
of the national in terest .  Two vivid examples w i l l
i l lu s t r a t e  the presence of this ambiguity in his thinking.
In seeking to defend the primacy of the national
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in terest  in -foreign policy, Morgenthau repeatedly objected
to the pretentious hypocrisy of America's presumed innocence
and v ir tu e .  Yet, i r o n ic a l ly ,  his objection to moral
pretense in foreign policy seemed to in fer  a standard of
evaluation beyond any p art icu la r  conception ot the national
in te re s t .  One scholar, documenting Morgenthau' 5
transcendent frame of reference, suggested:
The charge of hypocr i sy is  a mor al charge not a 
p o l i t ic a l  judgment. I t  is  to protest that a man 
Cor nation! is not what he pretends to be, 
a n d . . . i s  not as moral as he pretends to be. I f  
the only standard for judging the behavior ot 
states were national in te re s t ,  one would not 
l i k e ly  accuse the pretentious statesman of 
hypocrisy, a term laden with moral censure.140
I f  the charge of hypocrisy were to be interpreted as an
expedient p o l i t i c a l  action, then one would have expected
Morgenthau to accept the adherence to moral claims, l i f e  the
wielding ot the sword, as ju s t i f i a b le  when i t  was in the
nat1onal 1nterest to do so. From a pur ely p o l i t ic a l
standpoint, the pretense to v ir tu e  in s ta te c ra ft  would more
l ik e ly  be condemned, not by reference to moral hypocrisy,
but as an imprudent act of sheer p o l i t ic a l  s t u p id i t y .1'*1 In
other words, without recourse to moral judgment transcending
interest., Morgenthau’ 5 position would !'=■• compatible with
ra i  son d ' 61 at..
S im i la r ly ,  Morgenthau's emphasis on the paramount
1mportance of d1p1omac y as an element of nat1 on al power
displayed a curious mix of propositions, again based on both
p o l i t i c a l  s e l f - in te r e s t  and transcendent moral pr inciples .
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On the one hand, diplomacy must re f le c t  (even as i t  t r ie s  to
moderate) antagonistic in terests  in a world devoid o-f any
moral consensus on operative internat ional norms.
"Diplomacy, however morally unattract ive  i t s  business may
seem to many, is  nothing but a symptom o-f the struggle for
power among sovereign states. 1,142
At the same time, Morgenthau never envisioned diplomacy
as merely an inventory of amoral methods capable of being
placed in the service of any system of values. Morgenthau
treated diplomacy i t s e l f  as a kind of norm, directed by
certain  motives toward certain  goals:
The objective of foreign policy is r e la t iv e  and 
conditional: to bend, not to break:, the w i l l  of
the other s i d e . . . i n  order to safeguard one's own 
v i ta l  in terests  without hurting those of the other 
side. The methods of foreign policy are re la t iv e  
and conditional: not to advance by destroying the 
obstacles in one's way, but to re trea t  before 
them .. .to  soften and dissolve them...by means of 
negotiation and pressure.
Yet these diplomatic norms are anything but se lf -ev ident  in
Morgenthau's re l iance  upon the national in terest  as a moral-
f ree  guide to foreign policy. Morgenthau's idea that the
national in teres t  demands a moderate and restrained
diplomacy to help create an i nternational society conducive
to democratic values did not escape the "invocation of moral
p r in c ip le ,"  so much as i t  invested the national interest
with moral c o n te n t .1,4
These examples culminate in a conception of national
in terest  that embodied a notion of purpose tha t ,  by i ts
: .i 1
nature, must transcend pure s e l f - in te r e s t .  How is one to 
account for th is  im p l ic i t  normative dimension in the 
workings of the national in te re s t ,  in l ig h t  of Morgenthau’ s 
periodic tendency to recoil from universal pr inciples  in 
foreign policy? A good case can be made for the contention 
that these bold af f irmations of the national in terest  purged 
of pretentious moral content do not f a i r l y  represent 
Morgenthau1 s thought. Indeed, Morgenthau made i t  clear that  
he had no objection to residual ethical considerations 
l im it in g  the statesman's duty to promote national security .  
Instead, he took exception to the id e a l is t ic  t ra d i t io n  of 
applying universal moral pr inc ip les  to the actions of states 
without due regard for the p o l i t ic a l  ef fec ts  of avowedly 
moral action. Summarizing Morgenthau's outlook on the moral 
requirements of foreign policy, one commentator has 
observed:
More than Niebuhr, Morgenthau is  inclined to say 
that p o l i t i c s . . . involves a choice of lesser e v i ls .
These are fa te fu l  choices that involve not so much 
the balancing of r inhts against r ights as 
judgments about which course ot action is least  
l i k e ly  to bring harmful r e s u l t s . ,4B
In seeking to fashion an acceptable p o l i t ic a l  eth ic,
MoryenLhau emphasized Luo ways in which transcendent norms 
influence the pursuit of narrow s e l f - in te r e s t .  F i rs t ,  these 
princ ip les  serve as the relevant, objective, and constant 
goal of p o l i t ic a l  l i f e .  "Both individual and s ta te  must 
judge p o l i t ic a l  action by universal moral pr inc ip les ,  such 
as that of 1 iberty.  1,146 Admittedly, th is  theme is not
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always present or stated unequivocally in his published 
work. Furthermore, given the absence o-f a moral consensus 
in world p o l i t ic s ,  Morgenthau provided l i t t l e  indication of 
the type o-f new polic ies  or instrum entalit ies  that could 
generate mutual moral sympathies regarding transnational 
p o l i t ic a l  issues. In a statement distinguished not only tor 
i t s  candor but also by a l ingering moral hope tor mankind, 
he wrote: " . . . a s  there can be no permanent peace without a
world state, there can be no world state without 
t h e . . . community-bui1ding processes of diplomacy." 147
Second, Morgenthau's "sense of transcendence" re l ied  on 
uni ver sal mor al princ ip les  to expose and moderate the 
temptation to hypocrit ical pretense in foreign policy. At 
th is  leve l ,  morality functioned more as a judgmental 
re s t ra in t  than a contro ll ing  end-in-view. The prudent 
statesman capable of distinguishing between "the misery of 
p o l i t ic s "  and the realm of universal ethical norm is less 
apt to commit the sin of the Fascist mind: the equation of 
" p o l i t ic a l  and m il i ta ry  success with moral s u p e r io r i ty ." l4H 
Therefore, the absolute p r in c ip le  (or, at least ,  i t s  
recognition) prevents ac.tc of gros^ immoral ] tv .  while at t Kr- 
same time ident ify ing  every p o l i t ic a l  act as in fact  
p o l i t ic a l  and inconsistent with the moral law.
In sum, Morgenthau7 s e f fo r t  to re la te  in terest  and 
princ ip le  in internat ional p o l i t ic s  was often clouded in 
ambiguity. Early in his career, he rejected classical
rai son d* H a t  as an in te l le c tu a l  dead-end that was -founded 
on the a r t i f i c i a l  separation of p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  from man’ s 
inherently moral nature. Yet his own s ta te -c e n tr ic  theory 
of internat ional p o l i t ic s  re f lec ted  a number of propositions 
and concepts tra d it io n a l  1y id e n t i f ie d  with a Machiavellian  
or Hobbesian worldview. Not surprising ly,  the
contradictions and inconsistencies inherent in Morgenthau’ s 
position on internat ional  morality have spawned d i f fe re n t  
1nterpretations of his position. Some, for example, decry 
his insistence that " in terest  is  the perennial standard by 
which p o l i t ic a l  action must be judged and d irected."  More 
sympathetic colleagues share in his be l ie f  that: " . . . a l l
human actions in some way are subject to moral judgment. We 
cannot act but morally because we are men,. . . " ‘ * ¥
I f  Morgenthau' s position continues to raise doubts 
about the moral s ignificance of p o l i t ic a l  action, th is  is  
largely due to the relat ionship between his estimate of 
man's nature and the use ot transcendent norms in p o l i t ic a l  
analysis. Up to a point, Mor genthau" s view u-f human nature* 
para lle led  Reinhold Niebuhr’ s depiction of man’ s trag ic  
s itua t ion .  For Morgenthau, "the lust for power" was a 
"ubiquitous empirical fa c t ."  In a revealing passage, he 
noted: "For no social action can be completely free of the
ta in t  of egotism which, as selfishness, pride, or s e l f -  
deception, seeks for the actor more than is his due.
Niebuhr objected to Morgenthau1' s rather f a t a l i s t i c
■formulation o-f man’ s moral predicament, since i t  ignored th 
p o te n t ia l ly  crea t ive  presence o-f the human w i l l .  To w i l l  
e v i l ,  Niebuhr believed, implied the -freedom to w i l l  the 
good. ieai
Furthermore, Morgenthau’ s pessimistic view ot man 
raises an additional d i f f i c u l t y .  The pervasive ev i l  in 
human nature and p o l i t ic s  rendered his formal ethic so 
transcendent that i t  could not eas i ly  function as a v i ta l  
force d irect ing man’ s creative energies in an imperfect 
world. Morgenthau asserted that “a l l  nations stand under 
the judgment of God," but he also acknowledged that God's 
w il l  is "inscrutable to the human mind." Morgenthau 
believed that operative p o l i t i c a l  norms are u l t im ate ly  
derived from transcendent eth ica l pr incip les;  however, he 
was less i l lum inat ing  on how, and to what degree, these 
princ ip les  are capable ot guiding p o l i t ic a l  action when 
d1st orted by the in s t i tu t io n s  of s inful man. Bee ause his  
concept of moral p r inc ip le  was so transcendent, morality  
could operate only as a re s t ra in t  on p o l i t ic a l  man by savin 
him from hypocrisy ( i . e . ,  by demonstrating to him that he 1 
not God ) . 1 e,i’
By u lt im ate ly  endorsing a p o l i t ic a l  standard based on 
the national in te res t ,  therefore, Morgenthau adopted both a 
secular and r e la t iv e  conception of morality. Moral 
reasoning in internat ional  p o l i t ic s ,  he believed, obliged 
the prudent and pragmatic statesman to reconcile competing
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moral values -flowing from divergent in te rp re ta t io ns  of a
nation's interest in a part icu lar  s ituation and at a
particu lar  time. Morgenthau pointed to the in te l lec tua l
legacy of Burie who wrote:
Nothing universal can be ra t io n a l ly  affirmed on 
any moral or any p o l i t ic a l  subject. Pure 
metaphysical abstraction does not belong to these 
matters. The lines of m o ra l i ty . . .admit of 
exceptions; they demand modifications. These 
exceptions and modif1 cations are not made by the 
process of logic, but by the rules of prudence. 103,
Moraenthau and the Current Foreign Policy Agenda 
Our focus now turns to Hans J. Morgenthau"s outlook on 
several major foreign policy issues of the last decade that 
have generated considerable debate among scholars and public 
o f f ic ia ls .  Indeed, to evaluate Morgenthau only at the level 
of formal theory or p o l i t ic a l  philosophy ignores his role as 
a p o l i t ic a l  a c t iv is t ,  whD sought to "speak the truth to 
power." As public commentator, Morgenthau stressed 
l im ita t ions  on the uses of power and inveighed against i t s  
inordinate exercise over a range of cases, from the 
re la t iv e ly  minor Quemoy-Matsu c r is is  to the Vietnam War. As 
with other re a l is ts  included in our study, specific  
alicntic-i- is rit . ot ed to Mor gent hau ’ - .1 us on uch topics
as: (1) nuclear war and disarmament; (2) American m il i ta ry
and p o l i t ic a l  intervention abroad; < 3 >  American policy and 
the Th1rd WorId; and (4) human rights.
Morgenthau wrote at great length about the 
revolutionary impact of nuclear power on international
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p o l i t ic s .  The a v a i l a b i l i t y  ot nuclear weapons, he argued, 
resu lts  in two e::traardinary paradoxes which stem from the 
destructiveness ot these weapons. F i rs t ,  a quant ita t ive  
increase in s tra teg ic  weaponry does not necessarily  
corre la te with an increase in national power.184 Once a 
nation acquires the cap ab i l i ty  to destroy a l l  enemy targets  
chosen tor destruction, additional nuclear weapons w i l l  not 
increase i t s  power.
Second, he pointed to the inverse relat ionsh ip  between 
the degree ot destructiveness ot these weapons and the ir  
ra t iona l u s a b i l i ty .  Since the destruction ot one actor 
would ca l l  tor the simultaneous destruction of the other, 
both superpowers can afford to disregard the th r e a t , on the 
assumption that both nations w i l l  act r a t i o n a l l y . lOB 
According to Morgenthau, " i t  is only the assumption that the 
nations concerned might act 1r r a t io n a l1y by destroying each 
other in a l 1-o u t . . . war that the threat of nuclear war is  
c r e d i b l e . I n  short, Morgenthau drew a sharp d is t inc t ion  
between the threat and actual use of fo r c e .197
Morgenthau never doubted or disavowed the contribution  
of s tra teg ic  or ta c t ic a l  nuclear weapons for the nromoti 
and defense of American global in terests .  Yet, for some 
three decades, he expressed grave reservations about the 
"conventional" thinking shaping the evolution of United 
States s tra teg ic doctrine. The tendency to model and 
j u s t i f y  nuclear strategy in conventional terms was im p l ic i t
3 1 7
in the early  formulation of "massive r e ta l ia t io n " ;  and i t  
was subsequently refined in the 1960s and 1970s by 
counterforce strateg ies  based on the pr inc ip le  of "mutual 
assured destruction."  Underlying a l l  conventional estimates 
of nuclear policy is  "a theory of nuclear war which assumes 
nuclear war to be just another kind of violence, greater in 
magnitude but not d i f fe re n t  in kind from the types of 
violence with which history has acquainted u s ." 1D*  From 
th is  theoret ica l assumption, i t  follows that the United 
States need not l im i t  i t s e l f  to avoiding a nuclear 
confrontation: in addition, the United States must also
prepare to survive i t .  Furthermore, Morgenthau warned of 
the inescapable l ink between the continuation of a costly  
nuclear arms race and the commitment to a counterforce 
strategy which purports to o ffer  control lab le war-fight ing  
options by means of more accurate nuclear weapons.
Morgenthau believed that the security of the United 
States, threatened by the exposure of American t e r r i t o r y  to 
nuclear Destruction, required a dual emphasis on "the novel 
methods of deterrence and arms contro l ."  The management of 
nuclear power confronted policy-makers with two in te rre la te d  
problems: the abatement of the nuclear arms race and the
prevention of nuclear p ro l i fe ra t io n .  As long as both the 
United States and Soviet Union competed for new weapons, he 
saw l i t t l e  p o s s ib i l i t y  in preventing lesser powers from 
following s u it .  Moreover, diplomatic in i t i a t i v e s  designed
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to cu r ta i l  the nuclear arms race are ju s t i f ie d  because the 
indiscriminate destructiveness of nuclear weapons overwhelms 
a l l  possible objectives of a ra t ional foreign policy. " I f  
they are used as instruments of national policy, nuclear 
weapons would destroy the tangible objective of policy and 
the be ll igerents  as w e l l . ,,iet** In consequence,, Morgenthau 
wrote:
What the nuclear powers have...been doing 
pragmatically— that is ,  to re f ra in  from the use of 
nuclear weapons— they ought to now d o . . .a s  a 
matter of p r inc ip le :  to eliminate nuclear weapons
from th e ir  regular armory, so that they w i l l  not 
be used as instruments of national policy,  and 
assign to them ... the  function of a deterrent , to 
be used only in suicidal desperation.1AO
Denying the ra t ional u s a b i l i ty  of nuclear weapons in
worId p o l i t ic s ,  Morgenthau 1 den11f 1ed three spec 1 f i c
consequences for the conduct of American foreign and
m ill  tar  y policy. F i r s t ,  since nuc1 ear threats are
inherently  lacking in c r e d ib i l i t y  ( i . e . ,  not l im ited  to the
purpose of deterrence), they ought to be eliminated from
standard diplomatic p ra c t ic e .141 Morgenthau arqued that
nuclear force was credible only in terms of maintaining a
residual second-strike deterrent ca p a b i l i ty .  Second, since
nuclear weapons contribute l i t t l e  to the normal e,;ercise o<
national power, policy-makers should give greater attention
to the development of non-nuclear instruments of national
power. Third, the a v a i l a b i l i t y  of long-range communication,
delivery , and transportation systems have ra d ic a l ly  altered
the importance of the control of t e r r i t o r y  for national
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power. For example, "the conjunction between the large 
radius o-f nuclear destruction and the r e la t iv e ly  small s ire  
of th e ir  t e r r i t o r i e s  imposes a . . .handicap upon the a b i l i t y  
o-f the' t ra d i t io n a l  nation states, such as Great B ri ta in  and 
France, to mate a nuclear threat cred 1 b 1 e . " 1
Yet, Morgenthau remained slept ical a-f broad-gauge 
disarmament strategies and expressed only cautious optimism 
at the prospects of nuclear arms control. Since 1900, 
disarmament has been achieved only under two extraordinary  
conditions. F i r s t ,  arms reduction was agreed on only by
a l im ited number of nations and was large ly  local in 
character. Second, the agreed-upon ra t io  of armaments 
re f lec ted  e i ther  the absence of competition for power or 
temporary preference for regulated, rather than unregulated, 
competition for power in the form of armaments acquisit ion.  
By contrast, a l l  attempts at general disarmament (e .g . ,  the 
two Hague Conferences, the Geneva Conference of 1932, and 
the disarmament commissions of the United Nations) have been 
conspicuous fa i lu re s .
At the root of these fa i lu re s ,  Morgenthau believed, was 
the modern philosophy of disarmament which s ta rts  from the 
assumption that men f ig h t  wars because they have arms. 
Morgenthau judged that such th in t ing  trea ts  the symptom, 
while leaving the underlying i l l s  essen t ia l ly  in tact:
320
What makes -for war are the conditions in the minds 
of men which make war appear the lesser o-f two 
e v i Is .  In those condit1ons must be sought the 
disease o-f which the desire - for . . .  arms is but a 
symptom.. . .
At best, Morgenthau considered disarmament or the l im ita t io n  
o-f armaments as "an indispensable f i r s t  step in a general 
settlement of 1ntern a t1ona1 c o n f l ic ts ."  Disarmament can 
contribute to general pac i f ica t ion  and ease the f inancial  
burden of a costly arms race on_l_ii when there is a "mutually 
sat is fac tory  settlement of the power contest."
While disarmament seeks to reduce or e liminate  
armaments, arms control aspires to regulate the armaments 
race for the purpose of increasing m il i ta ry  s t a b i l i t y .  Such 
re s t r ic t io n s  on armaments can conceivably encompass 
in te rn a t io n a l , mutual, or u n i la te ra l  controls. Morgenthau 
decried the tendency of policy-makers and s tra teg is ts  to 
l ink arms control calculations exclusively to the increasing 
weapons level of a potentia l adversary. Instead, a rat ional  
approach to arms control involves "stopping one’ s nuclear 
armaments at the point where they provide an
in v u lnerab le . . .deterrent  and cutting them back to that point 
in so far as they have exceeded 1 t . " 1
Morgenthau’ s endorsement of nuclear arms control stands 
in v iv id  contrast to his pessimistic outlook on the 
regulation of conventional arms. Regarding the l a t t e r ,  the 
quantity and type of conventional weapons has a d irect  
bearing on the overa l1 d is tr ib u t io n  of m i l i ta ry  power. Any
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agreement to control these weapons would s ign ify  the end of 
competition for m i l i ta ry  advantage. However, attempts to 
halt  or slow m i l i t a ry  competition in conventional force 
leve ls  have floundered on the in a b i l i t y  to resolve  
outstanding p o l i t ic a l  issues .*“ •
In theory, the control of nuclear weapons is  
f a c i l i t a t e d  by the cap ab i l i ty  of major nuclear powers to 
reach an optimum of assured destructive potentia l beyond 
which i t  would be i r ra t io n a l  to increase armaments. 
Provisions in the SALT agreements of 1972 prohibit ing the 
deployment of ABMs ( a n t ib a l l i s t i c  missiles) and placing 
numerical l im ita t io n s  on d i f fe re n t  types of offensive  
nuclear weapons const itute a success in the f i e ld  of nuclear 
arms control.  In practice , however, arms control is based 
on "the s t a b i l i t y  of nuclear technology; for i t  is only on 
that assumption that the nations concerned can afford to 
desist from competit ion." l * 7 Yet as President Reagan's 
commitment to a new, space-based missile defense system has 
demonstrated, major nuclear powers can be expected a c t i v e l , 
to compete in areas where technology may confer decisive  
m il i ta r y  advantages in the nuclear arms race. In view of 
i t s  dependence on technolDgica1 s t a b i l i t y ,  "nuclear arms 
c o n t r o l . . . i s  l i k e ly  to remain both l imited and temporary."
In contrast to other r e a l is ts  included in th is  study, 
Morgenthau was much more outspoken on the spec if ic  problems 
confronting United States foreign policy in the Third Wor1d.
For some three decades a fte r  World War I I ,  he cited a 
combination of in te l le c tu a l  and p o l i t ic a l  miscalculations, 
the net e f fe c t  of which has been to weaken American power 
and influence in many parts of the developing world. The 
examples of Korea, Taiwan, Cuba, and South Vietnam provide 
viv id  testimony of "our in a b i l i t y  to achieve our p o l i t ic a l  
purposes even with an abundance of material means."l6B
Morgenthau viewed the concept of "intervention" as an 
inev i tab le  and ever—present p o l i t ic a l  r e a l i t y ,  commensurate 
with the struggle for power on the 1nternatianal scene. 
Intervention , through e ither  the withholding of benef its  or 
the in f l i c t in g  of disadvantages, is a general designation 
for the various forms of competition and cooperation 
characteriz ing the in terp lay  of conf l ic t ing  national 
in terests in world p o l i t ic s .  America’ s h is to r ic  commitment 
to the moral and legal doctrine of "non-intervention," he 
believed, had been of practical s ignificance only in terms 
of abstention from the p o l i t ic a l  r i v a l r ie s  of Europe during 
the era of isolationism. ***'’'
Even during the heyday of c lassical isolationism,  
however, America's adherence to the p r inc ip le  of non- 
1ntervent i on was qua1l f ie d  by i t s  tendency to 1ntervene at 
w il l  in the a f fa i r s  of the Western Hemisphere. The American 
propens1ty  for se l f  —deceptlon was revealed by trea t ing  such 
examples of intervention as essent ia l ly  d i f fe re n t  from the 
s e lf is h  and expansionist ways of t ra d i t io n a l  European
d i p 1 oinacy. Comment inq on the di vergence bet ween what
Americans thint; th e ir  -Foreign policy is  and i t s  actual
character , Morgenthau wrote:
. . . t h e  unchallengeable superior ity  of the United 
States within the Western Hemisphere, in 
conjunction with the American ideals at the 
service of which that superior ity  was supposed to 
be employed, made i t  appear to American eyes as 
though what was actua lly  intervention was in truth  
something d i f fe re n t ,  i f  not the enact opposite. lvo
The d is tr ib u t io n  of world power following World War I I  
posed additional problems for both the nature and 
ju s t i f i c a t io n  of American intervention abroad. For 
Morgenthau, i t  was obvious "that we are intervening  
massively and e f fe s t iv e ly  a l l  over the wor1d and what we 
have foresworn is  not intervention per se. but only certain  
finds of in te rv e n t io n ." 1'7,1 As much as the Soviet Union 
intervened in developing countries to promote causes of 
national l ib e ra t io n ,  the United States championed the 
p o l i t ic a l  status quo throughout the Third World. When faced 
with an actual or impending c r is is ,  Morgenthau judged 
American foreign policy as "incapable of foresight,  sureness 
of touch as regards means and ends, and mam pulat ive  s k i l l  
that are the prerequ ] s ■> t es of sue cessf ul p o l i t ic a l  
action. " I7:z Evaluating American intervention at various 
places in the developing and nonaligned world, Morgenthau 
emphasized the following themes: (1) the error of a n t i ­
communist intervention; (2) the se lf -defeat ing  character of 
a n t l - r e v o lu t i onary intervention; and <3> the f a i lu r e  of
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American -foreign and economic aid.
The interventions of the United States in Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, and Vietnam have been largely  ju s t i f ie d  
as reactions to communist intervention. Morgenthau never 
doubted the aggressive and expansionist tenor of Soviet 
foreign policy; however, he deplored the fa i lu r e  of United 
States policy-makers to assess ob ject ive ly  the extent to 
which the infusion of communist revolutlonary sentiment in 
local or regional con f l ic ts  threatened American security  
in terests .  Increasing1y, the United States confronted a
varie ty  of communist regimes pursuing th e ir  separate 
interests;  th e ir  dependence on the Soviet Union or China 
varied both over time and from one country to another. "The 
bearing . . .of those in terests upon the polic ies  of the United 
States must be determined not in terms of communist ideology 
but of th e ir  compatib il i ty  with the in terests of the United 
S ta te s ."
In seeking to contain communist intervention on a 
global basis, the United States has intervened in a var ie ty  
of c iv i l  c o n f l ic ts  for the purpose of supporting certain  
leaders or factions whose objectives are perceived to 
coincide with American national in te re s t .  According to  
Morgenthau, however, such interventions have accomplished 
l i t t l e  more than leg it im iz ing  the p o l i t ic a l  status quo and 
exacerbating deep-seated revo lu t1onary tensions. His 
wide1y—publir ized c ondemnation of Uni ted States
p art ic ipa t io n  in the Vietnam War te s t i f i e d  to the "an t i-
revo lu t ionary" stigma attaching to the exercise of American
power in the Third World.*'7'**
Morgenthau contended that an American policy of
indiscriminate anti-communist intervention would be s e l f -
defeating for two reasons. F i r s t ,  the United States lacked
s u f f ic ie n t  resources to deal simultaneously with a number of
acute revolutions at any one time. Second, such
interventions would f a i l ,  since "logic that would make us
appear as the ant 1-revolut ionary power. . . would surrender to
communism the sponsorship of revolution everywhere."*7H
A lte rn a t iv e ly ,  he argued that "the pr inc ip le  of s e le c t iv i ty "
should serve as the c r i te r io n  for American p o l i t ic a l  and
m il i ta ry  intervention .
Intervene we must where our national in terest  
requires i t  and where our power gives us a chance 
to succeed. The choice of these occasions w i l l  be 
defined not by sweeping ideological 
commitments.. .but by a careful calculat ion of the 
in terests  involved and the power ava ilab le .  1/41
The United States has also attempted to promote i t s
global in terests  and to counter communist gains through the
medium of foreign aid. Throughout the postwar era,
Morgenthau remained a vocal c r i t i c  of both the in te l lec tu a l
ra t io n a le  and actual operation of American assistance to
rec ip ient  countries in the developing w orld .177 The
assumption that r ich nations have a moral duty to assist
poor nations overcome th e ir  poverty ju s t i f ie d  the naive
expectation that the quantitat ive  extension of American aid
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was actually  capable of e liminating poverty on a grand 
scale. The American philosophy o-f -foreign a f f a i r s ,  
Morgenthau alleged, "equated foreign aid with economic 
development, economic development with social s t a b i l i t y ,  
social s t a b i l i t y  with democracy, and democracy with a 
peaceful foreign p o l ic y ." 1
Yet he believed that American foreign aid e f fo r ts  have 
la rgely  fa i le d  to promote democratic reforms or s ign if icant  
economic growth in developing societ ies.  By contrast,  
ambitious strateg ies  of modernization have often led to an 
uneven d is tr ibu t io n  of resources and had l i t t l e  bearing on 
the r e d is t r 1 but 1 on of p o l i t ic a l  power. Morgenthau argued 
that  American pol i. cy-ma ker s are just  now recognizing the 
"e:;tent to which the development of other nations depends 
upon indigenous rat ional and moral q u a l i t ies  not susceptible  
to del iberate  foreign i nf 1 uence. " 1 The conclusion
Morgenthau arrived at in his discussion of intervention also 
applies to the special kind of intervention called  foreign  
aid: i t  should be se lec t ive ly  oriented toward the p o l i t ic a l
advantage of the donor and, i f  feas ib le ,  the economic 
benefit  of the rec ip ient ought tn be the aim nf American 
foreign p o l ic y .1"0
Perhaps no moral issue in recent times has divided the 
American public and the ir  elected o f f i c ia ls  as the campaign 
to promote human r ights  in foreign policy. At th is  
juncture, i t  would be well to re ca l l  Morgenthau”s argument
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that moral principles for states are f i l t e r e d  through 
circumstances of time and place, as well as national 
concepts determining the ir  application. This approach 
raises a fundamental question for human rights policy: lo
what degree is a nation obligated to impose i ts  values on 
others? Morgenthau seriously questioned the idea that the 
rest of mankind was required to accept the American 
p o l i t ic a l  and moral t rad i t io n .  He found that Wilsonian 
moralism and President. Jimmy Carter's  campaign tor  universal 
human rights exhibited similar de fe c ts .1* 1 F irs t ,  the 
universal acceptance of human rights would be impossible to 
enforce. Second, the United States is  a global power with a 
variety of interests throughout the world. The consistent 
promotion of human rights in foreign policy could easily  
jeopardize other valuable m i l i ta ry ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  and economic 
interests. The United States, therefore, is incapable of 
applying a uniform moral standard to each and every country, 
because such a policy "must come in conf l ic t  with other 
interests that may be more important than the defense of 
human rights in a part icu lar  instance."
To Morgenthau, the issue of human rights is merely a 
general example of the connection between morality and 
foreign policy. Recognition that men and nations proclaim 
goals transcending national defense or sovereignty is a 
f i r s t  step in solving, but not a solution to, the moral 
problem in international p o l i t i c s . 1*^ In attempting to
: - . .h
formulate a standard tor the statesman seeking what is
moral] y and p o l i t i c a l l y  r ig h t ,  Morgenthau invoked the word'
o-f Abraham Lincoln!
In great contests each party claims to act in 
accordance with the w i l l  o-f God. Both may be and 
one must be wrong. . . .  These are not, however, the 
days of miracles and 1 suppose it. w i l l  be granted 
that I am not to expect a direct reve lat ion . 1 
must study the plain physical farts  of the case, 
ascertain what is possible and learn what appears 
to be wise and just .
Cone 1 usion
Following World War I I ,  the d isc ip l ine  of international  
rel atlons represented an ad hoc mixture of schoiar1y 
pursuits ranging from ln te rn a t i ona1 law and o rgan lra t i on to 
diplomatic history and descript ive area studies. The scope 
and methods of the various subfields were influenced, and 
often over shadowed, by the h is to r ic  American debate over the 
signif icance of power and moral pr inc ip le  in s ta te c ra f t .
The gradual recession of idealism and temporary ascendance 
of p o l i t ic a l  realism in the ear 1y postwar period was 
re f lec ted  in the works of such notables as Walter Lippmann, 
Reinhold Niebuhr, Robert Strausz—Hup£, and George F. hennan. 
However, in i t s  e a r l ie s t  f or mu 1 at i on , rea1 ism was a loose 
and i l l -d e f in e d  label applied at random to prominent 
individuals from such professions as journalism (Lippmann), 
theology (Niebuhr), and diplomatic service (Kennan).
I t  was the l i fe lo n g  achievement of one scholar-  
a c t iv is t ,  Hans J. Morgenthau, to integrate p o l i t ic a l  realism
within the mainstream of American p o l i t ic a l  science and help
to establish internat ional  p o l i t ic s  as an autonomous -field
of inquiry. The national in te res t  defined in terms of
power, the precarious uncertainty of the international
balance of power, the weakness of 1nternatianal morality,
the decentralised character of international law, the
deceptiveness of ideologies, the requirements of diplomacy—
these were phenomena his theory of 1nternat1 anal p o l i t ic s
aimed to address in terms of general pr inc ip les of p o l i t ic s .
Morgenthau’ s theory of 1nternat1onal p o l i t ic s  drew upon
fundamental philosophical conceptions about man, nature, and
p o l i t ic s .  Rejecting many of the optimistic  and reductionist
b e l ie fs  of modern l ib e ra l  thought, he stressed that p o l i t ic s
is governed by objective laws that have th e ir  roots in human
nature. One scholar has e f fe c t iv e ly  summarized Morgenthau1s
in te l le c tu a l  or ien tat ion in the following terms:
. . .h e  was determined both to erect an empirical 
science opposed to the utopias of the 
internat ional  lawyers and p o l i t ic a l  idealogues, 
and to a f f i rm  the unity of empirical research and 
philosophical inquiry in to the r ight  find of 
social order. He wanted to be normative, but to 
root his norms in the r e a l i t i e s  of p o l i t ic s ,  not 
in the aspirations of p o l i t ic ia n s  or in the 
constructs of ] aw ve r
Against the wishful thinking and pious hopes of interwar
idealism, Morgenthau developed a theoretical approach to
internat ional  a f fa i r s  that both described national behavior
and provided a framework for policy-makers, in order "to
reduce the facts of experience to mere specif ic  instances of
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general proposit ions .1'
Morgenthau' 5 r e a l is t  theory may be reduced to three hey 
assumptions that have stimulated considerable debate among 
contemporary students o-f international p o l i t ic s .  These 
assumptions are:
(1) The s ta te - centr1c assumpt1 on: the idea that the 
most important actors in world p o l i t ic s  are t e r r i t o r i a l ,  
organised e n t i t ie s  (c i ty  states or modern s ta tes ) .  Realists  
view the state as a te r r i to r ia l ly -d e te rm in e d  sovereign 
community, characterized by a consensus on rules and 
governing in s t i tu t io n s ,  and autonomy o-f i t s  soci o-economi c 
processes. In te rs ta te  interact ions are understood and 
explained largely in terms o-f -forces emanating from the
1nternationa 1 system.
(2) The ra t iona I  11 v assump11on: the b e l ie f  that world
p o l i t ic s  can be understood as i -f states were unitary  
ra t ional actors, c a re fu l ly  ca lculat ing costs o-f a l te rn a t iv e  
courses of action and seeking to maximize th e ir  expected 
u t i 1l t y . M o r g e n t h a u  contended that the theoris t  of
ln te rnat iona1 p o l i t ic s  could understand events and actions 
by imagining himself, as a rat ional ind iv idual,  in the 
position of a statesman, and re f le c t in g  on what he would do 
i f  faced with the problems confronted by actual decision­
maker s .
(3) The power assumption: the notion that sovereign
states, recognizing no higher authority ,  are in an
: i
xnternational state of nature; the result ing security  
dilemma forces them to l iv e  in a condition of mutual 
competition and c o n f l ic t .  In a s i tuat ion  of global anarchy, 
states seet power (both the a b i l i t y  to influence others and 
resources that can be used to exercise inf luence);  and they 
seek to ca lcu late th e ir  in teres ts in terms of power, whether 
as an end or a means to a var ie ty  of other ends.106
A new generation of scholars in the 1970s and 1900s has 
offered trenchant c r i t ic is m  of the r e a l is t  t ra d i t io n ,  
severely challenging the assumptions and concepts upon which 
i t  is  based. C r i t ic s  point to a number of new questions 
about lnternat lonal p o l i t ic s  that variously re jec t  or 
challenge major tenets of Morgenthau’ s r e a l is t  theory.
F i rs t ,  Morgenthau'5 r e a l is t  perspective does not 
s u f f ic ie n t ly  account tor the growing importance of economic 
and human welfare pursuits in world p o l i t ic s .  At the heart 
of the debate is the tendency of re a l is ts  to d i f fe r e n t ia te  
(and elevate) “high p o l i t ic s "  issues of m i l i t a ry  security  
over “low p o l i t ic s "  issues of social and economic w e l l ­
being. Contemporary theorists re fer  to s ign if ican t  
developments in the economic f i e ld  (e .g . ,  resource scarcity ,  
commodity p o l i t ic s ,  worldwide in f la t io n )  that have generated 
part lc lpa tory  demands and challenges to authority  in 
d if fe re n t  in s t i tu t io n a l  spheres.1"'7' The demand for a New 
International Economic Order (NIE0) and concern about the 
North-South c o n f l ic t  exemplify the growing awareness of
economic problems transcending national boundaries and 
defying national c a p a b i l i t ie s  in containing them.
Second, p o l i t i c a l  r e a l is ts  a f te r  l i t t l e  insight into  
the changing nature of power in the context of growing 
in ternat ional  interdependence. Morgenthau treated national 
in te res t  as a constant. Given the same level of national 
power, a l l  states would presumably react s im i la r ly  to 
stimuli from the movement of farces in the in ternat ional  
environment. For the r e a l i s t ,  power represents a 
generalized means and resource; i t  is homogenous, 
cumulative, and c o n v e r t i b l e . H o w e v e r ,  more recent 
research questions the adequacy of such a concept of power 
and points to the lack of correspondence between power- 
d if fe re n t  1 a1s and internatlonal outcomes. 109 Gases in point 
include the f a i lu r e  of the United States in Vietnam, the big 
l n f 1uence of sma11 a11le s , and the phenomenon of Third Wor1d 
power. Against the r e a l is t  viewpoint, the growing 
interdependence in d i f fe re n t  policy areas suggests that  
power is l im ited in scope and domain; i t  is  specif ic  to
lssue, po l ic ies ,  and ac to rs . 1
Final l v .  Morgenthau’ s insistence on "objective laws" n t
p o l i t ic s  tended to make him look: tor the determinants of the
national in terest  in the external environment— the nation's  
position in the world and h is to ry— more than in the domestic 
m ilieu . Such an external perspective blinds the theoris t  to 
the increasing 1n te r re 1 ationshlp between the domestic and
in te rnat iona1 system. The concept of "linkage p o l i t ic s ,"  
formulated by James Fiosenau, more precisely examines "any 
recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system 
and is reacted to in anot her . "1 1 What has been the impact 
of the Vietnam War on American domestic p o l i t ic s ,  to c i te  
but one example of an l nt er nat i ona 1 --domest l c linkage"'
The concept of linkage can serve as a correc tive to 
realism in two respects. On the one hand, i t  ra ises the 
1argely-unanswered question of the e f fec t  of domestic 
structures and forces on a country's foreign policy . On the 
other, i t  allows the theoris t  to explore differences among 
nations to the extent that they are "penetrated" from 
outside, or in the degree to which linkages exist between 
the internat ional  system and a domestic p o l i t ic a l  system.
More so perhaps than any American student of 
in ternat ional re la t ions  and foreign policy during the past 
generation, Hans J. Morgenthau has frequently been judged as 
the premier spokesman for the Rea1pol 111 k approach to 
ln te rn a t lon a1 p o l i t ic a l  behavior. Certainly his formative 
educational experiences in Germany exhibited a clear  
appreciation for the s ta te cra ft  of such standard-bearers of 
ra i son d * £t at as Frederick the Great, Richelieu, and 
Bismarck. Upon embarking on a new career in the United 
States, he staked out an in te l le c tu a l  position on the tragic  
side of the social drama and l e f t  to others— id e a l is ts  in 
the f i r s t  postwar generation, and peace-centered
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behavi oral i sts in the second— to side covertly  with the 
angel s . 1 Generally neglected, however, has been the
philosophy or conception o-f p o l i t ic a l  ethics underlying 
Morgenthau"s analysis.
In S c ie n t i f ic  Man and other essays, Morgenthau offered 
a forceful re jec t ion  of European r ai son d ' £ t  a t as a 
fraudulent p r in c ip le ,  based on the a r t i f i c i a l  separation of 
p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  from man's inherently  moral nature and 
capacity for ethical judgments. S p e c if ic a l ly ,  he rejected  
the "ethical dualism" of c lassical r aison d '£ t a t which, in 
his view, males the error of setting the p o l i t ic a l  sphere 
apart from the pr ivate  one for purposes of e thical  
evaluation. He always wrote and acted from the conviction  
that man in the p o l i t ic a l  sphere is not allowed to act as he 
p 1 eases and that his behavior must conf or m to a standard 
higher than success. The simple dichotomy or juxtaposition  
of power p o l i t ic s  and moral p o l i t ic s  was, for Morgenthau, 
fundamentally mistaken. In p a r t ic u la r ,  he concluded that  
r ai son d'£ t  a t is l i t t l e  more than a myth since "the struggle  
for power is i n t e l l i g i b l e  only as a d ia le c t ic a l  movement 
toward the re a l is a t io n  of ju s t ic e ."
The neglected transcendent component in Morgenthau’ e 
thought impinges d ire c t ly  upon the extent to which he re l ied  
on universal norms to d irect  or judge in terest  from a moral 
horizon beyond parochial in te res t .  Vet, Morgenthau7s 
attempt to s t r ik e  a meaningful balance between national
in terest  and moral pr inciples in internat ional p o l i t ic s  is 
beset by contradictory and ambiguous impulses. Various 
re-ferences to the “autonomy o-f p o l i t ic s "  and "paramountcy of 
national in terest"  c lea r ly  imply that moral pr inciples  must 
be derived from p o l i t ic a l  practice and not imposed on i t .
By contrast, Morgenthau found no escape from ultimate  
rel iance upon moral pr inc ip les in his avowedly "moral" 
objection to the pretentious hypocrisy of American foreign  
policy and in his id e n t i f ic a t io n  of operative norms of 
d1p1omat1c procedure.
In the f in a l  analysis, however, Morgenthau7s occasional 
re l iance on universal ethical pr inc ip les  was qua li f ied  by 
his excessively pessimistic view of man. Divorced from the 
transcendent by the sinfulness of man, p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  tends 
to develop i t s  own operational rules. E ffe c t iv e ly  distorted  
by the in s t i  tutlons of s inful man, Morgenthau7s f ormal ethic 
could not eas i ly  function as a v i ta l  force d irect ing man's 
creative  moral energies. At best, Morgenthau7 s recourse to 
universal moral pr inc ip les  functioned only as a checf to  
moderat e the tempt atlon to hypocrit ical pretense in foreign  
policy.
Moreover, Morgenthau’ 5 endorsement of a p o l i t ic a l  ethic  
geared to the national in terest  culminated in a secular and 
r e la t iv e  concept 1 on of mora1i t  y . Mor a1 reasonlng in
p o l i t ic s ,  according to Morgenthau, encompassed not so much 
the balancing of universal pr incip les or r igh ts ,  but
prudential and pragmatic choices o-f a course o-f action in 
changing circumstances. His thinking yielded to a vision 
pract ica l morality involving the reconei1ia t ion  of what is  
morally desirable with what is p o l i t i c a l l y  possible. A 
r e la t iv e  and proximate moral standard "recognizes the need 
■for the moral man in the immoral world to -find his way 
through a maze of con f l ic t ing  moral principles no one of 
which reigns supreme.1 1,3
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C H A P T E R  V
GEORGE P. PENNAN: SEARCHING FOR REALISM'S GRAND DESIGN
Perhaps no other American r e a l is t  has stimu1 ated as 
much protracted debate over the methods and goals of United 
States foreign policy as has George Frost I ennan. As both a
career diplomat and scholar of diplomatic h is tory,  his 
c r i t i c a l  eye has never d r i f te d  far  from the in te l le c tu a l  and 
moral ju s t i f i c a t io n  of American national in te res t  in world 
a f fa i r s .  P a ra l le l in g  Kennan's assessment of the consistency 
and change in American national in terest  since the early  
days of the republic has been his passionate commentary on 
the few successes and, even more, fa i lu re s  of United States  
policy-makers to ensure a viable balance of power among the 
great powers following World War I I .
As both American ambassador to the Soviet Union and a 
student of Ru?sian-European history,  Pennan wrote and 
lectured widely on the evolving strategic-diplomatic;  
relat ionsh ip  between the United States and the Soviet Union 
during the years of cold war antagonisms. During the 197us 
and 1960s, however, he increasingly devoted attention  to 
such topics as: the nature and changing d is t r ib u t io n  of
power in the internat ional environment; the i r ra t io n a l  
madness of nuclear stockpiles and pro 1 i f e r a t io n ; the
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relat ionsh ip  o-f the Third World to tra d it io n a l  bipolar  
(superpower) competition; and the ro le  o-f norms and ideology 
in -foreign policy. Final ly ,  Kennan’ s rather pessimistic: 
evaluation o-f United States -foreign policy prospects -for the 
future was rooted in belie-fs about the in ternal and psychic: 
di Border of Amer1can society, as we11 as democratic 
impediments to a consistent and wise diplomacy.
Much of the confusion associated with Kennan's 
diagnosis of the objectives and errors of United States 
foreign pal icy stems from what, has been widely-perceived as 
an u n in te l l ig ib le  reversal in his approach to the 
requirements of American national security in the nuclear 
age. In fac t ,  several c r i t i c s 1 see not. one George Kennan 
but two d is t in c t iv e  persona li t1es, with divergent 
convictions regarding the contribution Df American power and 
diplomacy. On the one hand, there is the tennan who sounded 
a 1 arms about the e>: pans i am st nature of Sovi et f or ei gn 
policy in both the "long telegram"3* of 1946 and the 
p seudonymous 1947 dt t i d e 3 in F or ei gn A f f a i r s . The
"early" Kennan introduced a new generation of poiicy-makers 
to the logic of containment and advocated the v ig i la n t  
app1i c a t i on of "counterf or c e" as a measured response to 
aggressive Soviet intentions in war—torn Europe and beyond.
On the other hand, there ls  Kennan the "dove" or "nep- 
i s o la t io n is t , "  who has t r ie d  to e::pose the errant reasoning 
underlying the g1oba1izat ion and mi 1i t a r 1rat lon of
containment in United States -foreign policy -for the last  
three decades. Indeed, the " la te r"  Kennan occasionally  
appears to revise the containment ra t iona le  by seeking to 
res tra in  America's m i l i t a r i s t i c  impulse and i ts  
ju s t i f ic a t io n  in s t e r i l e  p la t itudes  of unyielding and r ig id  
ant 1-communism.
Our primary concern is  the influence of classical  
raison d’ £ta t  as one in te l le c tu a l  determinant (among others) 
in Kennan’ s understanding of the nature and structure of 
1nternat1onal p o l i t ic s  in the twentieth century. More 
s p e c if ic a l ly ,  does Kennan draw on the ethical dualism of 
ra j  son d1 £ta t  in discussing morality as a c r i te r io n  for the 
det ermi na t i on of the behavior of sovereign states"7 In what 
sense does Kennan acknowledge or neglect norms not 
immediately derived from the tra d it io n a l  concepts or 
princ ip les  of p o l i t ic a l  realism"7 The philosophical sources 
in Kennan’ s thought provide a useful standard by which to 
examine a number of disputed points in his trenchant 
c r i t ic is m  of the theory and pract ice  of American foreign  
policy since World War I I .
The Two Careers of George I ennan
George F. Kennan has enj oyed and occ asi ona11y been 
troubled by a distinguished career as both diplomat and 
hist  or i an. His meteoric r is e  within the F orei gn Ser vic e 
immediately launched Kennan to the forefront  of debate 
regarding the re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  of American power in an
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increasing!y dangerous postwar world. Although modest about 
his actual influence at the highest echelons of American 
government, he occupied a unique position in being able to 
re f le c t  on the signif icance of po lic ies  and diplomatic 
strateg ies  he helped to shape. During the ape:: of his 
diplomatic career in the la te  194<js , liennan’ s confidentia l  
reports and public statements provided the broad outlines  
for the posture of containment that has guided United States 
foreign policy toward the Soviet Union ever s in ce .4 
According to Henry Kissinger, he "came as close to authoring 
the di p1omat i c doctrine of his era as any diplomat in our 
h l s t o r y . " w
Serving since 1974 as professor emeritus of diplomatic 
history at Princeton’ s In s t i tu te  For Advanced Studies,
Kennan was born in Milwauhee, Wisconsin, on February lh, 
1904. From his ancestors (pioneer farmers who emigrated to 
the United States from Ireland in the eighteenth century) , 
he inherited an apprec i at l on for the t h r i f t  and s a c r i f ic e  of 
the Protestant wurK eth ic ,  as well as a strong commitment to 
individual f r eedom. E<ot h his f at her and grandfather 
preferred the ways and th ird i  ng of the eighteenth, as 
opposed to the nineteenth century. Absorbing part of their  
values. Kennan maintained a certain  detachment from 
twentieth century customs and manners. “■ As we shall see, 
th is  singular preference for a bygone era perhaps 
contributed to Kennan's evaluation of the internal and
external obstacles inh ib i t ing  America from playing a major
to
ro le  as a great power in world a f fa i r s .
Kennan enrolled at Princeton in 1921 and was drawn to 
the study of classical l i t e r a tu r e ,  h istory, and p o l i t ic s .  
Unlike the formative academic experience of such r e a l is t  
scholars as Walter Lippmann and Hans J. Morgenthau, kennan’ s 
universi ty  years yielded no commitment on his part, to any 
p art ic u la r  philosophy of p o l i t ic s  or foreign policy. After 
graduating from Princeton in 1925, Kennan-'s out loot on 
public a f fa i r s  extended l i t t l e  beyond a vague endorsement of 
Wilsonian l ibera l ism , support for the League of Nations, and 
a b e l ie f  in competitive la is s e : - f a i r e  economics.^ In fa c t ,  
the s t i l l  Linresol ved issue of Kennan's p o l i t ic a l  philosophy 
or worldview was never a debatable proposition un t i l  his 
postwar commentary on the i l l s  of American society and 
foreign policy.
In 1927, Kennan entered the Foreign Service, where he 
specialised in Russian cu lture and h istory. Over the 
ensuing f iv e  years, he held diplomatic assignments in 
Geneva, Hamburg, T a l l in ,  Riga, and Berlin.  Thereafter,  
Kennan served as th ird  secretary in Moscow (19"4); consul in 
Vienna (1935); second secretary in Moscow (1935); second 
secretary (1939) and consul (1939) in Prague; second 
secretary (1939) and f i r s t  secretary (1940) in Berlin;  
counselor of legation in Lisbon (1942); counselor to the 
United States delegation of the European Advisory Commission
in London (1944); minister counselor in Moscow (1945); 
deputy director  -for -foreign a f fa i r s  at the National War 
College in Washington (1946); d irector o-f the State  
Department Policy Planning Sta-f-f (1947); ambassador to the 
Soviet Union (1952); and ambassador to Yugoslavia (1961- 
1963).«
Kennan7s "second career" as elder statesman and 
diplomatic h is tor ian  began in 1950 through his association 
with the In s t i tu te  For Advanced Study and continued until  
his retirement as professor emeritus in 1974. His 
retirement -from the Foreign Service in 1953 coincided with a 
profound personal experience o-f "anxiety" and "despair" 
regarding an in a b i l i t y  to countenance the organi z a t i ona1 
r i g i d i t y  and increasing p o l i t ic iz a t io n  o-f the -foreign 
a f fa i r s  bureaucracy. From the venue of Soviet-Amerlcan 
re la t ions  during the early  1950s, Pennan grew increasingly  
cynical because of e f fo r ts  by more conservative po licy ­
makers (such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles) to 
invoke "the logic of containment" as pr im ari ly  a m i l i ta ry  
remedy to expanding Soviet p o l i t ic a l  influence throughout 
the world. Especially' in his relat ionsh ip  with Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson e a r l ie r ,  kennan considered his role not 
unlike that of "a court jes te r  . . . p r i v i 1eged to say the 
shocking things, valued as an in te l le c tu a l  g a d f ly . . .b u t  not 
to be taken f u l ly  seriously when i t  came to 
t h e . . . responsible decisions of policy."*'’ Recalling his
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f in a l  days as a public servant, he wrote: "I was inclined to
wonder whether the day had not passed when the government 
had no use f or the qua1i t i es of persons l ik e  me — f or
t h e . . . cool and rat ional analysis in the uniform substance of
1mponderab1es. " 1°
Kennan l e f t  the State Department strong in his
conviction that "only the diplomatic h is tor ian , working from
t h e . . .  detachment of a 1ater day, w i l l  be able to unravel 
th is  lncredlb1e tang1e and to revea1 the true aspect of the
various factors and issues invo lved .1' 11 Despite his
sympathy for the comprehensive view of the diplomatic 
histor ian  who reveals the present through i t s  genesis in the 
past, he was destined to become an active and highly v is ib le  
contributor to the ongoing foreign policy debate. Of his  
seventeen published books, only about half can be considered 
works of h is tory.  Indeed, Kennan*s only sustained 
discussion of American diplomatic history is to be found in 
his now c1assi c Amer i c an Diplomac y. 1900—1950 <1951) and ln
the opening chapter of R ea l i t ie s  of American Foreign Policy 
(1 9 5 4 ) .1= More recent studies— Russla, the Atom and the
West ( 1 95B ) ; On Deal inq with t he Common i st Mor 1 d ( 1 9£>4 ) ; The
Cloud of Danqer; Current R e a l i t ie s  of American Foreign 
Pol icy <1977); and The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-Amerlcan
Relations in the Atomic Aae (1982)— examine contemporary 
issues of American foreign policy within the content of the 
evolving East-West c o n f l i c t . 13
Despite the burden o-f psychic remorse that Kennan 
continues to exh ib it  about the mi sunderstana 1ng of his 
position arid the subsequent errors of United States foreign 
policy,  he must be credited with an honesty of mind and 
o r ig in a l i t y  of vision that few modern American statesmen 
have equalled. That his views have been at the center of 
national attent ion tor over fo r ty  years is  ref lected  by an 
impressive publication record that  includes seventeen bools; 
fourteen published statements before Congress; fo r ty - f iv e  
published speeches; and some seventy-five a r t i c l e s . 1"* In 
addi 11 on to r eceiving eigh teen honor ary doc to ra te s , he has 
also been the rec ip ient  of such d is t inc t ions  as two P u l i t re r  
Prises, a Bancroft Price, a National Bool Award, a Benjamin 
FranKlin Award, and, most re c e n t ] / ,  an Albert Einstein Peace 
Prize.
P o l i t ic a l  Philosophy and Diplomatic History  
The c r i t i c a l  accounts of Kennan’ s published work may be1 
divided into one of two rather general categories. Not 
surprising ly,  considerable attent ion has been given to 
Kennan the Cold War s tra teg is t  and h i s t o r i a n . B o t h  
"orthodo," and "i ■ visiuiust." scholai have h o t l /  debated 
Pennan7s i n i t i a l  formulation of containment, i t s  legacy for  
United States foreign policy in the ensuing years, and i t s  
relevance for superpower diplomacv in the 1970s and 
By contrast, numerous scholars have variously celebrated or 
rejected the is o la t io n is t  impulse behind tennan's more
3 jfa
recent proposals tor the "disengagement" o-f American power 
-from tra d it io n a l  areas o-f involvement in Europe and the 
developing w o r ld . lA In conjunction with the disengagement 
theme,, students of Ken nan’ s work have also analyzed his more 
specif ic  outlook on such key issues as nuc: 1 ear strategy,  
global interdependence, and human r i g h t s . 17.
Less often examined, however, have been the antecedent 
philosophical assumptions and ethical  precepts shaping 
Kennan's understanding of man and society 's  p o l i t ic a l  
existence in a l l  of i t s  cooperative and conf l ic tua l  
dimensions. The neglect is  especially  conspicuous with 
respect to his contribution in the f ie ld s  of internat ional  
p o l i t ic s  and American foreign policy. With perhaps one 
notable exception,1B v i r tu a l ly  no p o l i t ic a l  sc ien t is t  or 
in ternat ional  re la t ions  expert has assumed the more 
demanding task of integrating the philosophical 
underpinnings of Kennan's p o l i t ic a l  realism with his  
observations on the ro le of power, s e l f - in te r e s t ,  and 
morality in human existence. furthermore, t ins  oversight is 
p a r t ic u la r ly  unfortunate, since kennan has devoted 
considerable at tent ion to the p i t f a l l s  and lim ited  
contribution of American l iberal-democratic  values in the 
conduct of United States foreign policy. Lippmann, Niebuhr, 
and Morgenthau offered a conceptual framework for  
understanding foreign policy rooted squarely in assumptions 
about the nature of man, society, and the world of sovereign
~ v  c :-  - /  
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nation states. Can the same be said o-f Kennan?
At the out set , i t  w i l l  be usef ul to bear in mind 
several l im ita t io n s  in attempting to reconstruct the 
normat 1ve basis of K ennan 7 s thought. That K ennan' s 
p o l i t ic a l  philosophy has not often been the subject of 
rigorous scrutiny results as much from his own unique 
in te l le c tu a l  temperament as i t  does from the "policy-  
onented" focus of his c r i t i c s .  In fa c t ,  i t  must be 
admitted that Kennan7s infrequent observations on the 
perennial themes in Western p o l i t ic a l  thought tend to be 
vague and highly abbreviated in content. His dependence 
upon any one philosophical t ra d i t io n ,  as i t  re lates  to the 
question of p o l i t ic a l  morality, is a matter that , for 
whatever reason, Kennan chose never to tackle e x p l ic i t ly .
Whether Kennan ought to have examined the sources of 
his in te l le c tu a l  insp irat ion more fu l ly  is ,  a f te r  a i l ,  more- 
an issue of academic preference than some inv io lab le  
prerequisite  for the conduct and analysis of diplomacy. 
Undoubtedly, some measure of his elusiveness resulted from 
more practica l career goals, as well as from Kennan’ s patent 
distrust  of abstract doctrine and r ig id  tormula in the 
exercise of foreign policy. Addit ionally ,  the broad sweep 
of normative p o l i t ic a l  theory is  often only a tangential  
consideration for the manner in which the diplomat thinks 
and writes about h istory. The more challenging question, 
from the standpoint of th is  study, is how someone who was
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not trained to think or write  in systematic phi 1 osophi cat -  
ethica l terms, nevertheless, has wound up holding such -firm 
views on many o-f these issues.
There is  no reason to suppose that Kennan was unaware 
o-f, or -failed to grasp, the phi 1 osophi cal moorings of 
p o l i t ic a l  realism as an approach to international a f fa i r s .
As the director  o-f the State Department Policy Planning 
Sta-f-f, he coordinated the ideas o-f such luminaries as 
Reinhold Niebuhr. Hans J. Morgenthau, Louis J. Halle ,
Dorothy FosdicK, and Charles Burton Marshall. His reference 
to Niebuhr as "the -father of us a l l "  is ins tru ct ive  -for his 
own assessment o-f the nature and destiny o-f man, the 
per p 1 e:: 111 es o-f social ethics, and the conditions of human 
communlty.
Kennan cer ta in ly  embraced the position of his real i st 
colleagues, i f  not the central premise of the classical  
p o l i t ic a l  thinkers: that the underlying basis for p o l i t ic a l
action and the maintenance of p o l i t ic a l  society begins with 
an appreciation of the -forces at work in the human soul.
The goals and objectives of any p o l i t ic a l  community mirror 
the r e la t iv e  levels of in te l le c tu a l  and 'sp ir i t" - ]  growth (nr 
degeneration) of i t s  c it izens .  Kennan saw the seat of 
worldly ev il  "not in so n a l  and p o l i t ic a l  in s t i tu t io n s ,  and 
not e v e n . . . in  the w i l l  or inequit ies of statesmen, but 
simply in the weaknesses and imperfections of the human soul 
i t s e l f . " 1'' In addition, both the meaning of freedom and
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man's r igh t  to -fundamental human l ib e r t ie s  "begins . . .w i th  
the humble acceptance of membership in, and subordination 
to, a natural order o-f things, and i t  grows only with 
struggle, and s e l f -d i  scipl me, and fa i th .  "3rj Unfortunately,  
Kennan never developed a theory of the state or elaborated 
on the processes of nature by which man s tr ives  to achieve a 
certain excellence o-f character (or v ir tue)  in the p o l i t ic a l  
association. At the same time, however, his concern -for the 
organic base o-f p o l i t ic a l  society, as well as the need to 
care fu l ly  nourish the higher in te l le c tu a l  and rat ional  
v i t a l i t i e s  in human nature, suQoest a l in e  of reasoning that  
may be summarized as -follows: Law, ju s t ic e ,  and the state
are not to be looted on as e v i ls ,  but are to be valued for 
themselves as things which are fundamentally good and 
essential for the proper development of human nature.
Because the world is constructed according to a coherent and 
rat ional pattern, i t  is proper and generally benef ic ia l  that 
each species should develop and exercise i t s  own natural 
char act ui isi jus.
Kennan's inc l ina t ion  to view society as Man writ 1 at ge 
is  informed by a sober preoccupation with the many human 
fa i l in g s  that of ten preempt the r e a l i z a t i  on of those mor a 1. 
v ir tues  that l i e  at the core of c iv i l i z e d  existence. As 
with other r e a l is ts ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  Niebuhr, Kennan’ s focus is 
on man's sinfu l p r o c l iv i t ie s  and the inev itab le  tragedy of 
human existence. For Kennan, man is in t r in s ic a l ly  a s e l f -
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regarding creature, whose more noble motives are o-ften
betrayed by ego t is t ic  impulses.31 Gnee re jec t ing  a Quaker
plea -for pacifism, he argued:
We run around, each o-f us, encumbered with a side 
o-f our nature — the demonic side— which i s . . .  wholly 
unamenable to reason, capable of great 
destructiveness, and extremely persistent . I t  
manifests i t s e l f  ind iv idua l ly  and c o l le c t iv e ly .  
Ultim ately,  i t  can be restrained only by some form 
of force. Violence is  the t r ib u te  we pay to 
orig ina l s i n . 33
Adhering to what one c r i t i c  has described as a 
C alv in is t ic  conception of human nature, Kennan accepted the 
r e a l i t y  of coercive power and violence in l i f e  as the price- 
to be paid for restraining  the ambitions of human egotism.
He once stated: "The* prob lem .. . is  not whether force is to be
exerted but how; and th is applies in the ind iv idua l,  the 
family, the nation, and the world community."33 Certainly  
the reference to or ig ina l sin raises the s t i l l  unresolved 
issue of the r e la t iv e  significance of e ither  theological or 
secular philosophical pr inciples  in Kennan's realism. 
Moreover, the problem is further compounded by his tendency 
to stress the demonic, more than the divine or ra t io n a l ,  
elements in man. At no point, however, does Kennan 
elaborate. ■' ■ how the. r-I f - lo v e  in  human nature is moderated 
by fa i th  in a higher law. Un111e Morgenthau, he never 
attempted to examine the rat ional requirements of a re a l is t  
theory of p o l i t ic s .  Unlike Niebuhr, Kennan offered l i t t l e  
insight into why i t  is necessary to draw upon another moral 
or s p ir i tu a l  resource to widen the conception of s e l f -
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in terest  in p o l i t ic a l  l i f e .
Given Kennan's recognition of man’ s fa l le n  nature, i t
is  with no small touch of irony that he sometimes displays a
personal and in te l le c tu a l  a f f i n i t y  tor the pleasant, genteel
world of eighteenth century rationalism. Deeply i l l - a t - e a s e
in his society and his time, Kennan always f e l t  an
obligation to set a personal example of c i v i l i t y  and
moderation.24 In his famous Encounter interview with George
Urban in 1975, he argued "that kindliness and generosi ty in
our personal behavior, and a refusal to be beastly to others
even by way of reaction, are both moral and pragmatic
q u a l i t ies  of the highest o rd er ,"2° Furthermore, the
remnants of Ca lv in is t  theology in tennan’ s thought are open
to dispute by his periodic inc l in a t io n  to equate the pursuit
of s e l f - in te re s t  with the common in te re s t .  In a concluding
summary of foreign policy in Amer ican Diplomacy, kennan
displayed a typical 1lbera1-bourgeois fa i th  in the idea that
the well-mannered pursuit of one's objective s e l f - in te r e s t
cannot help but serve the common good.2*
I t  w i l l  mean that we w i l l  h a v e . . . to  admit that our 
own nat i on a 1 i n t. er est is a l l  that we are r e a l ly  
capable of . . .understanding— and the courage to 
recognise that i f  our purposes. . .  here at home are 
decent ones, unsullied by arrogance or h o s t i l i t y  
toward other people. . . then  the pursuit of our 
national in terest  can never f a i l  to be conducive 
to a better war I d . . .  .
As with any of the more philosophical determinants 
influencing Kennan7s thought, the c r i t i c  must avoid the 
temptation to seel' consistency in his expression or thought
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where there simply may be none. For example, even the
r a t io n a l is t ic  f lavor of Kennart's commentary on the American
national in teres t  must also be judged in the more practical
content of his "Niebuhrian" remonstrat 1ons against the
" le g a l is t ic -m o ra l is t ic  approach to internat ional problems."
In addit i  on, i t  cannot be said that t ennan' s worldview
re f le c ts  any very profound appreciation of e g a l i ta r ian
sentiments rooted in American p o l i t ic a l  culture.
I f ,  ph ilosophical ly ,  Kennan is  a man of the eighteenth
century, he perhaps has more in common with the conservatism
of Edmund Burke than the l ibera lism  of John Locke or John
Stuart M i l l .  The central function of government, as lennan
sees i t ,  is the establishment and maintenance of public
o rd e r .2*  In one of his most-quoted observations on the
problems of ju s t ic e  and order in society, he wrote:
Humanity d iv id e s . . .between those, who in th e i r  
p o l i t ic a l  philosophy, place the emphasis on order 
and those who place i t  on ju s t ic e .  I belong in 
the f i r s t  of these categories. Human ju s t ice  is 
always imperfect. The laws on which i t  bastes 
i t s e l f  are always to some e:;tent unjust. . . .But the 
good or der of society is sonu_ t lung tangible and 
solid .  There is  l i t t l e  that can be done about 
men's motives; but i f  men can be restrained in 
the ir  behavior, something is  accomplished.3**'
Tor Kennan, the benefit of the doubt should rest with
the forces of order and not the wor1d-improvers. That the
maintenance of human order may e n ta i l  "a certain amount of
natural inequity and b ru ta l i ty "  is "a sad necessity of the
human predicament— a prudent concession to human
weakness. 11:30 A se 1 f-desc r l bed " inveterate e l i t i s t , "  Kennan
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yearns for a c i v i i u e d  meritocracy of s k i l l  and in t e l le c t ,
founded upon the h ierarchical structure of society.
One has to distinguish between individual  
dispositions. There is  always a small 
m in o r i ty . . .who have values, insights, and 
s e n s it iv i ty  far  greater than the mass of th e ir  
fe llow beings, and i t  is very important how th is  
p a t te rn -s e t t1ng minority behave. Beyond that ,  you 
have the mass of people...who are the common run 
of humanity with th e ir  normal strengths and 
weaknesses.31
Throughout his long diplomatic career, Kennan was 
consistently troubled by the intrusion of domestic p o l i t ic a l  
consideratlons in to  the realm of foreign policy and the 
representation of United States in terests abroad. Against 
the chaotic disorder of the American p o l i t ic a l  process, 
Kennan favors "a greater fastidiousness about the allotment 
of tas is  and responsibl1i t i es. . . a preference for hierarchy  
and authority  over compromise and manipulation. 1,32 In a 
revealing passage from his Memoirs. he likened his ro le to 
that of “the su rg eo n . . . i f  told to def lect  the knife and male 
the cut in a d i f fe re n t  and unsuitable place because he might 
look b e t t e r . . . t o  people in the seats of th'“ th e a t re ." 33
Before turning to the concepts and princ ip les  shaping 
Kennan's realism as an approach to i nternationa1 p o l i t ic s ,  
b r ie f  mention must also be made of his ro le  and thought as a 
diplomatic h is tor ian .  In general terms, kennan defines 
di p1omat i c hi story as one aspect of p o l i t ic a l  h istor y.
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I t  is  part of the study of man in his behavior as 
a p o l i t ic a l  animal; and i t  concerns i t s e l f  with 
what occurs at that p ar t icu lar  point of f r ic t io n  
where the a c t iv i ty  of one sovereign p o l i t ic a l  
authority  rubs and grates on that of another.34
From the nature and personality  of the sovereign state, the'
h is tor ian  is  led to the classical problems of p o l i t ic a l
science: how men tend to behave in the exercise of p o l i t ic a l
power and the problem of reconciling s e l f - in te re s t  with a
larger national purpose.
Regarding the methods of the diplomatic h is tor ian ,
Kennan may be considered a " p a r t i c u la r is t , " who scrupulously
avoided formulating systematic theory or a philosophy of
h istory,  in the tra d it io n  of Oswald Spengler or Arnold
Toynbee. Subscribing to what one author labels the
"snowbal1 theory of hi s to r y ,"3a Kennan argues that the great
moments and ideas of history are more the result  of
cumulative errors in the mundane or in the everyday choices
of people and governments.
One thing leads to another. Every mistake is  in a 
sense the product of a l l  the mi stales that have 
come before i t . . . a n d  at the same time every 
mistake is  in a sense the determinant of a l l  the 
mistakes of the future, from which i t  derives a 
sort of cosmic unforgiveab1eness.
Aside from occasional hints in the d irect ion  of 
formulating "a personal philosophy of foreign po licy ,"  
Kennan's concern for the h is to r ic a l  part icu lars  ( i . e . ,  the 
hidden, unexpected, and unpredictable in human a f fa i rs )  is 
matched by his aversi on to "the search for absolutes in
world a f fa i r s .  1137 Indeed, Kennan has long been suspicious
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of sweeping doctrines and universal -formula o-f -foreign 
policy in a world -forever changing and marked by " re la t ive  
and unstable values." Reflecting on his long days of public 
service, he wrote: "I had no confidence in the a b i l i t y  of
men to define hypothetically  in any useful way, by means of 
general and legal phraseology, future situations which no 
one could r e a l ly  imagine or envisage."30
In sum, Kennan’ s p o l i t ic a l  philosophy is  nowhere stated 
in e x p l ic i t  or systematic form. Commentators seeking to 
discern his in te l le c tu a l  progenitors confront the unenviable 
chore of groping for some measure of order or relat ionship  
among thoughtful fragments, dispersed at random throughout 
his many books and essays. To appraise kennan7s ideas 
so1e1y from the standpoint of p o l i t ic a l  philosophy would not
on ly  be a b r ie f  and 1 nconc: 1 usi ve endea vor ; this
uni d i men si on a 1 f ix a t io n  would also seriously neglect, his 
more stimulating and practica l re f lec t ions  on America's rote  
in the unend i ng struggle f or secur i ty and f reedom in a 
host l i e  worId.
However, to be pragmatic in p o l i t ic s  and foreign policy  
is not to d is in h e r i t  basic assumptions about the meaning and 
value of man in his p o l i t ic a l  existence. There is every
reason to believe that Kennan would concur with Morgenthau7?,
point, that "man.. .cannot l iv e  without a philosophy that  
gives meaning to his existence, by explaining i t  in terms of 
causa1i t y . . .  and ju s t i fy in g  i t  in terms of e th ics ."  The
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•following section examines Kennan's realism as a philosophy 
o-f world a f fa i r s  and id e n t i t ie s  the root pr inc ip les  shaping 
his primary concepts of analysis.
Pr inciples of American Statecraft  
The path by which Kennan was led to embrace the 
princip les  of r e a l is t  thought defies brief recap 11ulat 1 on . 
His in tu i t iv e  curios ity  for the "imponderables" of 
in te rs ta te  re la t io n s  and "the f in e r  d is t inct ions  of the 
psychology of our adversaries" precluded any systematic 
refinement of r e a l is t  theory. Eugene Rostow describes 
Kennan as "an impressionist, a poet, not an ea r th l in g ,"  one 
whose mind "has never moved along mathematical l ines ,  and 
never wi 1 1 . Writing on containment strategy, John Lewis
Gaddis argues that Kennan’ s approach depended on the 
"noncomiriun i c ab 1 e wisdom of the experienced career o f f ic ia l  
and had l i t t l e  patience with the r i g i d i t i e s . . .and 
a r t i f i c i a 1i t l e s  involved in administering large 
organ izat ions ." While always appreciative of the personal 
and esoteric s h i l l  of Kennan, Secretary of State Acheson 
said in reference to him that the conduct of foreign policy  
requires "communicable wisdom, and not mere conclusions,
however soundly based in experience and i n t u i t io n  "4,J
Any account of Kennan’ s realism must begin by 
acknowledging the personal torment that moved him to 
question the deep-seated psychological and material forces 
determining the h is to r ic a l  fate  of individuals and nations.
For example* Kennan believed that the -failure o-f the Western
countries to reach a stable and sat is fac tory  p o l i t ic a l
solution to the d ivision of Europe following World War I I
resulted from "our general ignorance of the h is to r ica l
processes of our age and p a r t ic u la r ly  from our lack of
attent ion to the power r e a l i t i e s  involved in a given
s itua t ion .  1141 kennan invoked the reasoning of the Cambridge
h is to r ian ,  Herbert B u tte r f ie ld ,  who wrote:
Behind the great con f l ic ts  of mankind is  a 
t e r r ib le  human predicament which l ie s  at the heart 
of the s to r y : . . .Contemporaries f a i l  to see the 
predicament or refuse to recognize i t s  genuineness 
so that our knowledge of it. comes from la te r  
analysis. I t  is only with the progress of 
h is to r ic a l  sc 1ence. . . that men come re a l ly  to 
recognize that there was a t e r r ib le  knot almost 
beyond the ingenuity of man to u n t ie . -* 2
Kennan7s reservations about the objectives of United
States foreign and defense policy throughout the postwar
period involve more than the calculat ion of power
d if fe re n 1 1 a1s and respective national c a p a b i l i t ie s .
Underlying much of his writ ing  on the purposes of American
power 1s a profound sense ol horror and bewi1derment at the
stakes 1nvolved in 1nternat1onal p o l i t i c s . * ’  In a relevant
passage from his Memoirs, re c a l l in g  a t r i p  to Hamburg in
1943, Kennan referred  to:
. . . a n  unshakable conviction that no momentary 
m il i ta ry  advantage.. .could have ju s t i f ie d  th is  
stupendous, careless destruction of c iv i l i a n  l i f e  
and of material v a l u e s . . . . I f  the Western world was 
re a l ly  going to mate a va lid  pretense of a higher 
moral departure p o in t . . . th e n  i t  had to learn to 
fight, i t s  war s moral ly as we ]1 as m i l i t a r i l y ,  or
not f ig h t  them at a l l ;  for moral princ ip les  were a
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part ot i t s  s trength.4A
By his own admission, these thoughts would remain at 
the center of Fennan’ s t r i a l s  in future years. They were 
c le a r ly  re f lec ted  in his views on whether America should 
commit i t s e l f  to the development of the hydrogen bomb; in 
the BBC Reit hi Lectures of 1957, in which Kennan spoke 
against basing the defenses of NAfO members on nuclear 
missiles; in the senatorial hearings of 1966 and 1967, where 
debate centered on the bombing of North Vietnam; and in the 
public domain throughout the 1970s, in the controversy over 
nuclear p ro l i fe ra t io n  and strateg ic  arms contro l . 40
Turning his at tent ion to the lessons of United States 
diplomatic h is tory,  Kennan"s realism took shape as an 
inventory of various in te l le c tu a l  misconceptions associated 
with the " 1 ega 1 l st l c-mor a 1 i st. i c approach to international  
pr ob1ems. " In part icu]ar  , he noted the con t r  ast between the 
r e a l i s t i c  or ien tat ion  of ear ly  American statesmen during the 
Feder a l i  st er a and "the cloudy bombast of the ir  successor s 
of la te r  decades." K rom the period of tiie L iv i l  War to 
World War I I ,  American foreign policy was " le g a l is t ic  in i t s  
concept and methodology, moral ist ic  in the demands i t  seemed 
to place on others, and sel f- r ighteous in the degree of 
h l gh-mi ndedness. . . i t  imputed to ourselves."*** In both 
Amer ican Dipl cimac y and R ea l i t ie s  of American Foreign Po licy , 
he examined various undertakings in which these tendencies 
revealed themselves: s p e c if ic a l ly ,  the endless preoccupation
with a rb i t ra t io n  t re a t ie s ;  the e f fo r ts  toward world 
disarmament; and the i l lus ions  o-f achieving a peaceful world 
through internat ional organization and m u lt i la te ra l  
d i p 1 omacy.
Deeply rooted in the national consciousness,, these 
id e a l is t ic  abstractions invoked by American leaders served 
"as unconscious pretexts" for the fa i lu re  and in a b i l i t y  to 
deal with the "real substance of 1nternat1onal a f f a i r s . "  At 
the core of the 1egal1s t 1c-mora11s t 1c approach is the be l ie f  
t h a t :
instead of taking the awkward co n f l ic ts  of 
national in terest  and dealing with them on th e ir  
merits with a view to finding the solution least  
unsettl ing to the s t a b i l i t y  of i nternational l i f e ,  
i t  would be better to find some formal c r i t e r i a  of 
a ju d ic ia l  nature by which the permissible 
behavior of states could be defined. ■*“
Among the consequences of th is  hopeless mi sconcep11on 
were the following: i t  erroneously assumes that a l l  states
are s a t is f ie d  with th e ir  present status and l im its  the ir  
p o s s ib i l i t y  for redress; i t  confers an absolute value on the 
concept of national sovereignty, ignoring var ia tions in 
national divisions and in h ib i t ing  flu;-: and change; i t  
assumes that domestic issues cannot become in ternat lona1 
concerns; and, wor st ol a l l ,  i t  abets a mor a11sm — the 
"assumption that state behavior is a f i t  subject tor moral 
pronouncement"— which gives r is e  to the mentality of total  
war and to ta l  v ic to r y .4’
Kennan's analysis of the id e a l is t ic  component in
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American -foreign policy is  generally consistent with the 
in te l le c tu a l  standards u t i l is e d  by other r e a l is ts  in th e ir  
evaluation of American diplomatic history. Unlike a  Niebuhr 
or Morgen than,, however, Kennan does not systematically  
develop his c r i t iq u e  of American foreign policy within the 
context of an e x p l ic i t  and comprehensive worldview or 
philosophy of global p o l i t ic s .  In recounting the errors of 
American diplomacy a f te r  1900, he was more incl ined to 
"discuss individual episodes and s i tu a t io n s . . , in the hope 
that th is  impressionistic pattern may communicate better  
than any attempt at d irect  presentation my own reactions to 
the material at hand."00 kennan7s particularism, as well as 
his concern to unravel the various factors involved in 
specif ic  h is to r ic a l  outcomes, almost always toot precedence 
over any sustained e f fo r t  to convey the essential concepts 
and normative precepts underlying his thought.
Yet i t  is inconceivable that kennan could w ri te  at such 
length about the conduct of American s ta te c ra ft  without 
re lying  upon a core of basic pr inciples  and explanatory 
concepts. While the fundamental tenets of George F.
Kennan7s realism were never formulated in prerise  
theoret ica l terms, several recurrent ideas distinguish his 
approach to the study of American foreign policy and 
in ternat ional  p o l i t ic s .  Here, we shall examine b r ie f ly  
Kennan7s realism, as i t  re la tes  to the rul ing  
charac ter is t ics  of the modern state  system, the objective
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-foundations of foreign policy, the ro le of power and force, 
and the contribution of American ideals to the preservation 
of internat ional  s t a b i l i t y .
— Human nature is " i r r a t io n a l , se l f is h ,  obstinate and 
tends to violence."™1 I t  is v i r t u a l ly  impossible to 
effec t  basic changes in man, and few people w i l l  ever
"have an abstract devotion to the pr inc ip les  of 
1nterna11 ona1 1ega l l ty  capable of competlng with
impulses from which wars are apt to ar ise . "B1'
— International p o l i t ic s  takes place in an anarchic 
global environment where the v i ta l  forces of "tear,  
ambition, insecurity ,  jealousy, and...even boredom" are 
the prime movers of events. The sovereign national 
state " s t i l l  recognizes in the crucial moments of i ts
own destiny no law but that of i t s  own egoism— no
higher focus of obligat ion , no overriding ethical
code."=3
— The prudent statesman is  obliged to recognize the
" r e a l i t i e s  of power" arid to  deal t r a n f  l y  w i th  them in 
the i n t e r e s t s  of the s u rv i v a l  and i n t e g r i t y  of na t iona l  
l i f e .  Reconc i l ing d ivergen t  na t iona l  o b je c t i v e s  and 
min imiz ing the sources of l n t e r n a t i ona1 tens ion are 
best l e f t  t o  " the t r a d i t i o n a l  devices of p o l i t i c a l  
e:i ped l enc y w i t h  an eye t o  the g i ven r el  at  l onsh i ps of 
power .
— A n a t i o n ' s  fo re ign  p o l i c y  cannot be grasped apart  f rom
the domestic factors that prescribe the goals of policy  
or in te rn a t1ona1 forces that hinder achievement of 
those goals. What a state may hope to achieve in 
l nt er na t. i ona 1 p o l i t ic s  resu lts  from the complex 
in terp lay  of state in teres ts ,  personalit ies , and 
domestic pressures, as well as the nature and 
organization of a s ta te 's  foreign service.
— A logical coro l la ry  to the persistence of national 
ambition and r iv a l r y  in in te rn a t i onal p o l i t ic s  is the 
absence of any universally  applicable standards of 
morality in re la t ions  among sovereign states. While 
"moral princ ip les  have th e ir  place in the heart of the 
ind iv idua l ,"  governmental behavior cannot be subjected 
to the same moral judgments that are applied to human 
behavior. In p a r t ic u la r ,  government, "may not subject 
i t s e l f  to those supreme Jaws of renunciation and s e l f -  
s a c r i f ic e  that represent the culmination of individual 
moral growth."aA 
While by no means an exhaustive l i s t ,  these recurrent themes 
are p a r t ic u la r ly  instruct ive  for understanding tennan's 
out. 1 oof on the purposes and pr inciples  of American power in 
a changing postwar internat ional environment.
Per haps no other c oncept or standard is as integral to 
Kennan's writ ing  on America's postwar diplomatic behavior as 
ttie national in te res t .  The power r e a l i t i e s  that define the 
essence of internat ional p o l i t ic s  largely derive from the
destab il iz ing  impact of self-centered national egoism in a
world of large secular societies . Underlying his c r i t iq u e
of the 1egal1stic-mora11s t 1c s ty le  of United States
diplomacy was Kennan's b e l ie f  that pollcy-maKers
mi sunder st ood both the se l f ish  motives of a l l i e s  and
adversaries, as well as the nature and l im its  of American
power in the service of worId peace. Shap lng Kennan7s
analysis of the nati ona1 i nterest were such f undament a1
considerations as: (1) the problem of conceptualization and
d e f in i t io n ;  (2) the national in te res t  and underlying
purposes of Ameri can soclety; and (3) the national lnterest
as a de l im ita t ion  of geopolit ical  strongholds.
For over t h i r t y  years, Kennan studiously avoided any
s ta t ic  or a pr i orl conception of the national in terest  of
the United States, as a fi;:ed measure by which to trea t  the
means and ends of foreign policy. Nevertheless, he was
w i l l in g  to accept the h is to r ica l  r e a l i t y  and rational
i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y  of the concept of the national in te res t .  In
Kennan7 s words:
I wanted .. . to  t ry  to ascertain on what concepts of 
national in teres t  and national ob ligat ion, as 
rel at ed to foreign a f fa i r s ,  the van ous Ameri c an
statesmen had operattd .07
by 19UO we were generally aware that our power had 
world-wide signif icance and...from that time on 
our in teres ts  were constantly involved in 
i mportant ways with such events.
I t  w i l l  mean that we w i l l  have the modesty to 
admit that our national in teres t  is  a l l  that we 
are r e a l ly  capable of Knowing and understanding.™^
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Yet while he was emphatic about the value of the
concept of s e l f - in te re s t ,  Kennan was also skeptical about
e f fo r ts  to define the national interest according to
invariant c r i t e r ia  or fixed det er m i nan t s. Two reasons may
be cited tor th is  reluctance. The f i r s t  concerns Kennan's
be lie f  that the most important character ist1c of
1nternationa1 p o l i t ic s  is i t s  d ivers i ty ,  not i t s  uniformity.
International p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  is something organic, 
not something mechanical. I ts  essence is change; 
and the only systems for the regulation of 
international l i f e  which can be e f f e c t iv e . . .are 
ones s u f f ic ie n t ly  subtle, s u f f ic ie n t ly  p l iab le ,  to 
adjust themselves to constant change in the 
interests and power of the various countries 
i nvolved.
The sources of conf l ic t  and change in relations among 
sovereign states are "always specif ic ,  never general." 
Judgments on the components of the national interest w i l l ,  
therefore, always be re la t iv e  to particular circumstances 
and ta i lo red  to account for the changing d istr ibut ion of 
power and values in the international system.
A second reason followed from the doubts Kennan 
expressed about whether the vicissitudes of American foreign 
policy, including the national in terest , can be subjected to 
precise theoretical d e f in i t ion .  In language more in tu i t iv e  
than analyt ic ,  he once described the national interest as 
"something. . . you Know must e x is t— you can demonstrate i t  by 
the process of exclusion—but i t  is too vast, too rich in 
meaning, too many-sided, for any positive d e f in i t io n ." -’1 
B rie f ly  reviewing Kennan's outlook on what the national
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in terest  is not . rather than what i t  is ,  some insight may be
gained into that “something" shaping the purpose and
objectives of American foreign policy.
In Kennan*s view, America's national in te res t  “is not  a
detached in te res t  in our internat ional environment f or i t s
own sate. 1ndependent of our asp1r at 1ons and pr ob1ems her e
at home." He believed that nations "do not l iv e  just  for
th e ir  re la t ions with others": rather they "conduct foreign
policy in order to l i v e . "  Kennan was also convinced that
the national in te res t  “is  a function of our duty to
ourselves" and "one of the means by which some higher and
more comprehensive purpose is served .“ That end or purpose
"consists in whatever we consider to be the general objects
of American B o c i e t y . T r e a t i n g  the national in terest  as
an expression of se lf - respect ,  Kennan wrote:
A natlon which is  meetlng i t s  prob1ems, and 
meeting them honestly and cred itab ly ,  is  not apt 
to be a problem to i t s  neighbors. And...having  
figured out what i t  wants to do about i t s e l f ,  i t  
w il l  f ind that  i t  has. . . mysterlously acquired 
c r i t e r i a . . . for knowing what to do about i t s  
relation::: w i t h o L ‘. l r s . **
In l inking the national in terest  to the general objects 
or values of American society, Kennan consulted the vision 
of the Founding Fathers. Government existed in order to 
secure to the individual c i t ize n  such natural r igh ts  as 
l i f e ,  l ib e r ty ,  and the pursuit of happiness, as well as “the 
r ight  to hold property and to dispose over i t . "  Reflecting  
the tenets of 1ib e ra l - ra t io n a l  p o l i t ic a l  thought, th e ir  view
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was that the state "was not conceived as an end in i t s e l f  or 
the bearer "o-f any concrete social program. " The "greatest 
good o-f the greatest number" was believed to be the result  
o-f the natural processes of pr ivate  in t e r e s t . * 4
From th is  conception of the original objects of 
p o l i t ic a l  society, Kennan believed that American statesmen 
were compelled to follow a "modest" and "restrained" course 
in foreign a f f a i r s .  In the ear ly  years of the republic,  
American national in terest  had two basic objectives: "to
protect the physical intactness of our national l i f e  from 
any external m i l i ta ry  or p o l i t ic a l  intrusion" and to 
"promote and protect" pr ivate American in terests abroad. 
Moreover, there was "nothing in i t  that said we should be 
ashamed to recogmce the r e a l i t i e s  of power or to deal 
franl. ly  with them in the in terests of our survival . "*°  For 
example, res is t ing  European intrigues in the New World and 
extending American sovereignty to the western t e r r i t o r ie s  
both "involved power considerations." Yet, as kennan 
observed, such a national policy "at th is time was not 
considered e v i l ,  or Machiavellian, or cynical. I t  was 
simply regarded as a response to t h e . . . loqica! requirements 
of our s i t u a t 1 on. "
In the decades a f te r  World War I I ,  Kennan"s d e f1n111 on 
( i f  not his more ambiguous 1n te rp re ta t1 on) of the national 
in teres t  added l i t t l e  to the diplomatic perspective of the 
Founding Fathers. For example, in 1948, he suggested that
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the -fundamental objectives of United States foreign policy  
must always be: to protect national security , by which he
meant "the continued a b i l i t y  of th is  country to pursue the 
development of i t s  internal l i f e  without serious 
in te r fe re n c e . . .from foreign powers"; and to promote the 
well-being of the American people, "by promoting a world 
order in which th is  nation can make a maximum contribution  
to the peaceful. . .development of other nat ions ."t7
Many years la te r ,  Kennan would write: "The in terests of
the national society. . . are those of m i l i ta ry  security , the 
in te g r i ty  of i t s  p o l i t ic a l  l i f e ,  and the well-being of i t s  
people. The fundamental in te res t  of the United States in
world a f fa i r s  is  "to continue th is  FTlgrim's Progress.. .with  
a minimum of foreign 1nterference, and also with a minimum 
□ f . . .provocation to the in terests  of other nations, "*'* By 
contrast, constructive e f fo r ts  to enhance the harmony and 
s t a b i l i t y  of domestic l i f e  preclude an a c t iv is t  foreign  
policy l inking the defense of American national in terest  to 
such lo f ty  goals as assuring the morality of international  
conduct elsewhere in the world; preventing economic hardship 
or a l te r in g  l iv in g  standards in distant countries; and 
seeking m i l i t a ry  superior ity  in an age of " i r ra t io n a l"  
nuclear o v e r f i l l  capab i l i ty .
To Kennan"s mind, the national in teres t  is not 
p r1 mar 11y a question of purpose, objective, or doctrine;  
rather i t  is  a question of "how" rather than "what." From
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th is  angle, Kennan is  apparently preoccupied with the s ty le
or the conduct o-f American -foreign policy, rather than any
predetermined hierarchy of desirable goals. Indeed, "manner
of execution is  always a -factor in diplomacy of no less
importance than concept. 1170 Harshly judging America's
diplomatic d i l le ta n t is m  in foreign a f fa i r s ,  he observed:
Objectives were normally vainglorious, 
unreal . . .  even pathetic — l i t t l e  l ik e ly  to be
r e a l iz e d  But methods were another matter.
These were re a l .  I t  was out of the ir  immediate 
e ffec ts  that the quality  of l i f e  was re a l ly  
molded. In war as in peace I found myself 
concerned less with what people thought they were 
s tr iv in g  for than with the manner in which they 
strove for i t . 71
For Kennan, good form in outward behavior "becomes a value
in i t s e l f ,  with i t s  own v a l id i t y  and effectiveness, and
perhaps— human nature being what i t  i s — the greatest value
of them al 1 . "7'=t
Whlie a number of conceptual defects in Kennan' s
realism w i l l  be more f u l l y  e;: ami ned at a 1 a ter s t age of th is
chapter, i t  is  ins tru c t ive  at th is  juncture to note the
ambiguity in his treatment nf the national interest as an
extension of the American purpose in foreign policy. Dn one
le v e l ,  he is  inspired by a nostalgic a f f i n i t y  tor the
conception of national purpose that shaped the
ln te rp re ta t io n  of American national in terest  during the
ear 1y years of the republic. In th is  period, American
foreign policy was geared to "fined and l im ited objectives,"
involving only the "improvement of our national l i f e . "
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America's influence in the world went no further than 
minimizing European influence in this hemisphere and 
protecting private American commercial interests abroad.
What is far  less certain in Kennan's writing,, however, 
is the extent, to which the vision of the Founding Fathers is 
meaningful tor the conduct of United States diplomacy in the 
second half of the twentieth century. At one paint, Kennan 
acknowledged that the trad it iona l  objects and ideals of 
American society "must be enlarged" and "pursued.. .part iy  in 
the broader theater of our 1nternat1ona1 environment."7J 
Against the 1ai ssez- f a ire theory that the best interests of 
society are served by promoting individual s e l f - in te re s t ,  he 
called on government to foster a greater sense of co llect ive  
and national purpose with regard to the social and economic 
i l l s  of the nation. Clearly, Kennan considers the l ib e ra l -  
rational philosophy of watch-dog government as the guardian 
of private interest sorely def ic ient  as a remedy to such 
negative phenomena in American l i f e  as in f la t io n ,  
unemployment, pornography', and declining educational 
standards. However, beyond opposing the welfare state or 
social ization of the means of production. Kennan har? had 
l i t t l e  to say about either the re o r ien ta t1 on of c iv ic  values 
or new ins t i tu t io n a l  forms which would shape American 
national l i f e  in Keeping with the demands of the future.
To a considerable degree, Kennan’ 5 cursory observation;, 
on the national purpose have been eclipsed by his
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examination o-f American national in terest  as a geopolit ical  
problem. While mindful o-f numerous domestic influences and 
constraints on -foreign policy, f ennan devoted more attention  
to the const e 1 1 at. i on of external variables a f fect ing  
America's t ra d i t io n a l  in terest  in preserving national 
security  and promoting a stable world order. As pioneer in 
the f ie ld  of national security studies at the National War 
College, Kennan developed an in teres t  in both the 
organization of postwar in te rn a t1ona1 society and the 
d is tr ib u t io n  of m i l i ta ry  and p o l i t i c a l  power in the nuclear 
age.7“* Americans in a b i l i t y  to police the world and 
considerations of power balance led him to distinguish among 
hey geographic areas on the basis of the ir  contribution to 
United States security .
Speahing to a War College audience in 1948, Kennan 
provided a rough out line of "those areas of the world 
which...we cannot p e r m i t . . . to  f a l l  into hands host i le  to 
us." His l i s t  included:
1. The nations and t e r r i t o r ie s  of the A t lan t ic  community, 
which include Canada, Greenland and Iceland, 
Scandinavia, the B ri t ish  Is les ,  Western Europe, the 
Iberian Peninsula, Morocco and the west coast of Africa  
down to the bulge, and the countries of South America
( r oiTi t  lit- bulge north;
2. The countries of the Mediterranean and the Middle East 
as far east as, and including, Iran; and
3. Japan and the P h i l ip p in e s .7®
In la te r  years, Kennan narrowed his geopolit ical  
p r io r i t i e s  to encompass f iv e  strongholds of m i l i ta ry -
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industr ia l  strength having a d irect  bearing upon American 
national security . All are located in the Northern 
Hemisphere; they include the United States, the United 
Kingdom, the Rhine Valley with adjacent industr ia l  areas, 
the Soviet Union, and Japan, 7*1 Only these regions can bring 
together "great masses of manpower, m i l i ta ry  s tren g th . , . and 
p a r t ic u la r ly  strength of an amphibious nature, capable of 
reach1ng our homeland and disput i ng our power within i t . "  
Only one of those great power centers was, at that  time, in 
h o st i le  hands; the primary in terest  of the United States in 
world a f fa i r s ,  therefore, was to see to i t  that no others 
f el 1 under enemy cont rol .
The concept of f iv e  v i ta l  centers of world power would 
remain an enduring feature of Kennan's internat ional  
perspective throughout the postwar decades of cold war and 
detente. Yet he acknowledged that his primary concern for 
mi 1i ta ry -s e c u r i ty  objectives in Europe and Asia did not 
exhaust the t o t a l i t y  of America's varied in terests  in world 
a f fa i r s .  Kennan' s pc> ; t io n , according to Gaddis, "was that  
of the v a r ie t ie s  of power that existed on the lnternat ional  
scene, in d u s t r ia l—m il i ta ry  power was the most dangerous, and 
hence or i mar v emphasis should be placed on Keeping it. under 
control." '7’™ C lear ly ,  Kennan recognized that American 
foreign policy includes such essential in teres ts as 
consolidating a sphere of influence within the Western 
Hemisphere; preserving access to sources of raw materials
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throughout the developing world; and maintaining a broad
network, o-f economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  and cu ltural t ie s  with the
major industria l  democracies.
The concepts o-f power and balance of power were o +
decisive importance in kennan's views regarding the
re a l iz a t io n  of America's postwar m i l i ta ry  and diplomatic
l n t er est s . His preoccupat 1 on with the con f 1 i c t s o-f i nt er es t
and power among nations is  rooted in a tragic conception of
human nature. The basic: human condition, according to
Kennan , i s one Q-f a l ien a t i  on. Desp i t e  occasi on a 1 moments o-f
transcendent greatness, the destructive force o-f s e l f - lo ve
in human nature leads to man's estrangement from other men.
The pursuit of power in the l ives of both men and nations
creates a "moral dilemma":
. . . t o  wield power is at best an ambivalent th ing— 
a sharing of the gu i l t  taken upon themselves by 
a l l  those men who, over the course of the ages, 
have s o u g h t. . . to  t e l l  others what to do... .Power,  
l i k e  sex, may be concealed or outwardly 
lgnored. . . but neither in the one case nor in the 
other does th is  concealment save us from the 
destruction of our innocence. . . . ^
ParadoMlcal1y, the universal urge to power is  both the 
seat of the soul’ s corruption as well as an organic process 
by which t _ ■ : t : -ain or iz.i.ik : ■ thu s i n fu l  and aggressive
pretensions of demonic man. Accordingly, kennan called on 
Americans to accept frankly "the v a l id i ty  and legitimacy of 
power r e a l i t i e s  and a s p ira t io n s . , . to  take them as existing  
and in a l te ra b le  human forces.. .and to seek th e ir  point of 
maximum equilibrium rather than th e ir  reform or th e ir
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r e p r e s s i o n . I n  an imperfect world, the morality of a l l  
p o l i t ic a l  action is  contingent upon the expedient search for  
a balance among conf l ic t ing  i nterest s .
The balance of power p r inc ip le  also provided Kennan 
with a standard with which to re la te  American security  
in terests to the organization of in te rn a t1onal society. The 
importance of th is  concept for his thinking can be traced to 
three pivotal assumptions about the nature of internat ional  
p o l i t ic s .
F i rs t ,  grandiose legal blueprints for world government 
cloak the in trac tab le  r e a l i t i e s  of internat ional p o l i t ic s  
behind a s t e r i l e  facade of "parliamentary shadow-bo;; 1 ng" and 
in h ib i t  action necessary in defense of the national 
1 nt er e s t . An or gam r at 1 on for in te rn a t i  on al security' can 
f u l f i l l  i t s  purpose on 1 y when the int. er est s of the 
p art ic ip a t in g  countries happen to coincide with the 
maintenance of a part icu lar  p o l i t ic a l  or t e r r i t o r i a l  status 
quo. Reflecting on the fa i lu r e  of the Holy All iance and 
League of Nations, Kennan noted that "the moment i t  became 
in the ln terest of one or the other of the great powers to 
a l t e r  the status quo, none of these treaty structures ever 
stood in the way of such a l te ra t io n ."  In short, 
ln ternat lonal  security  w il l  depend "on the r e a l i t i e s  of 
power...not on the structure in which they are clothed."®1
Second, as Kennan envisioned i t ,  the "organic" 
character of internatlonal p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  is one in which
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man, cu lture,  and history are woven together in an 
inextr icab le  web. The organic metaphor underlies Kennan1 s 
b e l ie f  in the contingent nature o-f in ternat ional p o l i t ic s ,  
where "there is  nothing -final in point of time, nothing not 
vulnerable to the law of change, but also nothing absolute- 
in i t s e l f . "  Given the inherent in s t a b i l i t y  of p o l i t ic a l  
phenomena, "the function of a system of in ternational  
relat ionsh ips is not to in h ib i t  th is  process of change by 
imposing a legal s t r a i t j a c t e t  on i t  but rather to f a c i l i t a t e  
i t ;  to ease i t s  t rans it ions  and to temper i t s  asp er i t ie s ." '3  ^
Any equilibrium among major powers would have to be 
s u f f ic ie n t ly  f le x ib le  to adjust i t s e l f  to constant change in 
the in terests  and power of the countries involved.
Third, any mechanism tor the regulation of 
1nternat1onal p o l i t ic s  must adapt i t s  methods to accommodate 
both violent and nonviolent forms of change. Committing 
American diplomacy to the elim ination of armed c o n f l ic t  front 
in ternat ional  l i f e  was a goal that  Kennan thought neither  
possible nor desirable. In addition, he observed: "I thinl
we have to face the fact that there may be arrangements of 
peace less acceptable to the security  of thi = rount.rv than 
isolated recurrences of v iolence."®3 American foreign  
policy, according to Kennan, should abide by the maxim: 
"Peace i f  possible, and insofar as i t  a f fects  our 
ln te re s ts . *
In terms of i t s  s ignificance for American foreign
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policy, Kennan equates the balance ol power with "using 
American influence, wherever possible, to assure that the 
a b i l i t y  to develop m i l i t a ry  power on a grand scale is  
divided among several governmental e n t i t ie s  and not 
concentrated e n t i re ly  in any one of them."BD The balance of 
power not only prevented the outbreak of a major war in 
Europe during the century pr ior  to 1914; in addition, the 
European balance (along with B ri t ish  maritime supremacy) 
represented a p o l i t ic a l  necessity for America’ s economic 
expansion and hemispheric security throughout the nineteenth 
century. Yet, Kennan believed that i t  was only during the 
ear 1y years of the republic that American statesmen 
confidently  dealt with power r e a l i t i e s  and attempted to 
res tra in  European powers in th e ir  t e r r i t o r i a l  ambitions in 
the Western Hemisphere. By contrast, in the decades before 
and a fte r  World War I ,  America's t ra d i t io n a l  in terest  in the 
balance of power was mortgaged upon i l lu s o ry  hopes of 
universal disarmament and the abstract formalism of 
international law. Again during World War I I ,  America 
planned for a world organisation, unmindful that the Soviet 
Union was emerging as a new threat to the equilibrium n(
Eur ope.
Increasingly a f te r  1945, balance of power 
considerations began to shape o f f i c ia l  estimates of American 
foreign policy goals in a bipolar world. "The objective of 
our policy from th is  point on," Secretary of State Marshall
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announced in 1947, ’‘would be the restorat ion  o-f a balance of 
power in both Europe and Asia a n d . . .a l l  actions would be 
viewed in the l ig h t  o-f th is  objective. " *7 Kennan emphasised 
that America's v i ta l  in terest required f i r s t  and foremost 
that  no single cont i nent al power come to dominate the major 
power centers in Europe and Asia. The power vacuums created 
by the defeat of Germany and Japan necessitated
"strengthening.. . the  natural forces of resistance within the 
respective countries which the communists are attaching and 
that has been.. .  the basis of our policy."*"*
Kennan id e n t i f ie d  several prerequisites for American 
overseas policy geared to promoting a balance of power in 
Europe and Asia. Because of i t s  unrivaled position of 
influence in the postwar world, the United States would have 
to take the lead in seeking to maintain any global balance 
of forces. Yet i t  was equally obvious that America lacked 
both the resources and the w i l l  to hold the world in balance 
uni la te ra l  1y. "We may not l ik e  a l l i e s —but we've got to 
have t h e m . S i m i l a r l y ,  American security hinged upon 
establishing a balance among host i le  powers and sowing 
dissension within enemy ranis. S p e c if ic a l ly ,  kennan urged 
policy-makers to u t i l i z e  more f u l l y  propaganda techniques as 
part of a vigorous diplomatic campaign to counter Soviet 
gains in Eastern Europe. P o l i t ic a l  regimes that posed a 
threat  to the national in terest  of the United States would 
thus be "compelled to cancel each other out . . . 1n order that
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the constructive -forces, working -for world s t a b i l i t y ,  may 
continue to have the p o s s ib i l i ty  o-f l i f e .  "’ °  F in a l ly ,  
smaller states in the Third World do not male any 
s ig n if ic a n t  contribution to the global strateg ic  balance.
To th is  day, Kennan s t i l l  believes that a balance of power 
is only applicable to the f iv e  predominant geopolit ica l  
strongholds of m i l i t a ry - in d u s t r ia l  poten t ia l .
At th is  point, i t  w i l l  be useful to assess Kennan’ s 
conception of power as i t  re la tes  to the various foreign 
policy methods he deemed essential for implementing a 
postwar balance. Despite his concern with the ubiquity of
power in foreign policy, Kennan never sett led  on any one
e x p l ic i t  d e f in i t io n  of power applicable to the wide range of 
events and processes evident 1n modern in te rn a t1ona1 
p o l i t ic s .  As a general proposition, Kennan treated power as 
the a b i l i t y  to achieve intended results or to influence the 
a t t  itudes and behavior of other peop1e in some desired way. 
More s p e c if ic a l ly ,  Kennan denied that power simply 
translates  into the possession of superior force; the 
American national in terest  "cannot be served by any single
agency of p o l i r v  Tt is  the sum to ta l  of our performance
that counts; our e f fo r ts  must embrace a l l  facets of our
n at i ona 1 beha v i or . " 1 Any at tempt by t h e  Un i  ted St at es t o
foster  a state of equilibrium among the major powers of 
Europe and Asia would, therefore, entail  re l iance on a 
combination of m i l i t a ry ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, psychologjcaJ,
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and other dimensions of -foreign policy.
George Kennan is certa in ly  no p a c if is t  and, at least 
unti l  the 1970s, he recognized the importance of m i l i ta ry  
force in maintaining the postwar balance. Although cynicaJ 
about nuclear weapons (both strategic and ta c t ic a l )  as 
usable instruments of policy, he did favor u t i l i z in g  small, 
high ly -tra ined , mobile -forces that could be rap idly deployed 
in local s ituat ions to restore the balance of power. In 
addition to supporting United States involvement in Korea 
(1950), he is on record of having considered (though not 
f i n a l l y  recommending) possible American m il i ta ry  
intervention in Greece (1947), I t a l y  (1948), and Taiwan 
(1949).*'^ However, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Kennan 
joined Walter Lippmann, Hans J. Mnrgenthau, and other 
commentators in opposing the escalation of United States 
m il i ta ry  commitments in Vietnam. S p ec if ica l ly ,  he doubted 
whether America had ei ther  s u f f ic ie n t  power or s u f f ic ie n t ly  
strong in terest  to police, and u l t im ately to resolve, a 
c iv i l  co n f l ic t  in the jungles of Indochina. There was 
l i t t l e  evidence, Kennan argued, that the turmoil in Vietnam 
had a s ign if ican t  bearing on the security of Japan or the 
overa l1 balance of power in East fts ia . ’ 3 Kennan also 
believed that the deployment of conventional American forces 
on a l imited scale was questionable. He suggested that the 
greatest value of American m il i ta ry  forces lay in the ir  
psychological qual ity  as a deterrent. "Armaments are
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important, " he wrote, "not just -for what could be done with
them in time o-f war, but -for the psychological shadows they
cast in time of peace. 11,4
The importance o-f American diplomatic and economic
in i t i a t i v e s  in creating a postwar bal ance o-f power derived 
-from the nature of the Soviet threat to the peoples of 
Western Europe and Japan. Kennan never expected, and s t i l l  
does not believe, that the Soviet Union would rist: a war 
with the United States in order to achieve i t s  desired 
foreign policy goa1s. More l i t e l y  than d irect Sovlet 
m il i ta ry  intervention in Europe and elsewhere was the 
p o s s ib i l i ty  of a psychological conquest and the prospect of 
communist-1 ed coups or v ic to r ies  in free  elections.  
Accordingly, economic aid, and in Western Europe the 
Marshall Plan, constituted the primary vehicle by which to 
bolster "the strength and will  of those people to a point 
where they could play the ir  part in the European balance of 
power."
The Marshal 1 PI an...would lay the foundation tor a 
new sense of purpose in Western society. . . .  In this  
visi  on, we saw a new ordering of in te rnat iona1 
rel ations genera)ly in the A t lant ic  and European 
areas. . . ; i t  was our hope that th is  al tern at ive  
could be made so patently wurthy and inspir ing in 
i t s e 1f . . . that peoples could safely repair to i t  
without raising m il i ta ry  i55ue5.,D
Concomitant with the economic recovery of Europe and 
rehabi1i ta t lo n  of Japan, Kennan called for such American 
diplomatic in i t i a t i v e s  as reducing the scope of Soviet 
influence by exploit ing ten si ions within the i n t er nat l on al
communist movement; modifying 
in ternat ional  re la t ions  with a 
settlement of outstanding differences;  
ideological pretensions by constructive  
abroad; and maintaining a healthy and 
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early views on national interest and balance a-f power are 
s t i l l  meaningful in terms of the l im its  and opportunities 
confronting the United States in an interdependent global 
arena which is poised, as Kennan c lear ly  believes, on the 
precipice of nuclear and environmental calamity. While a 
-future section of th is  chapter more fu l ly  evaluates his 
position on several continuing problems in American foreign 
policy, i t  seems appropriate to ca ll  attention here to a
number of conceptual defects in Kennan"s realism.
Much of Kennan"s thought gravitated toward the 
complexities and ambiguities of international p o l i t ic s  and
away from any theoretical or systematic explanation of the
foreign policy process. Kennan, therefore, provided no 
coherent framework by which to ranK-order or judge the 
interaction of external or internal variables in specific  
outcomes of foreign policy. On the domestic side of the 
ledger, this reluctance may be attr ibuted to Kennan"s 
professed e l i t ism  and cynical reproach of democratic 
dec i s i on-mak i ng . Foreign policy, fie has always believed, 
should remain the exclusive preserve of an in te l lec tua l  
aristocracy insulated from the pullings and haul inns of 
ethnic, re l ig ious,  and economic groups that have at heart 
only parochial concerns, not the national in terest .
S im ilar ly ,  Kennan"s thought suffers from a lack of 
precision both in specifying the content of the national 
in terest ,  as well as in accounting tor i ts  significance, in
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the formulation of specif ic  foreign policy goals. Against 
the 1ega1is t ic -m ora1i st ic  pr inc ip les  id e n t i f ie d  with the 
interwar years, kennan’ s invocation of the "national 
in terest"  as the lodestar of United States foreign policy  
was based on a firm appreciation for the r e a l i t i e s  of power 
and c o n f l ic t  in i nternatlonal l i f e .  However, he never 
s p e c if ic a l ly  ex plained what i t  means to formulate foreign 
policy based on ex is t ing  power r e a l i t i e s .  The implication  
of Kennan7s argument is that po lic ies  enhancing the national 
in terest  can be deduced from the application of power 
r e a l i t i e s  to spec if ic  i nternational p o l i t ic a l  problems.
Left unresolved, however, is the question of how a general 
grasp of these r e a l i t i e s  can determine a statesman’ s 
pref erence f or any par t ic u la r  c our se of action in the l ight  
of f luc tuat ing  value patterns and r e la t iv e ly  scare means.''7
Furthermore, Kennan’ s tendency to t re a t  the national 
in terest  as a se l f -ev id e n t ,  objective datum that follows  
from the or ig ina l  objects of the American national 
experience is ta u to lo g ic a l : i t  begs the question of what the
national in te res t  i_s in any spec if ic  foreign policy context, 
why certain  measurer ">re : of orred over erf hers at d i f fe ren t
times, for what purposes power and influence are being 
u t i l i z e d ,  and (among several competing interests)  which 
i nt er est is the nati on a 1 l n t er e s t . *rei
Second, kennan’ s case against moral and legal 
abstractions in foreign policy obscures the way in which the
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broad purposes and in teres ts  of a society are u lt im ately  
subject to normative evaluation. Both preserving national 
security  and protecting the welfare of Americans are 
statements of value that cannot be deduced from any 
ob j ec 11 ve statement of facts. For e;i amp 1 e , i t  won Id male 
l i t t l e  sense to argue that nations should seet: power- 
adequate for th e ir  survival i f  high value were not placed on 
the existence of independent nations. Moreover, concern for 
individual welfare e n ta i ls  a moral judgment on the worth or 
dign ity  of man as well as the desired ends of human 
e:; i stence.
F in a l ly .  Kennan’ 5 1nterpretat lon of the national 
in te res t  followed from an inquiry into the general objects 
and purposes ot American society. The Founding Fathers' 
commitment to l im ited government, individual freedom, and 
economic l ib e r ty  translated into a modest and restrained  
conception of foreign policy. Kennan s t i l l  describes 
himself as a " t r a d i t io n a l is t  who does not believe  that th is  
country is well const i t u t ed. . .  to play an active ro ie  in 
foreign a f f a i r s . " 100
However. Kennan never probed further  into the 
re la t ionsh ip  between national purpose and national in teres t ,  
even while he believed that the eighteenth century 
conception of national in terest  was not f u l l y  applicable to 
twentieth century America. This neglect is a l l  the more 
unfortunate in that Kennan frequently  exhibits  seemingly
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i r reconci1 able views on the value and strength of Amer1can 
society in a troubled postwar world. For example. In 19b4, 
he wrote:
I f  I did not believe that , despite a l l  our 
national fa i l in g s ,  our existence as a great nation 
was by and large benefic ia l to the c iv i l i z a t io n  of 
which we are a part ,  i f  I did not believe that our 
purposes as a nation were on balance worthy 
o n e s . . . I  would not feel we were e n t i t le d  to take 
the a t t i tu d e  I have suggested th is evening. 101
Yet, in speaking to George Urban in 197fa, kennan claimed
that America was i l l - s u i t e d  to speak and act as an e ffec t iv e
leader in worId a f fa i r s .
Leadership cannot be given for  the two reasons we 
have already mentioned: <1> because the United
States has noth1ng much to say to the out s i de 
worId, and (2) bee ause the kind of gover nment we 
have does not permit, even i f we had a val 1 d 
message to i mpart, the shaping of that message 
into a consistently pursued foreign policy. 1 ,:>i'
Since he spent much of his career debating the strategy  
and ta c t ic s  of American power, i t  is  somewhat surprising to 
f ind that kennan never developed the balance of power as an 
analyt ica l  tool for assessing a l te rn a t iv e  foreign po lic ies  
and changes in 1nt ernatlonal p o l i t ic a l  s tru c tu re . In 
general, his in te rp re ta t ion  of the balance p r inc ip le  was as 
neogranhical1y narrow as i t  was q u a l i ta t iv e ly  vague. The
postwar balance ot power would be maintained, he believed,  
as long as mi 11ta ry - in d u s tr1 a1 power "on a grand scale" was 
divided among the f iv e  major centers of geographical
strength in the Northern Hemisphere. Lar gely absent f r om 
Kennan's geopolit ica l design is any investigat ion into the
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precise operation of the balance of power in tandem with the 
nuclear balance o-f te r ro r ;  the d is tr ibu t io n  o-f power 
concomitant with new re la t ions  o+ interdependence and recent 
trends in the world economy; the significance of loca l— 
r eg1 ona1 ba1ances of power ln both the deve1 op mg and 
industr ia l  parts of the world; and the influence of social,  
economic, and p o l i t ic a l  developments in the Third World upon 
the global balance of power,
Kennan7s more recent commentary on the balance of power 
leaves open for debate the degree to which i t  provides a 
useful standard for  United States foreign policy. In an 
interview with the editors of Foreign Pol icy in 19711, he 
claimed that  " i t  should not be cynica lly  conceived and i t  
should not. . .be tal:en to mean pushing other people into  
c o n f l ic t  with each other." This seems to represent a clear 
departure from his e a r l ie r  conviction that the balance could 
be used to e>: p 1 o i t ten si ons within the wor Id c ommun l st 
movement and otherwise permit America's enemies to spend 
th e ir  energies in c o n f l ic t  with one another. fennan 
provides l i t t l e  insight into how the balance might be more 
p o s it ive ly  conceived in terms of specific  policy in i t i a t i v e s  
designed to s ta b i l i z e  the sources and expressions of 
c o n f l ic t  both within and among nations. In the same 
context, Kennan admitted that "except for our ro le  in NATO, 
and such influence as we might have— or might have had— on 
the situat ion  on the subcontinent of Ind i a—Pahistan, our
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p o s s ib i l i t ie s  are decidedly l im ite d ."  In East Asia, the 
"curious balance of power" maintained by the Russians, 
Chinese, and Japanese "is not our doing, and needs no 
stimulation from u s ." 103 These reservations suggest that  
hennan now finds the balance of power applicable only to 
NATO countries, which seek to maintain rough equivalence 
with the Soviet Union in stra teg ic  and conventional m i l i ta ry  
capab 1 1 1.1 y .
Realism and Relative Floral Judgments in Foreign Policy
Aside from his formulation of the containment doctrine  
and i t s  continuing relevance for American national security ,  
no other facet of Kennan' s work, has been as vexatious as his 
treatment of morality  and foreign policy. Unlike the other 
re a l is ts  examined in th is  study, hennan never wrote at any 
length about the ph i1osophical, re l ig iou s ,  or s c ie n t i f ic  
foundations supporting a l te rn a t iv e  ethical conceptions of 
p o l i t ic s  in the history of Western thought. Undoubtedly, 
his more pract ica l concern for wor k ab l111 y over abstract  
p rin c ip le  in foreign policy m i l i ta te d  against any ongoing 
inquiry into the normative basis of r ights  and obligations  
in in te rs ta te  behavior.
1hroughout the postwar era, therefore, hennan' s 
re f le c t io n s  on the moral qua li ty  of American s ta te c ra ft  
stand as abbreviated fragments and summary footnotes in his 
more general indictment of the id e a l is t ic  t ra d i t io n  of 
American diplomacy. More recent ly ,  he has admitted that
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"these observations were.. . brought forward too c ry p t ic a l ly  
and. . . 1nv1ted a wide var ie ty  of in terp re ta t ions , not 
excluding the thesis that I had advocated an amoral, or even 
immoral, foreign policy for th is  country." 104 In fa c t ,  i t  
was not un t i l  he published an essay in the Winter- 1 9 B b / 8 h 
ed it ion  of Foreian A ffa irs  that hennan even attempted a 
systematlc present at i on of his views on the subject.
The concept of raison d7 6tat  (explained more f u l l y  in 
Chapter I)  has never figured prominently in hennan's writ ing  
on the ro le  of American values and ideals in international  
p o l i t ic s .  However, i t s  meaning should certa in ly  not be 
a l ie n  to one who read Clausewitz and Machiavel1l while 
serving at the National War College with Bernard Brodie. As 
a consc’ entlous scholar interested in European diplomatic 
history,  for George hennan the h is to r ic a l  manifestation of 
"state necessity" permeated his recent study of the pre- 
World War I Franco-Russi an al l iance. l,JB Whether r ai son 
d'6 ta t  is  relevant for American power, as informed by a 
r e a l i s t i c  appraisal of the national in te re s t ,  was translated  
by hennan into the question: "Can i t  be true that here, too,
there is no room for the application of moral p r inc ip le  and 
that  a l l  must be l e f t  to the workings of expediency, 
national egoism and c yn 1 c i bhi" " 1 Bringing together the
disparate strands of hennan's moral reasoning w i l l  entai l  
considering the problem of "moral ism" in foreign policy; the 
statesman's loya lty  to norms transcending the national
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community; and the rela t ion  of domestic purpose to foreign
policy norms.
Both the ro le  and l im itat ions of morality in
international p o l i t ic s  have been important elements in
Kennan's polemic against the le g a l is t ic -m o ra l is t ic  impulse
in United States foreign policy conduct. Increasingly since
the turn of the century, this approach found expression in
the tendency of pollcy-makers to substitute high moral
pronouncements and universal legal principles tor
calculations of the national interest based on the "rude
facts of power." Summarising the American moralistic sense
of mission in world a f fa ir s ,  he wrote:
I t  was assumed by American statesmen that whatever
was u rg e d . . . in  the name of moral or legal
principles bore with i t  no specific responsibil ity
on the part of him who urged i t ,  even though the 
princ ip le at hand might be of questionable 
applicabi11ty to the situation and the practical  
effects of adherence to i t  drastic and far  
reaching. 10 *
Whether in theory or philosophy, "every attempt to 
systematise about international a f fa ir s  involves a r t i f i c i a l  
d i s t i nc t i ons."1 For hennan, the state represented an 
always changing organic whole, the embodiment of unique 
histor ica l  lorces and cultural t rad i t ions . Since tno 
sta te 's  p o l i t ic a l  growth re f le c ts  no predetermined structure 
or generally accepted universal patterns, what is morally 
r ight or wrong is not readily  apparent to the foreign 
observer. Because of the subjective nature of i t s  cultural  
development, no nation can presume to "be the judge of
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another's domestic in s t i tu t io n s  and requirements. "1,Jir Like 
Morgenthau, Kennan distrusted approaches to international  
peace that re ly  on the innate human capac 11 y f or moral 
judgment as a panacea for reconciling divergent claims and 
in terests of sovereign states. With Lippmann, he believed 
that the morality of peace and war can never be approached 
separately from "the internat ional  s ignificance of p o l i t ic a l  
problems and the deeper sources of in te rn a t1onal 
s t a b i l i t y . " 110
Insofar as Kennan*s moral perspective eschews abstract 
moral commands and looks to concrete p o l i t ic a l  experience, 
i t  is  not surprising that many of his most revealing  
statements are made within the context of specif ic  
diplomatic case studies. Certain ly anyone who has taken the 
time to read both volumes of his Memoirs cannot help 
concluding that he is  an almost t rag ic  f igure ,  genuinely 
troubled by the "stupendous, careless destruction of 
c iv i l i a n  l i f e  and material values, b u i l t  up laboriously by 
human hands over the course of te n tu r1es. " 111 Among the 
many examples and fa i lu re s  Kennan ci tes  in the history of 
American foreign policy, i t  is possible to extract several 
core concerns that have shaped his approach to the ethical  
p o s s ib i l i t ie s  and l im its  of constructive st atesmianshi p.
1. Foreign Policy By And For Governments; Chief among 
the p o l i t ic a l  r e a l i t i e s  that characterise the national state  
is that "foreign policy is conducted by governments, as a
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function of th e ir  governmental respons ib i l ity ;  and i t  must 
serve the purposes of government genera l ly . '1 Against the 
t r ad111 ona1 Amer1can yearning + or re l  a t 1 on5 of peop1e to 
people. Kennan argued that amorphous expressions of public 
sentiment or states of national feel ing  are e f fe c t iv e  only 
when f i l t e r e d  through a duly-constituted p o l i t ic a l  authority  
that has control over the inner processes of a nat ion ’ s 
l i f e .  Whether a government speahs with an enlightened voice 
in world a f f a i r s  "wi l l  be largely a matter of the outlook of 
the rul ing group i t s e l f  and of the independence i t  enjoys, 
at the given moment, to follow a courageous and constructive  
course in i t s  foreign policy. 111 12
2. Mora1 Purposes And Government: Whether on the 
subj ect of e ither  domest1c or f orei gn policy, k ennan has 
always insisted on a "wall of separation" between the actual 
tasks of government and i t s  normative ra t iona le  according to 
c r i t e r i a  of national purpose. The governing of human 
beings, he believes, is a prac tica l (and not a moral) 
exercise best l e f t  to the devices of p o l i t ic a l  expediency.
In an of ten-quoted passage, he argued:
I t  is a pract ica l funct ion. made necessary, 
regrettciliJ y, by the need tor order in social 
relat ionships and for  a co l le c t iv e  d isc ip l in e  to 
control the behavior of that large majority of 
mankind who are 100 weak: and sel f 1 sh to con t r  o 1 
the ir  own behavior usefully  on the basis of 
individual judgments and conscience.113
3. F'ublic vs. Private Standards Of M o ra l i ty ; Like other 
American r e a l is ts ,  kennan draws a sharp d is t inc t ion  between
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the moral conscience o-f the individual and the morally-
neutral obligation o-f the statesman to uphold a nation's
sovereignty and security . He acknowledges that "moral
pr inc ip les  have th e ir  place in the heart o-f the individual"
and are "essential to the successful functioning o-f any
p o l i t ic a l  society that rests on popular consent." However,
in a passage with a strong Niebuhrian accent, he noted:
...when the in d iv idu a l 's  behavior passes through 
the machinery o-f p o l i t ic a l  organization and merges 
with that o f . . .  other individuals to -find i t s  
expression in the actions of a government, then i t  
undergoes a general transmutation, and the same 
moral concepts are no longer relevant to i t .  A 
government is  an agent, not a pr inc ipa l;  and no 
more than any other agent may i t  attempt to be the 
conscience of i t s  p r in c ip a l .11"*
Furthermore, kennan considers a s ta te 's  in terest  in 
maintaining m i l i ta ry  security and the in te g r i ty  of i ts  
p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  as "unavoidable necessities of a national 
existence and.. .not  subject to c la s s i f ic a t io n  as e ither  good 
or bad." While admitting that these goals "may be 
questioned from a philosophical point of view" (a view he 
never takes),  he warns that "the government of the sovereign 
state cannot make such judgments." 1 By suggesting that a 
government needs no moral ju s t i f ic a t io n  for acting in 
defense of security  and national well-being, some c r i t ic s  
contend that hennan has called into question, i f  not 
exempted, moral choice in foreign policy dec i si on-mah 1 ng. 1
4. Moralism In Foreign Po licy : Typical of Kennan's
foreign policy analysis is  his preference for defining by
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exclusion or boxing in a problem by eliminating -false
answers or untenable solutions. Regarding ethics and
foreign policy,  he has often chastised American statesmen
for f a i l in g  to distinguish between the practical
requirements of morality and a crusading moralism geared to
the indiscriminate promotion of universal norms. Moralism
is the tendency to mate one moral value supreme and to apply
i t  without regard for r iv a l  moral claims emanating from a
wide var ie ty  of cu ltural  and p o l i t ic a l  settings. Into th is
category, Kennan placed such pronouncements as the Kellogg-
E(riand Pact, the A t lant ic  Charter, the Yalta Declaration on
Liberated Europe, and the Helsinki accords of 1975. In a
b r ie f  essay prepared tor the Council on Religion and
In te rn a t1onal Af fa i rs ,  he asked:
I f  our government. . .  set out to pursue moral 
purposes in foreign policy, on what would i t  base 
i t s e l f ?  Whose outlooks, philosophy, re l ig ious  
concepts would i t  choose to express? Are we to  
assume that the government knows what is  r igh t  and 
what is wrong, has imparted th is  knowledge to the 
people at large, and obtained th e ir  mandate to 
proceed to bring about the triumph of what is  
r ight  on a worldwide scale?11-7
F in a l ly ,  Kennan notes "that there are no in te rn a t1ona11y
accepted standards of moralltv to which the IKS. government
could appeal i f  i t  wished to act in the name of moral
p r in c ip le s ." 11W
I f  a number of Kennan's detractors erroneously label
him a cynical architect  of American R e a lp o l l t ik . they are
correct in maintaining that his s tr ident  c r i t iq u e  of
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mar al ism mare o-f ten c on-f uses , r at her than c la n  f i es , the 
nature and ra le  o-f norms in foreign policy. To a 
considerable degree, th is -failing may be a t tr ibu ted  to the 
many broad g en era l i t ies  and propositions that appear to cast 
the re la t ionship  between r e a l i t y  ( facts)  and morality  
(values) in 1rreconc11ab1e terms. In the interview with 
George Urban, he stated: "Please understand that for
purposes of argument I am given to overstating a case . . . .  I f  
one wants to see both sides of a coin, one h a s . . . t o  bring 
out each side in exaggerated r e l i e f .  " l l ' ’ I t  is  not always 
c lear ,  for example, whether Kennan generally re jec ts  
morality  as a v iab le  standard in international a f f a i r s  or, 
more s p e c i f ic a l ly ,  just the p a r t ic u la r  celebration of 
American v ir tues animating the le g a l is t ic -m o ra l is t ic  
approach. Several examples can be cited to i l l u s t r a t e  the 
c onf1i ctlng themes and areas of c ontr ad l ct i on l n Kennan ’ s 
t hought.
While ra re ly  sympathetic to idealism, Kennan certa in ly  
disavowed the more modern view of p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  as a value- 
f ree  medium of predictable behavior. Less c lear ,  however, 
is  precisely what he means by morality ethics: nor is he
overly clear about the contribution of universal pr inc iples  
within the framework of a p lu r a l is t ic  democracy. Convinced 
that there are few i f  any uni verbal 1y-accepted moral 
b e l ie fs ,  Kennan once wrote: "I Know of no absolutes in the
qua li ty  of human beings anywhere."iao Yet, in any interview
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with Joseph Alsop regarding Soviet power in Eastern Europe, 
he averred:
. . . t h a t  these events do have grandeur, because 
they are v is ib le  proof that c e r t a in . . .moral 
princip les  re a l ly  must be observed in the long run 
in the successful government of great people.
These events prove that i f  those princ ip les  are 
consistently  v iolated over a long period of time, 
th is  v io la t io n  avenges i t s e l f .
Kennan submitted that certain  higher pr inc ip les  were 
objective and immutable: "They were there. God created
them, in my o p in ion ."131 Never one to debate morality as a 
phi 1osophical or theological proposition, he offered scant 
advice on re la t in g  objective, immutable pr inc ip les  to a less 
than perfect world "where the ideal so obviously l ie s  beyond 
human reach."
With regard to the i l lu s ion s  associated with idealism 
and moral ism in f oreign a f f a i r s ,  hennan i s not always 
consistent in his re f lec t io n s  on ei ther  the r e a l i t y  of 
in ternat ional norms of conduct or the extent to which power 
and p r inc ip le  may be reconciled in the formulation of 
American national in te res t .  On a few rare occasions, he 
acknowledged that no foreign policy can be successful over 
any length of time without some recourse to moral sanctions. 
In R ea l i t ie s  of American Foreign Po licy . Kennan argued "that 
the conduct of foreign re la t ions  ought not to be conceived 
as a purpose in i t s e l f  for po l i t i c a l  soclety. . . but rather as 
one of the means by which some higher and more comprehensive 
purpose is served. The reference to a normative purpose
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in foreign policy Is somewhat puzzling, in l ight  of his 
conviction that only the methods, as opposed to the 
purposes, of states can be assigned moral s i g n i f 1cance. "1 
have never. . .  meant to suggest that we should not be 
concerned for the observation of these concepts in the 
methods we select for the promulgation of our foreign  
p o l i c y . " 13’  Yet what are "moral" methods, i f  not variat ions  
of purposive actions with value in the ir  own r ight? His 
imprecision in dist inguishing between purposes and methods 
is  matched by the absence of any explanation regarding how 
the means of foreign policy can be subjected to moral 
evaluat1 on.
A related l in e  of Kennan’ s thinking sees morality and
the national interest  as potent i a l 1y complementary forces in
foreign pol icy.  From th is  perspective, he suggested there
need be no conf l ic t  between tne demands of security and
those of pr inc ip le ,  provided the f i r s t  were understood as a
precondition for the second. Speaking to the Naval Academy
in 194/, he observed:
I think that our country has made the greatest  
e f fo r t  in modern t im e s . . . t o  t rea t  the questions of 
i nternat lona1 l i f e  from the standpoint of 
principles and not power: but even we in the end 
are compelled to consider the security of our 
peop1e . . .  because. . . uni ess they can enjoy that  
security they w i l l  never be able to make any 
useful contribution to a better  and more peaceful 
war 1 d.
The complementariness of national security and moral purpose 
was again affirmed by Kennan's conviction that ,  " i f  our
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purposes here at home are decent ones.. . then the pursuit at
our national interest  can never t a i l  to be conducive to a
better  world." Despite these more opt imist ic assessments o-f
the moral impulse in United States -foreign pol icy.  Kennan
offered l i t t l e  or no insight into the question of the
operative American ideals or values that are to be promoted
in the service of a "better" and "more peaceful" world.
Kennan’ s rather cursory and ambiguous remarks on the
eth i ca1 char ac ter  of Americ an nat1onal 1nterest has been f ar
overshadowed by his preoccupation with the tragedy, and
ult imate constraints of decision-making, in a decentralised
and power-regulated system. A more pronounced tendency in
Kennan's wri t ing is to cast the re lat ionship between power
and moral pr incip les in con f l ic t ing ,  i f  not mutual 1y-
e:;clusive, terms. Writing about the d r i f t  toward war in the
1930s, he said:
I t  meant as early as the la te  19 30s, no clean, 
moral victory for the West was any longer in the 
cards. . . . Dnly the very strong, or those so weak 
that they do not choose to compete in terms of
power, can enjoy the luxury of acting purely in
the name of ideals; the others have to make their  
compromises.1
In a passage from his personal diary in 195o, he wrote: 
"Only the very strong can take high and mighty moral 
posi11ons and lgnore the ba1ance among the opposlng forces. 
The weak must accept . . .and exploi t  those r e a l i t i e s  to the ir  
advantage as best they can." ,2fc Kennan's words bring to 
mind a simi lar  account of the re la t ion  between might and
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r igh t  that f igured in Thucydides’ character1zat 1 on of the 
conference in 41 & B.C. between Athens and Mel os. Brushing 
aside the argument of the weaker Melians, the Athenians 
remark: " . . .you  know as well as we do that r i g h t . . . i s  only
in question between equals in power, while the strong do 
what they can and the weak suffer  what they mu5t. " 127 One 
suspects that the Athenians would have endorsed Kennan*s 
more pointed judgment that nations should recognize the 
"legitimacy of power r e a l i t i e s  and aspiratlons. . . without 
fee l ing the obl igat ion of moral judgment."
In a l l  fairness,  i t  was never Kennan"s simple intention  
to relegate the necessity for moral choice to the 
machinations of the wealthy and powerful. The e::cesses of 
H i t l e r ' s  Germany, and especial ly S t a l i n ’ s Russia, are cited  
as more conspicuous examples of man’ s fa l len  nature and 
capacity for ev i l  on a grand scale. Describing the 1939 
Nonaggression Pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet 
Union, he observed: "You had the reducti on ad absurdum of
p o l i t i c a l  cynicism, the i l l u s t r a t i o n  of the helplessness of 
people who...have launched themselves into a stratosphere of 
unlimited opportunism where there is no moral g rav i ty ."  f'n 
the evolution of Soviet power, he argued that "individual  
moral concepts cannot remain permanently separable from the 
problem of how man t reats  man within the framework of state  
power. "12tl Unfortunately, i t  is  often d i f f i c u l t  to  
reconcile kennan’ s bel ie f  in man"s moral nature with the
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advice that Americans should view the vicissi tudes of power 
in foreign policy as “neither good nor bad," and they should 
seek: on 1 y a power equi 1 1 br 1 urn rather than f undamen t al 
ref  or m.
At his most extreme, kennan sometimes e;; emp 1 l f i es the 
agnostic who re jects  "the assumption that state behavior is 
a f i t  subject for moral judgment." Insofar as most 
internat ional  conf l ic ts  are the product of uncontrol1ab1e 
h i s t o r 1 cal forces, what is mora11y r ight  or wrong is "simp1v 
not discernible to the o u ts id er ."1Z’  On whose side, he 
asks, resides jus t ice  in the co n f l ic t  between Israel  and the 
Arab states"1 Where is the? r ight  and wrong in the dispute 
over kashmir7130 On numerous occasions, kennan questions 
whether America has a useful moral message to impart to the 
world and doubts whether the United States government is 
prepared to accept the varied consequences of moral 
intervention in the a f f a i r s  of others. Certainly such 
expressions of doubt as "our national interest  is a l l  that  
wo a r e . . .capable of knowing" appears casually to invoke the 
classic ra t iona le  of ra 1 son d' £tat  for American foreign 
policy.  While perhaps sensing the danger of cynical ly  
stretching the gap between interest  and norm to i t s  breaking 
point,  kennan was reluctant to absolve decision-makers of 
al l  moral respons ib i l i ty  in acting on the basis of the 
national in teres t .
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Let u s . . . conduct ourselves at a l l  times in such a 
way as to s a t is fy  our own ideas o-f moral i ty.  But 
l e t  us do th is  as a matter o-f obl igat ion to 
ourselves, and not as a matter o-f obl igat ion to 
others. Let us do i t  in order that we may be able 
to l i v e  eas i ly  with ourselves. But. l e t  us not 
assume that our moral values. . .have v a l i d i t y  -for 
people everywhere.131
Although Kennan never mates a consistent case as to why 
states should be held morally accountable tor the i r  actions,  
he was never able to avoid the introduction of extr ins ic  
nor ms into the conduc t of internat ional  r e l a t  1ons. F or a l l  
of his re f lec t ions  on the national interest  as something 
object ive and value- free ,  he would have America "ease" the 
t rans i t ions  and "temper the asperi t ies" of 1nternat1ona1 
relat ionships;  he wishes to " isolate  and moderate" 
lnternat ional  conf l ic ts ;  he seeks solutions "least  
unsett l ing to the s t a b i l i t y  of internat ional  l i f e " ;  he 
places before us "that tremendous task of learning, and of 
helping others to learn, how man can l ive  in f r u i t f u l  
harmony. " i:sa Such e:: hor t  at l ons const i tute i r reducib le  
normative judgments. They evoke a moral frame of reference 
(however dimly perceived) both higher and broader than that  
which is implied when kennan professes only to know "our own 
national interest"  anu that a lo n e .1-3-3 As was often the case 
with Morgenthau, kennan simply insinuates operative  
diplomatic norms into his view of the national in terest .
Unlike Reinhold Niebuhr, kennan never d i re c t ly  
addressed e i ther  the nature or contribution of transcendent 
moral pr incip les in the pursuit of an ordered and just
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internat ional  l i f e .  He seems to have been so impressed with
the hypocri t ical  pretense in every claim to the moral
absolute that he decided to occupy the less dangerous ground
of moral r e l a t i v i t y .  Often l e f t  ambiguous is the question
of whether there are any universal norms not to be violated
in the pursuit of in teres t .  He implies that no categorical
answer can be given to that question since the concepts of
r ight  and wrong are not applicable to the purposes and
Dehavior of other states.  Vet, in one of his most
fascinat ing passages on the dangers of nuclear war and
environmental pol lu t ion,  hennan cal led for a standard of
judgment beyond the dictates of "objective" s e l f - in t e r e s t .
Is there n o t . . . a n  element of sacri lege involved in 
placing a l l  of th is  at stake just  for the sake of 
t h e . . . f e a r s  and national r i v a l r i e s  of a single  
generation7 Is there not a moral obl igat ion to 
recognize in th is  very uniqueness of the habitat  
and nature of man the greatest of our moral 
r e s p o n s ib i I i t 1es. . . . Th1s , i t  may be objected, is a 
re l ig ious question, not a mora l -po l i t ica l  
one. . . . But the ob j  ec t ion inv i tes  the f urt her 
question as to whether there is any such thing as 
morali ty that does not r e s t . . . o n  some foundation 
of re l ig ious  f a i t h ,  for  the renunciation of s e l f -  
in terest  . . .  c: an never be rat  i onal l z ed by purely 
secular and m a te r la l ls t lc  considerat ions.134
While suggesting a posit ion at odds with the logic of
r e l a t i v i s m ,  k e n n a n  f a i l s  to specify whet r it. i t n e  pi  lnciples
of re l ig ious  f a i t h  function only as a res t ra in t  on sinful
man or as a viable ,  creat ive force in the destiny of a l l  men
and nat lons.
In his recent a r t i c l e  in Foreign A f f a i r s , kennan
provides not so much a ph l1osophica1 discourse on the ethics
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of s ta tecra f t  as he does a more pragmatic or ientat ion to the
role  of values in American foreign policy.  Regarding the
moral defensibi1l t y  of American actions taken against the
internal  practices of offending governments, he advises that
such interventions are legi t imate "only i f  the practices
against which they are directed a r e . . . i n ju r i o u s  to our
interests ,  rather than just our s e n s ib i l i t i e s . "  Against the
h is t r ion ics  of moralism, Kennan fee ls  that "Americans must
overcome the i r  tendency toward general isation and. . .examine
each case on i t s  own merits." There may be times when the
chief requirement of American security in a certa in  part of
the world "is not an unnatural imitat ion of the American
model but sheer s t a b i l i t y . "  The merit of each part icu lar
case is not to be found in the attract iveness of general
semantic symbols but in the e f fect  of a given si tuat ion on
the "tangible and demonstrable interests of the United
States." Once again viewing morality and s e l f - in te r e s t  in
complementary terms, he writes:
If t h e . . . actions of the U.S. government a r e . . . t o  
conform to moral standards, those standards are 
going to have to be America's own, founded on 
t r a d i t i o n a l . . .pr inc ip les  of jus t ice  and propriety.
When others f a i l  to conform to those pr incip les,  
and when th e i r  f a i lu r e  has an adverse e f fect  on 
American i nt er est. s . as d is t inc t  from p o l i t i c a l  
tastes,  we have every r ight  to complain a n d . . . to  
take r e t a l i a t o r y  a c t io n .130
Although kennan previously held that the problem of 
internat ional  peace is best l e f t  to "the t ra d i t io n a l  devices 
of p o l i t i c a l  expediency." he has more recently objected to
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any approach to American diplomacy based on the national  
egoism and cynicism of raison d ? 61 a t . At least in America's 
judgment of i t s e l f  (ijp. not others) . "the connection between 
power and respons ib i l i ty  — between the sowing and reaping — is 
in te g ra l . "  In the f in a l  analysis,  his estimation of 
American moral conduct in world a f f a i r s  is r e l a t i v e  to. and 
a function of ,  the internal  purposes and normative order of 
domestic society.  Moral i ty in foreign policy, he believes,  
begins with the humble recognition of the gap "between what 
we dream of doing and what we r e a l l y  have to o f fe r ,  and the 
r e s o l v e . . . t o  take ourselves under control and establish a 
better re lat ionship between our undertakings and our real 
c a p a b i l i t i e s . "  A country vict imized by huge budget 
d e f ic i t s ,  and where defense spending has grown into a 
national addiction, "is not in a position to male the most 
e f fe c t iv e  use of i t s  own resources on the internat ional  
scene, because they are so largely  out of control . " 1:36 
Aside from averting the supreme dangers of nuclear 
annihi la t ion and the destruction of the natural environment, 
America's moral mission is i t s  own social and sp i r i tua l  
r egenerafinn.
Seeking a coherent whole from the many diverse and 
often conf l ic t ing  strands of kennan’ s thought on the 
normative resources of American foreign policy is perhaps 
beyond the l im i ts  of even the most creat ive display of human 
ingenuity. One wonders i f  th is  complicated man w i l l  ever
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sat is fy  the c r i t i c s  without redirect ing his energies to more 
■fully account for the " f i r s t  pr inciples" and "mart icu la ted  
assumptions" of his ethical  convictions. While re ject ing  
classical  r aison d7 £ t a t as a standard for United States 
f orei gn pol icy,  his wri11ng mor e of ten emphasi:es the 
ubiquity of s e l f - in t e r e s t  and power, while casting doubt on 
both the need for moral judgment, as well as upon the 
existence of internat ional  norms of state behavior. Kennan 
presumes to speal about an object ive national in terest  at 
the same time as he variously celebrates and debunks the 
values and purposes of American society. He takes exception 
to universal norms in internat ional  p o l i t i c s ,  while 
exhorting Americans to abide by the i r  t rad i t io n a l  principles  
of jus t ice  and propriety.  Ul t imately,  Kennan found no 
escape from the "middle ground" of moral re la t iv is m —the 
bel ie f  that transcendent pr inciples must be f i l t e r e d  through 
circumstances of time and place. Presumably, however, one 
must or should have some conception of universal pr inciples  
before they are attenuated by the sel f -serving ins t i tu t ions  
of sinful  man. Beyond an infrequent and vague profession of 
re l ig ious  f a i th  in immutable pr inciples.  Kennan never probes 
the creat ive forces of the human w i l l  in foster ing communal 
brotherhood and harmony. His formal ethic is immanental: 
morali ty is a function of how we behave toward ourselves 
rather than others.
Kennan and the Mew Real i t ies  of American Foreign Pol icy
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In some respects, Kennan' s second career as a 
provocative analyst o-f contemporary -foreign policy has 
overshadowed his e a r l i e r  years of distinguished diplomatic 
service. In his more recent publications and statements,  
Kennan came tD the center o-f national debate at a time when 
detente lost c r e d i b i l i t y  and the containment o-f communism 
accelerated new tears of a nuclear Armageddon. Part of the 
growing fascinat ion with Kennan resul ts  from the perception 
of a radical  sh i f t  in his thinking regarding the nature of 
the Soviet threat ,  as well as the new requirements of 
American national security.  Whether he has been consistent  
or, in fac t ,  changed his views on the American strategy tor 
power in the postwar period has produced what Gaddis ca l ls  
"a Kind of cottage industry" of continuing exegesis. I t  is 
beyond the scope of th is  study to review f u l l y  the panoply 
of issues that  continue to divide hennan and his persistent  
c r i t i c s .  To i l l u s t r a t e  his thought, this section w i l l  focus 
on the fundamental problems of nuclear war, containment, and 
human r ights.
No other single issue of 1nternat1ona1 p o l i t i c s  has so 
haunted kennan and provoked his moral i re  as the terror  of 
nuclear war. Comparing the momentum of the current arms 
race to that which catapulted Europe into World War I ,
Kennan warns: "We are a l l  being carried along at th is  very
moment towards a new m i l i ta ry  co n f l ic t  which could not 
conceivably end, for any of the part ies ,  in anything less
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than disaster .  "137 On one occasion,, he even suggested that
the mere possession of such weapons carr ies with i t  the
stigma of moral g u i l t .  Speaking in 1900 before a West
German audience, and direct ing his impassioned plea to both
Soviet and Amer1 can 1eaders, he said:
For the love o-f God. ..and of the c iv i l i s a t i o n  to 
which you belong, cease th is  madness. . . .  Von have 
no r ight  to hold in your hand. . . destructlve powers 
suf f ic ien t  to put an end to c i v i l i z e d  l i f e  on a 
great portion of our planet.  . . .Thrust them -from 
you. The r isks  you might thereby assume are not
g r e a te r — could not be greater than those which
you are now incurring -for us al 1 . 1
Kennan has now been at the center o-f the nuclear debate 
-for more than t h i r t y - f i v e  years. As early as 1950, he 
pleaded against the decision to develop the hydrogen bomb 
before renouncing the pr inc ip le  o-f "-first use" and before 
resuming internat ional  negotiations to outlaw a l l  weapons of 
indiscriminate mass destruction. Since the era of "massive 
r e t a l i a t i o n , "  and extending to the present emphasis on 
assured destruction capab i l i ty ,  he has consistently objected 
to basing the American defense posture on the nuclear 
warhead. Kennan7s objection was and has been rooted in 
several key consi derations.
— bince Wen Id war 1, a l l -o u t  war has ceased to be a 
coherent means to a desirable end. Weapons of mass 
destruction rendered obsolete the normal object ive of 
warfare construed as the to ta l  destruction Df the 
enemy’ s a b i l i t y  and w i l l  to res is t .  The existence of 
such weapons, kennan wrote, "meant that to ta l  war would
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ei ther  be suicidal  D r . . .destruct ive to a degree 
impossible to contemplate and out of accord with every 
pr inc ip le  of humanity in warfare. " 1311
-No respi te  from the nightmare of nuclear catastrophe 
can be hoped tor without the recognition that "the 
weapon of mass destruction is a s t e r i l e  and hopeless 
weapon. . . wh1ch cannot in any way serve the purpose of a 
constructive and hopeful foreign pol icy."  Even the 
ta c t ic a l  nuclear weapon is "destructive to a degree 
that sickens the imagination." The object ive of 
p o l i t i c a l  action is "to a f fect  the deeper convictions 
of man; th is  the atomic bomb cannot do. 11,40 With 
Sta l in ,  hennan believed that nuclear weapons are 
largely id le  threats with which to f r ighten people with 
weak nerves.
-At the center of American nuclear strategy for over 
three decades has been the pr inc ip le  of " f i r s t  use"-~a 
"pernicious theory," according to kennan, that "has 
la in at the heart not only of the nuclear  weapons 
ra c e . . .b u t  also of the p ro l i fe ra t io n  of nuclear weapons 
across the alnbe." Re]vinq on nuclear weapon^ to 
influence a broad range of pol ic ies  culminated in a 
"steady displacement of p o l i t i c a l  considerations by 
m i l i t a r y  ones," and a "dreadful mi 1 i t a r i z a t  i on of the 
e nt i re  East-West re lat ionship in concept, in rhetor ic,  
and in assumption. 11141
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— While the SALT ta lks open up useful channels of
communication between the two governments, there is not 
much l ikel ihood that any arms l im i ta t ion  agreement wi l l  
successfully address the dynamics behind Soviet-  
American m i l i t a ry  competition. One reason for this is 
that the pace of advancement in m i l i t a ry  technology is 
much more rapid than the pred1ctable pace of 
negotiations of th is  n a tu re .142 In addit ion, without 
some measures of un i la tera l  res t ra in t  on the part of 
Doth part ies ,  such t a i l s  degenerate into "contests to 
see how much one could contrive to keep. . .and how much 
the other side could be brought to give up, as though 
the purpose of the exercise was. . . to  get the other 
party at a clear disadvantage."
Although more inclined to speculate on what the Soviet 
leaders have ruled out (rather than in) by way of m i l i ta ry  
strategy, Kennan’ s primary concern has been with the revival  
of Cold War rhetor ic  and behavior in United States foreign 
pol icy.  Concerning the highly-debated motivations behind 
the Soviet arms build-up in the post-Vietnam years, Kennan 
"saw no s ig n s . . . th a t  they intended to go beyond a general 
state of equivalence." Against the "myth" of growing Soviet 
super ior i ty  in conventional armed strength in Central Europe 
beyond any l im i t  that the NATQ powers could conceivably 
match, he commented: "I was incl ined to see the causes of
th is  as much in our own neglect— in our uncontrolled
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in f la t io n  and the. . .wastefulness o-f our awn m i l i ta ry  
establishment — as in any s in is te r  Soviet designs -for the 
launching of World War Three. 1,143 Soviet problems in 
Eastern Europe, in addition to a variety of internal  
concerns and a genuine understanding and fear of the 
consequences of war, mit igate against any inc l inat ion  to 
e::pand m i l i t a r i l y  into Western Europe. 144
While hennan holds both sides culpable for the 
dangerous escalation of the nuclear arms race, there is a 
recurrent tendency in his recent wort to contrast a 
"conservative" and “cautious" Soviet leadership with 
American o f f i c i a l s  who have been "hypnotized" by "a high 
degree of general ant i -Soviet  hyster ia ."  Especial ly since 
1973, he notes that American a t t i tudes both in and out of 
government have contributed to "the assumption of deadly and 
i r reconci lab le  conf l ic t"  and "the acceptance of the 
l ikel ihood,  i f  not the i n e v i t a b i l i t y ,  of Soviet-Amer i can 
war." 140 These perceptions find the i r  apotheosis in the 
heaqan Administra t ions proposals tor new f i r s t - s t r i k e  
weapons, as well as in the project ion of the "nuclear 
delusion" into spare. kennan now believes that n^i'fpnt 
calculat ions of deterrent capab i l i ty  have been eclipsed by 
i r ra t io n a l  scenarios of "overk i l l "  potential  and morbid 
inquir ies  into national "surv ivab i l i ty"  in the event of 
1lmi ted or protr ac ted nuclear war.
Kennan’ s long-standing opposition to the " f i r s t  use"
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pr inc ip le  and re ject ion of nuclear weapons as viable  
instruments of national policy have placed him at odds for 
more than three decades with the o f f i c i a l  American doctrine 
of war. Aligning himself with more l ibera l  c r i t i c s  of 
current American strategic pol icy,  Kennan has proposed 
several dramatic i n i t i a t i v e s  in the area of arms control and 
disarmament. Borne of these include: a comprehensive test
ban agreement with the Soviets; a temporary "freeze" on 
exist ing nuclear arsenals; a total  "denuc1 ear 12 a t io n " of 
Central and Northern Europe; and a renunciation of the 
" f i r s t  use" p r i n c i p l e . 146 In receiving the Albert Einstein 
Peace Prize in 19B1, he suggested that the Soviet Union and 
United States should agree to a f i f t y  percent across-the-  
board reduction in a l l  forms of nuclear weapons and del ivery  
systems. 1
Yet Kennan acknowledges that even his own far-reaching
program "would not be enough, in i t s e l f ,  to give Western
c i v i l i z a t i o n  even an adequate chance of surv iva l ."  In what
must be considered a revolutionary transformation in his
thinking on war and peace, he now confesses:
War, i t s e l f ,  as a means of se t t l ing  d i f fe rences . . .
Li. i_w>__'. . ! yr tu t  iudustt i j I powers, w i l l  have to
be 1n some way ruled out ; and with 1t there wi11 
have to be dismantled. . . the greater part of the 
vast m i l i t a ry  establishments now maintained with a 
view to the p o ss ib i l i ty  that war might take 
p1 ace. *■
kennan c i tes  two primary reasons for th is  conclusion. 
F i r s t ,  modern weapons— even of the convent 1 onal v a n e t  y - -
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have become so destruct ive that there can be no clear l ine  
o-f demarcation between the discriminate ones and weapons ot 
mass destruction. Second, even a confrontation among major 
powers involving conventional forces would "in a l l  
probabi l i ty  s l ip  over into the use of those to which the 
term conventional could not be properly app 1 1 ed , " 1
Dn the surface, in recent years hennan appears to have 
been groping for the same sort of pacifism or universal  
prohibi t ion of violence that he condemned throughout most of 
the postwar per iod1 His remedy ca l ls  for "frank searching" 
and "patient communication" that would produce 
"understandings of such moment that  they would e f fe c t iv e ly  
ru le  out not only the very thought of war but also the 
preparations for i t . "130 I t  is one thing to a l te r  or modify 
the in s t i tu t io n s  or modalit ies of power; i t  is quite another 
to press for the redemption of human nature with a view 
toward changing "the ingrained habits and assumptions" of 
men. Perhaps more than most, Kennan has provided an 
eloquent testimony to the genuine r isks of viewing the 
Soviet-American m i l i t a ry  balance pr imari ly  in nuclear terms. 
However, he is far  less i l luminat ing on how two p o l i t i c a l  
systems with profound ideological and p o l i t i c a l  differences  
can find a common rat ional  or moral ground for assuring the 
mutual recognition of " legit imate" security interests in a 
world devoid of massive m i l i t a ry  sanction.
With the impact of a destab i l iz ing  nuclear arms race
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upon superpower r i v a l r y  in world a f f a i r s ,  i t  is appropriate 
to reexamine Kennan's early postwar thinking on the 
containment strategy and i t s  relevance for United States 
foreign policy in the 1980s. In the July 1947 edit ion of 
Foreign A f f a i r s . Kennan cal led for an American policy of 
"long-term, pat ient  but f irm and v ig i lan t  containment of 
Russian expansive tendencies." "Counterforce" had to be 
applied to "constantly sh i f t ing  geographical and p o l i t i c a l  
points" in order to "promote tendencies which must 
eventual ly f ind th e i r  out let  in e i ther  the break-up or the 
mellowing of Soviet power."101 The basic themes of the "X" 
a r t i c l e  had been developed in a number of Kennan’ s e a r l ie r  
papers and governmental reports: Soviet aggression was based
on the internal  necessity of ju s t i fy in g  i t s  d ic ta to r ia l  
authori ty at home; an in t ractab le  antagonism toward the West 
would continue unt i l  the nature of Soviet power i t s e l f  
changed; in l ight  of Soviet imperviousness to object ive  
r e a l i t y ,  the United States must be prepared for a "duel of 
i n f i n i t e  durat ion," a protracted cold war of tough 
containment of Russian e>: pansi on i sm. 1 ax
Few statements in the history of American diplomacy 
have produced such confusion. As Kennan was compelled to 
concede in his Memoirs. the "X" a r t i c l e  was ambiguous and 
imprecise in several key respects. A serious deficiency was 
the f a i l u r e  to deal with Soviet power in Eastern Europe and 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s  of rul ing an empire.103 In discussing the
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sources of Soviet -foreign policy conduct, Kennan's analysis 
was pr imari ly  l imited to the question o-f ideology and the 
signif icance of power within the content of domestic 
p o l i t i c a l  structure.  The Soviet role  in foreign a f f a i r s  was 
narrowly cast as a response to internal  needs rather than a 
reaction to real or imagined threats from the outside. An 
addit ional dilemma is that he never c lear ly  defined what the 
tools of containment were to be. Left  unclear also was the 
quest 1 on of whether the app l ic a t io n  of " count er f or ce1 
cor r e 1ated with any spec i f l c  ec onomic, m i l i ta ry ,  or 
diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e s  by the United States. F ina l ly ,
Kennan placed no l im i ts ,  geographical or chronologlcal , on 
containment, and thereby ignored the resources and wi l l  of 
the United States to undertaTe such a long-term campaign.
Walter Lippmann observed that containment could evolve into  
a "strategic monstrosity" i f  interpreted as a ju s t i f i c a t io n  
for extending the reach of American power to countries l ike  
China and other Afro-Asian states,  whose internal  p o l i t i c a l  
struggles did not a f fect  American security interests  
d i r e c t 1y.
In the foi lnw j ng vears. the peculiar visi on of Mr. ">"
dogged Kennan7s footsteps " l ike  a f a i th fu l  but unwanted and 
somewhat embarrassing animal ."1®6 Subsequently, he t r ied  to 
c1a r l f y  his posit ion in l ight  of the shortcomings cited  
above and, in so doing, generated another storm of 
controversy by tal ing exception to the continuing relevance
of the containment pr inc ip le  for United States conduct
abroad. In discussing the containment of Soviet power, he
claims to have had in mind "not the containment by mi 1 i tary
means of a m i l i t a r y  threat ,  but the p o l i t i c a l  containment of
a p o l i t i c a l  threat .  11,87 Never intending to formulate a
foreign policy "doctrine," much less a programmatic
statement on the uses of American power, Kennan suggested:
The purpose of containment as then conceived was 
not to perpetuate the status quo to which the 
m i l i ta ry  operat1ons. . . of World War I I  had led; i t  
was to t ide  us over a d i f f i c u l t  time and bring us 
to a point where we could discuss. . .with the 
Russians the . . .  dangers th is  status quo involved,  
and to arrange for i t s  peaceful replacement by a 
better  and sounder one.1®8*
The tar greater danger to a demoralised Europe was not 
the unrea l is t ic  prospect of d irect  Soviet m i l i t a ry  
aggression; rather ,  Kennan was more concerned about the 
a b i l i t y  of indigenous communist part ies to exploi t  through 
violent  tac t ics  the sources of social and p o l i t i c a l  
i n s t a b i l i t y .  The policy of containment, he argued, related  
"to the e f f o r t  to encourage other peoples to res is t  th is  
type of violence and to defend the internal  in te g r i ty  of 
the i r  countr ies ."1®^  As Kennan emphasized both then and 
n o w ,  t h e  m i l i t a r i z a t i o n  u l  W e s t e r n  Lurope v i a  N A T O  w a s  a  f a t  
less viable method of containing Soviet influence than the 
Mar sha11 Plan and i t s  cone ern f or "the r estor atlon of the 
economic health and vigor of European societ ies ."
In addit ion,  he objected to the temptation of c r i t i c s  
bath in and out of government to read into containment a
universal commitment on the pa 
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4The problem of containment i s . . . a  problem of the 
reactions of people within the non-communist 
world. I t  Is  true that th is  condition depends 
upon the maintenance by ourselves and our 
a l l i e s . . . o f  an adequate defense posture. . . .  But so 
long as that posture is maintained, the things 
that need most to be done to prevent the further  
expansion of Soviet power a r e . . . th in g s  we must do 
in our re la t ions with the peoples of the non- 
commun i st wor I d . 1
Yet, throughout the 1950s and 19<b0s, Kennan pointed to
a number of developments that e f fe c t iv e ly  undermined the
assumptions behind the concept of containment, as expressed
in the "X" a r t i c l e .  F i rs t ,  he argued that i t  was not
containment that fa i led ;  i t  was the intended followup that
never occurred. In his Memoirs. Kennan wrote:
The f a i l u r e  consisted in the fact that our 
government, f inding i t  d i f f i c u l t  to understand a 
p o l i t i c a l  threat  as such and to deal with i t  in 
other than m i l i t a r y  terms. . . f a 11ed to taKe 
advantage of the opportunities for useful 
p o l i t i c a l  discussion when, in la te r  years, such 
opportunities began to open up .1**'*
S pec i f ica l ly ,  i t  was the m i l i t a r is a t io n  of East-West
conf l ic t  which helped to seal and perpetuate the very
division of Europe which American policy should have been
concerned to remove.
Second, Kennan’ s original  inspirat ion for containment 
was invalidated by changes in the internal structure of 
Soviet power, as well as by the emergence of polycentric  
tendencies in the global communist movement. When he used 
the term "Soviet power" in 1947, he had in mind the 
monolithic structure of power and ter ror  dominated by Joseph 
S t a l i n . 1**® S t a l i n ’ s firm grip on the revolutionary actions
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o-f communist part ies throughout Europe was accentuated by 
the ruthless tac t ics  he used to el iminate p o l i t i c a l  
opponents and consolidate his authori ty at the ape:: o-f 
Soviet power. Kennan argued that the de -S ta l1n i z ation 
campa 1 gn 1 ed by Khrushchev in the 1 950 s , and the r is e  of a 
more "parliamentary" -form o-f party rule under Brezhnev in 
the 1960s, had a s ign i f ican t  e f fect  on the Soviet position  
in world a f f a i r s .  l<,t While a new generation of Soviet 
ru lers  could be expected to a f f i rm S ta l in 's  goal of reducing 
Western influence on the Eurasian land mass, a major 
m i l i t a r y  confrontation with the West was an unl ikely  
prospect. The need to consolidate the i r  heavy-handed 
hegemony in Eastern Europe, in addition to the problems of 
c o l lec t iv e  leadership and the need to bolster economic 
product iv i ty ,  suggested new (a lbe i t  l imited) p o s s ib i l i t i e s  
for  more peaceful and col 1aboratlve exchanges. Writing 
about the ideas and behavior of S ta l in 's  successors, Kennan 
observed: " T h i s . . . i s  something far  more l i k e  the t rad i t iona l
established great power of Russia than 1ike the fanat ical  
per sona1i t y  we f aced in the Soviet regime of Lenin's 11me or 
t. he. . . t ot a 1 i t ar l an despotism of Sta l in .  "1,S7
Concomitant with the "mellowing" ot Soviet power after  
S ta l in 's  demise was the emergence ot a p iura1i t y  of 
independent or p a r t i a l l y  independent centers of p o l i t i c a l  
authori ty within the communist bloc. The d isaf fect ion ot 
the Yugoslavs from Soviet control in 1948 was just the f irst.
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signal o-f a fundamental change in the nature of
internat ional  communism as a p o l i t i c a l  force on the world
scene. A great part of the energy of Soviet foreign policy
is today devoted to the e f fo r t  to "contain," p o l i t i c a l l y ,
another so c ia l is t  s ta te—China.1*’**
. . . t h e  Chinese-Soviet co n f l ic t  was. . . the greatest  
single measure of containment that could be 
conceived. I t  not only inval idated the original  
concept of containment, i t  disposed in large  
measure of the very problem to which i t  was 
addressed. . . . I emphatically deny the paternity of 
any e f fo r ts  to invole that, doctrine today in 
si tuat ions to which i t  has, and can have, no 
proper relevance.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Kennan’ s e a r l i e r  
inspirat ion for the containment of Soviet e:: pansi on 1 sm was 
transformed into a pessimistic indictment of the moral 
complacency and ominous wave of mi l i tar ism sweeping over a 
declining Western c i v i l i z a t i o n .  He has now come to believe  
that the negative image of the Soviet Union "is a monster of 
our own creat ion."  In contrast to the " fu l l - f ledged  war 
scare" created by the "ant i -Soviet  hysteria" of the Reagan 
Administration, Soviet leaders are portrayed as "men whose 
motivation is essent ia l ly  defensive and whose at tent ion is 
r i v e t e d . . . t o  the unsolved problems ot economic development 
within th e i r  own country." While once seeing ideology as a 
s ign i f ican t  factor in Soviet -foreign policy,  Kennan now 
st ipula tes  that the Soviets w i l l  "behave...  as a normal great, 
power, the t rad i t io n a l  concerns and ambitions of Russian 
ru lers  tahing precedence over ideological ones." For
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example, he e:: plained the Soviet invasion ot Afghani st an (a
"bi:arre" and " i l l -considered act") pr imari ly  in terms of
age-old Russian anxiet ies about the security ot i t s  borders
(apprehensions that  had been aggravated by such American
moves as the planned lmproveffient of NA10 f o r c e s ) . 1 '^-' Aside
from the possible exception of the Middle Last, the "United
S ta te s . . .  has, tor the f i r s t  time, no ser ious t e r r i t o r i a l  -
p o l i t i c a l  co n f l ic t  with the Soviet government." The
m i l i t a ry  r i v a l r y  in both nuclear and conventional weapons
"has no f o u n d a t i o n  in real i n t e r e s t s — no f ounda1 1 o n . . . but in
fear ,  and essent ia l ly  an i r ra t io n a l  tear at t h a t . " 1*’1
Kennan believed i t  the height of f o l l y  to s p e aI o t
protecting the world from dubious external threats,  "when
the signs of d ] sintegra11 on are so str ih ing from within."
F'inding some residual merit in the case for isolationism, he
wondered i f  the United States would not be better  served "if
we put our main e f f o r t  into mating ourselves wur th
protect ing."  From a revealing passage in the Urban
1 nterv 1 ew, tie said:
Show me f i r s t  an America which has successfully  
coped with the problems ot crime, drugs, declining  
educational standards.. .and decadence of one sort 
or another— show me an America that has pulled 
i t s e l f  together and is what i t  ought to be. then 1 
wil l  t e l l  you how we are goi ng to defend oursei vc?s 
from the Russians,172
Paradoxically!, the normative f lavor  of Kennan's 
assessment of the national purpose is seldom evident in his 
more recent commentary on the ro le  ot human r ights  in
American foreign policy. Unti l  the late 19705, whatever 
specif ic  thoughts he may have had on the subject were 
indist inguishable f'om his opposition to the excessive 
moral i sm underlying much of United States diplomatic 
history.  T'a ting exception to the Carter Ad mi n i st r at 1 on " 5: 
advocacy of a f Dreign policy guided by eth1c a1 and mor a1 
precepts, Kennan pointed to several problems associated witt 
both the d e f i m t i  on and 1 mp 1 emen t at 1 on of human r ights  in a 
cu l tu ra l ly  p l u r a l i s t i c  world.
As previously noted, Kennan views the conduct of 
government and foreign policy as a prac t ica l ,  not a moral, 
undertaking. The statesman’ s principal  duty is to protect  
the interests of the national society; in addit ion,  these* 
interests have no moral qual i ty and r e f l e c t  the "unavoidable 
necessit ies of national existence." Moral pr inciples,  
including those of human r ights ,  are secondary and re la t iv e  
to the prudent calculat ion of a nat ion's interest  in ever - 
changing foreign policy si tuat ions.  The promotion of 
individual l i b e r t i e s  and freedom abroad can best be 
achieved, not by abstract arguments of r ight  and wrong, but 
through the power of America’ 5 own ex ample in securing the 
vir tues of jus t ice  and propriety at home.
Furthermore, Kennan doubts the existence of any 
1nternat 1cna11y recognized ethical  pr inciples that could 
concretely define the meaning ot human r ights in specif ic  
conf l ic ts  of interest  and power. He can f ind "no cr i te r ion
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for determining what they ought to be other than their
general u t i l i t y  in assuring the higher social aims ot a
given society. 11174 The p o s s ib i l i t i e s  and ju s t i f i c a t io n  tor
achieving humane and orderly social conditions wi l l  varv
great ly  from one society to another. In Kennan'’ s view, the
case -for human r ights  cannot be made apart -from specifying
the resp o n s ib i l i t ies  that fol low from the acceptance ot
basic freedoms.
And human r ights ,  too, operate only within a 
framework of d isc ip l ine  and r e s t r a i n t . . . . Do 
we.. .  in undertaking to decide what r ights should 
exist  in other countries propose to t e l l  the 
peoples and governments of those countries what 
res t ra in ts  should also exist"1 And can one. . .  t ry  
to t e l l  another country what r ights ought to be 
observed in i t s  society' without t e l l in g  i t  what 
sort of government i t  ought to have"1170
The answer to th is  question, he believes, must "be found in
the workings of thei r systems tor arr iv ing at consensus or
acceptance— not ours. " 1 '7±‘
A number of additional d i f f i c u l t i e s  ei ther  l im i t  or
render impossible the internat ional  implementation of human
r ights .  From the At lant ic  Charter to the Helsinki accords
of 1975, the codif icat ion ot human r ights has been
uni la tera l  and declarator'.' , not contractual.  I h e  g e n e r a l
and imprecise terms in which these agreements have been
formulated "deprived them of the character ot specif ic
obligations to which signatory governments could useful ly be
held."* '7'7' As Kennan points out, few governments can be
expected to re f ra in  from such vague endorsements ot
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pr inc ip le  since "the mere act of subscribing carr ies with i t
no danger o-f having one’ s freedom s ig n i f ican t ly
impaired."1'7'*3 In par t icu lar ,  human r ights reform in the
Soviet Union "could not be implemented. . .without fundamental
changes in the Soviet system of power— changes we had no
reason to e;:pect. would, or could, be introduced by the
men . . . i n  power . " 1 7
More importantly,  the case for human r ights  in foreign
policy is jeopardized by the temptation of policy-makers to
read universal signif icance into America’ s own l ib e r a l -
democratic heri tage.  By contrast,  Kennan argues that
democracy is not the natural form ot government for most of
mankind; i t  derives from the unique environmental
characteristic;?; a f fect ing only a small portion of humanity,
pr imar i ly  northwestern Europe and i t s  offshoots on other
continents. 1130 Against those who contend that the
enc our agemen t ot democracy is always in the interests of the1
United States, he writes:
Democracy is a loose term. Many var ie t ies  of 
f o l l y  and in jus t ice  contrive to masquerade under 
th is  designation. The mere fact that a country 
acquires the trappings of self-government does 
not. . .  mean that the interests nf the United States 
are thereby -furthered. T hi ere are forms ot 
p leb isc i tary  democracy that may well prove less 
favorable to American interests  than a wise and 
benevolent author i t a r i ani sm. lffll
F ina l ly ,  in ca l l ing  for democratic reform in the 
internal  practices of other governments, " i t  seems seldom to 
occur to us that even i f  a given situat ion is bad, the
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al ternat ives  to i t  might be worse." According to Kennan, 
th is  amounts to exercising a "veto power over those whose 
practices that  we d is l ike ,  while denying responsib i l i ty  tor 
whatever may -flow -from the i r  acceptance, 1116,2 I t  may very 
well be that the national in terest ,  modestly conceived, is 
the highest moral attainment o-f a state in -foreign policy.
Cone 1usion
In the years to come. George F. kennan w i l l  remain an 
enigmatic personal i ty to Cold War historians and students o-f 
American foreign policy.  While regarded throughout the 
world as a man ot reason and in te g r i ty ,  his v e rs a t i le  career 
as both pr omi nent dipl omat and schol ar has more o-f ten been 
played out in the midst of turbulent debates regarding the 
re sp o n s ib i l i t ies  and l im i ts  of American power in 
internat ional  a f f a i r s .  After designing the broad outl ines  
of a policy for waging the Cold War, he subsequently 
objected to the "m i l i ta r iza t ion"  ot containment and denied 
i t s  relevance as a r e l i a b le  instrument for the purpose^ of 
American power. Today, kennan stands out as an impassioned 
opponent of nuclear weapons and argues that th e i r  existence 
poses a tar greater danger than does the Soviet Union, 
believing that there are no ser1ous p o l i t i c a l  di fferences  
between the two superpowers, he would r e s t r i c t  the reach of 
the American national interest  to the "defense" of the 
industr ia l  nations of Europe and Japan. In short,  he seems 
more concerned with what the United States might, do to
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provoke a confrontation with the Soviets than with the 
potent ia l  for destabi l iz ing and aggressive m i l i t a ry  behavior 
by Moscow.
Kennan’ s credentials as a p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i s t  can be 
substantiated by his conceptualization of internat ional  
p o l i t i c s  in terms of power and foreign policy is a function 
of the national in terest .  At th is  1evel of analysis,  his 
emphasis on "noncommunicab1e wisdom," and his i n t u i t i v e  
dis t rust  of absolutes in world a f f a i r s ,  tool: precedence over 
theoret ical  inquiry into the meaning and re la t ion  of key 
concepts. For example, his conception of the national  
in terest  as an objective category based on the or iginal  
purposes of American society exhibi ts a number of 
def ic iencies.  Go the one hand, to j u s t i f y  the broad range 
of foreign policy actions by reference to the inexorable 
1ogic of the national interest  is both abstract and 
tau to log ica l .  Left unresolved is the problem of what the 
national interest  means in a specif ic  foreign pol icy  
si tuat ion  and for what purposes power and influence are 
being used. On the other hand, i t  is  doubtful whether any 
society can define i t s  foreign policy interests apart from 
underlying ethical  c r i t e r i a .  Preserving the national  
securi ty and promoting the welfare ot Americans involve 
normatlve j udgment s about the value ot i ndependent nati ons 
as well as the meaning of human existence in a communal 
set t ing.
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A similar  sense of ambiguity colors Kennan' 5 approach 
to the "power r e a l i t ie s "  and balance 0+ power p r in c ip le  in 
in ternational p o l i t ic s .  Just how the "rat ional"  recognition  
0+ power r e a l i t i e s  translates into specif ic  policy  
i n i t i a t i v e s  serving the national in teres t  is  never fu l ly  
c la r i f i e d .  He formulated no consistent set of c r i t e r i a  by 
which to judge the in teraction of external and internal  
variables of power in the foreign policy decision-making 
process. Moreover, i t  is d i f f i c u l t  to see how the 
statesman's duty to promote the national in terest  can be 
discussed apart from the f luc tuat ing  values, domestic 
p o l i t ic a l  pressures, and l im ited  resources impacting on the 
implementation ot p ar t icu lar  in terests in varying external 
s1t u a t 1ons.
Unfortunately, Kennan never developed an e x p l ic i t  
d e f in i t io n  of power that could function as a useful 
analy t ica l  tool in comparing or explaining a l te rn a t iv e  
foreign p o l ic ie s .  His fa i lu r e  to do so is  somewhat 
surprising in l ig h t  of his obvious appreciation tor the 
economic, psychological, and ideological 1nstrumenta11t 1es 
of American power in world p o l i t ic s .  For the most part,  
however, these variables have been secondary in importance 
to his evaluation of m i l i ta ry - in d u s tr ia l  potentia l among the 
major national actors and coa l it ions  in the evolving East- 
West c o n f l ic t .  He believed that the postwar balance ot 
power would remain viable as long as mi 11t a r y - 1ndustr1 a1
power was divided among the f iv e  major centers ot 
geopolit ica l  strength in the Northern Hemisphere. At no 
point did Kennan specify the structural or functional  
prerequisite!; of the contemporary balance of power system 
with regard tor the destab il is ing  impact of developments 
beyond Europe and Japan. In p a r t ic u la r ,  he neglected to 
consider how the balance of power is affected by growing 
trends of interdependence in the v o la t i le  world economy. 
Aside from noting the existence of a "curious" balance ot 
power in East Asia (which "needs no stimulation from us"),  
Kennan showed l i t t l e  in terest  in the nature or actual 
workings of local-reg ional balances of power in both the 
developing and industr ia l  parts of the world. The u t i l i t y  
ot the balance p r inc ip le ,  he ar gued, e;: tended on 1 y to
ef f or t s by the Un1 ted States and West ern Europe t d maint ain 
a "general equivalence" with the Soviet Union in strategic  
and conventional m i l i ta ry  cap a b i l i ty .  From th is  rather  
l im ited  perspective, the balance of power becomes v i r tu a l ly  
indist inguishable from calculat ions ot deterrence underlying 
the nuclear balance of t e r r o r .
In essence, Kennan’ s realism represented a broad 
c r i t iq u e  of American democratic idealism which ignored the 
fac tors of s e l f - in te r e s t  and power in internat ional  
p o l i t ic s .  Especlally during the f i r s t  postwar decade, he 
pointed out that the single-minded emphasis on universal 
moral and legal precepts (to the neglect of an objective and
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rat ionally-construed national in te res t)  mates -foreign policy 
more dangerous and more prone to wars that seek to ta l  
v ictory .  For a l l  o-f his penetrating insight into the 
def ic iencies o-f pretentious idealism in American diplomatic 
history, Kennan never formulated a comprehensive theory of 
realism or p o l i t ic s .  The reluctance to account more fu l ly  
for the operative philosophical underpinnings of his 
in te l le c tu a l  or ien tat ion  is p a r t ic u la r ly  relevant for his 
evolving commentary on the purposes and values of American 
foreign policy behavior in an overcrowded world that hovers 
at the edge of a nuclear disaster .
Although Kennan seldom referred  to a l te rn a t iv e  ethical  
or phi 1osophical t rad i t ions  in Western p o l i t ic a l  thought, he 
quite c1 ear 1y objected to the modern inc l ina t ion  to trea t  
the p o l i t ic s  and history of a people as a va lue-free  medium 
of human behavior conducive to precise hypothetical 
expression. S p ec if ica l ly ,  he pointed to the "organic" 
character of a l l  p o l i t ic a l  growth and development where 
there are "no uniformities,  no generally accepted universal 
p a tte rn s ." In addition, he joined with other prominent 
American re a l is ts  in hr-1 \pving that a me a n i no 1 - ■ 1 appm to
the problems of p o l i t ic a l  society w il l  always r e f le c t  an 
understanding of the cont lictual  forces in human nature. 
Although Kennan acknowledged that the moral capacity of man 
may occasionally reach out in "moments of transcendent 
greatness," th is  theme was overshadowed by his concern for
the consequences ot sinful man in an imperfect world. Jn 
b r ie f ,  Kennan was less concerned with the existence ot any 
“higher law" moderating the element of s e l f - lo v e  in human 
nature than the inev i tab le  resort to violence and coercion 
as a re s t ra in t  on the upheavals of the human ego at a l l  
1 evel s ot man ’ s soc i a 1 e;; 1 stence.
The troubling sense ot ambivalence associated with 
Kennan' 5 in a b i l i t y  to c lea r ly  distinguish between the 
requirements of se lf  —interest  and mora 1 p r in c ip le  in 
p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  carr ies  over into his few re f le c t io n s  on the 
values and purposes of American government. Believing that 
human ju s t ice  is  always imperfect, his p o l i t ic a l  thought ha 
always given p r io r i t y  to preserving “the good order of 
society."  I f  there is l i t t l e  that can be done about men's 
motives, society w i l l  p ro f i t  in some degree " i f  men can be 
restrained in th e ir  behavior."
Vet on other occasions, he appears to believe that the 
motives and intentions of men are indispensable for a w e l l -  
ordered and constructive p o l i t ic a l  existence. tor e;; ample, 
in discussing the American national purpose, he in terprets  
morality as "the channel ot individual s e l f - f u l f i l lm e n t , "  
"the foundation of civic, v ir tu e ,"  and as "a condition 
precedent to successful democracy." While suggestive, thes 
observations provide few specif ic  de ta i ls  about the nature 
and scope of individual l ib e r t ie s  or the obligations of 
government in promoting the public good. From Kennan7s mor
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recent indictment o-f the "moral decay" and crass materialism 
o-f American society, i t  is clear that he considers the 
1a is s e z -fa ire  p r inc ip le  of 11bera1- r a t 1ona1 philosophy 
inappropriate for a country debauched by the po llu t ion  of 
a ir  and water, se l+~ indulgent permissiveness, pornography, 
and violent crime. In fa c t ,  he now speaks more often of 
assigning a "higher value" to the c o l le c t iv e  resolution of 
national i l l s  rather than relying  on the purely pr ivate  
functions of enlightened s e l f - in te r e s t .  Beyond opposing 
state  ownership of production and favoring a meritocracy of 
s k i l l  and in t e l l e c t ,  Kennan had l i t t l e  to say about the 
necessary reorlentat lon  of c iv ic  values (either  in terms of 
morality or power) that should shape American p o l i t ic s  in 
keeping with the demands of the future.
Of a l l  the r e a l is t  scholars evaluated in th is  study, 
Kennan ranks as the most puzzling and elusive in his e f fo r ts  
to re la te  moral pr inc ip les  to the conduct of American 
diplomacy in the twentieth century. Our more spec if ic  tasl 
has been to determine i f ,  and in what respects, his 
p o l i t ic a l  realism mirrors the e th ica l perspective of 
classical r a l son d 'e ta t .  In p a r t ic u la r ,  does Kennan’ s 
p o l i t ic a l  thought allow for the moral evaluation of 
p o l i t ic a l  power in in ternat ional p o l i t ic s?  The philosophy 
of "reason of s ta te ,"  associated with the names of 
Machiavelli and Hobbes, exempts the state from any ru le  of 
conduct or normative re s tra in t  other than the one which is
4J . 9
dictated by i t s  own s e l f - in te r e s t .  Moreover, the ethical  
dual ism o-f r ai son d •" £t at separates the p o l i t ic a l  realm from 
the pr ivate  one -for purposes of normative judgment. Pn the 
one hand, the individual may be compelled to observe 
universal moral standards when he acts in a pr ivate  
capacity; on the other, statesmen and nations are often 
obliged to subordinate ethical considerations to the 
expedient ca lculat ion of v i r t u a l l y  any means which have the 
best chance of successfully defending a s ta te 's  security in 
the internat ional  struggle for power. In perhaps i t s  most 
extreme and cynical form, raison d’ 6ta t  suggests not only 
that  the s tate is  exempt from morality , but also that i f  the 
state does re ly  on morality , morality  w i l l  f a i l  to protect 
i t . ‘ B;3
In both his many publications and pr ivate papers, the 
debate over the operative norms or values of American 
foreign policy has been an integral facet ot fennan's 
realism throughout the postwar decades. Writing in American 
Diplomacv and R e a l i t ie s  ot American foreign P o l icy , he 
stated out a position against the crusading moral1sm that 
animated American thinl inq on the problems ot war and pea'-*3 
since the turn of the century. Essentia l ly ,  he emphasized 
that universal moral or legal concepts are too abstract and 
in f le x ib le  to accommodate the co n f l ic t in g  in terests  of 
sovereign states. I t  purposes at home are decent ones, 
unsullied by arrogance or h o s t i l i t y  toward other people or
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delusions o-f superior ity ,  th is  contributes more to a better  
and peaceful world than claims of universal law or absolute 
moral p r in c ip le s .1
Unlike a Morgenthau or Niebuhr, however, Kennan' 5
negative assessment of the 1 ega11s t 1c—mora11s t 1c approach 
never devel oped i n tandem with a more profound philosophical 
or theol og 1 ca 1 in qulry into the nature of mor a l i t y  in ei ther  
man ’ 5 p r ivate or p o l i t ic a l  e:;istence. In terms ot his  
in te rn a t1onal thought, he never provided a coherent 
framework of moral reasoning conducive to the evaluation ot 
a s ta te 's  methods and purposes in world a f fa i r s .
Unf ortunate1y , K ennan seldom men11oned or pr obed into the 
ethica l requirements (or l im ita t io n s )  of r aison d 7 £t a t . Yet 
i t s  general meaning was surely grasped and im p l ic i t  in h i s
observation that the sovereign state " s t i l l  recognises in
the crucial moments of i t s  own destiny no law but that of
i t s  own egoism— no higher focus of obligation, no overriding  
ethica l code. " At the same 11 me, he has written that "no 
one could be more sadly conscious than is the professional 
diplomatist of the p r 1 mi1 1 veness, the anarchism, the 
in t r in s ic  absurdity of the modern rnnrppt ot
sover ei gn t y . " 1 These observations tend to suggest that
Kennan does not believe the inev i tab le  expression ot 
national s e l f - in te r e s t  can or should function as a 
1 eg111 mate normat1ve st and ar d f Dr state r e la t io n s .
Beyond th is  t a c i t  admission, Kennan's perspective on
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the ro le o-f moral judgments in foreign policy becomes a 
p r o f i le  in inconsistency and contradiction. As was 
i l lu s t ra te d  in several passages cited from previous pages ot 
our study, Kennan7s position ranges from affirming the 
comp 1ementary nature of power and morality to denying that 
"state behavior is a f i t  subject for moral pronouncement."
By suggesting that "our own national in terest  is  a l l  that we 
are re a l ly  capable of knowing," he more often questions 
whether moral c r i t e r l a  may r ig h t ly  enter into the conduct ot 
American foreign policy. At the same time, he shows l i t t l e  
reluctance in speaking of America’ s moral respons ib i l i ty  in 
averting the apocalyptic dangers of nuclear catastrophe and 
devastation of the world’ s natural environment. U ltimately,  
kennan takes his stand on the side of moral re la t iv ism  by 
arguing that universal moral pr inciples  w i l l  always be 
attenuated by the statesman's moral 1y-neutral obligation to 
preserve the nat ion 's security and the in te g r i ty  of i ts  
p o l i t ic a l  l i f e .  While e x p l ic i t l y  objecting to a foreign  
policy l e f t  to the workings or "expediency" and "national 
egoism," he would "seek the p o s s ib i l i t ie s  for service to 
morality pr im ari ly  in our own behavior, not in our judgment 
ot others." From th is  vantage point, i t  is d i f f i c u l t  to see 
how kennan can avoid the accusation that his notion of 
r e la t iv e  moral judgments based on the best t ra d i t io n s  of 
American society can function as l i t t l e  more than as a 
ra t iona le  tor the primacy of the national in te re s t .  That
44
the national in terest  should be "prudently" and 
"pragmatical 1y" conceived hardly resolves his dilemma 
insofar as these q u a l i f ie rs  suggest the existence (or belief  
in) operative diplomatic norms that are in no way conveyed 
by an "objective" statement of national s e l f - in te r e s t .  In 
the f in a l  account, Kennan never gives a persuasive account 
of why nation states should not be held accountable morally 
for the consequences of th e ir  a c t io n s .186
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CHAPTER VI 
REALISM AND RAISON D’ tTAT RECONSIDERED
Throughout the 1940s and into the 19Sos, a number of 
scholars and public servants (many associated with the 
newly-established State Department Policy Planning S ta ff )  
helped to stimulate national debate on the operative values 
and goals of American s ta te c ra f t .  In addition, these 
" re a l is ts '1 called for a new in te l le c tu a l  or theoretical  
or i entat i on by whi ch to underst and and evaluate the 
r e a l i t i e s  of power, c o n f l ic t ,  and in terest in 1nternat1ona1 
p o l i t ic a l  behavior. Documenting the fa i lu r e  of America's 
periodic relapse into le g a l is t ic  and moralistic  approaches 
to world p o l i t ic s ,  these individuals probed beneath surface 
events in order to l ink foreign policy conduct with 
competing philosophical in terp re tat ions  of human nature, 
p o l i t ic s ,  and h is tory.  Often character1zed as proponents of
e pod j * nt "power pol i t i c s ," the p□1l t ic a l  ! call st s t r i  ed to
account for the resi dual force of s e l f —lnterest i n the I i ves
of men and nat lons, as well as the statesman's "mor a1
d 11 emma" in seel- i ng to uphDld uni versal norms of conduct i n
a wor 1 d of ch angi ng and unst ab1e va1ues.
Th i s study has not attempted t o summariz e and compare
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the scope and methods of p o l i t ic a l  realism in re la t io n  to 
a lte rn a t iv e  theories and approaches in the d isc ip l in e  of 
in ternat ional  re la t ions;  rather , our more spec if ic  objective  
has been to examine the signif icance of continental raison 
d • £t at for the normative roots and p o l i t ic a l  concepts of 
postwar American realism. Case studies on the international  
thought of Walter Lippmann, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans J. 
Morgenthau, and George F. tennan provided a basis for 
examining the hypothesis that the philasophical precepts 
shaping the response of postwar r e a l is ts  to the many 
challenging issues of contemporary world p o l i t ic s  d i f fe rs  
from the diplomatic ra t iona le of raison d"£t a t geared to a 
Eurocentric international society. At issue is  the e::tent 
to which the e a r l ie r  European tra d it io n  has been adapted or 
modified by r e a l is t  spokesmen to account for the methods and 
goals of United States foreign policy. While frequently  
labeled by the ir  c r i t i c s  as modern proponents of 
R e a l p o l i t i t . how and why have r e a l is t  thinkers pointed to 
various re s tra in ts  and l im ita t io n s  affecting the promotion 
of American national in terest  based on balance of power 
s tra te g 1es?
Raison D'etat and the tnmacv of tne ic-itionai ummun 11 >• 
Before turning to a f ina l  assessment of American 
realism according to the c r i t e r i a  of analysis used in each 
case study, i t  w i l l  be useful to summarize b r ie f ly  the 
central features and tenets of c lassical "reason of state"
as outlined in chapter one. In the long history o-f European 
statecraft, ,  the diplomatic legacy of r ai son d' £ t  at often 
defied precise or consistent in terp re ta t ion  as a doctrine of 
foreign policy. Among continental theorists,  ra i  son d * £ta t  
was variously char ac t er 1 z ed as a "mixture of moral and power 
considerat 1 ons, " "the s ta te 's  f i r s t  law of motion,” and "the 
victory of the demonic over the divine or ra t iona l in man. 1 
On other occasions, the concept has functioned 
simultaneously as both a description of the international  
environment and a ju s t i f ic a t io n  of immoral methods by which 
the statesman seeks to preserve the health and strength of 
the state.
As a basis for comparing continental in ternational  
thought with an American r e a l is t  philosophy of internat ional  
p o l i t ic s ,  the basic tenets of raison d'£ ta t  may be reduced 
to f iv e  essential propositions.
1. International p o l i t ic s  is the study of patterns of 
action and reaction among sovereign states. The most 
important r e a l i t y  of ln ternat lona1 p o l i t ic s  is the fact  that 
nation states are the major units of p o l i t ic a l  l i f e .  
Theorists of raison d'£ ta t  since the time of Thucydides have 
regarded the organized p o l i t ic a l  community (p o j i t y ) as a 
d is t in c t iv e  moral agent, which commands the supreme loyalty  
and s a c r i f ic e  of i t s  c it izens .
2. The s ta te 's  p o l i t ic a l  existence is defined by i ts  
position in an external environment of r iv a l  powers and
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co n fl ic t in g  in terests .  Sovereign states coexist in an 
anarchical in te rn a t1onal arena devoid of e f fe c t iv e  legal 
sanctions or supranational normative re s tra in ts .  The 
primary obl igat ion of every state in th is  environment— the 
goal to which a l l  other national objectives should be 
subordinate— is to promote the national s e l f - in te r e s t ,  
defined in terms of power.
3. The Machiavellian or Hobbesian view of raison d’ £ta t  
is  geared to the assumption that the origin of internat ional  
conflict, and in s t a b i l i t y  stems from the am mus domi nand 1 : 
the inexorable lust for power man exhibits  at a i l  levels of 
his p o l i t ic a l  existence. Under such circumstances, 
in ternat ional p o l i t ic s  is a struggle for power, a war of a l l  
against a l l .  The national in teres t  necessitates a s ta te 's  
self-promot1 on. especial ly  through the acquisit ion of 
m il i ta ry  c a p a b i l i t ie s  s u f f ic ie n t  to deter attacl by 
potentia l enemies. However, with the re la t iv e  weakness of
1nternational law and morality, the chief measure of 
national power is  u lt im ate ly  the a b i l i t y  to deprive r iva l  
nations of th e ir  s e l f - in te r e s t  including, as a las t  resort,  
th e ir  very surv iva l .
4. Throughout the centuries, m i  son d' f* t a t embodied a 
dual standard of morality that separates the p o l i t ic a l  
sphere from the pr ivate one for purposes of ethical  
judgment. The s o l i ta ry  individual retains the prerogative  
to s a c r i f ic e  his l i f e  in defense of a universal moral
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command; however, in 1nternat1ona1 p o l i t ic s ,  the imperative 
of national survival becomes the highest moral value, thus 
making a l l  othe*'" considerations — moral, legal,  or social--- 
secondary. In general, moral prononncements can p1 ay a 
posit ive  ro le  in foreign policy only insofar as they 
■function to le g i t im iz e  successful policy in i t i a t i v e s .
5. Above the state,  there is no centralized authority  
beyond the mechanism of the balance of power, which can 
impose actual l im its  on the c o l le c t iv e  desire for  
domination. For example, Thucydides warned that power 
represents an amoral force that w i l l  grow u n t i l  resisted by 
opposing power. While emphasizing m il i ta ry  s e l f - re l ia n c e  as 
the most appropriate technique to bring about unity on the 
I t a l i a n  peninsula, Machiavelli thought the statesman was 
i l l -a d v is e d  to remain neutral in a conf1lc t  between 
neighboring powers. For European statesmen of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centur ies , the operations of the 
balance re f lec ted  a b e l ie f  in a world governed by reason arid 
conforming to c lear ,  i f  often mechanistic, rules of 
diplomatic intercourse. In p a r t ic u la r ,  R ichel ieu 's be l ie f  
in a community of reason shaping the negotiations of 
diplomats was loined with the idea of equilibrium amono the 
leading European powers. Viewing France and the Hapsburgs 
as two poles of power, French diplomacy sought to counter 
the Hapsburg threat by entering into a series of a l l iances  
with the Protestant powers of Europe. Although Bismarck:
r ej ec t  ed the not 1 on o-f Europe uni ted by transcendent moral 
and p o l i t ic a l  standards, h 11 diplomacy o-f Real pol l t i f  
represented an e f fo r t  to create a new balance o-f power in 
Europe with a un if ied  Germany as one o-f the pr inc ipal
ac tor s .
American Realist Philosophv and 
Principles  o-f Internat 1 onal P o l i t ic s
Following World War I I ,  the r is e  of p o l i t ic a l  realism 
as a d is t in c t iv e  approach to the study of in ternat ional  
p o l i t ic s  represented a vigorous re fu ta t ion  of the central 
assumption shaping America's philosophy of foreign re la t ions  
for well over a century: the b e l ie f  that the involvement in
power p o l i t ic s  is  not inev itab le ,  but only a h is to r ic  
accident, and that the statesman has a choice between power 
p o l i t ic s  and other modes of diplomacy not ta inted by the 
desire for power.1 Sceptical of the a b i l i t y  of nations to 
transcend f u l ly  th e ir  own s e l f - in te r e s t ,  American re a l is ts  
called into question the relevant norms and pr inc ip les  of 
United States foreign policy in a rapid ly changing postwar 
environment. In refuting the challenge of pretentious  
moralism throughout United States diplomatic h is tory,  these 
5din] ars ri f hr rv-'-d for nei p( ' ’ " npr . ral orient ] on
or theoret ica l approach to the recurrent patterns of 
in te rn a t1ona1 p o l i t ic a l  behavior.
The varied professional and academic commitments of the 
major figures examined in the previous chapters suggest
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several preliminary considerations relevant -for any 
assessment of realism as a d is t in c t iv e  American tra d it io n  of 
p o l i t ic a l  thought. At a minimum, the r e a l is t  worldview has 
seldom been characterued  by e i ther  i t s  leading proponents 
or c r i t i c s  as an autonomous or unprecedented agenda of 
research and p o l i t ic a l  inquiry. In fac t ,  much of the 
creative energies helping to distinguish the r e a l is t  
approach to internat ional  p o l i t ic s  emanate from a wide range 
of in te l le c tu a l  or 1entations in philosophy, theology, and 
ethics. Moreover, the divergent paths by which these
thinkers arrived at a common body of pr inciples  also provide 
a basis for iden t ify ing  more spec if ic  differences among 
American r e a l is ts  in matters of conceptualization and policy  
eva] ua11 on.
As d iscr im inat1ng c r i t i c s  of public a f fa i r s ,  they 
sought to re la te  spec if ic  trends and developments in 
national policy to the norms and philosophy of American 
society. Reflecting on the ra t iona l  requirements of 
p o l i t ic a l  action in a democracy, Lippmann argued that a 
large p lu r a l is t ic  nation could not be governed "without 
recognizing tha t ,  transcending i t s  plural in teres ts ,  there 
is a ra t ional order superior to canon la w ." He iudged i t  to 
be the basic respons ib i l i ty  of the in te l le c tu a ls  to promote 
"a common conception of law and order which possesses 
universal v a l id i ty "  and which would provide the basis for 
the American public philosophy.
In terms of America's in te l le c tu a l  h istory. Niebuhr's 
special contr1 bution was in formulating and applying a 
pragmatic Christian ethic to the struggle for ju s t ic e  in 
human communities. The Christian view of man as both a 
sinner and image Df God led him to the conclusion that 
democracy was a "perennially valuable" form of p o l i ty .  As 
he one e wrote: "Man' s c apac1t y f or jus t ice  makes democracy
possible; but man's inc l ina t ion  to in jus t ice  makes democracy 
necessary." A system of checks and balances represented the 
best method of neu tra l iz ing  special in terests and of 
arr iv ing  at the truth  by allowing various conceptions of the 
t ru th  to destr oy each other. At the same 11 me, Ni ebuhr was 
far  from offer ing one more celebration of American 
uniqueness. In The Irony of American H istory, he treated  
the American experience not as a revelation of progress, but 
a sign of the indeterminacy of h istory, of i t s  potentia l for  
good and e v i l . 32 For Niebuhr, the atomic bomb served as only 
the most v is ib le  symbol of man's technical fo r t i tu d e ,  as 
we 11 as a sign of the crushing an:-: i et y of modern l i f e .
Although receiving scant attent ion in academic c irc les ,  
Morgenthau" s The Purpose of Amer 1 can F'ol 111 cs represents a 
strong rebuttal of the p o p u l a r  mi scene ep 11 on tha4- his 
p o l i t ic a l  thought is concerned exclusively with power to the 
neglect of purpose and morality . Any great nation, he 
submitted, must pursue i t s  in terests for the sake of a 
transcendent purpose that gives meaning to the day—by~day
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operations o-f i t s  foreign policy. The very uniqueness of
the American purpose— the establishment of freedom conceived
as equality  of opportunity and minimization of p o l i t ic a l
contro l— brings into being another purpose that "endows the
action required by the fundamental purpose with a spec ia l . . .
re sp o n s ib i l i ty :  to maintain equality  in freedom...as an
example for other nations to emulate."3 In language hardly
compatlble with the European t ra d it io n  of "reason of s ta te ."
Morgenthau wrote:
The American purpose carr ies  within i t s e l f  a 
meaning that transcends the natural boundaries of 
America and addresses i t s e l f  to a l l  the nations of 
the world. By pursuing i t s  own purpose and in the 
measure that i t  achieves i t ,  America gives meaning 
to the inspirat ions of other nations and furthers  
the awakening and achievement of th e ir  purpose.^
As one of the principal architects of postwar American
diplomacy, kennan noted that the diplomatic h is tor ian  is
compelled to take cognizance of the classical problems in
the history of p o l i t ic a l  philosophy ( i . e . ,  the obligations
and res tra in ts  in the exercise of governmental power). Like
Morgenthau, Kennan conceived of the ro le of the United
States in world a f fa i r s  as a re f le c t io n  of the internal
purposes and values of American society. Although less
w il l in g  to assign i ■ n 1 v ^ r s a 1 significance to a n v h o r
of national purpose, he equated the successful defense of
the national in terest  with America's s p ir i tu a l  and material
resolve in coping with the strains  and divisions of domestic
society. S p e c if ic a l ly ,  Kennan judged America's t ra d i t ion a l
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1ib e ra l - ra t io n a l  philosophy as the servant at pr ivate  
in teres t  no longer s u f f ic ie n t  to address such negative 
phenomena as in f la t io n ,  declining educational standards, 
pornography, and environmental po llu t ion . While ca l l ing  for 
the reorientat ion  o-f c iv ic  values with a greater sense o-f 
c o l le c t iv e  purpose, he argued that "the ancient con+lict of 
freedom and authority  has taken on new forms in th is  day and 
age, and ones which a s s a i l . . . t h e  very foundations of our 
p o l i t i c a l  and social philosophy."0
The standard of American Real pol l t i t : , as some c r i t ic s  
have alleged, can be demonstrated by the r e a l is t  
preoccupation with: (1) the i r ra t io n a l  and ego t is t ic
elements in man's nature; (2) the omnipresence of conf l ic t  
and coerc l on in a l l  p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  result ing f r om the 
struggle for power; (3) the nation state as the most 
important actor in world p o l i t ic s ;  (4) the national interest  
as the objective basis of a s ta te 's  foreign policy; (5) the 
importance of classic diplomatic procedures and the balance 
of power for preserving in ternat ional s t a b i l i t y  and 
reconcil ing divergent national objectives; and (A) the 
i l lu s io n  of moral absolutes in world a f fa i rs .
l_ 5 y-<-* th e ir  Firnpefln pretlpcpfr-nre. each schol ar 
evaluated in th is  study affirmed the importance of 
contrasting perspectives on human nature for generalising  
about p o l i t ic a l  behavior at a l l  levels of human existence. 
Although Lippmann’ s investigat ion into the ethical basis of
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human behavior ref lected periodic shi f ts  in viewpoint, he 
consistently inveighed against the tendency of p o l i t ic a l  
scientists to focus exclusively on inst i tu t ions without an 
accompanying analysis of "man" who males and l ives under 
them. Forever trying to str ike a balance between the fusion 
of universal ideals and s e l f - in te re s t  in national behavior, 
Niebuhr’ s "Christian Realism" drew i t s  inspirat ion from the 
dia lect ica l  tension between the law of love and the re a l i t y  
of man in an imperfect world.
Similar ly .  Morgenthau reminded his more empirical-  
minded colleagues that the commitment to a "value tree" 
po l i t ica l  science is i t s e l f  a phi 1osophical predisposition 
based on certain bel ie fs  about man's nature and the meaning 
of his p o l i t ic a l  existence. Although generating 
considerable controversy over America’ s moral mission in 
world p o l i t ic s ,  Kennan certa in ly  shared the conviction of 
the classical p o l i t i c a l  thinkers that the ju s t i f ic a t io n  for  
p o l i t ic a l  action begins with an appreciation of the forces 
at work in the human soul. In responding to America’ s 
radical student 1 e l t  of the 1960s, he suggested that the 
origin of evi l  in this world is "not in social or po l i t ica l  
in s t i t u t io n s . . .or the inequit ies of statesmen, but simply in 
the weaknesses and imperfections of the human soul i t s e l f . "
Although often motivated by a broad range of 
in te l lec tua l  concerns, these four thinkers te s t i f ie d  to the 
manifold v i t a l i t i e s  and contradi ctory forces at work in
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human nature. Man is both good and ev i l ,  rat ional  and 
compulsive, part animal and part s p i r i t .  The great 
societies that h is to r ica l ly  comprise mankind must share the 
same burdens and strengths. While American re a l is ts  have, 
in varying degrees, recognized man’ s capacity lor vir tue and 
moral sel f -sac r i t i ce in community with others, they have 
also affirmed one of the key insights o-f European thinkers--- 
that p o l i t ic s  and diplomacy bring out the harshest side of 
man's nature. Writing in The Federalist  Papers on the 
origin o-f conf l ic t  among states, Alexander Hamilton 
suggested: "To presume a want of motives for such contests
would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindict ive,  and 
r apac i ous. " *•
The ineluctable tension between the misery and dignity  
of human nature had a direct bearing on Lippmann's inquiry 
into the competing themes of morality and power in modern 
society. As a dedicated p o l i t i c a l  ra t io n a l is t  seeking to 
i l lumine objective standards undergirding a l l  po l i t ica l  
action, he equated the ethical goal of human development 
with the triumph at reason over man’s passions and natural 
impulses. Against the chaos and disorder of a large 
democratic society, the dictates of reason f i l l e d  the 
"mature man" with an appreciation for universal standards of 
order and just ice  superior to the self ish ambitions of 
private interests backed by power. In an essay prepared for 
the f i r s t  issue of The New Republic, Lippmann echoed a theme
that would be -fundamental to a l l  his wri t ing:  Man's thought 
and ideas represent the only viable weapons in control l ing  
the i r ra t io n a l  resort to violence in both domestic and 
internat ional  p o l i t i c s . y Reviewing The Public Philosophy. 
Morgenthau took: exception to Lippmann's " r a t io n a l is t ic  
idealism" and the emphasis he placed on the power o-f s e l f -  
sustaining reason to transform the philosophy by which men 
11 ve.
...Lippmann believes that men in the i r  p o l i t i c a l  
thoughts and actions can be sincerely lucid and 
ra t io n a l ,  and he considers th is  r a t io n a l i t y  to be 
the very foundation of the public philosophy.
Herbert B u t te r f ie ld ,  Reinhold Niebuhr, myself and 
others have t r ied  to show how much more 
ambiguous. . . the re la t ions between reason and 
p o l i t i c s  are than is suggested by th is  simple 
ra t  1ona11st ic  fa i th .®
Morgenthau's objections to the abstract mechanical 
formulas of modern rat ional ist ,  philosophy notwithstanding,  
his summary review f a i l s  to i l l u s t r a t e  how Lippmann's 
thought was influenced by an awareness of both the norms of 
the American "higher law" t ra d i t io n  and the comple:: 
in terplay of persona1l t i es and h is tor ica l  forces in a dark 
and angry world of unreason. !he p o l i t i c s  of human 
reconstruction takes place within a social and p o l i t i c a l  
arena i n which the vast maior i ty of men are f o o l i sh and 
ever-insurgent against reason, where both groups and 
individuals seek to r e a l i z e  the i r  desires by force. As a 
r e a l i s t ,  Lippmann real ized that "there is evi l  which is as 
genuine as goodness, that there is ugliness and violence
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which are no less real than joy or love." In a world where 
c o n f l ic t  and r i v a l r y  are a fac t ,  the survival of men and 
nations cannot be achieved unless power is confronted with 
power, unless i t  is  checked and balanced.
The ethical  realm of man7s p o l i t i c a l  existence within 
society and the more complex internat ional  community formed 
the v i t a l  center of Niebuhr's Christian Realism. From the 
perspective of Christ ian ethics,  he alluded to the 
fundamental ex is tent ia l  contradiction of man in h is tory— 
where, on the one hand, man aspires to the law of love as 
the true essence of human 11as and, on the other, the tragedy 
of his consistent betrayal of that  law. Niebuhr located the 
source Df th is  contrad1c11 on in man being situated at an 
uneasy juncture between necessity and freedom, s p i r i t  and 
nature, the human and the divine.  The classical  
preoccupat1 on with man's unique and rat ional  qua l i t ies  is 
often betrayed by man7s rest less urge to power and brute 
nature. A I te r n a t iv e ly , the more modern perception that man 
is a product of nature and unable to r ise  above his 
immediate circumstances says l i t t l e  of man as "a s p i r i t  who 
stands out side of nature, l i f e ,  himseIf,  his r eason and the 
world." As Niebuhr- nnrp po inted out: " C h r is t ia n i ty . . .
recognires that the dignity of man consists precisely of 
that freedom which makes i t  possible tor him to s in . " 7^
Man's involvement in the paradox of f i m t u d e  and 
f reedom provided the boundarles within whi ch Ni ebuhr
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re-fleeted on the re la t ion  between power and moral pr incip le  
in the p o l i t i c a l  behavior o-f groups and nations. According 
to Ni ebuhr, i t  is  in man's at temp t. to over come his own 
vu lnerab i l i ty  to the self -regarding ambitions of others that  
"al l  human l i+e  is invoi ved in the sin of seek 1ng secur1t y 
at the expense of other l i f e . " In both individual and 
co l lec t ive  l i f e ,  the human predicament has i t s  roots in the 
"secur1ty-power dilemma"; the margin of power sought is 
never s u f f ic ie n t  to achieve complete security and the 
struggle for power cont1nues unabated as both man and 
nations are caught in a t ragic dilemma. The fe roc i ty  and 
1ntensity of the struggle among groups ls so strong that  
"the only harmonies are those which.. .neutra l ize  th is  force 
through the balance of power...and through techniques for  
harnessing i t s  energy for social ends."*0
More e x p l i c i t l y  than some other American r e a l is ts ,  
Morgenthau suggested that a l l  p o l i t i c a l  re lat ionships are 
governed by objective rules deeply rooted in human nature.  
Since these rules are "impervious to our preferences, men 
w i l l  challenge them only at the risk, of f a i l u r e . "  Viewing 
man as a self -centered creature whose ego is contaminated by 
the propensity for sin and e v i l .  Morgenthau acknowledged 
that forces inherent in human nature prevent the r e a l i : s t io n  
of a thoroughly rat ional  or moral, p o l i t ic a l  order. Whereas 
Niebuhr emphasised man’ s creat ive and destructive  
tendencies, Morgenthau's doctrine of p o l i t i c a l  man was often
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couched in e::treme, pessimistic terms. " I t  is impossible,"
he argued, "to be a successfu1 p o l i t i c ia n  and a good
Christ ian."  Cal l ing into question the influence o-f morality
upon social l i f e ,  he wrote:
There can be no actual denial of lust for power 
without denyi ng the ver y c ond111ons of human 
existence in th is  wor ld . . . , There is no escape from 
the evil  of power, regardless of what one does.
Whenever we act with reference to our tel low men 
we must s i n . 11
Divorced from any transcendent moral authori ty ,  man’ s
p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  is doomed to produce e v i l .
Kennan’ s reference to Niebuhr as "the father of us a l l "
was in large part prompted by the diplomat’ s recognition of
the many human f a i l in g s  that  preempt the rea1i z at i on of
those mor a1 and c iv ic  vi r tues that f orm the basis of
c i v i l i z e d  existence. However, Kennan is perhaps closer to
Morgenthau than ei ther  Lippmann or Niebuhr in his tendency
to stress the demonic more than the divine or rat ional
elements in man. An admitted e l i t i s t  repulsed by the crass
materialism of the Western world that has lost i t s  sp ir i tua l
stamina, he accepted the r e a l i t y  of coercive power and
violence as "the t r ib u te  we pay to or iginal  s in."
Ult imately,  Kennan’ s thought was shaped less by the
requirements of hunun justice ' .e.g., "there is l i t t l e  that
can be done about men’ s motives") than the need to preserve
the tangible order of society by the imposition of
res t ra in ts  on recalcitrant,  human behavior. Un 1 i K e Lippmann,
Kennan devoted l i t t l e  consi deratlon to how the s e l f - in te re s t
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in human nature is moderated by fa i th  in a higher law.
Uniihe Niebuhr, he provided l i t t l e  insight into why i t  is 
necessary to re ly  upon transcendent moral pr inciples to 
broaden the conception of s e l f - in te r e s t  in p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .
Integral to both the continental t rad i t io n  of r a 1 son 
d "£t at and American r e a l i s t  thought is the assumption that  
conf l ic ts  of power are an inev i tab le  feature of a l l  
p o l i t i c a l  re la t ionships— more so perhaps among nation states  
than at any other level of p o l i t i c a l  in teract ion.  European 
theor ists  viewed the s ta te 's  struggle for power and security  
as a fact  of nature or a datum of history impervious to 
human w i l l  and control .  The best the p o l i t i c a l  philosopher 
could hope to achieve was to describe the 1nternat1ona1 
state of nature and the precarious legal order presumed to 
e" is t  among nations. Along with Thucydides and Machiavel l i ,  
American r e a l i s ts  regarded the lust for power as an 
in t r in s ic  qual i ty  of human nature; however, the p o l i t i c a l  
thought of Lippmann, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau more 
s p e c i f ic a l ly  i l l u s t r a t e d  how the peculiar corruption of 
p o l i t i c a l  man is magnified by the transference of power 
impulses from the individual to the state.
Tracing the modern force of nationalism to the l o v e '7 
and prejudices of man's ' ' f i rs t"  (or i r r a t io n a l )  nature,  
Lippmann noted that the nation absorbs the lo y a l t ie s  that  
men desire to bestow on an e n t i ty  more permanent and 
enduring than themselves. The strength of co l lec t ive
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egotism, according to Niebuhr, resuits from the tendency of 
groups and nations to enpress both the v ir tue and 
selfishness of their  members. One consequence of modern 
society is that the state del imits and suppresses the 
ind iv idual 's  desire for power and personal security.  
Frustrated individuals seel: an outlet  for their  inhibited  
aspirations by projecting their  ego to the level of the 
national ego. Furthermore, this process of transference is 
accentuated by the state 's  appeal to the loyalty and se l f -  
sacr i f ice  of individuals.  What was egotism and immoral for 
man in his personal l i f e  now becomes patr io t ic  and noble 
when these impulses are directed by the state i t s e l f  toward 
i t s  own ends. Believing that society simply "cumulates the1 
egotism of individuals and transmutes their  individual  
altruism into col lect ive  egoism," Niebuhr concluded that no 
nation "acts from purely unselfish or even mutual intent and 
p o l i t ics  is therefore bound to be a contest of power."
Building on Niebuhr's analysis, Morgenthau explained 
how the diversion of power drives from the individual to the 
state gives the " l ie"  to the ethical dualism associated with 
Machiavellian raison d' e t a t . Speci f ica l ly ,  those who seel 
power at all  levels of po l i t ica l  organi 7 f ’ " T' "■"-+■ m-Mr? i f
appear that they are aiming at something more worthy of 
moral approval than power or domination. This objective is  
usually met by the invocation of p o l i t ic a l  ideologies which 
conceal and transform the p o l i t ic a l  act into something
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di -f f erent from what i t  actual ly  is .  As for the ethical
signif icance of th is  transterence, these ideologies function
to blunt man's conscience,, in that man becomes oblivious to
the corruption of power in the public sphere while s t i l l
being aware of i t s  pr ivate man1f e s t a t 1 on. With obvious
reference to the ethics of r aison d * £ t a t . Morgenthau wrote:
The dual m o r a l l t y . . .which j u s t i f i e s  what is done 
for the power of the state but condemns i t  when i t  
is  done for the power of the 1nd1v1 dual . . .  presents 
but the posi t ive aspect and at the same time the 
logical consummation of th is  fo rge t fu lness .12
In b r ie f ,  these American thinkers can be distinguished from
the i r  European counterparts in the i r  e f fo r t  to more f u l l y
substantiate the connection between human nature and the
power of s e l f - in te r e s t  in national or group behavior. While
continental theor ists  generally retained a pessimistic view
of man, Niebuhr and Morgenthau argued that the 1nternat1ona1
state of nature was a product of both the virtuous and
se l f ish  side of man7s nature.
An addit ional point on which the American school of
realism p a ra l le ls  the classical diplomacy of raj  son d7 £tat
is the assumption that  nation states are the most
s ign i f icant  actors in world p o l i t i c s .  Especial ly following
the breakup of medieval Christendom, con t inen ta l  t h e o r i s t s
regarded the state as an enduring moral e n t i ty ,  whose
authori ty superseded transnational sympathies. The norms of
diplomacy and m i l i t a r y  confrontation observed by Richelieu
and Bismarck were eff icacious only to the extent that they
4enhanced the power and security of the French and German 
state.  In tac t ,  the legacy o-f Bi smar c k i an Real pol 11 i k was 
to elevate the state to the level of a "mortal God" -for an 
age that no longer believed in an Immortal God.
Although American re a l is ts  continue to view the 
governments o-f t e r r i t o r i a l  ly-organized nation states as the 
primary actors on the in te rna t1 ona1 stage, they have been no 
less insistent  in refusing to t re a t  the self -centered,  
parochial national community as a f ina l  norm of human 
existence. Referring to the "anarchism" and "pr1 mitiveness" 
of the modern concept of sovereignty, Kennan asked: "Could
anything be more absurd than a world divided into several 
dozens of large secular societ ies,  each devoted to the 
cu l t iva t ion  of the myth of i t s  own overriding importance and 
v i r tu e 7" 13 S imi lar ly ,  Niebuhr suggested that realism must 
be tempered with moral i ty,  that "nations must use their  
power with the purpose of mating i t  an instrument of just ice  
and a servant of interests broader than the i r  own." 
Lippmann’ s r a t i o n a l i s t  ethics led him to the conclusion that  
a world state predicated on the law of reason--or the Law of 
Nature's God— must be the ult imate norm of a l l  c lear  
thinking men. Insofar as the dictates of reason are 
universal and coextensive with mankind, Lippmann could argue 
that nationalism represented a barbaric retrogression in the 
criminal r i v a l r y  of nations.
Along with kennan, Morgenthau pointed out that  "the
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contemporary connection between interest  and the nation 
state is a product o-f history,  and i s . . .  bound to disappear 
in the course o-f h is t o r y . " 14 Nowhere is i t  preordained that  
nation states const i tute the permanent p o l i t i c a l  units o-f 
internat ional  l i f e .  “The parado;: o+ the present age is that
the nation state may have outl ived i t s  usefulness but no 
wholly viable form of p o l i t i c a l  organization ("more in 
keeping with the technological p o te n t ia l i t i e s  and moral 
requ1rements of the contemporary worId") has emerged to tat e 
i t s  p la c e .16* In tandem with Lippmann and Niebuhr,
Morgenthau considered "the equation between a par t icu lar  
nat i ona1lsm and the CounseIs of Pr ov i dence as morally 
indefensible,"  for i t  "is l i a b le  to engender the d istort ion  
in judgment wh ich . . . in  the name of moral pr inciples"  
destroys nations and c i v i l i z a t i o n s .  All tour American 
r e a l i s t s  are united in the be l ie f  that interest  is the 
perennial standard by which p o l i t i c a l  action must be judged 
and directed; however, they have been much more w i l l in g  than 
continental thinkers to recognize the t ragic moral dilemma 
of acting within the p o l i t i c a l  sphere.
Thucydides' statement that " ident i ty  of interests is 
the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals"  
was echoed by those American r e a l i s ts  who appealed to the 
his tor ic  r e a l i t y  of the national interest  to account for the 
goals of postwar United States foreign policy.  While 
previous chapters b r i e f l y  noted a number of conceptual and
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empirical weaknesses o-f realism as a theory of international  
p o l i t i c s ,  the signif icance of raison d ' 6t a t  for the 
expression of American national interest  in wor1d a f fa i rs  is 
primari ly  a problem in p o l i t i c a l  ethics.  In other words, 
the moral dilemma for the statesman inheres in his having to 
reconcile the requirements of p o l i t i c a l  success with 
ult imate standards of r ight  and wrong in the behavior of
sovereign states.  Although our analysis has been restr ic ted
to four prominent r e a l i s t  thinkers,  each of them has 
acknowledged that  the ethical  dimension of diplomacy assumes 
special importance inasmuch as Americans have t r a d 111ona11 y 
viewed the actions of the United States as taking place
within a framework of moral res t ra in ts  and l im i ta t ions .  "The
projection of American power in war or peace has seldom been 
j u s t i f i e d  exclusively by reference to national survival;  
rather ,  po l ic ies  designed to defend and augment national  
securi ty are viewed in and out of government as standing tor 
moral purposes beyond the state.
To some extent,  the charge that these American scholars 
are l i t t l e  more than modern enthusiasts of hard-headed power 
p o l i t i c s  resul ts  from the i r  periodic inc l inat ion  to draw an 
overlv sharp d is t inct ion  between moral pr inc ip le  and 
objective s e l f - i n t e r e s t  (backed by power) in foreign policv.  
Influenced by the geopol l t ical  stratagems of Mahan and 
Spykman, Lippmann's classic de f in i t ion  that foreign policy  
"consists of bringing into balance with a comfortable
surplus o-f power in reserve, the nation's commitments 
and...power" implied that in diplomacy the national interest  
is a consideration superior to a l l  others. According to 
some commentators, the Machiavellian tendencies in the 
thought of Niebuhr may be evidenced by his occasional 
tendency to portray national se l f - in te res t  as an inescapable 
r e a l i t y  -from which no state can demur. by viewing group 
pride as a corruption of individual loyalty,  Niebuhr 
rejected the proposition that a nation can escape the power 
of self-regard through the proc1amat1 ons of universal 
aspirations based on mutual intent .  For example, he once 
noted that during World War I I  the a l l ied  nations were 
driven by "a stronger desire to come to the aid of stricken 
peoples [invaded by the fascistsJ than they had the power to 
act upon that d e s i re . . . .fcvery impulse of national pride 
intervenes to prevent the desired, or at least desirable,  
act 1 on."
In addition, selected passages from the writ ings of 
Morgenthau and Kennan appear to stretch the gap between "the
moral ideal and the facts of p o l i t ic a l  l i f e "  to i t s  breaking
point. Spec 1f l c a l 1y , Morgenthau often characterized 
p o l i t ic s  as an "autonomous" f i e ld  nf inn>nrv 'd is t inct  from 
ethics) and argued that the statesman's primary obligation 
is to thint  and act in terms of interest defined as power.
Judging the p o l i t ic a l  act to be inev11ab1v e v i l ,  he called
into question the ethical potential  of American foreign
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policy by suggesting that "the invocation o+ moral 
pr incip les -for the support of national pol ic ies i s . . . o f  
necessity a pretense."
In equally str ident  tones, Kennan rejected the 
proposition "that state behavior is a f i t  subject for moral 
judgment"; in most internat ional  conf l ic ts ,  he cautioned, 
what is morally r ight  or wrong is "simply not discernible to 
the outsider."  I ro n ic a l ly ,  both of these r e a l i s ts  evinced a 
normative ra t iona le  for the pursuit of a national interest  
unencumbered by the moral abstractions of pretentious  
idealism. Addressing the Truman Administration, Morgenthau 
wrote:
And above a l l ,  remember that i t  is not only a 
p o l i t i c a l  necessity but also a moral duty for a 
nation to fol low in i t s  dealings with other 
nations but one guiding s ta r . . .o n e  rule  for  
action: the National I n t e r e s t . 17
EmempI i fy i ng the l ibera l  f a i th  that the observance of one 1s
object ive s e l f - in te r e s t  cannot help but serve the common
good, Kennan expressed the conviction that " i f  our purposes
at home are decent ones. . . then the pursuit of our national
interest  can never f a i l  to be conducive to a better  world."
Certainly a number of these more extreme statements on
the r e l a t i o n  of power to  p r i n c i p l e  in s t a t e c r a f t  wo>-e
perhaps chosen by American r e a l is ts  far  the i r  cutt ing edge
in a polemical contest with the idea l is ts .  As the previous
chapters have i l l u s t r a t e d ,  however, each of these thinkers
ref lected at length on the purposes and values of American
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foreign policy at a time when the legal f i c t io n  of state  
sovereignty is rendered obsolescent by new trends in 
m i l i t a r y  and economic interdependence. Largely in response 
to the accusation of being moral cynics and l i t t l e  more than 
tac t ic ians  of power, they attempted to c l a r i f y  more f u l l y  
the ethical  basis of a l l  p o l i t i c a l  action, including boili 
the l im i ta t ions  and p o s s ib i l i t i e s  of moral choice in foreign 
policy.
Moral i ty  and f-oreign Policy:
Raison D; fetat and the Dual Moral Standar d
Of the various American r e a l i s ts  evaluated in th is  
study, only Niebuhr and Morgenthau e x p l i c i t l y  confronted the 
Mach i avel 1 i an doc t  r me of r ai son d ' 61 a t as a d is t in c t iv e  
issue in the history of Western p o l i t i c a l  ethics.  In fact ,  
the moral realm of man’ s p o l i t i c a l  existence within both the 
national community and the more complex internat ional  
commun11y formed the basis of Niebuhr' s realism; he regarded 
p o l i t i c s  as a v i t a l  and evei—changing arena where the self-  
in terests  of power-seelang men and nations in teract  with the 
demands of conscience. Although Niebuhr claimed to abide by 
a "frank dualism" in ethical  matters, his use of the 
d ia le c t ic  denied neither egoism nor altruism, but 
i l l u s t r a t e d  how the many facets of man's social l i f e  are an 
inev i tab le  product, of both self-seeking and se l f -g iv ing  
impulses.
Always a le r t  to the errors resul t ing from an overly
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consistent realism or idealism, Niebuhr recoi led from the 
tendency of continental thinkers e i ther  to exempt or 
subordinate moral i ty to the r e a l i t i e s  of power and s e l f -  
in terest  in p o l i t i c s .  For example, he considered that the 
"secular realism" Df Machiaveili  and Hobbes jeopardised the 
prospect of achieving standards of discriminate just ice  in 
the p o l i t i c a l  order by i t s  cynical preoccupation with the 
sources of individual and co l lec t ive  egoism. The violent  
and destructive manifestations of man's fa l len  nature were 
recognised by these thinkers only for the amoral purpose of 
investing the Leviathan or conquering prince with suf f ic ient  
power to bring order to the conf l ic t ing  interests in 
society.  As a resu l t ,  the problem of the larger order 
between parochial communities disappeared from the moral 
hor icon. Niebuhr concluded that "pull ing ethics into the 
service of ju s t ic e ,  however defined, remains one of the 
paramount problems of an adequate p o l i t i c a l  eth ics."
The dual moral standard suggested by raison d' etat was 
rejected by Morgenthau for two pr incipal  reasons. F i rs t ,  he 
observed that p o l i t i c a l  philosophers since the time of Fiato  
and A r is to t le  have rout inely  embraced the be l ie f  that man is  
not allowed to act as he pleases in the p o l i t i c a l  sphere 
( i . e . ,  that his behav1 or ought to conform to a standard 
higher t han success) . The test  of a mor a l l y  good action is 
the degree to which i t  is capable of t reat ing others not as 
means to the actor 's  end but as ends in themselves. In
4~7tv
addition, Morgenthau shared the normative sentiment of
Niebuhr in recognizing that the struggle tor power amid the
evi l  and co n f l ic t  in p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  “must be i n t e l l i g i b l e  as
a d ia lec t ic a l  movement toward the rea l i za t ion  of ju s t ice ."
Doubting whether even the most cynical p o l i t i c a l  act is
enempt. from ethical signif icance,  he wrote:
The actors on the p o l i t i c a l  scene, however they 
may be guided b y . . .expediency, must pay t r ib u te  to 
these standards by ju s t i fy in g  the ir  actions in 
ethical  terms. The actor may subordinate a l l  
ethical  considerations to his p o l i t i c a l  goal; 
however, his act cannot be beyond good and 
e v i l . . . a s  long as he makes the apparent harmony of 
his act with the ethical standards part of the 
goal to be r e a l i z e d . 1®
Second, Morgenthau took exception to the notion that  
man acts d i f f e r e n t ly  in the p o l i t i c a l  sphere than in the 
private one because ethics allows him to act d i f f e r e n t ly  
( i . e . ,  p o l i t i c a l  acts are subject to one ethical  standard 
while pr ivate acts are subject to another) . This 
jumtaposi11 on, he believed, was fundamentally mistaken since 
i t  is always the individual who acts ei ther  in his own 
1nterests or in reference to the goals of others; the action 
of a society or nation, p o l i t i c a l  or' otherwise, has no 
empirical existence. The opposition between man and society 
reduces to the opposition between d i f fe ren t  kinds of 
actions. There is not one kind of ethical  precept applying 
to p o l i t i c a l  action and another one to the pr ivate realm, 
but one and the same ethical  standard applies to both. 
Morgenthau argued that the di f ference in moral character
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between the pr ivate and public sphere is at best a re la t iv e  
one: The potent ia l  immorality o-f a l l  human action becomes
obviously more present in p o l i t i c a l  behavior where i t  is  
impossible -for an action to conform to the rules of p o l i t ic s  
( i . e . ,  to achieve p o l i t i c a l  success) and to conform to the 
rules of ethics ( i . e . ,  to be good in i t s e l f ) . 1  ^ Niebuhr's 
admission of a "franl dualism" notwithstanding, both 
r e a l i s ts  viewed the lust for power as ubiquitous empirical  
fact  and i t s  denial as universal ethical  norm as the two 
poles between which the problem of p o l i t i c a l  ethics is 
per i lously  suspended.
By impl icat ion,  the ethical  dualism of raison d * £ta t  
poses a central  question for the nature of moral choice in a 
s ta te 's  external re lat ions:  To what e;;tent, and from what
perspectives, have American r e a l is ts  maintained a meaningful 
balance between un1 versa1 nor ms and nat i ona1 s e l f - i n t e r e s t 7 
That Lippmann was often described by c r i t i c s  as a proponent 
of American Kea lpo l i t ik  was due largely to his re l iance on 
the methods of classical  diplomacy and support for a 
reinvigorated At lant ic  Al l iance based on the balance of 
power and spheres of influence. Yet, his fa i th  in the 
rat ional  d igni ty  of man and conrern for transcendent 
standards of jus t ice  in democratic societ ies precluded any 
attempt to decouple power p o l i t i c s  from man's inherent  
capacity for moral judgment.
While Lippmann considered m i l i t a ry  and strategic assets
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as the f ro n t l in e  of any nat ion's power, he also warned that  
a government would be fool ish to disregard the potential  
impact of ideals in i t s  calculat ions of foreign policy.  
During World War I I ,  he defended the national values that  
shaped the history of American diplomacy with the conviction 
that "a peop 1 e wh 1 ch does not ad vance i t s  fa i th  has al ready 
begun to abandon i t . "  Even at the height of the Cold War, 
Lippmann urged American dec 1s1 on-maters to "develop and 
apply the i r  pr inciples" of democracy and freedom to counter 
Soviet ideological fervor in Europe and areas of the Third 
World. In the f ina l  analysis,  Lippmann suggested that  
United States foreign policy commitments abroad are 
supported by the fact that they en l is t  American power as the 
def ender of democracy.
Moreover, Lippmann7s geopol i t ical  or ientat ion must be 
evaluated in the content of his self -admitted  
1nternat1onal1sm and d is t in c t iv e  cosmopolitan worldview.
Both his wri t ings on American government and foreign policv  
reveal a mindset that  is sensit ive to the values and 
in terests  of many other countries. The prospects tor any 
rat ional  exchange of ideas and be l ie fs  among diverse 
societ ies were being _i eopardi zed, he thnuqht, bv the 
imperati ves of modern warfare and the gl oba 1 i : at i. on of 
m i l i ta n t  ideological confrontation between East and West.
To a considerable degree, Lippmann’ s use of diplomatic 
strategies t r a d i t i o n a l l y  associated with r alson d7 £tat
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represented the only r e a l i s t i c  means by which to salvage his 
cosmopolitan sympathies. The balance o-f power and 
stab111zat 1 on of a l l iance systems functioned as s e l f -  
act ivat ing res t ra in ts  on the i r ra t io n a l  resort to 
imperialism or bel l igerence by aggressive nations on e i ther  
side of the A t lant ic .  Although Lippmann never approached 
the American national interest  as an issue in moral 
philosophy, his contribution was to i l l u s t r a t e  how the 
ethics of war and peace can never be approached apart from 
p o l i t i c a l  and t e r r i t o r i a l  questions.
Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Kennan shared Lippmann"s 
concern that a true realism, grounded on jus t ice  and 
his tor ica l  standards, was an i l l u s i v e  goal unless "mi l i tary  
power has f i r s t  been organized for security against the 
threat  of great wars."*0 At the same time, these three 
thinker s took: Lippmann" s analysis a step further  by more 
precisely focusing upon the consequences and problems of 
trying to re la te  s e l f - in te r e s t  to norms transcending 
in terest  in the conduct of foreign policy. By noting both 
comp1ementary and dissimi lar  components in the moral 
perspective of these three thinkers,  students of American 
d i p ) n t , : W  wi 1 ] he ahl^ to draw on a more infn^med es+ imatr­
ot how r e a l i s t  ethics can be distinguished from the dual 
moral standard of raison d"£ t a t .
American r e a l i s t s  beg in th e i r  analysis of the mor a1 
problem in foreign policy by pointing to the inescapable
me
hypocrisy in the nation's claim to being the bearer of 
transcendent values: however, an important dif ference occurs
at the point of prescribing a remedy to the claims of the 
pretentious i d e a l i s t .  Kennan recommends that we have "the 
modesty tD admit" that the national interest  provides the 
only objective standard for American foreign pol icy.
Although Kennan would have pol icy“makers consult the 
national interest  with re s t ra in t  and prudent regard for the 
interests ot others, he argued that  the error of the 
1ega l is t ic -m ora l1st ic  approach was to carry over "into the 
a f f a i r s  of states the concepts of r ight  and wrong." Even 
though Morgenthau found i t  "morally indefensible" to equate 
a par t icu lar  nationalism with the creat ive work: of 
c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  he was no less insistent  in maintaining that  
the ends of policy are determined by interest  and by 
avai lable  power.
By contrast,  Niebuhr consistently urged that the 
r e a l i s t  understanding of the national interest  be broadened 
and evaluated beyond the aims of the parochial national  
community. He accepted the r e a l i t y  of national s e l f -  
in terest  while re ject ing  i t  as a norm. The recognition of 
prirm? beyond the national interest  helps to moderate the 
n at i on’ s egoism and assist i t  in achieving what at least may 
be regarded as enlightened s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  Niebuhr never 
denied that the nation consti tutes a morally defensible  
en t i ty .  What he did question, however, was whether those
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values that assure the legitimacy o-f the nation and impart a 
modicum o-f d igni ty  to the national interest  are ever defined 
in such a way to accommodate the devotion to pr inciples of 
ju s t ice  and established mutual i t ies in a community of 
sovereign nations. Accordingly, Niebuhr advised that "a 
narrow national l o y a l t y . . .w i11 obscure our long range 
in terests  where they are involved with those of a whole 
a l l iance  of f ree n a t io n s ." *1
A second important di f ference among these three  
thinkers concerns the role of universal norms in the 
p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  of nations. Human existence, Morgenthau 
stressed, "cannot f ind i t s  meaning within i t s e l f  but must 
receive i t  from a transcendent source."**  Against the 
Hobbesian view that  there is neither morality nor law 
outside the state,  he claimed that there are absolute moral 
pr incip les which "do not permit certain pol ic ies  to be 
considered at a l l  from the point of view of expediency." 
Paradoxical ly,  Morgenthau'5 rather vaguely defined 
transcendent ethic is so ethereal in distancing sinful  man 
from a "wholly other Divine Being" that i t  can play only a 
judgmental ro le  in saving man from hypocrisy ( i . e . ,  by 
[jpmpn'-frating that man ie not G o d  and that every pol i r i r - j  
act is therefore inconsistent with the moral law). By 
contrast,  he is far  less instruct ive  on how and in what ways 
moral absolutes may serve as the d i rec t ive  torce and 
constant goal of p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .  This l ine  of inquiry is
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preempted by Morgenthau^s more pronounced tendency to 
conceive 0+ p o l i t i c s  as an autonomous realm with i t s  own 
operational rules.  Although these rules may derive from 
universal norms, they are u l t imate ly  distorted (and 
re la t iv i z e d )  by individual self ishness and the t ragic  
presence of evil  in al l  p o l i t i c a l  action.
F-'erhaps more than any other prominent American r e a l i s t ,  
the ethical  precepts shaping the 1nternat1onal thought of 
Kennan defy precise categorizat ion.  While "moral pr inciples  
have the ir  place in the heart of the indiv idual ,"  he warned 
that the "unavoidable necessities" of the national interest  
( i . e . ,  maintaining the m i l i t a ry  security and p o l i t i c a l  
in te g r i ty  of the state)  are "not subject to c lass i f ica t ion  
as ei ther  good or bad." I f  Kennan has looted to "the 
t rad i t iona l  devices of p o l i t i c a l  expediency" as a remedy for 
id e a l i s t i c  and utopian abstract1ons, he has also sought to 
distance himself from the national cynicism of raison d '£ tat  
by occupying the less dangerous middle ground of moral 
rel  at i v1sm.
Throughout the postwar decades, Kennan exhorted 
Americans to re ly  upon pr inciples "of a moral and ethical  
nature which we l i f e  tn consider as being character is t ic  of 
the s p i r i t  of our c i v i l i z a t i o n "  without presuming that those 
principles are val id  tor others. Elaborating on the 
connection between power and respons ib i l i ty ,  he suggested 
that American moral conduct in world a f f a i r s  must be founded
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on and l imited to the nat ion’ s " t rad i t iona l  pr inciples of 
jus t ice  and propr iety ."  In contrast to Morgenthau’ s "sense 
of transcendence." Kennan’ s formal ethic is immanental; 
morality in foreign policy is a function of the values and 
normative order of American society.  Unfortunately,  h i s  
"humane relat iv ism" often fa i le d  to specify the nature o r  
importance of American transcendent pr inciples in the 
pursuit  of a just and ordered world community.
The realism of Niebuhr was distinguished by his 
l i f e lo n g  concern to reconcile the transcendent a r t i c le s  of 
Christ ian f a i t h  with the inevi tab le  tendency of men and 
nations to pursue the i r  own se l f ish  interests.  In Niebuhr's 
estimate, Morgenthau's concept of transcendence could hardly 
provide a viable p o l i t i c a l  ethic insofar as his overly  
pessimistic outlook on human nature functioned to obscure 
the search for moral pr incip les beyond the operative  
p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y  of any one par t icu lar  group or nation. In 
opposition to Morgenthau's contention that man’ s p o l i t i c a l  
l i f e  (divorced from a transcendent ethic)  is  doomed to 
produce e v i l ,  Niebuhr insisted on the mixture of good and 
ev i l  and found p o l i t i c s ,  l i k e  man, moral 1y ambiguous rather  
than the " p ^ n t o t ' - p e  o f  al l  p r r r ' h 1 ■' r ' ■"’- u p t  1 o n . " The 
responsib111ty for defining standards of order and just ice  
in the human community can only be acted on " i f  the 
individual is  known in terms of both his capacity for love- 
and s e l f - lo v e ."
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In addit ion,  Morgenthau's somewhat f a t a l i s t i c  
preoccupation with man's s inful  nature neglects the always 
precarious balance between the destructive and creative  
v i t a l i t i e s  of the human w i l l .  Niebuhr argued that  the 
"radical freedom" of the individual personali ty forces us to 
acknowledge that to w i l l  ev i l  implies the freedom to wi l l  
the good. While the community of perfect jus t ice  cannot be 
achieved, a narrow but real margin of moral choice may be 
preserved i f  the "higher loyalty" to norms beyond s e l f -  
in terest  saves the "lower loyal ty" ( i . e . ,  sel f - regard)  from 
c yn1c i sm and se l f -de fea t .  At the very 1 east , these 
universal pr incip les can serve p o l i t i c a l  man by pointing to 
those areas in which s e l f - in t e r e s t  intertwines with the 
int.erest of others. Whereas Morgenthau spoke of the 
" impossibi l i ty"  of reconcil ing the moral requirements of 
Chr is t ian i ty  and p o l i t i c s ,  Niebuhr's rel iance on the 
importance of Christian social teaching regarding the 
respons ib i l i ty  tor order and jus t ice  reduced the 
impossibi l i ty  to a t e n s io n - f i l l e d  possibi1i t y . 33
Certainly Niebuhr was aware that when applied to the 
behavior of nations the d ia le c t ic a l  balance between power 
and pr inc ip le  is subiect to enormous strains.  He mined 
with other American r e a l is ts  in maintaining that "there can 
be no complete s e l f - s a c r i f i c e  or even generosity in 
p o l i t i c a l  or co l lec t iv e  re la t io n s ."  While an enlightened 
s e l f - in te r e s t  is often considered the most a t ta inable  v i r tue
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of states, Niebuhr st ipulated that  “nations are, . .subject,
as are individuals,  to an internal  tension between the
claims o-f the sel f  and the 1 arger claims of love. At a
deeper level ,  and in vivid contrast to the re lat iv ism of
Kennan, he wrote:
I t  is  possible for . . .  1nd1viduals and groups to 
re la te  concern for the other with interest  and 
concern f or the s e l f . . . . A  val id  mor a1 out look f or 
both individuals and f or groups. . .se ts  no l im i ts  
to the creat ive p o s s ib i l i t y  of concern for others 
and makes no claim that such c r e a t iv i t y  ever 
annuls the power of self -concern. . . i f  the force of
r esi dua1 egotlsm l s not acknowl edged.
Speclf lc al 1y , Niebuhr drew upon his pr ofound fa i th "to
remind the nation of a majesty great er than i t s own, of
ob 1i gatlon s beyond i t s own in teres t . and of a di vine
j udgment. . . agalnst the complacent and proud . “ 2(5
The Responsibi1l t v and Limits of Amerlcan Power
Even though these thinkers e::hi b i t  a number of
l mportant phi 1osophical di f Terences Wl th regard to the
signif icance of moral i ty in world a f f a i r s ,  they have seldom 
been passive on the subject of the purpose or proper 
objectives of power in American diplomacy. The a l legat ion  
by some commentators that the r e a l i s t  perspective simply 
r ec ap 1 1  u 1 a t es +■ h  c  ! o g i  r  of r n  i s nn d  ' f* '• +  o f t e n  t  a  I ^  ^  r ’
form of a loosely-worded indictment against those writers  
who define the primary interest  of the United States 
according to the calculus of m i l i t a ry  and diplomatic gains 
in the enduring r i v a l r y  among host i le  states.  What is often
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obscured by th is  l in e  of reasoning, however, is the e;:tent 
to which American scholars repeatedly emphasized the 
necessi t y f or res t ra in ts  and l im i ts  upon the actions o-f the 
Lin 1 ted St a tes . as the 1 eader o-f the western a l i i  ance and 
champion of democracy around the globe.
For almost four decades, peace has been maintained 1n 
the world through the maintenance of an e f fe c t iv e  nuclear 
deterrent by the two major superpowers. Not one of the 
American thinkers examined in th is  study has ever argued 
against the need for a deterrent capacity s u f f ic ie n t  to 
prevent a d e b i l i t a t in g  " f i r s t  s t r ike"  by the Soviet Union. 
What they have objected to is: <1) the conviction of some
strategic  thinkers and government o f f i c i a l s  that the 
management and control of nuc 1 ear war is no different,  from 
the f ine-tuning of m i l i t a ry  strategy throughout, the ages; 
and 12) the naive be l ie f  that deterrence can be st ab i 1 i z ed, 
and American securi ty enhanced, by adding increasing numbers 
of new and more sophisticated weapons with which to threaten 
a potential  aggressor.
At the height of the Cold War, and with the concept of 
"massive r e t a l i a t io n "  in mind, Lippmann warned of the 
m i l i t a r i z a t i o n  of American diplomacy that would substi tute a 
temporary monopolization of nuclear power tor a more 
constructive diplomatic approach to resolving the 
t e r r i t o r i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  questions that l i e  at the center 
of Soviet-Amerlcan strategic dif ferences.  Along with
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(ennan, he ohj ected to basing the defense of Western Eur ope 
an offensive missiles and cal led tor the withdrawal at 
Soviet and American forces from Central Europe. Referring 
to the moral predicament o-f the statesman in the nuclear 
age, Ni ebuhr painted out that "we are caught in the dil  emine 
o-f doing the evi l  we do not want." Moreover, Niebuhr 
questioned whether American policy-makers could ever find a 
moral vantage point from which to j u s t i f y  a r e t a l i a t i o n - i n -  
kind in the event of a preemptive Soviet s t r ik e .  While his 
Christ ian f a i t h  revealed that there are no solutions to the 
ult imate ethical  problems of man’ s p o l i t i c a l  existence,  
Niebuhr believed that peace might be enhanced i f  "both sides 
were...more conscious of the common danger which transcends 
the i r  enmities."
In addition to the escalating costs and unparalleled  
r isks that continue to multiply in the m i l i t a ry  competition 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, a l l  four 
American thinkers acknowledged several important l imitat ion' ,  
upon American diplomatic influence throughout the Third 
World. Viewing the Truman Doctrine and containment strategy  
in re la t ion  to the developing world, Lippmann argued that 
f hr- impl ic i t  CLiQgpl: f 1 of n I ob s 1 i r e rf m i 1 1 t a ' m r f  cc-.t + ■ > -■ r 
with the Soviet Union would commit the United States to n^ 
"ideological crusade" and a dangerous policy of 
indiscriminate intervention in the a f f a i r s  of weaker and 
disorderly states.  Niebuhr cautioned the West against
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□verestimat i ng i t s  moral authori ty among the new nations; by 
the mid-1960s, he judged that the claims of capital ism and 
communism were largely i r re levant  to the many diverse 
l ibera t ing  movements o+ nationalism and modernization in 
A f r lc  a and Asia.
Focusing on the major strongholds o+ m i l i t a r y -  
industr ia l  strength that have a direct  bearing on American 
national security ,  Kennan maintained that the smaller states 
o-f the non -  Eur ope an wor 1 d are poor 1 y c onst i tuted to male a 
useful contribution to the global strategic balance. 
Furthermore, Morgenthau concluded that American foreign aid 
ef f ort  s have been inef f ect ive 1n promoting democratlc 
reforms and economic growth insofar as pol1cy-makers have 
f a i l  ed to recognize the e:: tent to wh i ch the devel op men t of 
other nations depends on indigenous rat ional  and moral 
solutions. S pec i f ica l ly ,  he believed that the problem of 
foreign aid is insoluble,  i f  treated as a "s e l f -s u f f ic ie n t  
technica1 enterpr lse" without regard f or ei ther  the 
p o l i t i c a l  problems of the donor country or the prevai l ing  
p o l i t i c a l  conditions in the receiving country.
Another integral  concept associated with the diplomatic 
n r ? r t  i rr ■' -■ i- . i r- n  n  d * + -■ f , and repp:-*'1"1! y emp h 3 s ; ~ ed h
leading Amer ican r e a l is ts  as a standard f or United States 
foreign pol icy,  is the balance of power. A1though the 
precise origins of the balance of power have been the 
subject of considerable debate among diplomatic historians.
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the p r inc ip le  generally served continental thinkers and 
statesmen as an ind ica t i  on o-f the methods by wh 1 ch f orei gn 
policy is conducted and a prescription shaping the 
successful defense o-f state objectives. As In is  Claude 
observes, "the trouble with the balance of power is  not that 
i t  has no meaning, but that i t  has too many meanings. "24' In 
the writ ings of our four American scholars, the balance 
concept has been variously construed to mean: <1) an
existing d is tr ib u t io n  of power; (2) an equilibrium or 
certain amount of s t a b i l i t y  that under favorable conditions 
i s produced by an a l l iance  or other devlces; < 3) a
part icu lar  manifestation of a general social p r inc ip le ;  (4) 
an approximately equal d is tr ibu t io n  of power; (S) a search 
for superior ity;  and (6> a law of universal application  
whenever a number of armed sovereign states coexist and 
compete for power.
Although American r e a l i s t s  have drawn on a wide v a r ie t y  
of d e f i n i t i o n s  to  c h a ra c te r ise  the workings of the balance 
of power, t h e i r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h i s  perennia l  concept has 
f re q u e n t ly  drawn on a number of common assumptions. F i r s t ,  
the fa c t  th a t  dec is ions  can be taken in  one or more 
i rHeppnr!pnt s ta te s  which m ~ . d ra c t i  ;- ! 1 y a I ' r -f the r:.it:inr,,'l 
w e l1—being and v i t a l  in te r e s t s  of other na t ions  means th a t  
fo re ig n  p o l i c y  must be shaped w ith  the end—i n —view of 
n e u t r a l i z in g  the power th re a t  i m p l i c i t  in  such a s ta te  
system. One s o lu t i o n — indeed, the most f r e q u e n t ly  adopted
47;'
solution— is tor each nation to seek all iances which w il l  
counter-balance the power of i t s  principal r iv a ls  and i ts  
a l l i e s .  In th is  way. an a l l iance  system is established 
which may enhance national security  by balancing r iv a l  
nat 1ons and r iv a l  power bIocs. In the words of Lippmann:
"Where coercive force ex ists , i t  must e ither  be neutral 1: ed 
by force or emp1oyed in the in teres ts of what we regard as 
c i v i l i : a t  j on. "
Second, the in terests  and objectives of the American 
republic going back to the Founding Fathers were res tr ic ted  
to maintaining a preponderance of power in the Western 
Hemisphere and a balance of power elsewhere in the world.
For well over a century, the only serious threat to the
security of the United States could come from a major
outside power — and th is  meant a European power — glven the
preponderance of great powers within Europe and the
proximity of Europe to the bulge of Brazil in the Southern
Hemi sphere. As both Morgenthau and k ennan pointed out,
American entry into the wor1d wars of the twen11eth century
was ju s t i f ie d  by the t ra d it io n a l  conviction that the
sub j ugat l on of Eur opean power s by any one p redominant nation
would p u t  the v e r y  safety of the U n i t e d  *- - 4 -■ ~ i n  th>-
Western Hemisphere in jeopardy.
Third, the t ra d it io n a l  balance of power framework 
composed of a m u l t ip l ic i ty  of states with roughly equal 
strength and sharing a common p o l i t ic a l  culture has been
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ra d ic a l ly  alt&red in the postwar era by a bipolar system of 
world power. Concerning the requirements and consequences 
of the new 1 nternat. 1 onal d is tr ib u t io n  of power, American 
r e a l is ts  have often displayed s ign if ican t  differences and 
pointed to a number of unresolved purples tor calculating  
the relevance of balance strateg ies  in the nuclear age. For 
example, Lippmann7s optimism that "third states" might serve 
to moderate co n f l ic t in g  in terests  between the major powers 
was rejected by Morgenthau and Kennan.
Agai nst Morgenthau7 s be l ie f  that the balance of power 
is  "an essential s ta b i l i z in g  factor in a society of 
nations," Niebuhr suggested that the balance of power may 
degenerate into domination and tyranny by creating a coerced 
unity of society in which the freedom and v i t a l i t y  of i t s  
members are impaired. Kennan7s use of the balance of power, 
re s tr ic te d  to i n i t i a t i v e s  designed to support an equilibrium  
among the geopolit ica l strongholds of the world, provided 
few clues about how such po l ic ies  can possibly be responsive 
to his more recent concern for the common environmental and 
m il i ta ry  dangers transcending a l l  nations. Furthermore, 
p o l i t ic a l  r e a l is ts  in general have devoted l i t t l e  attention  
t r  h ■ r * 1 -  ■■■■ r-. t-|irhni C|iir-<; c -h n to '1 s e f 1 11 ! 1. -■ ["’plied  ^r 1 *■ h e
nuclear "balance of te r ro r ."  Aside from seehing some 
numerical p a r i ty  in the weapons of mass destruction, what 
viable options does a statesman possess in seeking to 
preserve his nat ion 's security in a world where the rational
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r el at i on 5h 1 p bet ween force as a means and end of to reign 
policy no longer applies?
Cone 1usi on
In the f in a l  analysis, the philosophy and practice of 
postwar American realism can be evaluated on two 
in te rre la te d  leve ls.  On the one hand, some scholars contend 
that the r e a l is t  conceptuali:ation of power and national 
in teres t  has been overshadowed by the emergence of new 
ins trum enta l i t ies  of p o l i t ic a l  influence and patterns of 
competition in a rapidly changing internat ional environment. 
A1though these c r i t i c s  do not always 1gnore the normat 1ve 
roots of state behavior, for the most part th e ir  analyses 
are l im ited to contemporary developments in world a f fa i rs  
that  ca l l  into question the usefulness of p o l i t ic a l  realism  
as a comprehensive theory of in te rn a t1onal p o l i t ic s .  A 
younger generation of American p o l i t ic a l  sc ien t is ts  has 
provided an important and s ig n if ic an t  challenge to the 
r e a l i s t  worldview by documenting such phenomena as: the
v u ln e ra b i l i ty  or "penetrab il i ty"  of the nation state as a 
re su lt  of trends in promoting economic and m il i t a ry  
interdependence; the r ise  of in f lu e n t ia l  non—state actors; 
the " l in k a g e 1 between aoiuestic sti i_>-_ture dud internat ional  
p o l i t ic a l  outcomes; the lack of a consistent correspondence 
between a nat ion 's power and the actual requirements of a 
successful foreign policy; and the tendency of balance of 
power formulas to perpetuate a p o l i t ic a l  status quo by
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s u b D rd inat1ng social welfare issues to the exigencies of 
m il i ta ry  competition between East and West.
From the venue of in ternational ethics, however, to 
single out these four thinkers as e ither  vigorous or 
unwitting advocates of cynical r a1 son d"f t a t  is  
in te l le c tu a l ly  indefensible. In opposition to the 
inc l ina t ion  of continental theoris ts to exempt p o l i t ic a l  
action from ethical l im ita t ions ,  the American r e a l is ts  
affirmed that po’ i t i c a l  actors come under moral judgment and 
are witness to the values of th e ir  society. Specif1c a i1y, 
they maintained a consistent regard tor the under-lying 
purposes and ideals of American society.
"From the time of the Declaration of our Independence," 
according to Henry Kissinger, "Americans have believed that 
th is country has a moral s ignificance for the world. 'I2a The 
Un 1 ted States was created by a conscidue act by a people 
dedicated to a set of p o l i t ic a l  and ethical pr inciples  they 
held to be of universal meaning. While continental  
theorists of ra i son d"£ta t  propounded an autonomous ethics  
of s tate behavior, American thinkers have been unwilling to 
admit of any separate ethics for state behavior. Insofar as 
st att. is l- . gal true t i  l.-u, or t ict. i ! . .jv. u per ional i t . ,
i t  i s  not the state that decides and acts but always 
ind ividuals,  though they are sometimes called, "statesmen."
Furthermore, the ethical perspective of American 
re a l is ts  may, in part, be distinguished by th e ir  im p l ic i t
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af -f 1 r mat 1 on of the classical and Christian princ ip les  that 
characterize the "Higher Law" background of American 
const1tu t ional law. The founding fathers were practical  
philosophers whose views on democratic government and 
foreign policy were based on a c lear-cut  conception of the 
nature of man, the state,  and the world. Edward S. Corwin, 
one of America's leading constitut ional h istor ians,  argued 
that the ear ly  American statesmen succeeded in translat ing  
princ ip les  of transcendental ju s t ic e  into terms of personal 
and pr ivate r igh ts .  These princ ip les  of natural law, he 
wrote:
. . .w ere  made by no human hands; indeed, i f  they 
did not antedate deity  i t s e l f ,  they 
s t i l l . . .express i t s  nature as to bind and control 
i t . . . . T h e y  are eternal and immutable. In re la t ion  
to such pr inc ip les ,  human laws are, when e n t i t le d  
to obedience.. .merely a record or t ran scrip t ,  and 
th e ir  enactment an act not of w i l l  or power but 
one of discovery and dec 1a r a t1 on.
S im ila r ly ,  Lippmann wrote that the American founders were
the adherents of a public ph l1osophy--"of the doctrine of
natural law, which held there was law above the ru ler  and
the sovereign peop1e . . .  above the whole community of
mortals. " 30
That transcendent purpose, which Morgenthau deemed 
essential tor the successful workings of a democratic 
government, encompassed a common conception of law and order 
based on the natural r ights of man. Since imperfect man 
aspires to the good but is frequently  betrayed by a 
propensity for sin, the best system of government is  one
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which harnesses his virtues to serve good purposes and
l im i ts  his vices through legal and in s t i tu t io n a l  res tra in ts .
Niebuhr's perception of the manifold forces at work in human
nature, and his b e l ie f  that the balance of power stands at
the forefront  of whatever ju s t ice  is  achieved in human
re la t io n s ,  were ref lec ted  e a r l ie r  in the p o l i t ic a l  thought
of James Madison. In the pages of the Federalist  Papers,
Mad1 son op1ned:
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. "The 
in terest  of the man must be connected with the 
consitutional r ights of the place. I t  may be a 
ref  Iec 11 on on human nature that such devices 
shouId be necessary to control the abuses of 
government. But what is  government i t s e l f  but the 
greatest of a l l  re f lec t ions  on human nature? I f  
men were angels, no government would be necessary.
I f  angels were to govern men, neither external nor 
in ternal  controls on government would be 
necessary.31
The central moral problem of government, since the 
early days of the republic , has been to s t r ik e  a just and 
e f fe c t iv e  balance between freedom and authority .  In short, 
what Blackstone saluted as ’‘the eternal , immutable laws of 
good and e v i1" were in s t i tu t io n a 1 iced within a 
co n s t l tu t i onal system of checks and balances designed to 
achieve the best that is possible among mortal and f i n i t e ,  
di verse- and rpn^] j r h n n  me^,
Evaluating the potentia l significance of American 
ideals for the r e a l i t i e s  of international p o l i t ic s ,  re a l is t  
thinkers acknowledged that the princip les  of morality and 
the necessities of power are not mutual iy-e;:clusive
4VV
categories by which to define the scope and objectives of 
the national in te res t .  C lear ly ,  a responsible foreign  
pol icy most begin with the practica l necessities of s u r v 1 \ ra 1 
and the maintenance of a balance of power— a scope for 
action, a capacity t.o shape events and conditions. At the 
same 11 me, the higher law t ra d it io n  and transcendent values 
of the American people ensure that a policy directed solely  
at manipulating force would lack a l l  conviction, 
consistency, and public support.
Any number of hi st or 1 ca 1 e>: amp 1 es can be cited to
i l l u s t r a t e  how the confluence of s e l f - in te re s t  and the 
ethics of national purpose have distinguished America's 
re la t io n s  with the world for over two centuries. For 
example, the Founding Fathers were driven to manipulate the 
r i v a l r i e s  of European powers in order to secure the 
independence of a nation committed to the ru le of law and to 
reap the blessings of ordered l ib e r ty .  After World War I I .  
the Marshall Plan, as well as several other recent -foreign 
policy i n i t i a t i v e s — attempts to promote human freedom behind 
the Iron Curtain; e f fo r ts  to promote democratic governments 
in Latin America, A fr ica , and Asia; programs designed to 
el im inate or reduce p over tv and h tinner f-hmt.ighr'ii+ the Third 
World; campaigns to promote the in ternational observance of 
human r ights;  and in i t i a t i v e s  to achieve strateg ic  arms 
control and disarmament— have served both moral and
ends and which can only be sustained with
b u n
id e a l is t ic  conviction and practica l wisdom.
At a time in our history when both l ib e ra ls  and 
conservatives -frequently judge the nation 's in teres t  and 
•foreign policy commitments according to universal principles  
o+ ju s t ic e  and human r igh ts ,  the legacy of realism tor 
American diplomacy in the 1980s can be stated b r ie f ly .
While sensit ive  to the force of s e l f - in te r e s t  in the 
p o l i t ic a l  conduct of men and nat1ons. r e a l is t  scholar5 have 
exhorted America to maintain the courage of i t s  moral 
convictions, to seek the enhancement of freedom and basic 
human l ib e r t ie s  together with other national objectives. As 
Kennan suggested, the implementation of these convictions 
requires a renewed sense of the basic decency of th is  
country so that the American public and policy-makers may 
continue to have the pride and self-confidence to remain 
act ive ly  involved in the world. Furthermore, American 
r e a l is ts  are wel1-aware that underlying the t ra d it io n a l  
h is to r ic  and geopolit ica l c o n f l ic t  between the two leading 
superpowers is a pervasive ideological and s p ir i tu a l  
"struggle for the minds of men." The co n f l ic t  between 
freedom and to ta l i ta r ia n is m  is not transient or incidental;  
i * i -.-i m o t  .1 Ci ■ i ( 1 j : 1 , of f  undarner 11  ^1 hi .:>_■>.■ i i..a 1 
proportions, which gives the modern age a special meaning.
The error of moral perfec t ion is ts ,  as Morgenthau and 
fennan submit, is  to make an u n ju s t i f ia b le  leap from the 
omnipresence of the moral element in foreign policy to the
bu ]
conclusion that the United States has a mission to apply i ts  
own moral princ ip les  to the rest of humanity. Abstract 
principles of human rights  and individual l ib e r ty  not only 
come into con+lict with other diplomatic and strategic  
in terests  which America may possess in a given instance; in 
addition, the actual im possib il i ty  o-f con si st ent 1 y pursuing 
the global defense of se lf -ev ident  truths enshrined in the 
American p o l i ty  may be evidenced by the lack of e f fe c t iv e  
en f orcement mechanisms and the pr edominance of un1ver sa1 
ideo'ogical claims in the foreign policy of non — democrat 1c 
states. For these postwar r e a l is ts ,  the American trad it io n  
in foreign a f f a i r s  was best exemplified by John Quincy Adams 
who maintained that i t  was not for the Un i ted States to 
impose i t s  own pr inc ip les  of government upon the rest of 
mankind, but, rather , to a t t ra c t  the rest of manhind through 
the example of the United States.
Regarding the rel at 1on between moral pr inc ip i es and 
foreign policy, American r e a l is ts  have exemplified a 
d is t in c t iv e ly  praomat1c approach to the universal 
application of American standards of action to others. To 
th e ir  minds, moral pr incip les  are not realized in the real 
world of co n f l ic t in g  in terests hv moral fervor alone, but 
instead by a pragmatic ca lculat ion of the means to an end or 
by a rat ional an t ic ipat ion  of the actual consequences of a 
given action. Summarizing what is d is t in c t iv e  in the 
American approach to foreign policy, a former Secretary of
State has writ ten:
. . .s in c e  ToequeviHe, i t  has been observed that we 
are a pragmatic people, commonsensical. 
undogmatic, undoctr1na1 re — a nation with a 
permanent bent to the pract ica l and an ins t inc t  
■for what works. We have defined our basic goals — 
ju s t ic e ,  freedom, equal ity ,  and progress— in open 
and l ib e r ta r ia n  terms, seeking to enlarge 
opportunity and the human s p i r i t  rather than to 
coerce a uniform standard of behavior or a common 
code of doctrine and b e l i e f . 32
Since in ternational society is morally and in s t i t u t io n a l ! /
imperfect, i t  is  also inevitab le  that the e f fe c t iv e  means
for achievement of even the lo f t i e s t  goals w i l l  f a l l  short
of ideal standards.
In other words, universal norms must be f i l t e r e d
through the intermediary of h is to r ic  and social
circumstances, which w i l l  lead to d i f fe re n t  results in
d i f fe re n t  times and under d i f fe re n t  circumstances. As
Morgenthan pointed out, "there e:lists of necessity a
re la t iv ism  in the re la t io n  between moral princ ip les  and
f or eign policy that one c annot over 1ook i f one wants to do
ju s t ic e  to the pr inc ip les  of morality in 1nternat1onal
p o l i t i c s . " 33 The ancient v ir tu e  and art of prudence
provided American re a l is ts  with a standard to acknowledge
the persi stence of s e l f - in te re s t  without sa c r i f ic in g  the
pract ica l moral requirement of adjusting in terest  to norms
above the national community. In language that could not
f a i l  to command the acquiescence of his colleagues, Niebuhr
wrote:
Prudence is  a c ivic v ir tue  because i t  is  necessary 
not only to s t r iv e  tor ju s t ic e ,  but to take 
cognisance of a l l  contingencies in preserving the 
stab11i t y . . . of a community. Prudence is  the wise 
application of pr incip les of jus t ice  to the 
contingencies of in terest  and power in p o l i t ic a l  
l i f e . . . . P o l i t i c a l  tasks require a shrewd admixture 
of p r in c ip le  and expediency, of loya lty  to general 
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